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Vol. III

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LUSITANIA
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SOURCE RECORDS

OF

THE GREAT WAR

A COMPREHENSIVE AND READABLE SOURCE RECORD OF THE WORLD'S GREAT WAR, EMPHASIZING THE MORE IMPORTANT EVENTS, AND PRESENTING THESE AS COMPLETE NARRATIVES IN THE ACTUAL WORDS OF THE CHIEF OFFICIALS AND MOST EMINENT LEADERS

NON-PARTISAN NON-SECTIONAL NON-SECTARIAN

PRESENTING DOCUMENTS FROM GOVERNMENT ARCHIVES AND OTHER AUTHORITATIVE SOURCES, WITH OUTLINE NARRATIVES, INDICES, CHRONOLOGIES, AND COURSES OF READING ON SOCIOLOGICAL MOVEMENTS AND INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL ACTIVITIES

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With a staff of specialists

VOLUME III

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1915
GERMANY'S YEAR OF TRIUMPH

AN OUTLINE NARRATIVE OF

THE BUILDING OF GERMANY'S GRIM EMPIRE OF MIDDLE EUROPE

BY CHARLES F. HORNE

THE year of 1915 was one of sore amazement to western Europe. In 1914 Germany had failed; her plan for conquering Europe by one swift blow had been met by a France more strong, a Britain more alert, a Russia more loyal, than she had reckoned on. But in 1915 the Allies' leaders misread and misjudged this Germany as completely as she had misjudged them, and with results almost equally disastrous. They seemed to think that Germany, having struck with her utmost force, had exhausted her forty years of preparation and was now helpless. They assumed that they had only to "carry on," only to continue the same effort as before, and soon she would be entreating mercy at their feet.

Therein they underrated both the German power and the German temper. The whole German people now gave themselves up to winning the War at any cost. To the mere military colossus of 1914 there succeeded in 1915 a national colossus far mightier, less brutal, but more patiently and sternly terrible. The German people as individuals almost ceased to exist. Every one was set to labor for the State, either in the army itself or in preparing its munitions. Family life became a minor matter, as did personal business. The little manikins no longer moved or thought or even dreamed as human beings; they were become mere cogs in the mighty war-machine which was to establish the German supremacy over Europe.

It is worth noticing that European victory, and no longer world victory, was the purpose of this less blatant Germany

of 1915. World victory was now quite frankly laid aside as too large an attempt. It was to be the goal of a later war, for which this one was to prepare the foundations. The valiant army of France, the unconquerable navy of Britain, the ever-replenishing hordes of Russia, these had proven too strong to be destroyed at once. So Germany concentrated on making the most of what she had already partly accomplished, the extension of her power over a newly created empire including all middle Europe.

The plans of her leaders for establishing this empire were shrewdly laid. The Germans recognized, more clearly than the Allies, the nature of the deadlock on the French front. What this deadlock really meant was not that Germany was growing feebler, but that the new devices for defensive war had so outranked new measures for attack that a lesser army in the trench line could hold back a stronger one. Advance must be a matter of a few feet or rods, won only at a cost impossible to pay, even in cheapest "cannon-fodder." Hence, inverting her purpose of the preceding campaigns, Germany in 1915 planned to remain on the defensive in the West, while she won the War in the East.

In the West her purpose became civic rather than military. She set herself to consolidate her rule over Belgium and the captured parts of northern France in the hope that these might ultimately become a part, and a submissive part, of her Mid-Europe Empire. Her governors therefore trampled underfoot all civilian protests within the conquered region. They governed these lands in the same spirit as they had ravaged them. Their motto was still that no other people could possess any rights when these came in conflict with German wishes.[1] In the military strife in the West, Germany planned merely to hold her trench line as cheaply as she could; while France and Britain, kept in hot anger by her treatment of the captured provinces, exhausted their strength against her defenses. Meanwhile in the East, her new empire was to be expanded and consolidated by her fiercest warfare.

[1] See § I, "Germany Military Rule in France," by the Kaiser, Bishop Cleary, etc.

THE SWINGING PENDULUM OF VICTORIES

With this end in view, Germany began the year by encouraging Turkey to a vigorous attack on Russia, so as to deplete the Russian strength. Enver Pasha, the vainglorious Turkish leader, was persuaded to undertake an Asiatic campaign against the Russians in Armenia and the Caucasus. This resulted in brilliant Russian victories.[1] They were disastrous to the Turks, but not at all so to Germany, whose control over her Ally was thereby increased. Also Russian strength was distracted from the main front, the Polish front, where Germany's own attack was later to be made.

In similar fashion, Russia unwittingly played the German game, by devoting herself to a gigantic and most heroic attack upon the Austrian forces in the Carpathian mountains. Here for months was fought the remarkable "Battle of the Passes." All through the bitter eastern winter of 1914-15, the Russians struggled onward, high above the line of constant snow, to force their way over the Carpathian mountain passes and so enter Hungary and break the last shadow of Austria's power. Nature fought against them even more than the fiery Hungarians, who were now battling not for conquest but for their homes. Yet even against Nature the Russians pushed on. They won the crest of the mountain range; they were ready for the plunge into the land beneath; and it was spring at last, the fateful first of May, 1915.[2]

Up to that first of May the pendulum of the war seemed still swinging in the Allies' favor. Russia had won three great victories: in the Caucasus, in the Carpathians, and a third in the surrender of Przemysl (prā-mēl), the one strong fortress which had held out against her in Galicia. The Austrian army in Przemysl surrendered on March 22nd, surrendered to starvation after six months of siege, the only old-time lengthy siege of the War.[3] Everywhere, the struggle in the East seemed to promise Russian victory; and everywhere in the Allied countries hope ran high.

[1] See § II, "Turkey Loses the Caucasus," by Machray, Bodart, etc.
[2] See § VII, "Battle of the Passes," by De Souza, Duke Nicholas, etc.
[3] See § VI, "Surrender of Przemysl," by Gen. Krobatin, etc.

This was in spite of the first serious setback in the Dardanelles, which had given Turkey breathing space, time to recover her courage after the defeat in the Caucasus and become once more convinced of her own and German superiority. In March a combined French and British war-fleet had attempted to force the strait of the Dardanelles, the Turks' guarded passage between Europe and Asia. Its conquest would have captured Constantinople, and crushed all Turkey at a blow. Almost, the bold scheme succeeded. We know now that with a little more effort it would have succeeded; but it failed. The ships were driven back; and the reanimated Turks gathered an army and munitions, and made enthusiastically ready to resist any future attack. They applauded themselves as being the only people who had "proved that the British fleet was not invincible." [1]

Meanwhile, the early spring had also seen a lack of Ally success on the Western trench line. France and Britain were both hopeful of beating back the Germans there. The French tried it in March in the Champagne district, west of the Argonne forest, but without success. Next, the British at Neuve Chapelle (noov-shă-pĕl) made an even larger effort, with even less result. For the Neuve Chapelle assault British munition factories had been working all the winter making a store of projectiles, to be used in one huge artillery attack such as the world had never known before. This, on March 10th, was hurled against the Germans. The bombardment was tremendous, awesome; it lasted for three days of tumult. Then the British infantry rushed upon the battered trench-line hoping to break through, capture the dazed remnant of the defenders, and then attack the other German positions from the rear. But they had overcounted the effect of the great bombardment. Other German defenses, other troops, were ready behind the foremost trenches; and soon the British were brought to a halt in costly failure.[2]

It was no part of Germany's plan to seem too passive

[1] See § V, "Naval Disaster of the Dardanelles," by Ambassador Morgenthau, etc.

[2] See § IV, "Neuve Chapelle," by De Souza, etc.

in the West. Shortly after Neuve Chapelle, she launched a cautious offensive of her own against Ypres. Here for the first time she tried that new and hideous weapon, poison gas. On April 22nd, she directed a deadly cloud of this against the point where the French and British trenches met. A French regiment facing the full strength of the gas was practically annihilated, hundreds of men perishing in awful torture. The British portion of the line was held by the Canadian troops: and these, encountering the poison less directly, were able to survive and even at last to beat back the German infantry assault that followed hard upon the gas. The whole War contained nothing more terrible than the launching of this new form of agonizing destruction, nor more splendid than the heroism with which it was met.[2]

Soon afterward the Germans tried another similar device, the flame thrower, by which they hurled a stream of burning oil against their foes. The fire started conflagrations everywhere it fell. But against this also the Allied soldiers held firm, nor did the fire prove practical of employment in large quantities. Moreover, hasty inventions were contrived to meet the gas assaults. Thus defense soon reasserted itself as stronger than attack. The Western struggle was again at deadlock by the first of May.

A MIGHTIER WARFARE BEGUN AT THE DUNAJEC

On that fateful date Germany launched her own real main attack, the one for which she had been preparing all winter. How the German High Staff must have smiled at the French and British bombardments in Champagne and at Neuve Chapelle! How they must have congratulated themselves upon their own superiority! They too had been preparing a bombardment, and it was such a monster one as made that of Neuve Chapelle seem the effort of a child. It was directed against the Russian army on the Dunajec (doo'-nah-jĕk) River, in Austria's province of Galicia just south of the Polish border: that is, about midway of the long Eastern battle line. It did what the Britons had hoped to do

[2] See § IX, "Canadians Defy the First Gas Attack," official German and British reports.

with their bombardment; it fairly wiped out the Russian forces who encountered it. The German infantry then moved forward, seized the Russian lines at Gorlice, and brought the great guns onward for another attack. This Battle of the Dunajec, or of Gorlice, was the beginning of the great German drive on Russia, "Von Mackensen's battering-ram," as it was called. The Russians could find no defense against it. None seemed possible.[1]

The long Russian line was thus broken in the center. The victors to the southward in the battle of the Carpathian passes had to turn back from the Hungarian invasion, lest their line of supplies be broken and themselves entrapped. That was why Germany had been so willing that the Russians should expend their best blood in the Carpathians; she knew she could check that advance the moment Mackensen was ready. She had thus saved Austria a second time.

All through May and June that dreadful "battering-ram" kept on advancing through Galicia. Russian soldiers by the hundred thousands strove to bar its passage by the mere weight of human bodies. They perished in numbers uncounted and uncountable. Przemysl was recaptured by the advancing Germans and Austrians on June 3rd. Lemberg, the Galician capital, was regained June 22nd. It had fallen to the Russians in the great battle of the preceding September; and for almost a year they had retained over Galicia a rule more complete, and far more kindly, than that of the Germans over Belgium. By July 1st the great Mackensen drive seemed slowing up, but by that time practically all Galicia was once more in Austro-German hands, a restored province of the rapidly developing Mid-Europe Empire.

ITALY ENTERS THE WAR

A further check was put, at least to Austria's share in the Russian drive, by what was perhaps the main event of the year, Italy's entrance into the War.[2] This was formally announced on May 23rd, and was followed by a rapid Italian advance across the Italo-Austrian frontier in the Alps and along the Isonzo River. The Teutons, however, refused to

[1] See § XI, "Dunajec," by Gen. Mackensen, Duke Nicholas, etc.
[2] See § XIV, "Italy Joins the Allies," by Franz Josef, Salandra, etc.

become unduly anxious over this attack. They trusted to the strong natural barrier of mountains to hold the Italians in check, and sent there only the weaker Austrian reserves, the regiments of the "Landstrum" or older men. For a year the Landstrum held the Italians fairly in check, while Austria still used her main strength against her former foes, Russia and Serbia.

This sudden entry of Italy into the struggle was an event not clearly understood at the time, especially in neutral lands, where there was a tendency to regard it as a mere selfish grasping after territory, an attempt to get in line with the victorious Allies and so share their spoils. Such views were only possible because the European situation was misunderstood. Distant neutral peoples still labored under the illusion that Germany had exhausted herself at the Marne; and they had been told that the spring battles of Neuve Chapelle and Ypres had been great Ally triumphs, proofs of an ever-increasing superiority of force. They pictured the Germans at home as exhausted, starving and despairing. Of the new national colossus which had prepared the munitions for the tremendous Mackensen drive they had no conception whatever. That drive was to them but another of the see-saw movements on the Eastern front; no one foresaw that it was the beginning of Russia's destruction.

The Allies' leaders, however, were under no misconception as to the terrible meaning of the astounding artillery battle of the Dunajec. In it they foresaw Verdun and all the other tremendous battles of 1916. Italy knew well that she was entering on a struggle of life and death. German propagandists had done everything possible to keep her neutral; but, as her leaders grimly stated their position, a victorious Germany would surely trample Italy under foot despite every promise. The only future that awaited her in that direction was one of vassalage such as had already been forced upon Austria. So she might better make her fight for freedom now, while she had great allies to help her, than be driven to a hopeless struggle afterward, alone.

In other words, Italy was at last awake to the full meaning of the German world-menace. The scales had fallen

from her eyes, as they were to fall from those of America two years later; and the entry of the one into the War was of somewhat the same character as that of the other.

THE AROUSAL OF DEMOCRACY AGAINST GERMANY

Indeed Italy's step was but a part of that general arousal, that intensifying of effort, with which Western Europe met the realization of Germany's increasing power. Now came the real nationalization of the Great War. France to be sure could increase her effort but little. From the first she had recognized this as a struggle to the death, and had summoned every Frenchman to her aid. Britain, however, had so far fought in her old dogged but leisurely fashion. In May, 1915, after the news of the Dunajec, she underwent a revolution.[1]

It was a quiet, orderly revolution, typically British, approved of by all classes. Nevertheless it meant the completest change. The country had always been an oligarchy, that is it had been ruled by its upper classes, now it became a democracy. Lloyd George, the Welsh lawyer, leader and trusted friend of the working classes, was taken into the central group of rulers. Later he was to become Prime Minister; for the moment he was made Minister of Munitions, and his special business was to draw all the civilian population into the making of war munitions. The famous war hero, Lord Kitchener, was already busy building up a great army; and when at last volunteering failed, the nation turned sturdily to conscription, a method of State control over the liberty of the individual which Britons had always held in abhorrence. They had declared it the distinguishing mark between autocracy and their own freedom. Now, however, the whole nation had been hardened to a temper matching that of France and Germany. They meant to have an army and munitions to equal these of the Dunajec. There was to be no more dallying with the War. It was to be fought with the strength of every Briton.

Perchance British determination would never have reached this height had it not been for the new and fero-

[1] See § XIII, "Britain Democratized," by Destrée and Clemenceau.

cious methods of warfare adopted by the Germans both overhead and underseas. These were all part of Germany's mistaken policy of "frightfulness" which was at last to unite the world against her. She began with warship raids on British seacoast resorts in the autumn of 1914. These could have no direct result beyond the destroying of a small amount of private property and the slaying of some dozens of civilians, defenseless folk who by every principle of International Law or common humanity should have been spared and even protected. The whole question was as to the moral effect of such destruction. Were the Britons really, as the German schools had taught, a nation of "shopkeepers," who would figure these bombardments as a simple matter of profit and loss, and decide that war under such conditions was a poor investment to be sold out promptly to escape further cost?

Of a similar nature were the airplane raids which began against both France and Britain late in 1914, and the Zeppelin raids which began early in 1915. With these Germany at first anticipated a real military advantage, such as the destruction of munition factories, stored munitions, railroads, or even bodies of troops. Such a hope, however, must have been soon abandoned. The important military centers were too well protected; their destruction from aircraft proved infinitesimal. Soon the German airplanes and Zeppelins were, quite frankly, bombing Paris and London and lesser towns at random as an expression of "frightfulness," doing as much promiscuous damage as they could to private property and to civilian lives.

To these assaults the Allies, being less prepared with aircraft, could at first make no response in kind. The French, as soon as they possessed the means, responded with similar raids on Germany. The British, however, endured the continued "strafing" with grim scorning for almost two years before they would even admit the necessity of checking it by reprisals. Not until the last year of the War did Germany come forward with a proposal that such aërial attacks should be abandoned by both sides. It was she who at last adopted the shopkeeper's reasoning she had attributed

to Britain. The weight of retributive attacks had become so heavy that Germany decided that for her the slaughter of civilians no longer paid.

THE SUBMARINE ATTACK ON COMMERCE

The new submarine warfare adopted by Germany in 1915 was an even graver defiance of humanity and of International Law. So far as the latter is concerned, it is of course true that there were no submarines when the international law, as to capture and destruction of ships at sea, was agreed to by Germany in common with other nations. It is therefore conceivable that Germany might logically and even humanely have rejected the old law and proclaimed more satisfactory ones of her own. But here, as in all of her defiances of humanity, she simply rejected all righteousness and plunged into elemental ferocity. Her first large step in this direction was taken in February, 1915.[1]

Up to that time, as we have seen, Germany had used her submarines as other nations might have used them, to combat warships. In this legitimate field, in addition to the previously told triumph of Lieutenant Weddigen, she on February 1, 1915, sank a British battleship, the *Formidable;* and later in the War one French and two other British battleships were thus destroyed, though none of them were of the huge "dreadnaught" class. But these successes were too few and too costly to be worth the effort and the loss involved. In direct warfare the submarine did not pay. Moreover, the British blockade, gradually increasing in severity, was a serious menace to Germany. So the German Government resolved to use its U-boats in a new way, as commerce destroyers; and on February 5th she made announcement of this to the world.

Under old established sea law a merchant ship could not be destroyed until it had been actually boarded and examined to make sure it was an enemy ship or carrying "contraband goods," and until ample provision had been made for the safety of the civilian crew. Such a course was obvi-

[1] See § III, "The U-boat War on Commerce," by von Bülow, von Tirpitz, etc.

ously impossible to a tiny and fragile submarine. If it even approached an enemy merchant ship it might be captured or destroyed. In the later years of the War, larger submarines carried heavy guns of their own; but the early U-boats depended solely on the deadly torpedo, which must be launched from a distance. Hence the U-boat captain could not even tell which ships were enemies, since these would probably pretend neutrality.

Germany met the problem by announcing that she would sink all merchant ships that approached her enemies' coasts. This meant obviously the shooting or drowning of many French and British sailors who had been protected by the older laws. Such was indeed the grim result; and the sea slaughter that followed would in itself sufficiently explain that general tensing of the Allies' purpose which has been pointed out as characteristic of the spring of 1915.

For neutral nations the new German U-boat warfare meant an even more serious situation. It was the cause which was finally to drag into the War not only the United States but Brazil and China and several other neutrals, and was to breed against Germany an abiding hatred among Norwegians, Dutch, and those other small neutrals who, because of their immediate proximity to Germany's great strength, dared not openly defy her. No Power had ever before, even in war time, destroyed neutral vessels, or slain neutral citizens on the high seas. Except for pirates the neutrals had been safe; and against pirates all the sea Powers had united. Yet here was a leading Power going back to piracy, deliberately announcing death and destruction to any neutral who dared to sail the seas where she forbade.

Germany knew full well what she was doing. She thought she could afford to ignore the anger of the outer ring of nations. The only one strong enough to assail her was the United States; and German statesmen easily persuaded themselves that this country was too peace-loving to be driven into war. They even ventured to make secret war on America, sending agents to blow up munition factories and perform other crimes against her civil law. They did this so openly that the United States Government was compelled to

demand the recall of the Austrian Ambassador for obvious violation of the diplomatic laws.[1]

Germany, through her submissive Austrian tools, went even one step further. She had the Austrians protest against the sale of American munitions of war to the Allies. The protest took the wholly illogical ground that since Americans were not in a position to deliver merchandise equally to both parties to the War, their sales to the Allies became "opposed to the spirit of International Law." Not content with drowning neutral sailors to stop their trading with the Allies, Germany sought to give a show of justice to her action by this Austrian protest. In itself the protest would be unimportant, except for the fact that it partly accomplished what it was presumably intended to do. It confused some Americans into thinking there might be justice in the Austrian plea, when in truth there was none whatever. Germany had herself made a business of selling "munitions," and sometimes even regiments of soldiers, in every war that America had ever fought, and not once had she been in a position to traffic equally with each party to the war. In other words, Germany was again inventing an absolutely new rule, labeling it "International Law," and summoning neutrals to apply it for her benefit. Her plea, as a future question not of law but of abstract justice, had a speciously plausible sound. How unjust its application would really have been was decisively pointed out in the reply made by the United States Government.[2]

Confusion of American opinion was further increased by the fact that Britain at the time of the new U-boat attack began expanding the established methods of enforcing maritime International Law, so as to enable her to check all supplies from reaching Germany by sea. The United States Government protested to Britain, but admitted that the new British methods were within debatable grounds of law. The dispute was thus one to be settled within courts of law. Moreover, America's dispute with Britain was wholly different from that with Germany, because the British steps in-

[1] See § XVII, "The Secret Attack upon America," by Lansing, Bernstorff, etc.

[2] See § VIII, "Germany Protests against America," by Burian, etc.

jured Americans only in property, which could be restored or paid for, and did not strike at American lives, which were as beyond repayment as they were beyond restoration.

Nevertheless, the confusion of mind among Americans caused by Austria's protest, Germany's arguments, and the controversy with Britain, made it possible for Germany to venture her next step in frightening neutrals from the seas. On May 7, 1915, she sank the *Lusitania*.[1]

There is no need to dwell here upon the horror of that tragedy. It was of a piece with all Germany's policy of frightfulness; and the frank unwillingness of America to fight made her to German judgment a fitting subject for the lesson of submissive fear which she meant the sinking of the *Lusitania* to teach to all the neutrals. German psychology misread Americans as wholly as it had misread the Belgians and the Britons.

THE GREAT GERMAN ATTACK ON RUSSIA

By the summer of 1915 the world had thus become almost a unit in its disgust and anger against the Germans, though by no means a unit in its fear of them. That was to come later. The meaning of Dunajec was not at first widely understood. Germany now proceeded to make her new power clear. In the west she launched in June a series of smashing attacks against the French in the Argonne. These were conducted by the armies of the Crown Prince, and had perhaps a dynastic rather than a military purpose. At any rate, they were as resolutely met as they were delivered. The Germans could advance but a few yards, paying dearly for each one; and after three weeks they abandoned the assault.

If it had been intended only to concentrate the Allies' attention on the west, it had succeeded. Germany's mighty movement against Russia seemed for the moment almost forgotten. This Mackensen advance had been, as we have seen, partly delayed by Italy's entrance into the War; but by July 1st Galicia was reconquered and Mackensen was turning his advance northward into Poland, threatening Warsaw from the south.

[1] See § XII, "Sinking of the *Lusitania*," by von Jagow, Wilson, etc.

So began the third great German assault against Warsaw; and this time it was successful. Hindenburg, whose main armies lay along the Prussian-Polish border to the north of Warsaw, suddenly struck southward with all his strength, while Mackensen was striking northward. The main Russian armies were thus caught between the two, and might well have been surrounded in Warsaw and captured there. Their commander, the Grand Duke Nicholas, foreseeing this, fought delaying battles as long as he could, and then retreated, leaving Warsaw to its fate. The Germans entered it on August 4th, triumphant indeed at having captured the great city, but sorely regretful that they had not also captured within it the main Russian army.[1]

From that time Russian resistance continued crumbling before the mighty blows of Hindenburg and his able lieutenant, Mackensen. The greatest of Russian fortresses along the Western frontier was Kovno on the Niemen (nē-mĕn) River, the chief defense against East Prussia. This was stormed and captured by the Germans on August 17th. Its loss startled Russia far more than that of Warsaw. The latter was, after all, a Polish, not a Russian city; but Kovno was Russian, and in one sense was the outermost defense of Petrograd itself.

Directly east of Warsaw the strong Russian fortress town of Brest-Litovsk (lē-tŏfsk) was captured on August 25th; and between this loss of Kovno in the north and Brest-Litovsk in the south, the Russian armies were again threatened with encirclement. To escape, they on September 1st abandoned Grodno, another strong fortress position between the two extremes. Their line was now withdrawing toward the interior of Russia, losing mightily in men, munitions and territory, but always managing to evade that final surrounding and capture which was the avowed aim of the Hindenburg campaign.

On September 5th the Czar announced that he himself would take over the active command of the Russian forces. This made no immediate change; but gradually the Russian resistance stiffened. Once more Hindenburg made a desperate

[1] See § XV, "The Fall of Warsaw," by Van der Boeck, Princess Radziwill, etc.

effort to entrap an army, this time the one at the northern end of the long Russian line, at Vilna. After a week of battle Vilna was captured on September 18th. But the Russians again withdrew in safety, and the German losses in the long and bitter battle had been so heavy that Germany saw it was time to pause. Her success in the campaign had been enormous. Poland had been added to the Mid-Europe Empire; much of the Russian frontier lands had been occupied; and the Russian armies had been sorely battered. To have advanced further against them in the face of the oncoming Russian winter, would have been to repeat the blunder of Napoleon.[1]

Moreover, the Russian forces seemed once more as strong as ever. Immediately after their escape from Vilna, they began attacking again. At Dvinsk, to the north of Vilna and Kovno, there was a great battle lasting all through mid-October. When the Russians had no better weapons, they fought with clubs or with bare hands; and the Germans made no progress forward. Soon a new line of trenches extended all along the eight hundred miles of the Eastern front; and the exhausted Germans were perhaps more glad of the chance of shelter than were the furious and unconquerable Russians.

THE ALLIES' EFFORTS TO AID RUSSIA

Meanwhile what were the Allies doing to aid Russia in her dark hour of need? Britain continued her unfortunate attack upon the Dardanelles. If she could break the Turkish resistance there, she could bring to Russia some of the much needed ammunition. Having failed to force a passage through the strait by her ships alone, she sent an army to their aid. But by the time the army arrived in May, the Turks were fully ready, self-assured and eager for the fight. The Britons could scarcely even force a landing, much less sweep the Turks from the entire Dardanelles peninsula and capture Constantinople. The main assault was heroically delivered, chiefly by Australian and New Zealand troops, on August 10th, and was a costly failure.[2] All year these

[1] See § XIX, "Russia's Desperate Rally," by the Czar, et al.
[2] See § XVI, "Britain's Failure at the Dardanelles," Kitchener.

troops remained on the narrow strand they had won under the protection of the battleships, an unfortunate spectacle to the nations of the East, who were thus taught by ever-present example that the Britons were not invincible. At length, in December, Britain formally withdrew her forces, formally admitted her defeat in this region.

France also sought to relieve the pressure upon Russia. In September, Marshal Joffre ordered the first great French offensive on the Western front, the attack in Champagne. Hitherto Joffre had proclaimed his advocacy of the famous "nibbling" process. That is, he meant to let the Germans do all the costly attacking, while his sheltered defensive troops killed as many foemen as they could, yielding a little ground when the attack became too heavy, and falling back to the next defense. Let Germany work her savage will of plunder and torture in the captured region; that, France could not stop. But in the end the "nibbling" would exhaust Germany's strength, and the British blockade would reduce her to starvation along with her victims. The iron patience of the nibbling process, however, had not allowed for Russia's possible overthrow and the consequent opening to Germany of all the foodstores of the East. So now, to relieve Russia, Joffre undertook the Champagne offensive.[1]

Midway between the sorely battered city of Rheims (rănce) and that Argonne forest where the Germans had just attacked in vain and where Americans were later to win undying glory, the French let loose a three days' bombardment, the heaviest yet known in the West. Then half a million Frenchmen charged forward on a narrow front around Perthes, the scene of their unsuccessful spring attack. For ten days they battled onward, but succeeded in advancing their line only some two miles. Of course German reënforcements were drawn to the spot by thousands, and to that extent the German advance against Russia may have been weakened by the Champagne assault. But it was delivered at terrible expense, both in men and munitions; and the French official expressions of satisfaction over the result were by no means convincing to outsiders. In brief,

[1] See § XVIII, "The Big Allied Offensive," official statements.

the military lesson of 1915 on both the Eastern and the Western front was that while the new enormous artillery assault could break a second-rate trench defense, yet when both offensive and defensive were of the highest grade, the defense was still immeasurably the stronger.

GERMANY SEIZES THE ROAD TO CONSTANTINOPLE

With the dying down of the French attack in the West and of the great German advance in the East, there came in October the most tragic event of the tragic year, the crushing of heroic little Serbia.[1] Germany had planned this as her most important coup, the step which was to establish as a definite reality her Empire of Middle Europe. Her two Allies, Turkey and Austria, were wholly in her hands. German generals commanded their armies; and in Turkey's case German officers controlled her navy also. But between the German-Austrian territorial block and its Turkish outpost intervened the middle Balkans, where Bulgaria was neutral, and Serbia a foe. German diplomacy convinced Bulgaria that the War was practically won for Germany, and so persuaded the Bulgarian king to do what the Germans had accused Italy of doing. He entered the War hastily on what he deemed the winning side, so as to share in the spoils. Germany was glad to promise the Bulgarians anything and everything. They were to be lords of all the Balkans. Of course this lordship could only be preserved under Germany's control and protection; but for the moment Germany was careful not to emphasize this feature of the bargain.[2]

The arrangements for Bulgaria's entry into the War were conducted so secretly that the Allies were caught unawares. Moreover, the redoubtable General Mackensen was secretly shifted from the Russian front and with some of the best German troops was sent across Austria to the Serbian border. Now, suddenly, he began a fourth Teuton invasion of Serbia; and just at the most disastrous moment for the sturdily resisting Serbs, Bulgaria declared war upon them and attacked them from the rear.

[1] See § XXI, "The Crushing of Serbia," by Savic, Falkenhayn, etc.
[2] See § XX, "Bulgaria joins the Central Powers," by Menshekoff, Radoslavoff, etc.

There was some effort to give Allied help to the Serbians by an army gathered at Salonika, the nearest port in neutral Greece. But this aid was both too feeble and too late. The Serbs fought desperately all through October and November. They yielded no inch of soil until it was deep dyed with blood. They fought the German-Austrian army on their Danube frontier for a week before they withdrew from Belgrade. Their secondary capital, Nish, fell to the Bulgarians on November 5th. The Serbian Government was withdrawn from town to town southward and westward, until on November 25th its members abandoned Prisrend, the last little border city that remained to them, and fled across the Albanian mountains to the Adriatic coast. Here, under shelter of the Italian warships, they established themselves at Scutari (skoo-tah-rē), an exile government in a foreign land.

But they had still subjects. Undying in its fame forever, will be that last retreat of the Serbian army. Hopelessly outnumbered, surrounded, except for the snow-covered Albanian mountains at their backs, without ammunition and even without food, the Serbian soldiers still refused surrender. They preferred the starvation march across those frozen winter mountains. Many of the Serbian women and children chose that alternative also, rather than face the torture they knew they must expect from their unhuman conquerors. It was the exodus of a nation.[1] Few of the women and children survived; but of the men, with Italian aid, there ultimately gathered over a hundred thousand in the Adriatic Island of Corfu, the nucleus of a new Serbian army which ultimately marched in victorious triumph back into its empty and hideously martyred land.

THE SUFFERINGS OF THE CONQUERED

General Mackensen and his German troops promptly withdrew from conquered Serbia and left it in Austrian and Bulgarian hands. Of the butcheries, the deliberate torturings which followed there, we can only speak in despairing horror. American Indians never maltreated their victims with more

[1] See § XXIV, "The Serbian Exodus," by Barby, Novakovitch, etc.

cruelty and delight. Bulgaria's utmost official defense has been to declare the reports of the survivors "exaggerated." In fact, the series of widespread massacres with which the Mid-Europe Empire was inaugurated in 1915 make that perhaps the record year for all eternity of man's inhumanity to his fellows.

Here is the record. In the West, Germany continued to hold her dominion over Belgium and Northern France by her established policy of severity. Of this the most notorious case was the sudden, secret process of law and falsehood by which her officials executed the British nurse, Edith Cavell.[1] On the Western oceans, as we have seen, Germany began the killing of civilians and neutrals by means of submarines, including the sinking of the *Lusitania*. From the Western skies Zeppelins and other aircraft dropped their bombs upon unwarlike cities. In the East, Germany overran Poland, professed a heartfelt friendship and pity for the suffering Poles, and then exploited them in a slavery and starvation far worse than that which desolated Belgium. The Belgians were saved by American charity and by the publicity Americans gave to each injustice. The Poles, shut off from Western knowledge and Western pity, were compelled to endure their Calvary unaided.[2]

These were German and official cruelties, deliberately carried out for the consolidation of the expanding German Empire. In the farther East, where Germany had linked forces with the half civilized hordes of Asiatic origin, with Turks and Bulgars and Hungarians, the massacres were more personal, undertaken as much for pleasure as for business. Of such nature were the Serbian atrocities, and the still more unspeakable massacres of Armenians by the Turks. For these outbreaks of her Eastern partners Germany is only indirectly responsible; she did not command them but only allowed and unofficially encouraged them by precept and example. Meanwhile Germany herself raised constant outcry, because on the Western front the French and British employed some of their African and Hindu troops. These

[1] See § XXII, "Execution of Edith Cavell," by Whitlock, etc.
[2] See § XXV, "Poland's Agony," by Walcott and Trompczynski.

troops were trained to civilized warfare and kept under civilized command. Yet at the very moment of her protest, Germany linked hands with the most unhuman of Asiatics, and permitted these monsters to work their ghoulish wills unrestrained. The details of the Turkish slaughter of the Armenians are the most foul, the most unprintable, that history has been called on to record since the first Hunnish invasion of Europe almost fifteen hundred years ago.[1]

To Germany, however, these endless sickening horrors were but minor incidents, unfortunate, but inseparable from the one great triumph, the establishment of her Empire of Middle Europe.[2] This had become a visible fact, symbolized by the sending of a German train under German officials all the way from Berlin to Constantinople. This was first accomplished in November, and soon became a regular system, affording unbounded satisfaction to every German.

The new extension of empire had become possible through three main steps, each destructive to Germany's allies. Indeed, like the fabled god of old, Germany seemed able to grow only by devouring her own children; for even in Poland, which she now held as a conquered province, she had begun by proclaiming Polish independence and then destroying it. The three steps of her advance to Constantinople had been: first, the breakdown of Austria, compelling her obedience to German commanders; second, the Armenian massacres, which threw the Turkish leaders into the arms of German diplomats as their only shelter from punishment by outraged Christianity; and third, the German assistance and protection which had enabled Bulgaria to destroy the Serbs, and had thereby bound her in iron chains to Germany, her one defense against the sternly indignant "brotherhood of Democracy." This brotherhood was being born, with many throes, through all the western world. It was founded everywhere on the increasing rule of the people. Only by thus appealing to Democracy could the former rulers find the strength to persist in the tremendous War.

[1] See § X, "The Armenian Massacres," by Lord Bryce, Talaat Pasha, etc.

[2] See § XXIII, "Middle Europe Empire Established," by President Judson, et al.

GERMAN MILITARY RULE IN FRANCE

OFFICIAL SEVERITIES AND "THE GREAT PILLAGE"

WILLIAM HOHENZOLLERN BISHOP HENRY CLEARY PREFECT L. MIRMAN

What happened to French civilians and non-combatants when the Germans seized possession of northern France is, from the viewpoint of Frenchmen, tragically clear. They regard the invaders as having been drunkenly savage, and the occupation as stupidly bestial, an official slaughter in which officers were as vile as their men. They speak with shuddering horror of "the passage of the Hun"; and they recall disgustedly the "Great Pillage," in which even royal princes took a shameless part. To see the invasion from the German viewpoint is less easy. Some former officials still stand as indignant defenders of everything, declaring, as they did at the first seizure of Belgium, that their soldiers were all "pure as snow." Other Germans say that their rule was severe but not unnecessarily so, and that their men were occasionally brutal, but that the charges against them are "mainly propaganda." Only a few have yet come to admit the drunken, disgraceful frenzy in which their troops spread over France, and how unhappily much of official sanction they had for their barbarities.

It is in no spirit of revenge that the story is here retold; but only because the somber duty of History is to make sure that the lesson is not forgotten, that men do not build the future on a careless ignorance of the character and possibilities of the people who once sought to force their mastership on the surrounding nations—and may some day seek to do the same again. The German kindliness of pleasant moments is a notable and charming national characteristic, but it flares very easily into the "Furor Teutonicus" of moments of passion. What that fury is capable of is written here.

Each statement made in the following narrative has been tested and retested, and has stood long before the public gaze to invite contradiction or disproof, if such, alas, were possible. Dr. Cleary, the Roman Catholic Bishop of New Zealand, a clergyman of the noblest repute, speaks wholly from his personal experience. M. Mirman, on the other hand, is the official speaker for the entire body of French civic authority in the invaded districts. His report becomes thus the sworn and solemn statement of united France. There have been individual German reports by men who declared that they, being at the front, saw nothing of these savageries. There have also been reports by Germans who took active part in the atrocities and who gloried in them.

Among so many differing German voices, we have chosen here the most authoritative one. We let the German Kaiser himself declare the proclaimed policy of the "super-race." One would like to doubt the authenticity of this damning statement of one who, from his own human imperfection, assumes to become at once judge, jury, and executioner over an entire race. Unfortunately we have as yet no evidence against the genuineness of this terrible self-indictment. It was officially published in France in January, 1919, as part of an intercepted letter sent by the Kaiser early in the War to his fellow-autocrat, the aged Emperor of Austria.

C. F. H.

BY KAISER WILLIAM II.

MY soul is torn asunder, but everything must be put to fire and blood. The throats of men and women, children and the aged must be cut and not a tree nor a house left standing.

With such methods of terror, which alone can strike so degenerate a people as the French, the war will finish before two months, while if I use humanitarian methods it may be prolonged for years. Despite all my repugnance I have had to choose the first system.

BY RT. REV. DR. CLEARY

Both in Northern France and Belgium one hears very numerous stories of oppression and outrage against the civilian population. Some of these, told at second, third, or tenth hand, I felt bound to regard as exaggerated or wholly untrue. Others were stated in a form which did not aid investigation. Others, relating to fully detailed cases of alleged crimes, some of them of peculiar atrocity, I had not the time, nor as to certain of them the inclination, to investigate. I here refer only to acts of oppression and violence, vouched for by eye-witnesses of good standing, of declared competency and good character. The more public and striking outrages described hereunder are, moreover, supported by a very considerable mass of independent and convergent testimony which cannot be lightly set aside, and which induces a strong conviction that, on the whole, the German army of occupation did, in point of fact, translate into action the policy of "ruthlessness" and "terrorization" against the non-combatant population of the part of France to which reference is here made.

Hostages

During my stay in France, I met a number of prominent and respected civilians—mayors, parish priests, merchants, etc.—who had been seized by the German troops as hostages or sureties for the "good behavior" of the local population towards the invaders. The "good behavior" usually

included the safety of the German communications; the prompt supply of transport, money, or other things requisitioned; and the avoidance of any of the many (and often vague) things which the German commander, in his absolute discretion, might regard as helping the French enemy or interfering with the invaders' military plans. Failure, or alleged failure, on the part of the inhabitants exposed the hostages to heavy fines, deportation, long imprisonment, or prompt death at the hands of a firing party. Now, hostages have, in such circumstances, no effective power of control over a scattered and distracted population, and they are in no way responsible for the military action of their country's forces. For these reasons, the taking and, on occasion, execution or other penalizing of hostages is abhorrent to Christian sentiment and the modern practice of civilized war. Part 2, Chapter I, of the "German War Book" deals with this question of hostages, and it admits what follows: "Every writer outside Germany has stigmatized this measure as contrary to the law of nations, and as unjustified towards the inhabitants of the country." The same official publication goes on to say that this practice of taking hostages "was also recognized on the German side as harsh and cruel," but that its supreme justification was "the fact that it proved completely successful." In the war of 1870, the Germans, says the "War Book," forced their French hostages "to accompany trains and locomotives." In the town of ——— (where I was billeted for a week in the mayor's house) the Germans, when in retreat before the advancing French troops, found yet another use for hostages. A large number of the townsfolk, variously estimated for me by many eye-witnesses, were "rounded up" as hostages by the retreating invaders. Those unhappy civilians were placed in two guarded lines along two adjoining bridges and their approaches, at the very edge of the town. One of these bridges was over a canal, the other over a river beside the canal; and over these two bridges the German troops proceeded to retreat between the two long rows of French hostages: the idea was that the oncoming French would, in order to save their own people, forego the military advan-

tage of blowing up the bridges with high explosive shells or of treating the flying enemy to doses of bursting shrapnel or machine gun fire. The French shrapnel did, however, spatter over the bridges, smiting friend as well as foe. All my local informants assured me that, as each hapless hostage dropped, slain or wounded, he was thrown by his captors into the water, from which the bodies of twenty-two of them were subsequently recovered.

Although permitted and authorized by the German "War Book," the exposure of civilians to the fire of their own troops is, of course, contrary to the usages of civilized war. It is expressly forbidden by Chapter XIV. of the British "Manual of Military Law."

Pillage

In every war there occurs, in some or other degree, the looting of private property. (By looting is meant private thefts committed by individuals.) I am able to bear personal testimony to the generally splendid conduct of our New Zealand troops in this respect; and I have reason to believe that the restraint practiced by them, in this matter, represents the general attitude of the whole army. In the old wars, for instance, fowls, even in friendly countries, were commonly looked upon by soldiers as "derelict goods," the lawful prize of the first comer. And so they were regarded by both German officers and men. But since the enforced retirement of the invaders, domestic fowls have again gradually multiplied in Northern France; and it is a high tribute to our men to state that these important "live stock" of the French people, in the regions traversed by me, are practically as safe from confiscation as they would be in New Zealand or the British Isles. The fowl-runs in the war area represent a testimonial to the good conduct of our men, just as surely as another excellent testimonial is furnished by the great and highly reciprocated kindness and affection which they manifest to the children. This sometimes shows itself in quaint and "spoiling" ways (as some of them would to their own little ones), but always with the best intentions.

In modern military law, the seizure of the private property of non-belligerents is not permissible, except under the pressure of immediate military necessity; and where it is so taken, it is to be paid for on the spot, or its receipt acknowledged by a proper document. Over all the regions of France and Belgium traversed by me, and formerly occupied by German troops, the plunder of the private property of civilians was carried out in a generally wholesale way, without any pretense of military necessity, without payment, and usually without receipt, under the orders and direct supervision of army officers, and as an act of settled State policy. The evidence of this public policy of plunder was simply overwhelming; it extended over the whole occupied area visited by me; and it spared no class or section of the people—involving rich and poor alike to the extent of their respective chattel resources. Collating the oral and ocular evidence furnished to me by, literally, hundreds of townspeople, villagers, and peasantry, I found that the general official procedure was as follows:

At an early suitable moment after the occupation of a country district or center of population, official arrangements were made for the seizure and exportation of the greater part of the chattel property of the inhabitants. For this purpose, a sufficient supply of motor lorries was assembled. Squads of soldiers, under the supervision of officers, proceeded with the work of plunder. Others raided the fields and farms, collected and drove off all horses, cattle, sheep, pigs, etc., and took possession of all fowls and Belgian hares (which were numerously raised in Northern France for food purposes). Returns were demanded of all stock, stores of grain and other foodstuffs—the failure of a boy to mention a quantity of wheat concealed in a cellar resulted in his being shot by a firing-party close to my last billet in France. Grain and forage were seized and sent away; so, too, was a great part (sometimes nearly all) the food in dwellings; and much of the sustenance of even poor people was roughly thrown about, damaged, wasted, or destroyed. This was in 1914-15. Bed-coverings were almost invariably taken; so, usually, were linen and woolen articles (under-

clothing of every sort included), napkins, towels, curtains, table-covers, etc., ornaments, and furniture, excepting (as a rule) bedsteads and other heavy and cumbrous pieces. Locked drawers, presses, etc., were broken open. Money, plate, costly ornaments of comfortably portable size, and jewelry seem (according to the information given to me by numerous victims of this modern Great Pillage) to have been specially favored by the officers. And when the work was done to the satisfaction of the Command, the long procession of high-loaded motor lorries set out on its way towards the Rhine.

I will give here just three partial instances of the truly Prussian thoroughness with which this policy of plunder was carried out, in violation of natural right and the law of nations. One woman villager, a worker's wife, showed me her gutted (but somewhat reorganized) home, and wound up her detailed description of the official pillage with these words: "Those Prussians did not even leave me my baby's little booties or socks or shirts—they took everything, everything, everything." Only a few doors away from her humble abode stood the big house of a manufacturer with whom I was billeted for some days. He had sent away his wife and children shortly before the invaders occupied the village. These made a pretty clean sweep of his house. Several Prussian officers were billeted there. They personally stole every article of jewelry in the place, and all the valuable gold and silver family plate, some of it consisting of old and treasured heirlooms; they seized a number of costly gold and other ornaments; they invaded every drawer, and even carried away his wife's silk dresses. All his oil-paintings were taken away, except a few, of lesser value, and some of these were slashed with sword-cuts. *"Ils ont tout pillé* [they have pillaged everything]," said my host to me in his account of the behavior of his guests from beyond the Rhine. Just one other instance out of a great number that might be cited: It occurred at a little farmhouse, the home of a poor, childless, and very old widow, just behind our fighting lines. I was billeted in that shell-cracked farmhouse, within German gun-fire range, for

thirty-two days, while serving as chaplain in the fighting lines. The local evidence went to show that the poor old woman's home and little farm, like many others in the neighborhood, was pretty thoroughly "cleaned up" by the plunder-parties. Her own story, and that of another old eye-witness living in the house, was to this effect: That the military officials took practically everything, down to the last fowl; that they compelled the old woman to cook her own stolen food for them; that they fed inordinately thereon, drank great quantities of her coffee, and, said she, "what they did not devour, they wasted," leaving hardly a scrap of eatable food in the place. "Payment?" she replied, in answer to a question; "not a sou!" And receipt for goods taken? "There was no receipt," said she. The same replies were, in substance, made to me in all of the hundreds of cases of officer-led plunder of which I have a recollection. And, according to international law and to established conventions (to which Germany was a party), such a course of conduct in war is illegal: it is thieving, naked and unadorned.

Levies

Article 52 of the Hague Regulations declares, in regard to requisitions:—"They must be in proportion to the resources of the country." This provision is, as to its purport and effect, embodied in section 416 of the British "Manual of Military Law," and the British Requisitioning Instructions. The same just and humane Hague Regulation was affirmed by Article 40 of the Declaration of Brussels, accepted by Germany. But it is also set aside in Chapter IV of the "German War Book," where it declares that "it will scarcely ever be observed in practice," and that "in cases of necessity the needs of the army will alone decide." Over a great part of the country visited by me, the civilian population not alone had their chattel property systematically plundered, but they were, in addition to this, subjected to racking (sometimes confiscatory) money fines and levies. Some small hamlets, robbed of practically everything, and living in part on borrowed money, had to provide, on short notice, forced contributions running into £160

and upwards. From the information supplied to me by my manufacturing host and others, some of these compulsory payments, in the circumstances of the contributors, amounted in practical effect to the "buccaneering levies" (*brandschatzungen*) which are declared to be illegal in Chapter IV of the "German War Book." Yet this cruel and unjust measure is in full accord with the spirit of the militarist writers whose pagan principles are crystallized in the "War Book." One of these is Clausewitz, an authority of high standing with Prussian militarists. In the fifth chapter of his *"Vom Kriege,"* he declares that the military right of requisitioning private property "has no limits except those of the exhaustion, impoverishment, and devastation of the whole country." And, despite its condemnation of "buccaneering levies" and some commendable references to the rights of private property, the "German War Book" itself reaches the same merciless conclusion. This is stated in the third paragraph of the Introduction and in a fierce footnote quotation thereto from Moltke, which is given with approval. Both in text and footnote we find, nut-shelled, the Prussian policy of "terrorismus" against both the persons and the property of non-combatant populations.

Murder of Civilians

Another and more terrible form of this established Prussian militarist policy of "terrorization" of peaceful populations is the frequent and unnecessary taking of civilian lives. From numerous eye-witnesses—of the classes already described—I heard details of the murders of many unarmed civilians. One of these, already referred to above, was a mere boy, guilty of no military offense punishable by death. As illustrating the methods followed by officers in some such cases of murder, I cite two instances vouched for by competent and respectable eye-witnesses frequently seen by me.

During the early days of my stay at the front, in Northern France, I visited one of my priests, a Catholic chaplain, who was then billeted, with two other New Zealand officers, at a better class of farmhouse, quite close to the trenches. I had been informed that the house-mother there was witness

to a tragedy that had been reported to me. I found her to be an extremely pious Catholic woman, of middle age, fairly educated, and speaking better French than is common among the peasantry of that region. She confirmed, even in most details, the story which I had heard, and told me, in substance, what follows:—Her brother, a farmer, lived near by—a quiet, inoffensive man, very industrious, extremely careful not to mix himself up in military or political matters, not guilty of spying or any civil or military offense, and immensely devoted to his wife and three children. While my informant was on a visit to him, there entered some German officers. One of them (without any judicial formality) drew his sword and severed the farmer's hand at the wrist, the hand dropping to the floor. They then fired three revolver shots at him, two of the shots penetrating the victim's abdomen, the third his throat. All this took place in the presence of the victim's sister (my informant), and of his wife and three children, all of whom were frantic with horror at the sudden tragedy. The poor man's sister cried to him: "Oh, brother, you are dying; make an act of sorrow for your sins and of love of God." He replied faintly: "I cannot, sister; say them for me." Then his sister knelt beside him and began to recite the prayers. When she was so engaged, the dying man cried out: "I am done for!" and, making a big sign of the Cross over himself, began to recite the acts of sorrow for sin and of love of God. And so he died. The sorrow-riven widow, seemingly almost unbalanced by grief, left the scene of the tragedy, and lives in a town where I was billeted in the mayor's house for a week. In that town, the hostages were killed, as already described, and close to it occurred the further outrages to which reference is made hereunder.

A little over a mile westward from the town last referred to, there stands, close together, a group of small farmhouses—some of them at one time billets for our soldiers. I visited some of them from time to time—one of these (not a billet) being the home of a widow whose husband had also been cruelly murdered without any judicial formality, by German officers. He had hidden under some

hay in his barn as soon as he heard the rattle of German rifles "shooting up" the country around about. (I found a rather widespread impression among the peasantry, for many miles around, that persons running away, or found hiding, were regularly shot on sight by the then newly arrived invaders.) In the course of their search of the little farm in question, they discovered the hidden man, and the officers perforated him with seven revolver bullets. This is the statement made to me by his widow and by the family next door (only some twenty yards away), who quite plainly heard the shots that widowed their plundered neighbor and orphaned her children. The next door house referred to was also pretty thoroughly stripped, but the occupying troops did not otherwise molest the house-mother and the five delightful little children there, who used to swarm joyously about me when I visited the billets near by. When, in company with two of my chattering little friends, I paid a first visit of sympathy to the widow of the murdered man, she was busy winnowing peas in the barn, the same barn, grinding heavily on the handle of a big noisy machine. Her face looked towards the wall furthest from me. When she had finished the loaded hopper, she turned suddenly at the sound of my greeting. I shall carry to my death the agony staring out of her eyes and set in the closely crowded wrinkles prematurely carved by grief, and the utter hopelessness and helplessness that marked her mechanically-told tale of swift tragedy. There must be many such eyes in France and Belgium, that shall ever be riveted upon such sudden horror, until death, in mercy, closes them.

Of the various other cases brought to my notice, I will mention only those that follow:—In the neighboring town (a little over a mile away) seventeen civilians were (I was informed on the spot) put to death by the invaders; in a village close by, several others. I had heard a great deal about a ghastly massacre perpetrated close to the village of D——. I spent part of a January day investigating the matter, right upon the spot, and among those (including the parish priest) who were likely to furnish me with reliable information. I learned, in substance, that eleven flying peas-

ants (several of them being refugees from other invaded districts) were "rounded up" a few hundred yards outside the village, compelled (without trial) to dig a big pit, and then shot into it by a party of Prussian troops, under the direction of a Prussian colonel. The parish priest (who, by the way, was for a time a hostage) showed me the position of the pit into which the victims were shot. It is in an open field, outside the village. Three of the murdered men, local people, were exhumed and interred in consecrated ground in the parish cemetery, beside the ruins of the once beautiful church which the Prussians fired and destroyed on the eve of their retreat before the advancing French. A Prussian major assured the parish priest (so the latter informed me) that the civilian population of the place had not fired upon or molested the invaders. Such a course of action would, indeed, have been an act of supreme folly on the part of the women, children, and the few men (mostly old or unfit) left at the time in those French countrysides—especially in view of the well-known and oft-proclaimed methods of proscription and terrorism with which any civilian interference would be avenged, even upon the innocent, as was done in the well-remembered days of 1870. In view of this well-known German policy, the local authorities at D—— (and in these parts of France generally, so far as I know) seized the few shotguns and other weapons of offense in each commune, and stored them, under lock and key, in the Mairie, whenever there arose any probability of the early arrival of the invaders. In a town in which I was billeted, it was suggested or asserted by German officers that shots were fired by civilians. This, however, was hotly denied by prominent citizens, and one mayor assured me (as he had previously assured these officers) that the shots complained of were fired, in his full view, by organized French troops in retreat. That, however, did not save the place from enormous levies. And both the clergy and the civil authorities rather frequently voice the conviction that such accusations were merely a pretext for pursuing the German State policy of "ruthlessness" and "terrorismus" in the form of exactions in blood and coin. In any case, I was assured, many

times over, that no proper trial, or no judicial proceeding of any sort, preceded the penalty of death or of confiscatory levies. The "German War Book" declares that the slaying of prisoners is sometimes "expedient"—although it acknowledges the proceedings to be always "ugly." But even a civilian prisoner does not lightly lose, either by natural law or international convention, his right to a fair trial before forfeiting his life.

And even if attacks were really made by individuals upon the invaders, the Prussian method of inflicting general penalties, in such cases, is forbidden by Article 50 of the Hague Convention: "No collective penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the population on account of the acts of individuals, for which it cannot be regarded as collectively responsible." But a wide range of tragic outrage and wrong is left to the discretion of officers in the following words of sweeping menace contained in the official Introduction to the "German War Book": "Certain severities are indispensable in war; nay, more, true humanity very often lies in a ruthless application of them." But neither militarist sanction, nor even the plea of "orders," can be held to justify "inherently immoral" acts of violence and inhumanity.

Some "Not Bad"

Everywhere that I went, both in France and Belgium, I found that the people asserted differences in conduct among the various national elements of the German army of occupation. Even among French soldiers and some veterans of the war of 1870, I met sometimes with good words, sometimes with merely negative and comparative commendation, for Rhinelanders, Saxons, and a few others. I came across a certain number of cases in which both German officers and men were, for instance, ashamed of the evil work of State-organized plunder. And this was especially the case where they were billeted upon, and kindly treated by, the people whose homes they were ordered to pillage. In such cases, the work of plunder, although carried out, was generally by no means so searching and merciless as it too fre-

quently was elsewhere. Regarding such troops, the people would remark that they were "not bad," "not at all bad," that there were some "quite respectable men among them," and that this or that officer was "courteous" or "amiable," etc. Yet even the least objectionable of the invaders seem to have, under "orders," inflicted rather severe ordeals upon the people.

I had read a number of statements to the discredit of the Bavarian troops during the early part of the war. I was, therefore, quite unprepared for the practically universal verdict in their favor all over those invaded parts of the war-zone where I was in touch with the civilian population. These troops may or may not have been average samples of the Bavarian armies. On that point I venture no expression of opinion. But this I know: that, over the districts where I found they had been in occupation, the unfailing answer to inquiries was to this effect: That, among the invaders of these parts, the Bavarians were the most inclined to consideration and mercy in the gathering of spoil, less given than others to the "shooting up" of civilians, and, in billets, comparatively unobjectionable. The statement (published in British papers early in the war) was several times re-told to me in France, that two Bavarian regiments had mutinied against the execution of some of the "frightfulness" orders given in Belgium, and had been transferred elsewhere; and some instances were mentioned to me of real kindness, on their part, towards the people.

I mentioned this unexpectedly favorable verdict regarding Bavarians to a British officer occupying an important position in Belgium: he was one of the comparatively few who spoke French, and, practically from the beginning of the war, mixed freely with the people in (among others) the selfsame areas as were covered by my experiences at the front. He assured me that his information, derived from the people, expressed, on every side, the same opinion. And he told me the following illustrative case, which was afterwards repeated to me, in substance, by some residents near the spot:

This British officer's story relates to a now battered and uninhabited farmhouse, at present within our lines. For over a month I visited it or passed by it almost daily, on my way to or from the fire-trench. During the German occupation, the farm-buildings were used for a time as billets for a detachment of Bavarians. Just before their arrival there, the house-mother had died, leaving several helpless little children. The Bavarians told the bereaved father that he might pursue serenely his usual outdoor occupations, and that they, in the meantime, would look after the household and the motherless little ones. The cooking, washing, tidying-up, etc., were (I was assured) carried out with great, fastidious care; the house was a picture, the children shining examples of neatness and greatly attached to the big, hefty fellows from beyond the Rhine.

The Prussians

I met several French civilians who spoke not unkindly of individual Prussian soldiers who had been billeted upon them. I met one, and only one Frenchman in my experience who spoke well of a Prussian officer. That was the parish priest (already referred to), and he spoke very kindly indeed of the Prussian major already mentioned in the course of this letter. But in regard to the other Prussian officers with whom he had come into contact, his mildest expression was that they were all "arrogant" and "evil-mannered." For the rest, I made numerous other inquiries regarding Prussian officers, as distinguished from officers of other sections of the German army. Such inquiries or remarks were ordinarily met with set lips and flashing eye; with declarations that, though the Prussian private was sometimes "not bad," the Prussian officers were the most ruthless in pillage and the murder of civilians; and with such epithets (hundreds of times repeated) as "brutal," "merciless," and (over and over again) *ce sont tous des barbares—mais tous, tous* (they are all barbarians, all, all). The general verdict, as expressed to me, was that the worst and most callous violators of the usages of civilized warfare were the Prussian officers, and that the worst of the

Prussians were the Pomeranians, both officers and men. In this connection, it is, perhaps, a curious coincidence that, East Prussia is the home of the system known as "Prussianism," which has overlain Germany and organized the Empire, less as a State than as an Army bent on conquest.

The usually magnificent calm of French patience often breaks into a glow of hate when the Prussians and their ways are mentioned. With sundry other nationalities of the German Empire, it seemed to me that the peasantry of those regions felt that, under happier auspices, they might live, in peace, as neighbors, in a neighborly way. I thus gathered that, even amidst the fierce resentments aroused by such methods of warfare, the Northern French peasant is often able to judge as does President Wilson, between the German people and the Prussian military oligarchy. These, and their methods of pagan "frightfulness," have seared the brain and soul of the Flandrian populations.

Destruction of Churches

From townsfolk, villagers, peasantry, British officers and others I learned that the German method of dealing with churches proceeded generally along the following lines in the parts of France under consideration here: When a retreat from a hamlet, village, or town seemed to them an early likelihood, the German officers in command requisitioned all the kerosene and benzine around about, introduced straw, firewood, and other inflammable material into the church, piled up chairs, benches, etc., flooded the place as well as they could with the liquid, and then set the whole thing alight. They also, at times, distributed explosives in places where they were calculated to increase the damage. In sundry cases it was evident to even the most casual observer that the building was of little or no use for purposes of military observation or offense, being without tower, spire, or other such feature, and being overlooked (in some cases which I noted) by taller buildings. Occasionally, one sees only one building in a village burned down—it is the church. More numerous still are the churches destroyed by German guns firing high explosive shells. I ascertained

that, in several cases, the church towers had been used by both French and Germans in turn for observation purposes. In such cases, the destruction of the observation post was a legitimate, though regrettable, military measure. But one curiously frequent and significant fact struck me in connection with the churches burned down or otherwise destroyed by retreating German troops in the area of France to which I refer. It is this: Over a wide area, *nearly every tower was left standing, a conspicuous landmark in the flat landscape.* With a minimum of trouble, they could have all been immediately used for observation purposes by the advancing French troops. The spires, where present, were burned down or blown down; and the towers in question could easily have been in great part demolished by high explosives, such as were sometimes used upon the walls. But they were left, and still they stand. And it is assumed that they were spared for a German military purpose, namely, to serve as useful landmarks for "ranging" the German artillery. In one small area visited by me, close to our lines, six churches were destroyed. Two of the priests were killed, and a third had an extremely narrow escape.

Mention might here be made of a peculiar form of "frightfulness" followed by the Germans in destroying some of the churches in this district by high explosive shells. After a vigorous, accurate, and destructive bombardment of one church only (other buildings around being left comparatively little damaged) the firing suddenly ceased for a time. The parishioners (a very pious population hereabouts) felt confident that the bombardment was at an end, and they gradually assembled in and around their church to see and estimate the damage done. The vast majority of the gatherings naturally consisted of women, children, and old men—the fit men of military age being away in camp or billet or trench. Suddenly, without warning, the German guns broke out again, this time in a furious tempest of shrapnel, with results to the civilian population which you can well imagine. I heard of this form of "ruthlessness" from a number of persons, and (as regards one very considerable center of population) from some New Zealand

officers who were present, as well as from one of the priests of my diocese, a military chaplain, who witnessed the destruction, by these means, of one church of great beauty from his billet in the same square.

Various Crimes

Article 44 of the Hague Regulations says: "Any compulsion, by a belligerent, on the population of occupied territory, to give information as to the army of the other belligerent, or as to his means of defense, is prohibited." This just and humane provision is one of the many such repudiated in the "German War Book." It says in Part II, Chapter I: "A still more severe measure is the compulsion of the inhabitants to furnish information about their own army, its strategy, its resources, and its military secrets. The majority of writers of all nations are unanimous in their condemnation of this measure. Nevertheless, it cannot be entirely dispensed with; doubtless it will be applied with regret, but the argument of war will frequently make it necessary."

The compulsory betrayal of a country by its invaded inhabitants is thus, quite properly, forbidden by the Hague Regulations. They also (Articles 23 and 52) forbid the forcing of the inhabitants of an occupied region to engage in work designed to injure their country. The official "German War Book" also treats as "a scrap of paper" this valued provision of Christian and civilized warfare, and it authorizes such unjust compulsion of civilians even to the extent of "shooting some of them" in case of refusal (Part II, Chapter I). During my stay in France I heard a few vague allegations of attempted compulsion under both these heads, but no time was left to investigate them. I merely set down here the provision officially made for such very terrible forms of compulsion. The evidence recently supplied shows that, in point of fact, Belgian and French deportees were compelled to engage (even in the fire-area) in work designed to injure their respective countries.

The same official "War Book" approves of certain other resorts "on which," says Professor Morgan, "Inter-

national Law is silent because it will not admit the possibility of their existence" among civilized peoples. I refer to the German War Lord's sanction of "the exploitation of the crimes of third parties (assassination, incendiarism, robbery, and the like) to the prejudice of an enemy." This sufficiently explains certain forms of German official activity in the United States. The "War Book" seeks to justify the "inherently immoral" exploitation of crime by the following un-Christian doctrine of Professor Lueder: "The ugly and inherently immoral aspect of such methods cannot affect the recognition of their lawfulness. The necessary aim of war gives the belligerent the right and imposes upon him, according to circumstances, the duty not to let slip the important—it may be the decisive—advantages to be gained by such means."

Conclusion

In view of the "War Book's" repudiation of so many principles and methods of civilized warfare, it seems, to some extent, superfluous to adduce evidence of "ruthlessness" and "terrorization" by armies trained and acting under its instructions. The Prussian militarists' "War Book" is, in effect, the expression of armed materialism running amok. It provides for, or permits, or supposes, practically every form of "frightfulness" laid to the charge of "Prussianism" during this great struggle; so far as lies in its power, it flings aside the precious results of the Church's centuries of effort (crystallized and extended in international conventions) to mitigate the atrocities of pagan warfare.

With human nature as it is, war has more than sufficient horror, even when hedged around about by the restrictions called for by chivalry, Christian moral principles, and international agreements. In the mass of men engaged in war there will also ever be some who will fall at times short of the ideals that become the Christian warrior. But just as surely, in the stress of war, will many tend to fall below the lower, as before the higher, ideal of soldierly right and duty; and depth will naturally and inevitably call

to depth in the practical application of the hard, crude materialism of the Prussian military code. And, just as naturally, such forms of military "frightfulness" as it sanctions or directs, tend to increase in number and intensity, to the progressive degradation of war. We witness the further developments of this tendency in the deliberate sinking of Belgian relief ships, in the large deportations of unprotected girls in France and Belgium (against which the Holy See has raised its voice in protest), and (not to mention other things) in the open and repeated destruction of hospital ships and the attempted slaughter of wounded soldiers and nurses upon the high seas—in direct violation of Hague Convention, No. 10. The fundamental issue now is this: Are we, or are we not, to hold what is still safe, and to restore what is being lost, of Christian and civilized intercourse between nation and nation?

BY THE FRENCH CIVIL AUTHORITIES

L. Mirman, Prefect; G. Simon, Mayor of Nancy; G. Keller, Mayor of Lunéville

This is a statement of horrors, but a statement of plain truths! Where have we discovered our facts? They are taken from three sources: *First,* Four reports issued by the French Commission of Inquiry;[1] and "Germany's Violation of the Laws of Warfare," published by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; *Second,* Two volumes containing twenty-two reports of the Belgian Commission, and the Reply to the German "White Book" of May 15, 1915; *Third,* Notebooks found upon a large number of German soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and officers, who have been wounded or taken prisoners, and translated under the direction of the French Government. These valuable records, in which the bandits and their leaders have imprudently given themselves away, are real *"pièces à conviction."*

These reports in their entirety form an overwhelming indictment. We wish that every one could study them in

[1] The members of this Commission were MM. G. Payelle (Premier Président de la Cour des Comptes), A. Mollard (Ministre Plénipotentiaire), G. Maringer (Conseiller d'État), E. Paillot (Conseiller à la Cour de Cassation).

full. But the books are large, running to thousands of pages, and will not find their way to the general public.

Yet every one ought to know how the Germans carry on war. We have therefore made selections from these documents in order to compile this brief statement. A dismal task, this wading through mud and blood! And a hard task, to run through all these reports, pencil in hand, with the idea of underlining *the essential facts!* You find yourself noting down each page, marking each paragraph; and, lo and behold, at the end of the book, you have selected *everything*—that is to say, nothing. One might as well start to gather the hundred finest among the leaves of a forest, or to pick up the hundred most glittering grains among the sand on a beach. All we can do is to take the first examples which come to hand. This, then, is not a collection of the most stirring and striking German crimes, but simply a book of samples. Two classes of outrage stand out, and must remain ever present to the mind: murdered civilians can be counted in thousands; houses willfully burned, in tens of thousands.

Robbery

We shall not waste time over the looting of cellars, of larders, of poultry yards, of linen-chests, or of whatever can be consumed promptly, or immediately made use of by the troops—all these are the merest trifles. Let us also dismiss pillage, organized on a large scale by the authorities, of all sorts of raw material and industrial machinery: the bill on this score will come to several thousand million francs. Let us likewise put aside official robberies, committed by governors of towns, or provinces, from municipal treasuries (even the treasury of the Red Cross at Brussels was robbed), usually under the form of fines, or of taxes imposed under transparent pretenses. There again there will be millions to recover.

We shall deal here with *personal robberies* only, as distinct from the pilfering carried on by hungry soldiers, distinct too from the regular contributions levied on a conquered country by an unscrupulous administration. These

robberies are innumerable, committed sometimes by private soldiers, but often by officers, doctors, and high officials. Here are some examples:

(1) *Soldier thieves:* They are rougher in their dealings, and kill those who offer resistance. It is a case of "Your money or your life." Madame Maupoix, aged 75, living at Triaucourt, was kicked to death while soldiers ransacked her cupboards. Monsieur Dalissier, aged 73, belonging to Congis, was summoned to give up his purse: he declared that he had no money; they tied him up with a rope and fired fifteen shots into his body. Let us pass quickly over the "soldier thief"—merely small fry!

(2) *Officer thieves:* At Baron, an officer compelled the notary to open his safe, and stole money and jewelry from it. Another, after going through several houses, was seen wearing on his wrists and fingers six bracelets and nine rings belonging to women. Soldiers who brought their officer a stolen jewel received a reward of four shillings. The robberies at Baccarat and Creil were "directed" by officers. At Creil, a captain tried to induce Guillot and Demonts to point out the houses of the richest inhabitants, and their refusal cost them harsh treatment. At Fossé, a French military doctor in charge of an ambulance, conveying two hundred patients, and himself wounded, was arrested and taken before a captain. The captain told the doctor that he would have him shot, and meanwhile opened the doctor's tunic with his own hand, took out his pocketbook and appropriated the 400 francs he found in it.

Officers and privates sometimes share the stolen money. From a diary belonging to a titled Lieutenant of the Guards, let us quote this note: "Fossé. Village entirely burnt. The 7th Company made 2,000 francs in booty." From another officer's notebook: "More than 3,000 francs booty for the battalion."

Another diary, after the sacking of a place, gives a detailed account of the distribution thus: "460 francs for the first lieutenant, 390 francs for the second lieutenant, etc."

(3) *Doctor thieves:* At Choisy-au-Bac, two army doc-

tors, wearing their brassards, personally sacked the house of a family named Binder. At Château-Thierry some doctors were made prisoners: their mess-tins were opened and found to be full of stolen articles. After Morhange, a French doctor of the 20th Corps remained in the German lines to be near his wounded. He was accosted by one of his German "confrères," who with his own hands stole his watch and pocketbook.

At Raon-sur-Plaine, after the retreat of our troops, Dr. Schneider remained behind with thirty wounded. Next day up came a German ambulance with Professor Vulpius, a well-known German scientist of Heidelberg University, who must have presided over many international medical congresses. As soon as he was installed, "Herr Professor" intimated to his French fellow-doctors that he was "going to begin with a small customary formality." The formality was a simple one: his colleagues were to hand over to him "all the money they had on them." "I strongly protested" (declared the French doctor, on oath), "but we were compelled to hand over our purses and all their contents. Having relieved us in this way, he turned to our poor wounded, who were all searched and stripped of their money. There was nothing to be done: we were in the hands, not of a doctor, but of a regular brute."

(4) *Royal thieves:* After living about a week in a château near Liege, H.R.H. Prince Eitel Fritz, the Duke of Brunswick, and another nobleman of less importance, had all the dresses that could be found in the wardrobes belonging to the lady of the house and her daughters packed up before their own eyes, and sent to Germany.

These thieves are often *facetious:* they give as compensation a so-called receipt or bond (in German, of course), which means, "Good for a hundred lashes," or "Good for two rabbits," or "To be shot," or "Payable in Paris." They are also *disgusting.* In houses robbed by them they leave, by way of visiting cards, excrement in beds, on tables, and in cupboards.

These thieves have a partiality for safes, and in this connection the story of Lunéville deserves recording. A

house near the station, belonging to M. Leclerc, was set on fire; the walls alone remained standing, and in one of them (on the second floor) a safe was left intact. A non-commissioned officer, named Weill, with a party blew up the wall with dynamite, and the safe was extricated from the rubbish, carried to the station, put on a truck, and sent to Boche-land. This man Weill, before the war, often came to Lunéville on business with hops, was always well received there, made himself agreeable and knew everybody. When the Germans settled in the unfortunate town he played a very important part, in spite of his low rank, in acting as agent, confidential clerk and guide to the Commanding Officer.

The robbers are also business-like in their transport arrangements as to carriages, military wagons, lorries, and motor cars. At Compiègne, where the home of the Orsetti family was sacked, silver plate, jewelry and articles of value were collected in the courtyard of the château, then classified, registered, packed and "put into two carts, upon which they took care to place the Red Cross flag." We read in the notebook of a wounded German soldier, under medical treatment at Brussels, "A car has arrived at the hospital, bringing war booty, a piano, two sewing machines and all sorts of other things."

In 1870, our clocks were in most demand; now, pianos form the attraction, and an immense number have been sent to Germany. They are the article particularly favored by the Boche ladies. In a château retaken by our troops, an officer left behind a letter from his wife, in which is written, "A thousand thanks for the beautiful things you sent me. The furs are magnificent, the rosewood furniture is exquisite; but don't forget that Elsa is always waiting for her piano."

These women, however, are not all as patient in waiting as Elsa. They frequently come and choose for themselves, and preside over the packing. They have been seen arriving in motor cars from Strasbourg or Metz, at many towns in Lorraine, at Lunéville, Baccarat, and elsewhere.

All notebooks, more or less, contain such items as these:

"Wholsale pillage and abundant loot," "Everything destroyed or sacked," "Looting going strong," "Played the piano; looting going strong." This very German formula frequently occurs, "*Methodically* plundered." And again, "We have been allowed to plunder; we didn't require to be told twice: whole bales of loot."

"*Rethel.* The Vandals could not have done better." (The officer who makes this indiscreet admission and seems to protest against the thefts committed, writes on the following page: "I have found a silk rainproof coat and a camera for Felix.")

"*Courcy.* The village, and the workmen's cottages looted and sacked. Atrocious. There is something, after all, in what they say of German barbarians."

"*Ottignies.* The village was pillaged. The blond beast has made plain what he is. The Huns and the free-lances of the Middle Ages could not have done better."

"*Cirey.* During the night incredible things were done: shops sacked, money stolen, rapes: enough to make one's hair stand on end."

Incendiarism

In order to punish imaginary crimes, attributed to individuals or townships, or without even taking the trouble to discover any kind of pretext, the Germans often, especially after looting, set everything on fire *so as to make all traces disappear.* Sometimes, as at Courtaçon, they compelled the inhabitants to provide the material for burning their own houses; or, as at Recquignies, forced prisoners "to set the houses of the doctor and mayor on fire with lighted straw." But generally they do the work themselves. They have a *special service* for this, and all the requisite incendiary material is carefully prepared; torches, grenades, fuses, oil pumps, firebrands, satchels of pastilles containing very inflammable compressed powder, etc. German science has applied itself to the perfecting of the technic of incendiarism. The village is set alight by a *drilled* method. Those concerned act quite coolly, as a matter of duty, as

though in accordance with a drill scheme laid down and perfected beforehand.

Of course, fire once let loose, these people have to see that it does its work completely: accordingly, at Louvain, they destroyed the fire-engines and fire-escapes; at Namur, they stopped the firemen at the very moment they were preparing to do their duty.

In this way they sometimes willfully burned down whole blocks of dwellings (Lunéville): sometimes an entire district (105 houses at Senlis, 112 at Baccarat): sometimes almost a whole town itself (more than 300 houses at Gerbéviller, 800 at Sermaize). On other occasions they did not leave a house standing (Nomeny, Clermont-en-Argonne, Sommeilles).

The complete list of buildings, cottages, farms, villas, factories, or châteaux, burned willfully in this way by hand, will be a formidable one, amounting to tens of thousands.

Refinement of cruelty frequently occurs. At Aerschot "women had to witness the sight of the conflagration holding their hands up. Their torture lasted six hours." At Crévic, the Germans began their sinister work by burning a château which they knew belonged to General Lyautey. The troops, commanded by an officer, shouted out for Madame and Mademoiselle Lyautey "that they might cut their heads off."

The houses destroyed by fire were not always uninhabited. At Maixe, M. Demange, wounded in both knees, dragged himself along and fell prostrate in his kitchen; his house was set on fire and Madame Demange was forcibly prevented from going to the rescue of her husband, who perished in the flames. At Nomeny, Madame Cousin, after being shot, was thrown into the burning building and roasted. At the same place, M. Adam was thrown alive into the flames. Let us note in common with him, to their credit, an act of comparative humanity. Finding that the unhappy man was not being burnt fast enough, they ended his misery in the flames by shooting him. At Monceau-sur-Sambre, where they set fire to 300 houses, they confined

the two brothers S. in a shed, and the unfortunate men were burnt alive.

The soldiers' diaries are filled with descriptions of incendiarism, some of which we now quote. "Returned by Mazerulles, which was burnt as we passed through, because the engineers found a telephone there connected up with the French." "The whole village was in a blaze. Everything destroyed in the street, except one small house; in front of the door was a poor woman with her six children, her arms raised and begging for mercy. And every day it is the same thing."

Parux. "The first village burnt (in Lorraine, on August 10th); after that the fun began. Villages in flames, one after the other." Another notebook simply states, "Sommepy—horrible carnage. The village entirely burnt; the French thrown into the burning houses; civilians with the rest." Another recalls theatrical memories. "The village is ablaze; it reminds one of the conflagration of Walhalla in the 'Twilight of the Gods.'"

Here is a poet speaking: "The soldiers set up the red cock (*i.e.,* fire) upon the houses, just as they like." This poet is moved, and speaks of "pure vandalism" on the part of his companions in arms. And again, a musician writes, "Throwing of incendiary grenades into the houses; a military concert in the evening—*'Nun danket alle Gott'!* (Now thank we all our God)." Finally, a Bavarian: "The village (Saint-Maurice, Meurthe-et-Moselle) was surrounded, and the soldiers posted one yard apart so that no one could escape. Then the Uhlans set fire to the place, one house after the other. No man, woman, or child could possibly escape. Only the cattle were removed in safety, because cattle have some value. Any one trying to escape was shot. Everything in the village was destroyed." We shall see presently that they even went so far as to burn ambulances.

Murder

Not having sufficient space for a complete catalogue, we shall here simply mention the judicial murders of Miss Cavell, Eugène Jacquet, Battisti, and others, in order to honor

the memory of those noble victims. For the same reason, as they are now well known to every one, we content ourselves with merely recalling the criminal torpedoing of the *Lusitania, Ancona, Portugal, Amiral-Ganteaume* . . . all merchant steamers, without any military character whatever, employed in carrying passengers of every nationality, and the last named crowded with refugees.

We may pass over the crimes committed *from a distance,* so to speak, on unfortified towns, with field-pieces, long-range guns, aëroplanes, and Zeppelins, merely noting that the Germans *were the first* to fire shells into the center of towns indiscriminately. If they made an exception, it was to aim at the cathedral square, when people were leaving after Mass, as at Nancy, or into the market-place at the time when women are busiest, as they did at Lunéville.

We only mention here such outrages as were committed at close quarters with hand-weapons, bayonets or rifles. The list is a long one. Will the exact number of victims ever be known? In Belgium alone it has been proved that up to now more than 5,000 civilians have been assassinated: grown men, old people, women and children. They slaughtered their victims sometimes one by one, sometimes in groups, often in masses. They were not content only with killing. At one place they organized round the massacre such tragic scenes, and at another displayed such refinements of cruelty that reason falters in face of their acts, and asks what terrible madness has brought this race to such low depths? Is it possible? Yes, it is. Judge by the following examples:

A Westphalian prisoner states, "The commanding officer ordered us to shoot two women, and we did so. One of them was holding a child by the hand, and in falling she dragged the child over with her. The officer gave orders to shoot the child, because it could not be left alone in the world." At Rouves, a Government clerk refused to tell a Bavarian officer the numbers of the French regiments in the neighborhood. The officer killed him with two shots from his revolver. At Crézancy, another officer shot with his own hand young Lesaint, 18 years old, "to prevent his being a

soldier later on." At Emberménil, Madame Masson was shot for having, in absolute good faith, given some wrong information. As she was obviously in a state of pregnancy, they made her sit down on a bench to meet her fate. At Ethe, two priests were shot "for having buried some weapons." At Marquéglise, a superior officer ordered the arrest of four young fugitives. Learning that two of them came from Belgium, he exclaimed, "The Belgians are filthy people," and without more ado took his revolver and shot them one after the other. Three were killed outright, the fourth expired the following day.

At Pin, some Uhlans found two young boys on the road. They tied them by the arms to their horses and galloped off. The bodies of the poor lads were found a few miles away—their knees were "literally crushed"; one had his throat cut and both had several bullets in their heads.

At Hériménil, during the pillage, the inhabitants were shut up in a church, and kept there for four days without food. When Madame Winger, 23 years of age, and her three young servants, one girl and two boys, were too slow in leaving her farm to go to the church, the captain ordered his men to fire on them. Four more dead bodies!

The Germans arrived at Monchy-Humières. A group of inhabitants watched them marching past. No provocation whatever was offered, but an officer thought that he heard some one utter the word "Prussians." He at once called out three dragoons, and ordered them to fire upon the group—one killed and two wounded—one of the latter being a little girl of four.

At Sommeilles, when the fire—which destroyed the whole place—broke out, Madame X. took refuge in a cellar belonging to M. and Madame Adnot, who were there, with their four children, the eldest a girl of 11 years. A few days after, on returning to the village, our soldiers found the seven bodies in the cellar lying in a pool of blood, several of them being horribly mutilated. Madame X. had her right arm severed from her body; the little girl's foot had been cut off, and the little boy of five had his throat cut.

At Louveigné a certain number of men were shut up in

a blacksmith's shop; in the afternoon the murderers opened the door as if it were a pigeon-shooting competition, drove the prisoners out, and shot them down—a ghastly group of 17 corpses.

At Senlis the heroic Mayor, M. Odent, and six members of his staff were shot.

At Gerbéviller they forced their way into the house of M. and Madame Lingenheld; seized the son, aged 36, exempt from service, and wearing the badge of the Red Cross, tied his hands, dragged him into the street and shot him. They then returned to look for the father, an old man of 70. Meanwhile the mother, mad with terror, made her escape. On coming out she saw her son lying on the ground. As he still showed signs of life, they threw paraffin over him and roasted him. The father was shot later on with fourteen other old men. More than 150 victims were identified in this parish.

At Nomeny, M. Vassé provided shelter for a number of neighbors in his cellar. Fifty soldiers got in and set fire to the house. To escape the flames the refugees rushed out and were shot one by one as they emerged. Mentré was killed first; his son Léon, with his little eight-year-old sister in his arms, fell next: as he was not quite dead they put the barrel of a rifle to his ear and blew his brains out. Then came the turn of a family named Kieffer. The mother was wounded; the father, his boy and girl, aged respectively 10 and 3, were shot down. They fell on them with fury. Striffler, Guillaume, and Vassé were afterwards massacred. Young Mlle. Simonin, 17 years old, and her small sister, afraid to leave their refuge in the cellar, were eventually driven out by the flames, and immediately shot at. The younger child had an elbow almost blown off by a bullet; as the elder girl lay wounded on the ground, she was deliberately kicked by a soldier. At Nomeny 40 victims were identified.

The following depositions on the massacres at Nomeny are made by prisoners, one a Bavarian officer in the Reserve, the other a private in the same regiment. The lieutenant says: "I gathered the impression that it was impossible

for the officers at Nomeny to prevent such acts. As far as I can judge, the crimes committed there, which horrified all the soldiers who were at Nomeny later on, must be put down to the acts of unnatural brutes." The soldier says, "At five o'clock regimental orders were received to kill every male inhabitant of Nomeny, and to raze everything to the ground; we forced our way into the houses." Here is a more detailed account of a massacre near Blâmont: "All the villagers fled: it was terrible; their beards thick with blood, and what faces! They were dreadful to look at. The dead were all buried, numbering sixty. Among them were many old men and women, and one unfortunate woman half confined—the whole being frightful to look at. Three children were clasped in each other's arms, and had died thus. The Altar and the vaulting of the church were destroyed because there was a telephone [2] communicating with the enemy. This morning, September 2nd, all the survivors were expelled. I saw four small boys carrying away on two sticks a cradle containing a baby of five or six months. All this is dreadful to see. Blow for blow: thunder against thunder! Everything is given up to pillage. I also saw a mother with her two children; one had a big wound on the head, and one eye knocked out."

Outrages on Women and Children

We might write a long and heartbreaking chapter on this pitiful subject, but let the following suffice. The Report of the French Commission of Inquiry concludes with these words, "Outrages upon women and young girls have been common *to an unheard-of extent.*" No doubt the bulk of these crimes will never come to light, for it needs a concatenation of special circumstances for such acts to be committed in public. Unfortunately and only too often these circumstances have existed, *e.g.,* at Beton-Bazoches and Sancy-les-Provins, a young girl, and at St. Denis-les-Re-

[2] To whom did it belong, and where was it? Telephones exist in every district of Meurthe-et-Moselle. Besides, our army installed field telephones which were not all destroyed at the time of their retreat. It is a most foolish pretext.

baix, a mother-in-law and a little boy of eight years old, and at Coulommiers a husband and two children, were witnesses to outrages committed on the mother of the family. Sometimes the attacks were individual and sometimes committed by bodies of men, *e.g.*, at Melen-Labouxhe, Margaret W. was violated by twenty German soldiers, and then shot by the side of her father and mother. They did not even respect nuns.[3]

They did not even spare grandmothers (Louppy-le-Château, Vitry-en-Perthois, etc.).

Nor did they respect children. At Cirey, a witness (a University professor), whose statements one of us took down a few days after the tragedy, cried to a Bavarian officer, "Have you no children in Germany?" All the officer said in reply was, "My mother never bore swine like you."

Now and then they let themselves loose on a whole family; at Louppy, the mother and her two young girls, aged thirteen and eight, respectively, were simultaneous victims of their savagery.

The outrages sometimes lasted till death. At Nimy, the martyrdom of little Irma G. lasted six hours, till death delivered her from her sufferings. When her father tried to rescue her he was shot, and her mother was seriously wounded. Indeed, it was certain destruction to any frenzied parent who tried to defend his child. A clergyman of Dixmude says, "The burgomaster of Handzaeme was shot for trying to protect his daughter." And how many other cases have occurred! We have not the heart to continue the list.

Martyrdom of Civilian Prisoners

After having burnt our villages, and shot the inhabitants by dozens in some places, and by hundreds in others, they frequently deported all or a part of the survivors to Germany. It is impossible at this moment to establish the number of those deported, but they were sent off by tens

[3] See the report of the French Commission. See also the moving letter of Cardinal Mercier to von Bissing: "My conscience forbids my divulging to any tribunal the information, alas, only too well substantiated, which I possess. Outrages on nuns have been committed."

of thousands. These unfortunate people, men, women and children, who had witnessed and survived fires and massacres, who had seen their houses blazing and so many of those dear to them fall under the bullets of the assassin, and who were forced in some places to dig graves for their victims, and in others to hold a light for the executioners while they were finishing off the wounded,—these poor wretches are dispatched to Germany. What a journey, and what a place of residence!

Before February 28, 1915, more than 10,000 persons, old men, women, and children, who had been deported from France to Germany, had been repatriated by way of Switzerland. All those who received them on their return were "alarmed at their ragged condition and weakness," which was so great that the French Commission of Inquiry received special instructions to question these victims. They took the evidence of over 300 witnesses in 28 different localities. To do justice to their case one ought to quote the whole report—children brutally torn away from their mothers, poor wretches crowded for days together in carriages so tightly packed that they had to stand up, cases of madness occurring among these half-stifled crowds, howling with hunger. But we must confine our quotations to a few items of "Kultur." "While the men of Combres set out for Germany, the women and children were shut up in the village church. They were kept there for a month, and passed their nights seated in the pews. Dysentery and croup raged among them. The women were allowed to carry excrement only just outside the church into the churchyard." "At least four of the prisoners were massacred because they could not keep up with the column, being completely exhausted." "Fortin, aged 65, and infirm, could not go any further. They tied a rope to him, and two horsemen held the ends so that he had to keep the pace of the horses. As he kept falling down at every moment, they made him get up by poking him with their lances. The poor wretch, covered with blood, prayed them to kill him."

"One hundred and eighty-nine inhabitants of Sinceny, who were sent to Erfurt, arrived there after a journey of

84 hours, during which each of them got nothing but a single morsel of bread weighing less than four ounces. Another convoy spent four days on the railway journey and were only fed once, and were beaten with sticks and fists and with knife handles." The same brutalities were experienced in the German cities through which they passed, and very few of the civilian prisoners escaped being buffeted by the infuriated crowds or being spat upon.

So much for the journey. Now for what happened to them after their arrival! "The declarations made to us show clearly that the bulk of the prisoners almost collapsed from hunger. After food had been distributed, when anything was left, you saw some of them rush to the neighborhood of the kitchens; hustled and beaten by the sentries, these unfortunates risked blows and abuse to try and pick up some additional morsels of the sickening food. You saw men, dying of hunger, picking up herring heads, and the grounds of the morning's decoction."

At Parchim, where 2,000 French civilians from 12 to 77 years of age were interned, two starving prisoners who asked for the scraps left over were beaten with the butt-ends of rifles to such an extent that they died of their wounds. The young son of one of them who tried to protect his father was tied to a stake for a week on end.

On oath, Dr. Page deposes: "Those who had no money almost died of hunger. When a little soup was left, a crowd of unfortunates rushed to get it, and the non-commissioned officers got rid of them at last by letting the dogs loose on them." But what is the need of all these details and of all this evidence? Look at the 10,000 who came back after being repatriated and see what the bandits have done to them. Reader, summon up your courage and peruse to the bitter end the conclusions of the Official Commission of Inquiry. "It is impossible to conceal the melancholy and indignation we felt on seeing the state of the 'hostages' [4] whom the Germans had returned to us after they had kidnaped them in defiance of the rights of nations. During

[4] Through old habit, the Commission makes use of this word; they are not "hostages," of course.

our inquiry we never ceased hearing the perpetual coughs that rent them. We saw numbers of young people whose cheerfulness had disappeared apparently forever, and whose pale and emaciated faces betrayed physical damage probably beyond repair. In spite of ourselves we could not help thinking that scientific Germany had applied her methodical ways to try and spread tuberculosis in our country. Nor were we less profoundly moved to thought by the sight of women mourning their desolated hearths and missing or captive children, or by the moral impression left on the faces and bearing of many prisoners by the hateful régime which was intended to destroy, in those who were subjected to it, the feeling of human dignity and self-respect."

German Excuses: Lies and Calumny

The Boches have taken up three positions in succession. In the first place, in their speeches, in their writings and by commemorative pictures and medals, *they have gloried in their misdeeds,* thus declaring that Kultur is above morality (as stated by their writer, Thomas Mann), that the right of German might is above everything. Then, in the second place, when they discovered that in the world outside them there was something known as a "moral conscience," not understood by them, but still to be reckoned with, *they cynically denied the charges.* Finally, when they were driven from this second trench, when simple negation became impossible, *they had perforce to explain their crimes.*

Their commonest explanation is this, "Civilians fired on us." [5] The French Commission of Inquiry came to the following conclusion on this point: "This allegation is false, and those who put it forward have been powerless to give it the appearance of truth, even though it has been their custom to fire shots in the neighborhood of dwellings, in order to be able to affirm that they have been attacked

[5] Need it be noted here that even if in any locality an imprudent civilian had fired a shot, it would still remain—in accordance with the Hague Convention, International Law, and plain morality—a crime to massacre in a heap, haphazard, and without inquiry, so many innocent souls?

by innocent inhabitants, on whose ruin or massacre they had resolved."

Inquiries conducted by high magistrates have established the fact that German officials are very frequently guilty of premeditated lies. It is probable, all the same, that many German soldiers, on entering Belgium or France, were obsessed by the idea of civilians firing on them. The cry of a soldier trembling with fear, drunk, or thirsting for pillage—*"Man hat geschossen* (they have fired)"—is enough for a locality to be delivered up at once to the wildest fury. "When an inhabitant has fired on a regiment," said a soldier at Louvain, "the place belongs to the regiment." What a temptation for a Boche soldier to fire a shot that will at once unloose pillage and massacre!

Some mistakes have *possibly* been made which could have been avoided by the least inquiry. Read this admission recorded in his diary by a Saxon officer: "The lovely village of Gué-d'Hossus has been given over to the flames, though innocent in my opinion. I hear that a cyclist fell off his machine and that his fall caused his rifle to go off of itself. As a consequence there was firing in his direction. Then, the male inhabitants were simply hurled straight away into the flames. Such horrors will not be repeated, we must hope . . . There ought to be some compulsion to verify suspicions of guilt in order to put a check on this indiscriminate shooting of people."

The only shots fired at them inside, or in the neighborhood of, villages have been those of French or Belgian soldiers covering their retreat. Sometimes this has been discovered, but too late, and they have continued their crimes —in order to justify them.

Here is the statement of a neutral: "In one village they found corpses of German soldiers with the fingers cut off, and instantly the officer in command had the houses set on fire and the inhabitants shot . . . In the same district a German officer was billeted with a famous Flemish poet; the officer behaved courteously, was treated with consideration, and allowed himself to talk freely: his complaint was the misdeeds of his soldiers. Near Haelen, he told his host,

he had to have a soldier shot on finding in his knapsack some fingers covered with rings: the man, on being questioned, admitted that he had cut them off the bodies of the German dead."

In exceptional cases an inquiry is held; and in every such instance the truth is discovered and massacre prevented.

At the end of August, Liebknecht, a member of the Reichstag, set out in his car for Louvain. He came to a village where there was considerable excitement going on. The Germans had just found three of their men lying dead on the road, and accused the peasants of being responsible for the deed. Liebknecht examined them, and was not long in obtaining proof that the Germans had been killed by Belgian riflemen. At Huy there were shots in the night; two soldiers wounded; the populace accused; the mayor arrested and condemned to death; but he knew that there were no Allied troops in the neighborhood, and also that his own people had not fired a shot. "Shoot me, if you like," he said calmly, "but not before extracting the bullets from the wounded." The officer, less of a brute than some, gave his consent to this. The bullets in the wounds were German bullets.

In their private diaries they accuse one another, each throwing on his neighbor the responsibility for crimes committed. A cavalryman writes: "It is unfortunately true that the worst elements of our Army feel themselves authorized to commit any sort of infamy. This charge applies particularly to the A.S.C." A bombing officer: "Discipline becoming lax. Brandy. Looting. The blame lies with the *infantry*." An infantry officer: "Discipline in our company excellent—a contrast with the rest. The *Pioneers* are not worth much. As for the *Artillery*, they are a band of brigands." A final extract seems to be the only one that gives the truth: "*Troops of all arms* are engaged in looting."

What is our object in repeating these reports of horror?

Is it to incite our soldiers to commit, if chance arises, atrocities like theirs? We repudiate with horror a thought such as that. *Defensive* reprisals (asphyxiating gas, liquid

fire, etc.) are sometimes indispensable. Reprisals for *revenge* would be unworthy of us. But—without speaking of personal punishments, demanded by outraged conscience, and essential in order that the two indivisible principles of right and of responsibility may still exist in the world—we must make it absolutely impossible for the Wild Beast to break out again.

It is not enough for these crimes to be known by Governments and by a few hundred people with leisure and inclination to read collections of great volumes. They must be known by everybody, by the entire people, by the People, who—in our proud and free countries—control, support, direct their Governments and are the sole masters of their own destiny.

Our peoples ought to know the crimes committed in the name of "Kultur," in order, at all costs, to take the precautions necessary to prevent forever their return. That is our first object. The second is this: to all our martyrs we have a sacred duty—that of remembrance. There, where they fell, we shall doubtless carve their names in stone or bronze. But what of a time further away? When, after the long sufferings of this war, freed humanity takes up again its works of peace, we shall see the Germans reappear in every land, at every crossroad—men of commerce, industry, finance, science, men of the people and of society—in every place where those of all countries, all races and all colors meet and rub elbows. And what is our attitude to be? Our answer is this: So long as the nation in whose name and by whose hands these atrocities have been committed has not herself solemnly cast from her the scoundrels who dragged her into such decadence, we shall consider that it would betray our martyrs for us even to rub shoulders with their executioners, and that until the day arrives—if it ever does arrive—of a striking moral repentance, to *forget* would be to *condone*.

TURKEY LOSES THE CAUCASUS

THE RUSSIAN VICTORY OF SARIKAMISH

JANUARY 4TH

ROBERT MACHRAY GASTON BODART

No Turkish accounts of the Great War have been issued, except a few wholly empty and boastful proclamations. No reliable account ever can be issued now, because of the general Turkish downfall. The Russian anarchy has been almost equally destructive both of eye-witnesses and official records of the great events of the early years of the War. Hence we are obliged to appeal to a western historian, a British expert on the "Near East" for a clear narrative of the spectacular mid-winter campaign which Turks and Russians fought against each other amid the mighty mountans of the Caucasus. Dr. Gaston Bodart was the Teuton expert sent from Vienna to report on the campaign.

The Caucasus mountain region divides Europe and Asia to the eastward of the Black Sea. Its summits are among the highest peaks in the world, including Mt. Ararat of Biblical fame, which is over 21,000 feet high. Here occurred much of the hard fighting of the preceding Russo-Turkish war of 1878, which made famous the Caucasus fortresses of Kars and Erivan. And here in December of 1914, not far from Kars, the chief Russian stronghold, there gradually developed a bitter battle, which reached its climax of Russian victory at Sarikamish on January 4, 1915. Hence the new year was ushered in by an Ally triumph.

Northern Armenia was soon afterward occupied by the Russians, and also northern Persia, with its capital Tabriz. The Turks had previously seized northern Persia; and as they retreated the advancing Russians snatched it in their turn. The Persians were helpless between the two. The Russians had previously "policed" this part of Persia; now they gradually spread over it as conquerors. The Turks fell back unwillingly to their own domains along the Euphrates River valley. Here they were later to fight Britons as well as Russians.

BY ROBERT MACHRAY

OF unusual interest, both from the military and the political points of view, and not less remarkable in its broadly human aspects was the campaign in the Caucasus. It was no small affair, no mere episode; involving, as it did, the fate of above a quarter of a million men, and ranging over a front of some three hundred miles, it would have been rightly deemed something tremendous in any war

other than the present colossal conflict of the nations. Yet the large scale on which it was conducted in such a region and at the particular season of the year, the extraordinary boldness and at least partial success of the Turkish plan of attack, and the overwhelming triumph of the Russians that was its final result, came as a great surprise to the world, whose attention had been absorbed by the vast issues in the western and in the main eastern theaters of operations. The general public had been hardly aware that fighting of an important character was proceeding in the Caucasus; in our newspapers, as a rule, the *communiqués* dealing with it, issued by the Russian Headquarters Staff, which were almost the only sources of information available, had been consistently stowed away in a corner as if they did not count. Then suddenly this indifference was changed by the publication of a memorable telegram on January 4th from the Grand Duke Nicholas, that most laconic of men, addressed to General Joffre, another strong, silent man, which began with the significant words, "I hasten to give you good news," and definitely announced two crushing defeats of the Turks that were sheer, irremediable disaster, as later was seen to be the case.

Up to that time even the Russians themselves in other parts of their empire took comparatively slight notice of the struggle in the Caucasus, as in their view it was a very secondary business when compared with the gigantic and terrible contest being waged in Poland and Galicia. Nor at first did they appreciate the greatness of the achievement of their arms in that area at anything like its full value —they spoke of it as a "pleasant little success this Christmas," that is, at their Christmas, which is twelve days after ours. Further, the fact is that while sharp fighting with the Turks was not unexpected, it did not follow the line anticipated by the Russian Command, who looked and prepared for it much more to the southeast.

Although Turkey was suspected by the Allies almost from the commencement of the Great War in August, she did not commit the provocative acts, including the bombardment of Odessa, until the end of October. During the in-

tervening period of three months, and particularly towards the latter part of it, Austro-German pressure on the Russian front in Europe necessitated a withdrawal of some portion of the Russian troops normally stationed on the Turkish frontier and in Caucasia, and known as the "Army of the Caucasus." This force, which was under the immediate control of the Governor-General of the Caucasus, was intended to be, and generally was, kept independent of the Russian main armies and separate from them, and in ordinary times was credited with 180,000 effectives, comprised in three army corps, various brigades of rifles, several divisions of cavalry, and numerous bands of Cossacks. The southern boundary of Caucasia marches with both Turkish and Persian territory, and the activities of this army were not confined entirely to the viceroyalty, for it also supplied the body of soldiers that Russia maintained in the northern part of Persia, which under the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 is recognized as the "Russian Sphere." Last year, before the war, the number of these soldiers was estimated at 3,000, distributed in detachments throughout northern Persia, notably at Teheran, its capital, and in the province of Azerbaijan at Tabriz, its second city. Detailed, at all events nominally, for the preservation of order and the protection of Russian interests in that long-distracted country, and too inconsiderable to be designated an army of occupation, they yet constituted in a very real sense the advance-guard of the Russian Empire in that quarter of the globe.

When the Russians saw that war with the Turks was inevitable, their first preoccupation in that region was their frontier, which was so vulnerable, so little defended by fortifications of any sort, that it was called the Achilles' heel of Russia. Attack was easy on that side, and thinking it was there that the Turks would operate in force, they reduced their strength, already decreased by drafts to Europe, in the mountain districts of the Caucasus, and concentrated the troops thus obtained north and south of the Araxes, which forms the international boundary, the central point being Julfa, the terminus of a railway from Tiflis,

and some eighty miles distant from Tabriz by the best road in Persia.

The Turks, however, either foresaw what the Russians would do, or were informed by their spies of what was taking place, and when they developed their great offensive it was found that while their attack did include this south-eastern part of Caucasia, their main assault was made elsewhere, namely, in the mountains of the Caucasus on their own and the Russian frontier. Their objective was not Tabriz-Julfa-Tiflis, or Khoi-Julfa-Tiflis (Khoi lies west of Tabriz and is rather nearer Julfa), but Sarikamish-Kars-Tiflis. They deliberately selected the much harder route because, it must be held, they deemed the many difficulties which it presented as more than counterbalanced by the relatively inferior strength of the Russians who were defending it, and by the decided military advantage that comes from a surprise. The plan of the Turkish Command, who no doubt were acting under German inspiration, has been characterized as mad, but it is only right to say that it was madness with reason in it; the best justification of it is that it met with a large measure of success, and indeed very nearly succeeded altogether.

It was at the end of November that the Turks began to put their plan of campaign into execution, and winter had already set in, not only in the mountains, but throughout the Armenian plateau. The Russians were held up but still fighting hard at Koprokoi, and had made no further advance of moment on the rest of their front, north or south. There was no longer talk in Petrograd of the imminent fall of Erzerum; instead, the military critic of the *Retch* admitted that the Turks were making a spirited struggle in spite of their enormous losses, and that they were well-trained, well-equipped, disciplined, and enduring. The phrase "enormous losses" has been used so often in this war, and with so elastic a signification, that apart from figures being given, it has come to have little meaning; but whether their losses were enormous or not, the Turks were now in great strength, in far greater strength than the Russians.

Under Hassan Izzet Pasha, its Commander-in-Chief,

the Ottoman "Third Army," which included some of Turkey's best troops, had been concentrated at Erzerum; it consisted of three army corps, each of three divisions: the 9th Army Corps, whose headquarters was Erzerum itself; the 10th Army Corps, from Erzingan; and the 11th Army Corps, from Van. With auxiliaries this army numbered about 120,000 men. On its right, deployed southeast of Erzerum, were forces, perhaps drawn from Van or even Mosul; and still farther on its right were two or three Turkish regiments and masses of Kurdish irregulars. This right wing, which extended into Persia, was nowhere strong, and was not prominent in the unfolding of the Turkish offensive, but it kept more or less busily employed considerable Russian forces whose presence was much needed in the center—they had the satisfaction, however, of inflicting on it a defeat on December 26th at Dutak that prevented it from coöperating in the main attack, as may have been the design.

Of far greater consequence was the Turkish left wing, which was made up of two divisions of the 1st Army Corps, brought at the outset of the war from Constantinople and landed at Kopa and other ports on the Black Sea south of Batum, and supplemented by many irregulars in the district of the Chorok (northeast of Erzerum), where its concentration was effected. It had been the original intention of the Turks that this army should strike at Batum when it was in sufficient force by additions from oversea, but as the result of Russian resistance on land, and especially of various actions between the Turkish and Russian Fleets, which ended in the latter gaining the control of the Black Sea, the idea was rendered impracticable and was abandoned. Meanwhile, the plan for the big offensive in the Caucasus had been evolved, and the 1st Army Corps and its supports were fitted into it as the left wing. This wing may have had from 30,000 to 35,000 combatants; the precise figure is uncertain, but it must have been fairly large. Hassan Izzet Pasha, or Enver Pasha, if it was he who really was in chief command, had in all probability upwards of 160,000 men at his disposition, and the operations he set on foot soon

disclosed the familiar German turning movement which aims at the envelopment and destruction or surrender of an enemy army in some particular locality—in this case, the Russians on the line Sarikamish-Kars.

Naturally the Russians, like any other people in the same circumstances, do not make a point in their *communiqués* of announcing their retirements and reverses, and definite Turkish information is lacking; but while some of the details of this remarkable movement are obscure, its principal outlines are sufficiently clear.

I. *In the Center;* the main attack. During the last days of November and the first of December the 10th Army Corps moved out from Erzerum in a northeasterly direction by roads or tracks which must have been passable, two divisions marching on Ardost in the Sivri valley, and one division on Id in the adjoining valley of the Olti, a southern tributary of the Chorok. The Russians had occupied these frontier posts, which are in Turkish territory, early in November; the Turks now drove them out, and advancing on the Russian side of the mountains, took Olti, a little town, but the most important in the neighborhood, and the starting place of several tracks leading southward to Sarikamish, to the railway two or three miles east of it, and even to Kars. Pushing the Russians before it, but slowly, for they fought with characteristic "stubbornness," giving way only under the pressure of greatly superior numbers, the 10th Army Corps marched on to Sarikamish, with the intention, of course, of taking the Russians there in flank and rear, and capturing the railway to Kars. It reached its objective in the fourth week of December. At the same time the Russians were assailed in front by the 9th Army Corps, which now appeared upon the scene. In conjunction with the 11th Army Corps, the 9th Corps, by the third week in December, had compelled the Russians, after severe fighting, but here also far outnumbered, to withdraw from Koprokoi and other positions east of it on the main road to Sarikamish, and had forced them back into the mountains. Besides the main road there are in the vicinity two paths from the foothills that cross over to Sarikamish on different

passes, and on one of these tracks at Korosan, a few miles from the highway, the 11th Corps halted, attacked and "contained" the Russians immediately in front of them, while the 9th Corps fought its way over the pass on the main road, and got into touch with the 10th Corps. These two corps then assaulted the Russian forces, and after several days' sanguinary onslaughts, but with numbers still decidedly in their favor, took Sarikamish and two or three miles of the railway beyond it, as the year drew to an end.

II. *The Right Wing;* largely negligible, as noted above.

III. *The Left Wing;* most important outflanking movement, and scarcely subsidiary to that of I., but co-ordinated with it. In addition to the highway from Erzerum to Sarikamish there is but one other good road, and that is to speak relatively, in the Little Caucasus. It climbs up from Batum through the valley of the Chorok to Artvin, thence to Ardanuch on the south side of the river, and next to Ardahan, from which it goes down direct to Kars. The 1st Corps, operating in the Chorok region, and materially assisted by the rebellious Adjars of the country, seized this road, occupied Ardanuch, and after a desperate Russian resistance lasting seventeen days, which must have been one of the most heroic in history, took Ardahan, and threatened an immediate descent on Kars, which if it succeeded would cut off the retreat of the Russians west of it, that is, at Sarikamish, from Kars.

To sum up. On January 1st the Turks were in possession of Sarikamish and part of the railway, though they had destroyed a bit of it, and on January 2nd they also held Ardahan. It looked for all the world as if the Turkish plan were working out into a great victory. Reading between the lines of the messages wired by the correspondents of our journals, it could be discerned that Petrograd was anxious and uneasy; the correspondent of the *Times* said that "it must be recognized that the Turks under German leadership have displayed exceptional qualities of generalship." The Turks themselves appeared to be in no doubt of the issue; it is stated that Enver Pasha was so confident of the result that he said that he expected to be in Tiflis

within a few days. It was, however, written, as the Turks themselves would say, that their plan, even on the edge of seeming fulfillment, was doomed to failure of the most disastrous kind. When reënforcements came up, the Russians, thanks to the valor of these hard-pressed but undaunted infantry of theirs, were at once in a position to undertake a vigorous offensive, which developed into two glorious victories, gained practically simultaneously.

In point of time they succeeded first at Ardahan, Sunday, January 3rd. After the place was bombarded the Russians drove the 1st Army Corps out of it at the point of the bayonet, and by repeated charges utterly routed the enemy, who was crushed into fragments. These broken remnants fled in confusion back to Ardanuch, but, hotly pursued, were not allowed to rest there long, as it was reoccupied by the victors on January 18th. Some survivors from the wreck made good their escape into their own territory, while others sought refuge in the fastnesses of the Chorok ranges, where the Adjars gave them shelter, but as a combatant force the Turkish left wing had been swept out of existence.

The fighting in and about Sarikamish lasted longer. We hear of great masses of Turks, brave to the last but famished and half-frozen, being mown down by guns and maxims and rifle-fire on the main road, in the passes, and on the lower slopes of the mountains; or of their fierce attacks repulsed and Russian counter-attacks driven home, the cold steel finishing what was left undone by shell and bullet—the whole against a background of snow, in an atmosphere so arctic that the wounded succumbed to the cold where they fell. Doubtless it was all desperate and sanguinary enough. By the end, the 9th Corps, with the exception of its general, Iskhan Pasha, its divisional commanders, and a few hundred officers and men who capitulated, was totally destroyed, while the 10th Corps was decisively defeated and put to flight, what remained of it making its way back to Olti as best it could, and losing more men and material ever as it went. Thus, of the Turkish center one-third was absolutely demolished, and

another third battered to pieces and dispersed; with the left wing gone this meant that the plan of campaign, well-conceived as it was, and carried out with success for about a month, had after all finally crashed down in blackest ruin.

News of this disaster reached Enver Pasha, who hastened to Korosan, where the 11th Corps, the remaining third of the center, was still in position, holding the Russians in front of it. Enver moved up to Kara Urgan, a post on the main road to Sarikamish just on the frontier, and was joined by fresh troops in such numbers that, according to one account, his force was 100,000 strong. Kara Urgan is about a dozen miles west of Sarikamish, and the Russians advancing from the latter engaged this army, whose offensive was so resolute that for four days they made no headway against it. On January 11th the tide turned, but it was not till January 16th, when a strongly fortified Turkish position at Zivin, a few miles west of Kara Urgan, was stormed, that victory was assured and the Turks were thoroughly routed. "Despite violent snowstorms, which lasted from the 8th to the 16th of January, rendering the roads very difficult, our troops by dint of the greatest heroism and extraordinary tenacity progressed continuously with attack after attack," says the Russian *communiqué* of February 1st; "the enemy's forces were completely broken up and retreated precipitately, abandoning wounded and ammunition and flinging their guns down precipices." In other words, Kara Urgan repeated the same story as Ardahan and Sarikamish. For five days the Russians kept indefatigably pursuing the Turks, dislodging them from point after point, until they fled, demoralized and shattered, back towards Erzerum. This completed the *débâcle*.

BY DR. GASTON BODART

By the end of August, 1914, the Turks had begun to place an army in the strategetically most important section of their Caucasian frontier, the region of Erzerum. By the time Turkey declared war, in November, this Caucasus

army consisted of three corps of regular troops, besides an uncountable number of Kurdish tribesmen. The traditionally slow mobilization of Turkish forces rendered more acute by the nature of the ground, lack of railroads and highways, and the great distance from the base, gave the initiative to the numerically weaker but more rapidly mobilizing Russians. The tremendous efforts of Russia on the European scene of operations, left her only one of her three Caucasian corps free to operate; and this, in addition to four reserve divisions and the Caucasian Cossack corps, constituted, in the beginning of November, the entire force at the disposal of General Yudenitch, the Russian commander-in-chief. The chief command in the Turkish army was held in November by the German General Posseldt Pasha, who was in the Turkish service and who was followed in December by the Minister of war and Vice-Generalissimo of the Turkish army, Enver Pasha.

The Russian advance proceeded along a somewhat broad front, troops of all descriptions as to arms constituting the center and right wing, while the left was formed by the cavalry. The weak Turkish frontier troops were forced back on Turkish territory. On the important highway Kars-Erzerum the Russians, on November 11th and 12th, were halted by the Turks at Koprokoi, two days' march from Erzerum. The Russian forces were not sufficiently great to undertake further energetic operations, particularly against Erzerum, which afforded the Turks a protection similar to that which Kars afforded to the Russians. This interval of rest enabled the Turkish military command to complete the formation of its Third Caucasus army and to proceed to inaugurate a counter-offensive.

By bringing up reserves in considerable numbers, the Turks acquired a numerical superiority over the Russians (150,000 men against the 100,000 of Russia). The latter, energetically attacked along the whole line, had to evacuate during December all the region theretofore occupied besides considerable portions of their own territory. After retreating to Sarikamish, the terminus of the Russian railroad, 60 k.m. from Kars, they were here again attacked by the two

Turkish corps which had been engaged in pursuing them. While these corps were exhausting themselves in frontal attacks on the strong position occupied by the Russians at that place (December 22th-26th), General Yudenitch, who meanwhile had been strongly reinforced from Kars, turned the scales to his advantage. A counter-attack delivered along the whole line brought the Turks to a halt. The right Russian wing reconquered Ardahan, which had been lost during the retreat, and penetrated again into the Tchovock valley, which the Russians had also previously been compelled to evacuate. The left wing advanced as far as Khorasan and held there the 11th Turkish army corps, while the center, by a frontal attack on the 10th Turkish corps near Sarikamish and an encircling of the 9th, inflicted on both a severe defeat. The remnants of these Turkish corps, leaving the greater part of their artillery behind them, retreated to Kara-Urgan on the plateau of Sewin. Here they again confronted the Russians on the Kars-Erzerum road. They were again severely beaten in January, 1915, by means of a skilful flank movement directed against them from the vicinity of Olti. Although they succeeded in forming a new line in the less mountainous region around Van, they later, with the coming of spring, abandoned even Van, surrendering this chief Armenian city to their foes.

THE U-BOAT WAR ON COMMERCE

GERMANY'S DEFIANCE OF THE NEUTRAL NATIONS

FEBRUARY 4TH

PRINCE VON BÜLOW ADMIRAL VON TIRPITZ
WILLIAM ARCHER

On February 4, 1915, Germany took a step which challenged all the world to war. She declared that her U-boats would sink at sight any merchant ship which they even suspected of being an enemy. This obviously meant in threat, and actually caused in practice, the torpedoing of many neutral vessels. Now, the right of neutral sailors, and even of neutral merchandise, to safety at sea had been guaranteed to them for generations by every civilized nation, including Germany. Hence this declaration was a breaking, not of some special treaty as in the case of the invasion of Belgium, but of all treaties. It struck at the very basis of all International Law, and claimed for Germany the right to be sole arbiter of all her acts, including even the killing of foreigners who had committed no crime and with whom she had no war.

Such slaying of even a single citizen abroad has long been held as an absolutely necessary cause of war, if the injured nation meant to claim any sort of equal rank among others. Several years ago when a mob in one of America's southern cities slew some Italians, the U. S. Government felt called upon not only to deny all participation in the matter but to express its utmost disapproval and its desire to have the offenders adequately punished. Yet here was a government actually commanding its subjects to slay law-abiding foreigners. Had other nations been of as arrogant a temper as the Germans, this challenge must have meant universal war.

The neutrals, however, with the United States at their head, were determined to make every possible allowance for the exigencies of the Great War. They attempted only by words of protest to prevent the threatened killing of their people; and with words Germany was very ready to meet them. With each government she undertook elaborate and long-delayed discussions, while to the mass of shipping men she let the actions of her U-boats speak for her.

Of course the real issue for her was, could she block the bulk of neutral trade from Britain by terrorizing neutral sailors? She did not want to draw any further foes into the War if it could be evaded; but she meant to put fear into the hearts of all men at sea, as she had already sought to do by "frightfulness" on land. As regards France and Britain, the new form of submarine warfare was but a continuation of Germany's already announced attitude of the "superman." She

meant to break every pledge of the past, every restraint of morality or Christianity, if she thereby increased her chance of victory.

The British losses through this submarine attack were heavy. During the four years from 1915 onward, 5,622 British merchant ships were sunk, amounting to about half of all she possessed. Among neutrals, Norway, the victim to suffer most, lost about one-eighth as much as Britain. The United States lost 19 merchant vessels during her two years of neutrality, and 126 during her two years of war. More than 15,000 British civilian sailors were killed, and 775 Americans on American ships. These figures are exclusive of Americans slain on British ships as in the *Lusitania* case, that subject being reserved for another article.

Britain's standpoint in the matter is here presented by one of her ablest writers, Mr. William Archer. The German standpoint is voiced by her former Chancellor, Prince von Bülow and by Admiral von Tirpitz, the man who organized and directed the U-boat assaults.

C. F. H.

BY PRINCE VON BÜLOW

THE history of England, who has always dealt most harshly with her vanquished foe in the few European wars in which she has taken part in modern times, gives us Germans an idea of the fate in store for us if defeated. Once embarked upon a war, England has always ruthlessly devoted all means at her disposal to its prosecution. English policy was always guided by what Gambetta called *"la souveraineté du but."* England can only be got at by employing like decision and determination. The English character being what it is, since in the course of the world's history we are now for the first time at war with England, our future depends upon our employing all our means and all our forces with equal ruthlessness, so as to secure the victory and obtain a clear road. Since the German people, with unparalleled heroism, but also at the cost of fearful sacrifices, has waged war against half the world, it is our right and our duty to obtain safety and independence for ourselves at sea. We must also win really sufficient and, above all, practical, guarantees for the freedom of the seas and for the further fulfillment of our economic and political tasks throughout the world. The result of the great struggle in this particular respect will be decisive for the total result of the war and also for the judgment that will be passed upon it.

BY ADMIRAL VON TIRPITZ [1]

The historical decision to make a war zone around the United Kingdom and Ireland was arrived at on the evening of February 2nd in a conference between von Pohl and the Chancellor with the consent of the Foreign Office, in the presence of the Minister of the Home Office, and apparently without opposition from the Grand General Staff.

Von Pohl obtained the consent of the Chancellor, who was still sadly unconversant with the world conditions and our own submarine power and then on February 4th sprang his prepared draft of the declaration of the Emperor while sailing through Wilhelmshaven Harbor.

It was disloyal of von Pohl not to consult beforehand with the Secretary of State as to the wording of the draft. He was also disloyal to me as he had always previously sought my advice in reaching critical decisions. I was entitled to this.

His act was, on the whole, the product of boundless vanity. He wished above all that the declaration should be made over his name, and February 4th was the last date on which this could be done, for on that day he took over the command of the High Seas Fleet and was already, strictly speaking, no longer chief of the naval staff.

So, against my advice and on the decision of Bethmann-Hollweg, submarine war was to begin, threatening every ship sailing in the direction of Great Britain and Ireland. Unless the dignity, and therewith the power, of the empire was to be seriously impaired and the confidence of the enemy fatally strengthened, there was nothing for it now but to stand fast.

In the face of the whole world, seriously and with a flourish of trumpets, as it were, the declaration, in my opinion so premature and so unfortunate, had been made.

On February 12th came America's first note of protest against submarine warfare. In a responsible bureau this could hardly have been unexpected, but to von Pohl's as-

[1] From the "Von Tirpitz Memoirs," copyright, 1919, by Dodd, Mead & Co.

tonishment and chagrin it caused the Foreign Office to make an about-face in regards to the U-boat policy.

The Chancellor's representative at headquarters, von Reuter, later said that the Chancellor had been misunderstood by von Pohl. Von Pohl energetically denied the possibility of a misunderstanding, maintaining that he had carefully explained to the Chancellor the full consequence of the step.

Thus, scarcely had submarine warfare, born February 4th, drawn its first breath, when its own fathers, terrified, hastened to smother it. In my opinion we should never even have considered a modification of our submarine policy, once it was announced to the world, unless England consented to modify some of her own interpretations of maritime law during the war.

America's first protest resulted in our allowing the shell of submarine warfare to stand as a sop to the German public, ever irritating America, but by orders from our political leaders to our submarine commanders we had hollowed out the military kernel. We were acting on a program of big words and little deeds. Our method of submarine warfare had now become, according to Bethmann's prediction, ineffective for final German victory, but a fruitful source of vexatious incidents with the United States.

BY WILLIAM ARCHER

It took Germany some six months to make up her mind to the systematic employment of her U-boats as commerce-destroyers. During those six months (August, 1914-January, 1915, inclusive) a good deal of harm was done to Allied shipping by a few warships which had been at large at the outbreak of hostilities, notably by the *Emden* in the Indian Ocean. The proceedings of these ships were, if not incontestably legal, at least plausibly defensible under international law. It is true that they constantly sank their prizes instead of taking them into port to have their status determined by a Prize Court; but it is generally admitted that the destruction of a prize is permissible when circumstances render it dangerous or impracticable to bring it into

harbor; and as practically all Germany's oversea harbors had been seized very early in the war, it is manifest that there was neither port nor Prize Court within the raiders' reach. The right to sink captured ships is limited by the imperative condition that the captor "must make due provision for the safety of passengers and crew, and for the preservation of the ship's papers"; and this condition the raiders honorably observed. Captain Müller, of the *Emden,* collected the crews and passengers of a number of prizes on board a single vessel, which he then set free.

A few isolated instances of submarine attacks on merchant shipping occurred in this period, but only one was marked by gross inhumanity.

The first commercial victim was the steamship *Glitra,* from Grangemouth to Stavanger, which was stopped by a U-boat about noon on October 20, 1914, nine miles S.W. of Skudesnæs. A boat's crew of 5 men boarded the steamer, and when the captain lowered the British flag the German officer tore it up and trampled upon it. The *"Gott strafe England"* craze was then, it will be remembered, at its height. The crew were allowed ten minutes to take to their boats, and then the ship was sunk, it is believed by opening the bottom valves. The *Hamburger Nachrichten* described this exploit as "a brisk Viking-stroke."

On November 23rd the *Malachite* was held up in Havre roadstead, the crew were allowed ten minutes to leave the ship, and it was then sunk by shell-fire. Three days later (November 26th) the *Primo* was sunk off Cape Antifer. In neither of these cases was the crew exposed to any serious danger.

Very different was the case of the *Amiral Ganteaume.* This passenger ship, bound from Calais to Havre, with 2,500 refugees on board, was wantonly torpedoed, without a moment's warning, twelve miles from Cape Grisnez. The Channel passenger steamer *Queen* ranged up alongside of the stricken ship, and "with great resourcefulness and daring" took off most of the passengers. About 50, however, lost their lives. That the disaster was not due to a mine was proved by the discovery of a fragment of a torpedo

in the hull of the ship, which did not ultimately sink. This was the first of the German maritime outrages, and it was no fault of the perpetrators that it was not also the worst. Had the torpedo taken full effect, the death-roll would have been longer than that of the *Lusitania*. The attack was without a shadow of excuse. What military purpose could be served by sinking a passenger ship bound from one French port to another, and manifestly (for the incident took place in broad daylight) crowded with civilians? Whoever was responsible for the attack, which took place on October 26th, was clearly animated by the sheer lust of murder which is awakened in so many Germans by the sight of defenseless enemies. The sailor who commanded the unknown U-boat was a true brother-in-arms of the soldiers who, a few weeks earlier, had marched burning and massacring through Belgium.

On January 22, 1915, the steamship *Durward* was stopped by a U-boat about thirteen miles from the lightship *Maas*. The crew was ordered to take to the boats, no time being allowed for the removal of their private belongings. The submarine then towed the boats to a certain distance, ordered them to wait there while it sank the ship, and then towed them onwards in the direction of the lightship. A week later (January 30th) two ships, the *Ben Cruachan* and the *Linda Blanche,* were sunk, in both cases with reasonable consideration for the safety of the crews. The men of the *Ben Cruachan* were given ten minutes to leave the ship, the German officer, who spoke "perfect English," bidding them "get as many of their belongings together as they could." The ship was sunk by bombs. In the case of the *Linda Blanche,* the men on board the submarine "handed cigars and cigarettes to the crew" as they took to their boats. Deliberate inhumanity had not yet developed into a system, though the *Kölnische Zeitung,* about the middle of the month, had published an article declaring that "in future German submarines and aircraft would wage war against British mercantile vessels without troubling themselves in any way about the fate of the crews." This was evidently

an inspired forecast, and it was to be promptly and amply justified by events.

A few days before Christmas, 1914, Grand Admiral von Tirpitz granted an interview to the representative of the United Press of America, which very clearly indicated that Germany was already planning a submarine "blockade" of the British Islands. "America," he said, "has not raised her voice in protest, and has done little or nothing against the closing of the North Sea to neutral shipping by England. What would America say if Germany should declare a submarine war against all enemy trading vessels?" By the "closing of the North Sea" he meant the measure to which Britain had been driven by the German practice of indiscriminate mine-sowing under neutral flags. In the interests of neutral as well as British shipping, the Government had announced on November 3rd, not that the North Sea was "closed," but that a safe passage through it would be kept open for all neutral ships entering and leaving it by way of the Straits of Dover. It was only the northern passage between the Hebrides and the Faroe Islands that was closed, in the sense that vessels using it must do so at their peril.

On January 26, 1915, it was announced that the German Federal Council had decided to take under its control all the stocks of corn and flour in the country, on and from February 1st. It was at once anticipated that this measure would cause the British Government to regard all cargoes of foodstuffs destined for Germany as consigned to the German Government, and therefore contraband of war. The Germans afterwards tried to represent their attempted blockade as a measure of retaliation against this action of the British Government; but, to say nothing of the fact that the blockade had been threatened by von Tirpitz six weeks earlier, it was definitely announced before the British Government had taken any step whatever. The notification of the intended blockade was issued in Berlin on February 4th; not until the following day did the British Foreign Office announce that the Government was considering what steps it should take in view of the German commandeering of foodstuffs.

It so happened that, on January 23rd, a steamship named the *Wilhelmina* had cleared from New York for Hamburg, conveying a cargo of food shipped by an American firm, and consigned to an American citizen in Germany. The Foreign Office note of February 5th ran as follows: "If the destination and cargo of the *Wilhelmina* are as supposed, the cargo will, if the vessel is intercepted, be submitted to a Prize Court in order that the new situation created by the German decree may be examined, and a decision reached upon it after full consideration." This course was, in fact, pursued, and it was determined that the action of the German Government in taking foodstuffs under its exclusive control justified the Allies in treating all provisions consigned to Germany as contraband of war. But it is clearly absurd to represent as a result of this British measure a U-boat campaign which had been formally announced while the British Government was still considering its course of action, and before it had issued any statement whatever on the subject.

The German proclamation ran thus:

"The waters round Great Britain and Ireland, including the English Channel, are hereby proclaimed a war region.

"On and after February 18th every enemy merchant vessel found in this region will be destroyed, without its always being possible to warn the crews or passengers of the dangers threatening.

"Neutral ships will also incur danger in the war region, where, in view of the misuse of neutral flags ordered by the British Government, and incidents inevitable in sea warfare, attacks intended for hostile ships may affect neutral ships also.

"The sea passage to the north of the Shetland Islands, and the eastern region of the North Sea in a zone of at least 30 miles along the Netherlands coast, are not menaced by any danger.

"(Signed) Berlin, February 4th,

"Von Pohl,
"Chief of Marine Staff."

It will be seen that the warfare here threatened differs from the "unlimited" warfare of two years later in the position assigned to neutral shipping. Neutrals are warned that they had better avoid the "war region," but it is indictated that if they are attacked it will only be by mistake, and that, for these mistakes, they will have to blame the nefarious policy of the British Government with regard to the use of neutral flags.

There was not a single point at which this proclamation did not fly in the face of international law as stated by all jurists and as interpreted by all courts.

The use of a neutral flag by a vessel attempting to elude capture has always been held legitimate. Attacking under false colors is rightly prohibited—but that is a totally different matter.

The warship which doubts the genuineness of the flag displayed by a merchantman can put the matter to the test by exercising its unquestioned right of "visit and search." Thus the mistakes with which neutrals were threatened were mistakes which had no right to happen. As for the avowed intention of attacking enemy ships without warning (for nothing else was implied in the impudent phrase "without its being always possible to warn," etc.), it stood in flagrant contravention of every accepted principle and of all civilized practice. We have already seen, in discussing the case of the *Emden* and other raiders, that the sinking of prizes had hitherto been regarded as a measure to be resorted to only in the most exceptional circumstances. Here are some pronouncements of German authorities on the point:

GESSNER: As a general rule, the captor may not scuttle or otherwise destroy the prize he has taken in the open sea. He may do so, however, on his own responsibility, in circumstances of *force majeure.*

HEFFTER: The destruction of an enemy prize is not justifiable except in case of extreme necessity.

BLUNTSCHLI: As a rule, enemy prizes must be taken into the captor's port for adjudication. Destruction is permissible only in case of absolute necessity. *The blockade of*

the captor's port does not in itself constitute a case of absolute necessity.

Germany now claimed the right to make a universal rule of what had hitherto been sanctioned only as a rare exception, arguing that the submarine had created a new situation which had not been anticipated at the time when international law took shape. That was, it is true, an arguable point, and it was natural that Germany should decline to be bound by so strict a reading of existing regulations as would have made her U-boats entirely powerless as a weapon against the commerce of her enemies. But she not only resolved to sink every enemy ship that came in her way; she made up her mind to do so without that preliminary visit and search which had hitherto been held indispensable, and especially without taking those measures for the security of non-combatant crews and passengers which had been regarded as the most imperative of obligations. Here, she could allege no excuse in the nature of *force majeure*. It was perfectly possible for her to act humanely, as one or two of her commanders proved. By doing so she might to some extent have reduced the effectiveness of her campaign of havoc; but she would have had her reward in retaining some shred of the respect of the civilized world. Her disregard of every consideration of humanity was exactly on a level with her frequent use, in Belgium and Northern France, of civilian screens to mask an infantry advance. Such practices are defensible only on the theory that Germany must forego no possible advantage, of however dastardly a nature—the theory, indeed, which her "War Book" indicates almost without disguise, and on which she has consistently acted in every domain of warlike activity. But in her U-boat campaign, as in her treatment of Belgium, she has exceeded even the brutality which her theory demands. We shall have to record many deeds of a callous cruelty from which no appreciable advantage was to be reaped—deeds which betray in their perpetrators a positive delight in murder for its own sake.

February, 1915, opened with an attempt to torpedo the hospital-ship *Asturias*, which fortunately failed. We shall

have to speak more at length of this incident when the time comes to chronicle the deliberate and systematic war upon hospital-ships. For the present it remained an isolated and motiveless crime, which may be bracketed with the attack on the *Amiral Ganteaume,* as showing the reckless ferocity which was beginning to prevail among the U-boat commanders.

The "blockade," as we have seen, was proclaimed on February 4th, but a fortnight's grace was allowed to neutrals to clear out of the "war region," and leave the British to their fate. As a matter of fact, nothing of great importance occurred during this fortnight.

On February 19th, the day after the expiry of the period of grace, the Norwegian oil-steamer *Belridge* was torpedoed off Beachy Head, but managed to reach port. On the following day there were two victims: the *Cambank* was torpedoed without warning, while the crew of the *Downshire* were allowed five minutes to take to their boats. On the 23rd the *Oakly,* and on the 24th the *Deptford,* were torpedoed without warning. The 24th, too, witnessed the sinking of the *Harpalion.* The entire absence of warning is apparent from the account of the attack given by the second officer, Mr. Harper: "We had just sat down to tea, and the chief engineer was saying grace. He had just uttered the words, 'For what we are about to receive may the Lord make us truly thankful,' when there came an awful crash. I never saw such a smash as it caused." There is a certain grim humor in the situation, which, however, the sailors do not appear to have appreciated.

Mr. Asquith stated in the House of Commons on March 1st that the lawless submarine war was about to be met by a tightening of the strangle-hold upon Germany; and an Order-in-Council of March 11th made the definite announcement in the following terms: "His Majesty has decided to adopt further measures in order to prevent commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany, though such measures will be enforced without risk to neutral ships or to neutral or noncombatant life, and in strict observance of the dictates of humanity."

Two days earlier (March 9th) three ships, the *Tangistan, Blackwood,* and *Princess Victoria,* had been torpedoed off Scarborough, Hastings, and Liverpool respectively. In no case was any warning given, and of the crew of the *Tangistan*—38 in number—only one was saved.

On March 11th (the date of the Order-in-Council) Commander Otto Weddigen makes his last appearance on the scene. From the small U 9 with which he sank the three cruisers, he had been transferred to a much more powerful craft, the U 29. On this day, off the Casquet rocks, he sank the steamer *Aden-wen,* but gave the crew ten minutes to take to their boats, observing, "We wish no lives to be lost." He also provided a dry suit for a sailor who had fallen into the water, thus acting up to the nickname which he had earned of "the polite pirate." He had, unfortunately, only a few days more of life before him. On March 26th the Admiralty announced that U 29 had been sunk. "There seems to be no doubt," said *The Times,* "that Captain Weddigen's career has now come to an end, with that of his new boat. Our satisfaction at the occurrence is mingled with some regret at the death of a man who, so far as is known, behaved bravely and skillfully, and where it was possible displayed to his victims the humanity expected of seamen, but which has not been characteristic of all his brother officers."

This is almost the last good word that has to be, or can be, said for German conduct at sea. It is true that on March 13th, a few days before Weddigen lost his life, some humanity had been shown in the sinking of the collier *Hartdale.* The boats got off, but the captain, chief officer, steward, and a boy remained on board until the ship was awash. The boy was unfortunately drowned, but the three men were taken on board the submarine and were well treated. Ultimately, they were transferred to the Swedish steamship *Heimdal,* which had taken the boats in tow. It is also related that in the course of the summer, when attacks upon fishing boats were the order of the day, and when many fishermen were brutally done to death without being given a chance for their lives, a welcome exception to the general practice occurred when the commander of one submarine allowed the crew of

a trawler he attacked to get away in their boat. "We are not Prussians," he declared to the skipper; "it is only the Prussians who would let you drown." At sea as on land, unfortunately, the Prussians were enormously in the majority.

The *Atlanta* was sunk on March 14th, and the *Fingal* on the 15th. In the latter case there was a death-roll of six, including the chief mate and the stewardess, who is said to have been the first woman victim of the submarine war. On March 25th the Dutch steamship *Medea* was deliberately sunk by gunfire off Beachy Head. The crew, however, were all saved. Two days later the *Aguila* was sunk by the same method. The crew were nominally given four minutes to leave the ship, but the submarine opened fire while the boats were being launched, killing the chief engineer, the boatswain, and a donkey-man, and wounding the third engineer and several seamen. A member of the crew said that one boat contained ten men, the stewardess, and one woman passenger. As it was being launched the passenger cried out, "I'm shot!" and fell over the edge of the gunwale next to the ship's side. The next moment heavy seas capsized the boat, and neither passenger nor stewardess was ever seen again. The Germans, however, were not entirely callous, for they told the trawler *Ottilie* where the boats had been left, and enabled her to find them. On the same day, March 27th, the steamer *Vosges* was sunk by shell fire after a two hours' chase, the chief engineer being killed.

The following day, Sunday, March 28th, witnessed the first U-boat atrocity on a grand scale. The Elder-Dempster liner *Falaba,* Liverpool to South Africa, was just passing out of St. George's Channel when she was pursued by a submarine. Seeing that escape was hopeless, the captain stopped. "There is some doubt," says *The Times,* "about the exact number of minutes' grace accorded by the German commander, but it is agreed that well within ten minutes the *Falaba* was torpedoed at 100 yards range, when the enemy could not fail to see that the deck was still crowded and the first boat was actually half-way down the davits. The torpedo struck near the engine-room, and the *Falaba* sank

rapidly. The callousness of the attack was aggravated by the conduct of the Germans when their victims were struggling in the water. As they raised their arms, reaching out for life-buoys or scraps of wreckage, the Germans looked on and laughed, and answered their cries for help with jeers. This charge of inhumanity is not founded on any isolated allegation. It is the definite testimony of some half-dozen survivors." The captain was not drowned, but died of exposure.

Among the victims—111 in number—was an American citizen, Mr. Leon Thrasher. This naturally intensified the indignation felt in America, and it was already foreseen in many quarters that if Germany persisted in so reckless a disregard of the rights not only of noncombatants, but of neutrals, the traditional aloofness of America could not be permanently maintained. "The sinking of the *Falaba,*" said the New York *Times,* "is perhaps the most shocking crime of the war." Though less wanton and purposeless than the attack on the *Amiral Ganteaume,* it was equally cruel in intention and more disastrous in effect. It proved beyond all question that the spirit of modern Germany was as ruthlessly inhuman at sea as on land; but the world had not long to wait for still more startling evidence to the same effect.

Hitherto we have followed with some minuteness the record of German submarine activities, in order to trace the gradual decline from legitimate and honorable warfare to indiscriminate maritime murder. Henceforth, on the other hand, anything like a complete "Catalogue of the Ships" would be a mere weariness of the spirit, even were it possible. We must be content to register some of the more salient incidents of the campaign of massacre.

As to the principles inspiring it there is no longer any doubt. Six months after the outbreak of the war Germany had finally realized that her scheme of world-conquest had miscarried, and that she was standing on the defensive. The mass of her people, and her soldiers and sailors not the least, had from the outset taken quite seriously the ten-thousand-times repeated phrase *"Dieser uns aufgezwungene Krieg"*

("This war which has been forced upon us"). On the part of her rulers it had at first been a conscious and purposeful lie—a deliberate move in the war gambit invented by Bismarck, who openly confessed that the people would not throw themselves with sufficient ardor into a war in which they knew themselves to be the aggressors. But even the rulers have by this time repeated the formula so often that they have perhaps come to believe in it; and rulers and people are at one in holding that, when Germany is on the defensive, she is absolved from all the traditional decencies of civilized warfare, and not only entitled, but in duty bound, to ignore every obligation of humanity that conflicts in the slightest degree with her immediate interest and convenience. Only thus can we account for the fact that such events as the sinking of the *Falaba,* to say nothing of the greater crimes to follow, seem to have elicited scarcely a word of protest in Germany. Much light is thrown upon the German frame of mind by a little incident which occurred just at the time we have now reached.

On April 1, 1915, three trawlers, the *Jason, Gloxinia,* and *Nellie,* were sunk by the U 10. The crew of the *Jason* were taken on board the submarine and were well treated. The commander expressed regret, but said, "We have orders to sink everything. It is war, *and you started it.*" That is the whole German case. It is built upon the distinction which undoubtedly exists between the rights of the aggressor and the rights of his victim. If a highway robber were to attack me on a lonely road, I should not consider myself bound, in repelling him, to adhere to the delicacies of the duello, or even to the principles of fair-play. The Germans were right in insisting upon this ethical distinction—the weak point of their case lay in the fact that they, and not the Allies, were the highway robbers. It may also be mentioned that even the victim of an assault is scarcely justified in massacring the wife and children of his assailant.

The most notable feature of April, 1915, was the harrying of the British fishing fleet. On April 19th the Admiralty announced: "To-day a German submarine sank by a torpedo the trawler *Vanilla.* The trawler *Fermo* endeavored

to rescue the crew, but she was fired at and driven off. All hands on the *Vanilla* were lost. This killing of fisher-folk for no military purpose should not escape attention. It is the second murder of this character committed within a week."

The *Fermo* was chased for four hours and barely escaped. Three days later the trawler *St. Lawrence* was shelled and sunk. Most of the crew escaped, but the submarine prevented the rescue of two men who had been left on board.

Meanwhile, neutrals were learning the baselessness of the pretense in the German manifesto that what they had to fear in the war zone were only inevitable errors and accidents. Neutral ships were being destroyed with the greatest deliberation. On March 31st the Norwegian barque *Nor* was burnt because her cargo of timber rendered her practically unsinkable. On April 22nd, two Norwegian sailing ships, the *Oscar* and the *Eva,* were deliberately sunk by gunfire; and the Norwegians suffered other losses. In the first half of April two Dutch steamers, the *Katwyk* and the *Schieland,* were torpedoed and sunk. On May 1st the American tank steamer *Gulflight,* from Port Arthur (Texas) to Rouen, was torpedoed without warning off the Scilly Islands. The captain died of heart failure, and the wireless operator and a Spanish seaman were drowned. This event caused great excitement in the United States; yet the feeling it aroused was but a ripple compared with the tidal wave of horror and indignation which swept over not only America, but all countries in which war madness had not stifled human feeling, at the news of the *Lusitania's* destruction, which just a week later was flashed round the world.

NEUVE CHAPELLE

THE FIRST GREAT ARTILLERY ASSAULT

MARCH 10TH

COUNT DE SOUZA — FRANK R. CANA
ANONYMOUS GERMAN NARRATIVE

No one may put into words the miseries that men endured during the first winter of the trench warfare. Once that double set of trenches with the "No-man's land" between was stretched across France, men had to hold it night and day, ever on the watch against surprise attack. New necessities are rapidly met by new inventions of that alert and most brilliant of earthly organisms, the human brain. But in that brief interim between necessity and invention, what must not men suffer! The cold, which froze feet and fingers; the damp, which sent rheumatism and kindred ills through every muscle; the strain of watchfulness upon exhausted nerves; the ever-present hunger and the racking bombardments—active warfare came as a relief from these. The British to a man welcomed the first big spring assault of 1915, the battle of Neuve Chapelle.

Both the French and British accounts of this battle must be read with some reserve. Patriotic writers are naturally trying to find some good, some reason for satisfaction with, a struggle most exhaustive of ammunition, cruelly costly of human life, and inconclusive of result. In brief, both France and Britain were over-hopeful. They thought their winter of preparation, combined with Germany's exhaustive winter campaign against Warsaw in the east, had made them stronger than their foe. They attempted to test this by an early spring offensive. They had gathered what seemed to the experts of that day a huge store of ammunition. They employed it, the French in the Champagne district and the British at Neuve Chapelle, in an effort to break, in their favor, the deadlock of the trenches. The French learned at minor cost that the Germans had so extended trenches behind trenches that the defensive was still immeasurably stronger than their offense. The British learned this also, but only after an attack far more persistent and furious and self-destructive. It was then that Marshal Joffre's policy of "nibbling," of leaving to the Germans the offensive with its heavy losses, was adopted—because no other policy had yet proved possible.

BY COUNT CHARLES DE SOUZA

THE battle of Neuve Chapelle was an action in which through a surprise attack the British reconquered the position which the Germans had occupied in October and

powerfully organized in front of the British pivot at La Bassée. This position formed a salient in the British line, and in order to preserve the integrity of that line (in other words to make it stronger), it was necessary to take the village of Neuve Chapelle—which had been once before attacked unsuccessfully (October 28th). The former attempt had failed because it had been made with inadequate means. This time the operation was carried out by two army corps, the 4th Corps and the Indian Corps, which were swiftly and secretly concentrated on the line Rue d'Enfer-Richebourg St. Vast, their forward movement being covered and supported by the fire of 350 guns, British and French.

The Germans were surprised, outnumbered, outflanked on both sides, and, after a stubborn struggle, they were ousted from the position. The victory was complete, and would have been more satisfactory had it been less costly. The British casualties exceeded 12,000 out of 50,000 men engaged on that occasion.

This was due to the impetuosity of the new troops and of some officers who misunderstood the object of the attack, advanced too quickly and too far, and thus uselessly exposed their men to the effects of the severe counterblows which the Germans, with their accustomed thoroughness, did not fail to deliver. There was also confusion in the matter of bringing up reënforcements. The position, however, remained in the possession of the British, although their opponents did all they could to recapture it—a fact which when contrasted to the previous engagement makes it clear that the enemy was inferior both on the defense and the attack.

The French offensive in Champagne which synchronized with the battle of Neuve Chapelle was a more lengthy and methodical affair; it had also a totally different object. It started at the beginning of February and reached its climax at the date of Neuve Chapelle; it was carried out ostensibly to relieve the "pressure" exercised at the time by the Germans on the Russians in East Prussia and Suwalki; and for that reason it may be characterized as the first attempt at a coördination of movements between the two fronts. Locally it yielded good results; it displayed once more the offensive

qualities of the French troops and gave them good practice in the newly adopted methods of artillery preparation and the combination of infantry and artillery assaults on a large scale; but its primary object was not attained, simply because it was sought on a wrong assumption. Hindenburg's contemporaneous move in East Prussia was a false one, meant mainly to distract the attention of the Russians from another sector of their front.

It was part of the enemy's plan to exaggerate the number of their forces in that quarter, and they succeeded so far as to lead the Allies to believe that strong German units were being withdrawn from the Western front. It was computed in many quarters that Hindenburg had fifteen army corps with him in East Prussia, whereas he could not have had more than a third of that number.

Nevertheless, General d'Esperey's movement in Champagne was brilliant. The artillery bombardment was heavy and effective. Strong hostile positions were stormed between Souain, Perthes and Beausejour, and the French made many captures, the Germans admitting in their *communiqués* that their losses in that part of France were greater than those they had suffered in East Prussia, which were computed by themselves at 15,000.

Finally, this French movement paved the way for the bigger one which was carried out at the same spot in the autumn.

BY FRANK R. CANA

Early in March there were spells of bright weather, and the water-logged country began to dry up. The time had come for a vigorous offensive movement by the British troops. The reasons which Sir John French gave for this offensive deserve careful consideration. The interdependence of the operations of the Russians, French, and British should be particularly noted. It should also be noted that Sir John was contemplating, not a general advance, but a movement with a definite local objective. The British were to "hold" the enemy to the Western front, an operation incon-

sistent with "the grand offensive." Sir John, in his dispatch of April 5th, wrote as follows:—

"About the end of February many vital considerations induced me to believe that a vigorous offensive movement by the forces under my command should be planned and carried out at the earliest possible moment.

"Amongst the more important reasons which convinced me of this necessity were: The general aspect of the Allied situation throughout Europe, and particularly the marked success of the Russian army in repelling the violent onslaughts of Marshal von Hindenburg; the apparent weakening of the enemy in my front, and the necessity for assisting our Russian Allies to the utmost by holding as many hostile troops as possible in the Western theater; the efforts to this end which were being made by the French forces at Arras and Champagne; and, perhaps the most weighty consideration of all, the need of fostering the offensive spirit in the troops under my command after the trying and possibly enervating experiences which they had gone through of a severe winter in the trenches."

Such were the Commander-in-Chief's reasons, and they clearly limit the character of the offensive he now undertook, known as the battle of Neuve Chapelle. The object of the battle was the capture of Neuve Chapelle and the establishment of the British line as far forward as possible to the east of that place. This part of the German line was held by the Bavarians, supported by Prussian regiments, the Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria being in command.

Neuve Chapelle, after the heavy fighting in November, 1914, had again passed into the hands of the Germans. The village lies four miles north-northwest of La Bassée and about a mile west of a high ridge which comes from the direction of Lille. The little river Des Layes flows between Neuve Chapelle and the high ground. On this high ground is Aubers; below Aubers, and on the side of the Layes furthest from Neuve Chapelle, is the hamlet of Pietre. South of Pietre is the Bois de Biez, the German position in the wood being protected by a defended bridge-head over the Layes. It was Sir John French's hope that the taking

of Neuve Chapelle would be followed up by the capture of the Aubers ridge. This would have jeopardized the German position at La Bassée and made the enemy fear for the safety of Lille, which is some ten miles east of Aubers. The whole of the German front was immensely strong. Every house in the village of Neuve Chapelle had been turned into a fort, while just north of the village was a triangle of road enclosing an area in which were a few big houses, with walls, gardens, orchards, etc. In this triangle the enemy, with the aid of many machine guns, had established a strong post, which flanked the approaches to Neuve Chapelle.

It will be seen that the task assigned to the British troops was difficult. No attempt could be made to take the German positions without adequate artillery preparation, and at Neuve Chapelle, for the first time in the war, so far as the British were concerned, a force of artillery had been concentrated sufficient for its purposes. The German method of bringing an overwhelming and sustained mass of shell fire on to a given area, and "flattening out" all opposition, was now employed against them. Sir John French had given to General Haig and troops of the 1st Army the task of capturing Neuve Chapelle. The 4th Corps under Sir Henry Rawlinson and the Indian Corps under Sir James Willcocks were chosen to make the attack, supported by a large force of heavy artillery, a division of cavalry, and some infantry of the general reserve. At the same time troops of the 2nd Army were told to keep the enemy in front of them occupied, thus preventing reënforcements being sent by the Germans from those portions of his line to the main point of attack. These supplementary operations of the 2nd Army had the desired effect and resulted in the capture of the village of L'Epinette (near Armentières) and adjacent farms, but do not call for any further mention. To the left and to the right of the British army the French troops also supported its action by very heavy artillery, machine gun, and infantry fire.

An operation such as that contemplated required much prevision. Though the attack was not delivered until March 10th, Sir Douglas Haig had received his secret instructions

on February 19th. None save a few staff officers knew of the plans until all was ready, and the Crown Prince Rupprecht was taken by surprise. At half-past seven in the morning of the 10th of March, some four hundred great guns and howitzers began to play on the German lines at Neuve Chapelle. The bombardment was most effective, except on the extreme northern portion of the front of attack. Hell opened its mouth and belched forth fire and brimstone. The wind was torn, the ear pierced by the rush and roar of thousands of high explosive and shrapnel shells. A wall of fire fell upon the German trenches, and the men in them were dazed and mazed; many went mad with horror. Others were still hiding in their dug-outs after the fight was over. The cruel wire entanglements which guarded the trenches were in several places swept away by shrapnel fire. And the hail of shell continued, the gunners working with a grim joy as they marked how, under the bombardment from their huge howitzers firing lyddite, the enemy's trenches fell in and disappeared, and houses were hurtled into the sky. Meantime the troops who were to make the charge waited. They were the 21st, 22nd, 23rd, 24th, and 25th Brigades of the 8th Division, 4th Corps, and the Garhwal Brigade. At length the artillery ceased, and at 8.5 a. m. the 23rd and the 25th Brigades dashed forward to the German trenches on the northwest of Neuve Chapelle, while the Garhwal Brigade assaulted the enemy trenches south of the village. The artillery had only stopped momentarily to get its new range; as the infantry rushed at the German trenches, the guns turned their fire on to Neuve Chapelle itself.

In the trenches attacked by the 25th and Garhwal Brigades there was little opposition, and both lines were carried with slight loss. This was not the case with the 23rd Brigade, which found the wires still largely uncut, and as they endeavored to force them they fell in scores from the enemy's machine gun and rifle fire, the loss being especially severe in the Middlesex Regiment and Scottish Rifles. The success of their comrades saved the Brigade, for both the 25th and Garhwal Brigades pushed on to the village of

Neuve Chapelle, so that the Germans opposing the 23rd Brigade found their southern flank turned. Thus helped, the 23rd Brigade made progress. The manner in which the various British brigades rendered mutual help was a marked feature of the fight. The Germans fought desperately for possession of the village, and it had to be cleared house by house, the British advancing over heaps of dead mixed with the débris of houses, smashed guns, and impedimenta of all kinds. The Germans in Neuve Chapelle itself were now without hope; it was death or surrender, for the British artillery was playing beyond the village and created a curtain of shrapnel fire through which nothing could pass alive. Prince Rupprecht was unable to send a single man to the aid of the defenders, and by 11 a. m. the whole village and the roads leading northwards and southwestwards from it were in the hands of the British.

Notwithstanding the temporary holding up of the 23rd Brigade the day had been so far extremely favorable for the British; it ended less auspiciously. As we have stated, it had been designed to follow up the capture of Neuve Chapelle by an advance on Aubers. Nor were the Germans at 11 a. m. in any position to have withstood an energetic advance. Their resistance had been completely paralyzed, as was proved by the 21st Brigade being allowed to form up in the open without a shot being fired at it. But the happy moment was lost. After taking Neuve Chapelle, too much time was occupied in reorganizing the various units, and the further advance did not begin till 3.30 p. m. There were reasons for the delay. The infantry was greatly disorganized by the violent nature of the attack, and by its passage through the enemy's trenches and the buildings of the village. It was necessary to get units to some extent together before pushing on. Moreover, telephonic communication being cut by the enemy's fire rendered communication between front and rear most difficult. The left of the 23rd Brigade having been held up had not only caused delay in itself, but had involved a portion of the 25th Brigade in fighting to the north out of its proper direction of advance. All this required adjustment. An orchard, held by

the enemy north of Neuve Chapelle, also threatened the flank of an advance towards the Aubers ridge. These were all valid reasons, but Sir John French placed it on record that "this delay would not have occurred had the clearly expressed orders of General Haig been more carefully observed." We need not go behind or beyond the field-marshal's criticism; war has to take account of the personal equation.

When the advance was resumed at half-past three both the 21st and 24th Brigades made progress, the former towards the Pietre windmills and the appropriately named Rue d'Enfer (a collection of three or four farmsteads); the latter towards Pietre hamlet. Both, however, were eventually held up by concentrated machine gun fire from Germans established in houses and trenches. The 25th Brigade was directed towards the Des Layes River, but was also held up by machine gun fire from the bridge-head held by the Germans. At the same time two Indian brigades, the Dehra Dun and the Jullundur, had moved to attack the Biez wood, but they, too, were stopped at the line of the river by the enfilading fire of the Germans from the bridge.

This bridge over the Layes and its neighborhood immediately assumed considerable importance. "Whilst artillery fire was brought to bear," wrote Sir John French, "as far as circumstances would permit, on this point, Sir Douglas Haig directed the 1st Corps to dispatch one or more battalions of the 1st Brigade in support of the troops attacking the bridge. Three battalions were thus sent to Richebourg St. Vaast. Darkness coming on, and the enemy having brought up reënforcements, no further progress could be made, and the Indian Corps and 4th Corps proceeded to consolidate the position they had gained."

The day had not proved as successful for the British as had been hoped, but there was no justification for the criticism of armchair tacticians, who, fed by lying rumors as to the magnitude of the losses and the "failure" of the advance, declared the whole attack to be "a ghastly mistake." During the day the whole of the labyrinth of trenches at and around Neuve Chapelle had been taken on a front of

4,000 yards (2½ miles) and the British had consolidated themselves on a new front about 1,200 yards beyond the enemy's advanced trenches. More ground had been gained, in short, than on any other day since the battle of the Aisne.

On the next day, March 11th, the battle was resumed. The Germans had hurried to Lille by train and motors a mass of men from distant parts of the Western front, and these were poured into Aubers, the line of the Layes, and the Biez wood, to oppose the further British advance. We tell the story of the end of the battle substantially in the words of Sir John French.

"The attack on the German positions was begun on the morning of March 11th by the 4th and Indian Corps, but it was soon seen that a further advance would be impossible until the artillery had dealt effectively with the various houses and defended localities which held up the troops along the entire front. Efforts were made to direct the artillery fire accordingly; but owing to the weather conditions, which did not permit of aërial observation, and the fact that nearly all the telephonic communications between the artillery observers and their batteries had been cut, it was impossible to do so with sufficient accuracy. Even when the British troops which were pressing forward occupied a house here and there, it was not possible to stop the fire of its supporting artillery, and in consequence some of the British fell victims to their own guns. The infantry were therefore withdrawn. The two principal points which barred the advance were the same as on the preceding day —namely, the enemy's position about Moulin de Pietre and at the bridge over the river Des Layes.

By the 12th the Germans had been heavily reënforced. The chief feature of the day's fighting were violent counter-attacks delivered by them, and supported by artillery. These counter-attacks completely failed, Sir John French calling special attention to the ease with which they were repulsed. The British troops were elated and ready to continue the struggle, but the Commander-in-Chief decided otherwise. Most of the objects for which the operation had been un-

dertaken had been attained, and on the night of March 12th Sir Douglas Haig was directed to hold and consolidate the ground gained and to suspend, for the time, further offensive operations. The Crown Prince Rupprecht, stung especially by the fact that his army had been beaten by the British, whom he had openly reviled in orders to his troops, endeavored on the 13th by numerous further attacks to regain the ground lost, but all the attacks failed. Later Prince Rupprecht endeavored to minimize his defeat by declaring that the British had brought up forty-eight divisions against three German divisions—an obvious falsehood which yet found credence in Germany.

Thus ended one of the sternest battles on the Western front. The severity of the contest can be judged from the casualty lists. The British lost 190 officers and 2,337 men killed, 359 officers and 8,174 men wounded, and 23 officers and 1,728 men "missing" (many of these were killed but their bodies were not found—the rest were taken prisoners). Thus the total British casualties were nearly 13,000. The enemy suffered more; they left several thousand dead on the battlefield, seen and counted by the British, and removed over 12,000 wounded by train. They lost in prisoners 30 officers and 1,657 men—their total casualties being between 17,000 and 18,000.[1] Many of the prisoners taken on the first day were bright yellow in color from the effect of the lyddite shells; one Prussian officer who survived the tornado of shell fire on the advanced trenches angrily exclaimed, "This is not war, it is murder." That their own weapons should be turned against them always roused the ire of the Prussians.

Sir John French did not consider the price of victory too high. In a special Order of the Day to Sir Douglas Haig and the 1st Army the Commander-in-Chief said: "I am anxious to express to you personally my warmest appreciation of the skillful manner in which you have carried out your orders, and my fervent and most heartfelt appreciation of the magnificent gallantry and devoted, tenacious courage

[1] These figures of German losses, except as regards prisoners, have no official authority.

displayed by all ranks whom you have ably led to success and victory."

At Neuve Chapelle the Indian troops played a conspicuous part. The Indians, entirely unaccustomed to heavy artillery engagements before coming to France, had in a few months become inured to the novel conditions of warfare. They were much elated by the result of the action, and continually asked when they were going to have another chance. Many stories were told of their prowess. One Gurkha made his way into a house, and single-handed captured five Germans, whom he marched off at the point of his *kukri*. Of similar incidents in the fight much might be written. We make the following extract from a dispatch by the "Eye-witness" at British headquarters, as it pays a deserved tribute to the bravery of the German officers. The German officer, as an American observer of his conduct said, was too often "a combination of soldier, blackmailer, and burglar," but he was not lacking in the first requisites of a leader—courage:—

"In their counter-attacks from the Bois du Biez the German losses were tremendous. Line after line went down before our rifles. Indeed, in their picturesque phraseology, some of our Sepoys said that shooting the enemy was like cutting grain.

"Our men in action in this quarter were so excited that they clambered up on to the parapets in order to see better, and obtain greater freedom to use their rifles. In some of the captured trenches then held by us there was not room on the *banquettes,* or raised portions, from which men fire, for all the men in the trench to shoot at the same time, and as the action proceeded, those below in rear could not restrain their impatience. They shouted, 'Get down and give us a chance,' some even pulling down those in front in order to take their places. One battalion reserved its fire until the Germans were only fifty yards away, and then opened both with rapid rifle fire and with machine guns.

"The German officers displayed the most reckless courage. On more than one occasion they invited certain death by riding forward on horseback to direct the attack to within

a few hundred yards of our line. None of those who so exposed themselves escaped. One Jäger in charge of a machine gun kept his gun in action throughout our bombardment, and then, when our men charged down upon him, awaited death, calmly standing on the parapet of the trench, and emptying his revolver at them."

BY MARGARETE MUNSTERBERG

Translated from the popular Berlin periodical, the *"Kriegs-Rundschau"*

The battlefield of Neuve Chapelle and Givenchy—about 7 or 8 kilometers broad—is bounded on the north by the railroad Merville-Laventie-Armentières, on the south by the Canal d'Aire à la Bassée and is crossed by two main highways, from Estaires to La Bassée, and from Béthune to Armentières. Through this territory, in a southwesterly direction, flow the rivers Lawe and Louane, which, supplied by a multitude of brooks and small rivulets which issue from ponds, empty into the Canal d'Aire à la Bassée. In a northeasterly direction the Lys with its tributaries flows through the battlefield, and farther on joins the Deûle. The character of the whole region follows from this great abundance of water; it is almost perfectly flat and does not rise any higher than 19 meters, and about 21 meters in the south near Givenchy. Isolated groves and hedges break the monotony of this land upon which the exceedingly fierce battles of March 10th-14th were fought.

As early as October 29, 1914, our infantry regiment had stormed Neuve Chapelle, and until March 10th we were undisputed masters of the place. At the beginning of March, however, when the foggy weather began and observation from the air was impossible, our opponent succeeded, around March 10th, in carrying out movements of troops, unnoticed by us. As appeared through reports in English newspapers, he concentrated no less than two army corps, consisting of two English divisions, two Indian divisions and Canadian troops, besides very strong artillery, a part of which was French, for a joint attack upon our positions. The attack surprised us greatly, but found us by no means unprepared, so that one Jäger battalion and one infantry regi-

ment were able for the present to repel the attack of the English.

These, however, directed an overwhelming artillery fire —about ten to twelve grenades (frequently of American origin) to one meter of the trench—against our lines of defense, which were completely buried. In spite of these unfavorable conditions, the English attack was warded off twice, and again and again the enemy started new strong artillery fire. Contemporaneous with this attack upon Neuve Chapelle, the English started a further attack upon Givenchy; an English infantry division advanced against two German battalions, but was repulsed with enormous losses through the fire of our infantry and artillery. The English, advancing in great masses, were mowed down in sections. Meanwhile the fight over Neuve Chapelle continued. Here Indian troops rushed ahead—and seemingly unarmed. In the preceding days numerous Indians had deserted to our lines, hence our troops believed that in this case they were again dealing with deserters and so did not shoot. This sin of omission was thoroughly avenged; for close before our positions the Indians began to throw hand grenades and attacked the garrison of our trenches with knives.

Through these attacks by very superior numbers on March 10th, our troops in the trenches suffered severely, so that reserves had to be brought forward. These gathered under terrible English fire and advanced against the English with contempt of death. Although they did not succeed on this day in throwing the opponent out of the positions taken by him, nevertheless they were able to prevent a further advance of the greatly superior enemy forces and to hold the new positions against all attacks of the opponent.

On March 11th in the forenoon strong German artillery fire was directed against the enemy positions, and the attacks of the enemy were repulsed, although he succeeded in invading Neuve Chapelle at isolated points.

After more reserves had reached us on March 12th in the forenoon, we did the attacking; and the burning desire to settle with the hated English accelerated the steps of each soldier. We succeeded in gaining ground at several points

and in throwing the opponent back on Neuve Chapelle. The complete reconquest, however, of the place Neuve Chapelle itself, which was constantly under heavy enemy fire, would have required needless sacrifices, and for this reason we limited ourselves to attaining the general lines previously held by us.

The strategic plan of the enemy to break through had failed with enormous losses, and the English found themselves forced to give up their plans. But the great moral success of the fighting round Neuve Chapelle and round Givenchy lies in the repulse by comparatively weak German troops, of his attempt to break through which was undertaken with such great masses. Although the opponent succeeded in winning slight tactical successes and in gaining territory, these successes are quite out of proportion to the enormous losses, particularly of officers, which were characterized as "heavy" even by the enemy himself.

The papers have brought details, taken from letters and reports of officers, about the English method of warfare, which have been made known to the German troops as official warnings. According to these, in the battles round Neuve Chapelle, 250 Englishmen, in German cloaks and helmets, lured a band of German soldiers toward them, only to shoot them down from a short distance. German prisoners were used, as it were, as cover by the English during their advance.[2]

[2] There are in this magazine narrative several statements against which the reader should be warned. First is the habitually reckless German talk about American ammunition. Not until a much later period did American ammunition reach the Allies' cannon in any appreciable amount. Second is the implied charge of wholesale desertion by the British Indians. No such case is anywhere on record; the Indian regiments fought loyally and heroically throughout the War. More important still is the series of implications in the final paragraph. German publications frequently made vague charges of this type; but all actual evidence indicates that the Britons fought as honorably as they did heroically. The German Government never made any effort to establish these charges, presumably finding them more useful as rumors, a form which protected their falsity from British disproof.

THE NAVAL DISASTER OF THE DARDANELLES

TURKEY DRIVES BACK THE BRITISH FLEET

MARCH 18TH

HENRY MORGENTHAU HENRY NEVINSON
GASTON BODART

A consecutive Turkish narrative of the defense of the Dardanelles will probably never be written; but from Ambassador Morgenthau, that strong and observant American diplomat who stood nearest to the heart of the Turkish Government, we have a frank and careful record of what the Turkish leaders said and hoped for at the time. The British view of the disastrous event is given by a British expert on military and naval affairs. Dr. Bodart presents the official Teuton view.

The personages mentioned in Mr. Morgenthau's account have been already introduced in our earlier volume. Wangenheim and Pallavicini were the German and Austrian Ambassadors in Turkey. Enver was their Turkish tool, the Minister of War and actual ruler of Turkey. Talaat, the Minister of Finance, had been the leader of Enver's faction until the War crowded Enver to the front. Mr. Churchill was the sorely harassed but ever-energetic British Minister of Naval Affairs.

The "Dardanelles" is the name given to the southern portion of the series of Turkish waterways which, by connecting the Mediterranean with the Black Sea, separate Europe from Asia in the neighborhood of Constantinople. The southern or Mediterranean mouth of the Dardanelles is more than a hundred miles from Constantinople; but only this portion of the passage is easily defensible. Once this opening had been forced, the road to Constantinople would have been open, and the city must have surrendered or been destroyed by the huge naval guns. The assault was made chiefly by British ships; though they were aided by four French men-of-war, of which the largest, the *Bouvet,* was sunk in the main action, of March 18th.

The importance of this assault was that its success would have broken Turkey's strength completely and enabled the Allies to reach Russia with a mass of much needed military supplies. Its failure, on the other hand, released the East from its fear of British power, and tremendously strengthened the will of the Turks for war. This was again one of those evenly balanced moments which hang great with fate. Had word but reached the Allied commanders of the exhaustion of the Turkish ammunition; had they but endured their heavy losses but a little longer, the entire issue of the Great War might have been changed. Its three last terrible years might have been escaped.

BY HENRY MORGENTHAU [1]

ON March 18th, the Allied fleet made its greatest attack. As all the world knows, that attack proved disastrous to the Allies. The outcome was the sinking of the *Bouvet,* the *Ocean,* and the *Irresistible* and the serious crippling of four other vessels. Of the sixteen ships engaged in this battle of the 18th, seven were thus put temporarily or permanently out of action. Naturally the Germans and Turks rejoiced over this victory. The police went around, and ordered each householder to display a prescribed number of flags in honor of the event. The Turkish people have so little spontaneous patriotism or enthusiasm of any kind that they would never decorate their establishments without such definite orders. As a matter of fact, neither Germans nor Turks regarded this celebration too seriously, for they were not yet persuaded that they had really won a victory. Most still believed that the Allied fleets would succeed in forcing their way through. The only question, they said, was whether the Entente was ready to sacrifice the necessary number of ships. Neither Wangenheim nor Pallavicini believed that the disastrous experience of the 18th would end the naval attack, and for days they anxiously waited for the fleet to return. The high tension lasted for days and weeks after the repulse of the 18th. We were still momentarily expecting the renewal of the attack. But the great armada never returned.

Should it have come back? Could the Allied ships really have captured Constantinople? I am constantly asked this question. As a layman my own opinion can have little value, but I have quoted the opinions of the German generals and admirals, and of the Turks—practically all of whom, except Enver, believed that the enterprise would succeed, and I am half inclined to believe that Enver's attitude was merely a case of graveyard whistling. In what I now have to say on this point, therefore, I wish it understood that I am giving not my own views, but merely those of the officials then in Turkey who were best qualified to judge.

[1] Reprinted by permission from "Ambassador Morgenthau's Story."

Enver had told me, in our talk on the deck of the *Yuruk*, that he had "plenty of guns—plenty of ammunition." But this statement was not true. A glimpse at the map will show why Turkey was not receiving munitions from Germany or Austria at that time. The fact was that Turkey was just as completely isolated from her allies then as was Russia. There were two railroad lines leading from Constantinople to Germany. One went by way of Bulgaria and Serbia. Bulgaria was then not an ally; even though she had winked at the passage of guns and shells, this line could not have been used, since Serbia, which controlled the vital link extending from Nish to Belgrade, was still intact. The other railroad line went through Rumania, by way of Bucharest. This route was independent of Serbia, and, had the Rumanian Government consented, it would have formed a clear route from the Krupps to the Dardanelles. The fact that munitions could be sent with the connivance of the Rumanian Government perhaps accounts for the suspicion that guns and shells were going by that route. Day after day the French and British ministers protested at Bucharest against this alleged violation of neutrality, only to be met with angry denials that the Germans were using this line. There is no doubt now that the Rumanian Government was perfectly honorable in making these denials. It is not unlikely that the Germans themselves started all these stories, merely to fool the Allied fleet into the belief that their supplies were inexhaustible.

Let us suppose that the Allies had returned, say on the morning of the nineteenth, what would have happened? The one overwhelming fact is that the fortifications were very short of ammunition. They had almost reached the limit of their resisting power when the British fleet passed out on the afternoon of the 18th. I had secured permission for Mr. George A. Schreiner, the well-known American correspondent of the Associated Press, to visit the Dardanelles on this occasion. On the night of the 18th, this correspondent discussed the situation with General Mertens, who was the chief technical officer at the straits. General

Mertens admitted that the outlook was very discouraging for the defense.

"We expect that the British will come back early to-morrow morning," he said, "and if they do, we may be able to hold out for a few hours."

General Mertens did not declare in so many words that the ammunition was practically exhausted, but Mr. Schreiner discovered that such was the case. The fact was that Fort Hamidié, the most powerful defense on the Asiatic side, had just seventeen armor-piercing shells left, while at Kilid-ul-Bahr, which was the main defense on the European side, there were precisely ten.

"I should advise you to get up at six o'clock to-morrow morning," said General Mertens, "and take to the Anatolian hills. That's what we are going to do."

The troops at all the fortifications had their orders to man the guns until the last shell had been fired and then to abandon the forts.

Once these defenses became helpless, the problem of the Allied fleet would have been a simple one. The only bar to their progress would have been the mine-field, which stretched from a point about two miles north of Erenkeui to Kilid-ul-Bahr. But the Allied fleet had plenty of mine-sweepers, which could have made a channel in a few hours. North of Tchanak, as I have already explained, there were a few guns, but they were of the 1878 model, and could not discharge projectiles that could pierce modern armor plate. North of Point Nagara there were only two batteries, and both dated from 1835! Thus, once having silenced the outer straits, there was nothing to bar the passage to Constantinople except the German and Turkish warships. The *Goeben* was the only first-class fighting ship in either fleet, and it would not have lasted long against the *Queen Elizabeth*. The disproportion in the strength of the opposing fleets, indeed, was so enormous that it is doubtful whether there would ever have been an engagement.

Thus the Allied fleet would have appeared before Constantinople on the morning of the twentieth. What would have happened then? We have heard much discussion as

to whether this purely naval attack was justified. Enver, in his conversation with me, had laid much stress on the absurdity of sending a fleet to Constantinople, supported by no adequate landing force, and much of the criticism since passed upon the Dardanelles expedition has centered on that point. Yet it is my opinion that this exclusively naval attack was justified. I base this judgment purely upon the political situation which then existed in Turkey. Under ordinary circumstances such an enterprise would probably have been a foolish one, but the political conditions in Constantinople then were not ordinary. There was no solidly established government in Turkey at that time. A political committee, not exceeding forty members, headed by Talaat, Enver, and Djemal, controlled the Central Government, but their authority throughout the empire was exceedingly tenuous. As a matter of fact, the whole Ottoman state, on that eighteenth day of March, 1915, when the Allied fleet abandoned the attack, was on the brink of dissolution. All over Turkey ambitious chieftains had arisen, who were momentarily expecting its fall, and who were looking for the opportunity to seize their parts of the inheritance. As previously described, Djemal had already organized practically an independent government in Syria. In Smyrna Rahmi Bey, the Governor-General, had often disregarded the authorities at the capital. In Adrianople Hadji Adil, one of the most courageous Turks of the time, was believed to be plotting to set up his own government. Arabia had already become practically an independent nation. Among the subject races the spirit of revolt was rapidly spreading. The Greeks and the Armenians would also have welcomed an opportunity to strengthen the hands of the Allies. The existing financial and industrial conditions seemed to make revolution inevitable. Many farmers went on strike; they had no seeds and would not accept them as a free gift from the Government because, they said, as soon as their crops should be garnered the armies would immediately requisition them. As for Constantinople, the populace there and the best elements among the Turks, far from opposing the arrival of the Allied fleet, would have welcomed it with

joy. The Turks themselves were praying that the British and French would take their city, for this would relieve them of the controlling gang, emancipate them from the hated Germans, bring about peace, and end their miseries.

No one understood this better than Talaat. He was taking no chances on making an expeditious retreat, in case the Allied fleet appeared before the city. For several months the Turkish leaders had been casting envious glances at a Minerva automobile that had been reposing in the Belgian legation ever since Turkey's declaration of war. Talaat finally obtained possession of the coveted prize. He had obtained somewhere another automobile, which he had loaded with extra tires, gasolene, and all the other essentials of a protracted journey. This was evidently intended to accompany the more pretentious machine as a kind of "mother ship." Talaat stationed these automobiles on the Asiatic side of the city with chauffeurs constantly at hand. Everything was prepared to leave for the interior of Asia Minor at a moment's notice.

But the great Allied armada never returned to the attack.

BY HENRY WOODD NEVINSON

Orders for washing and clean clothes (to avoid septic wounds) were issued on February 18th, and next morning, in clear and calm weather, "General Quarters" was sounded. The firing began at eight, and the first scene in the drama of the Dardanelles Expedition was enacted.

The main forts to be destroyed were four in number; two on either side the entrance. One stood on the cliff of Cape Helles, just to the left or southwest of the shelving amphitheater afterwards celebrated as V Beach. Another lay low down, on the right of the same beach, close in front of the medieval castle of Seddel Bahr, where still one sees lying in heaps or scattered over the ground huge cannon-balls of stone, such as were hurled at Duckworth's fleet more than a century before. Upon the Asiatic side stood the fort of Kum Kali, at the very mouth of the strait, not far from the cliff village of Yenishehr, and separated from the

plain of Troy by the river Mendere, near neighbor to the Simois and Scamander conjoined. About a mile down the coast, close beside Yenishehr village, is the remaining fort of Orkhanieh. None of these forts was heavily armed. The largest guns appear to have been 10.2 inch (six on Seddel Bahr, and four on Kum Kali), and when our squadron drew their fire their extreme range was found to be 12,500 yards.

Throughout the morning of February 19th, Admiral Carden concentrated his bombardment upon these forts at long range, and they made no reply. Hoping that he had silenced or utterly destroyed them, he advanced six ships to closer range in the afternoon, and then the reply came in earnest, though the shooting was poor. At sunset he withdrew the ships, though Kum Kali was still firing. In evidence, he admitted that "the result of the day's action showed apparently that the effect of long range bombardment by direct fire on modern earthwork forts is slight." It was a lesson repeated time after time throughout the campaign. The big naval shells threw up stones and earth as from volcanoes, and caused great alarm. But the alarm was temporary, and the effect, whether on earthworks or trenches, usually disappointing. For naval guns, constructed to strike visible objects at long range with marvelous accuracy, have too flat a trajectory for the plunging fire (as of howitzers) which devastates earthworks and trenches. It was with heavy howitzers that the Germans destroyed the forts of Liege, Namur, and Antwerp, and, owing to this obvious difference in the weapons employed, Mr. Churchill's expectation of crushing the Dardanelles defenses by the big guns of the *Queen Elizabeth* and the *Inflexible* was frustrated.

Nevertheless, after a few days of driving rain and heavy sea (a common event at this season, which might have been anticipated), Admiral Carden renewed the bombardment on February 25th, employing the *Queen Elizabeth, Irresistible, Agamemnon,* and *Gaulois.* The *Queen Elizabeth,* firing beyond the enemy's range, assisted in silencing the powerful batteries on Cape Helles, and though the *Agamemnon* was

severely struck at about 11,000 yards' range, the subsidiary ships *Cornwallis, Vengeance, Triumph, Albion, Suffren,* and *Charlemagne* stood in closer, and by the evening compelled all the outer forts to cease fire. Next day landing-parties of marines were put ashore to complete their destruction; which they did, though at Kum Kali they were driven back to their boats with some loss. The story that marines had tea at Krithia and climbed Achi Baba for the view—places soon to acquire such ill-omened fame—is mythical. But certainly they met with no opposition on the Peninsula, and if a large military force had then been available, the gallant but appalling events of the landing two months later would never have occurred. Had not the War Council persisted in the design of a solely naval attack, even after their resolve had begun to waver, a large military force might have been available, either then, or to coöperate with a similar naval movement only a week or two later.

Stormy weather delayed further attack till March 4th, when a squadron, including the *Triumph, Albion, Lord Nelson,* and *Ocean,* passed up the strait to a position beyond the village of Erenkeui, conspicuous upon a mountainside of the Asiatic coast, and bombarded Fort Dardanus. The fort stands upon Kephez Point, which projects as though to defend the very entrance of the Narrows. Over the top of the promontory the houses and mosques of Chanak and Kilid Bahr could be plainly seen, where those towns face each other across the narrowest part of the passage. Of the eight lines of mine-field drawn across the strait, five lay between Kephez Point and Chanak. Day and night our mine-sweeping trawlers were engaged upon them, and considerable praise must be given to the courage and endurance of their crews, who for the most part had been North Sea fishermen before the expedition. Their service throughout, whether for mine-sweeping or transport, was of very high value. It almost justified the remark made to me by a skipper whom I had met before on the Dogger Bank: "If the Kayser had knowed as we'd got trawlers, he would never have declared war!"

A similar advance to engage the forts at Dardanus, and,

after those were thought to be silenced, the forts at Chanak and Kilid Bahr, was made next day, and again, in stronger force, on March 6th. At the same time, on the 6th, the *Queen Elizabeth,* stationed off Gaba Tepe on the outer coast, flung her vast shells clear over the Peninsula into the Chanak forts, her fire being directed by aëroplanes. She was supported by the *Agamemnon* and *Ocean,* and there were high hopes of thus crushing out the big guns defending the Narrows, some of which were believed to be 14-inch. Nevertheless, when the four French battleships advanced up the strait on the following day (March 7th), supported at long range by the *Agamemnon* and her sister ship *Lord Nelson,* the Chanak forts replied with an effective and damaging fire. It was impossible to say when a fort was really out of action. After long silence, the Turkish and German gunners frequently returned and reopened fire, as though nothing had happened. In his evidence, Admiral Carden stated that when the demolition parties landed after the bombardment of the outer forts, they found 70 per cent. of the guns apparently intact upon their mountings, although their magazines were blown up and their electrical or other communications destroyed. Still worse than these disappointing results was the opportunity left to the enemy of moving, not only bodies of men, but field-guns and heavy howitzers from one point of the Peninsula and Asiatic coast to another, and opening fire upon the ships from concealed and unexpected positions. Our landing-parties of marines also suffered considerably from the advantage thus given to the enemy, as happened to a body which landed at Kum Kali for the second time on March 4th. All such dangers and hindrances would have been removed if the navy had been supported by sufficient military force to occupy the ground behind the ships as they advanced.

Mr. Churchill, though striving to restrain his impatience, strongly urged Admiral Carden to press forward the naval attack with the utmost vigor. In a telegram of March 11th he wrote: "If success cannot be obtained without loss of ships and men, results to be gained are important enough to justify such a loss. The whole operation may

be decided, and consequences of a decisive character upon the war may be produced by the turning of the corner Chanak. . . . We have no wish to hurry you or urge you beyond your judgment, but we recognize clearly that at a certain period in your operations you will have to press hard for a decision; and we desire to know whether, in your opinion, that period has now arrived. Every well-conceived action for forcing a decision, even should regrettable losses be entailed, will receive our support."

To this Admiral Carden replied that he considered the stage for vigorous action had now been reached, but that, when the fleet entered the Sea of Marmora, military operations on a large scale should be opened at once, so as to secure communications. On March 15th Mr. Churchill, still anxious not to allow his impatience to drive him into rashness, telegraphed again that, though no time was to be lost, there should be no undue haste. An attempt to rush the passage without having cleared a channel through the mines and destroyed the primary armament of the forts was not contemplated. The close coöperation of army and navy must be carefully studied, and it might be found that a naval rush would be costly without military occupation of the Kilid Bahr plateau. On these points the Admiral was to consult with the General who was being sent out to take command of the troops. To all of this Admiral Carden agreed. He proposed to begin vigorous operations on March 17th, but did not intend to rush the passage before a channel was cleared. This answer was telegraphed on March 16th. But on the same day the Admiral resigned his command owing to serious ill-health.

Rear-Admiral Sir John de Robeck, second in command, was next day appointed his successor. He was five years younger, was, of course, fully cognizant of the plans, and expressed his entire approval of them. Yet it appears from his evidence that though strongly urged by Mr. Churchill to act on "his independent and separate judgment," and not to hesitate to state objections, his real motive in carrying on the prearranged scheme was not so much his confidence in success as his fear lest a withdrawal might injure

our prestige in the Near East; and, secondly, his desire to make the best he could of an idea which he regarded as an order. "The order was to carry out a certain operation," he said, "or to try to do it, and we had to do the best we could." If the ships got through, he, like many others, expected a revolution or other political change in Turkey. Otherwise, he saw that transports could not come up, and that the ships could not remain in the Sea of Marmora for more than a fortnight or three weeks, but would have to run the gauntlet coming down again, just as Admiral Duckworth did in 1807. In his telegram accepting the command, however, he made no mention of these considerations, but only said that success depended upon clearing the mine-fields after silencing the forts.

Indeed, he had small time for any considerations. For on the very first day after receiving his command (March 18th) he undertook the main attempt to force the Narrows. The weather was favorable—no mist and little wind. The scheme was to attack in three squadrons successively. The first blow was given by the four most powerful ships —*Queen Elizabeth, Inflexible, Lord Nelson,* and *Agamemnon*—which poured heavy shell at long range into the forts at Chanak and Kilid Bahr, while the *Triumph* and *Prince George* bombarded Fort Dardanus on the Asiatic coast, and Fort Soghandere, opposite to it upon the Peninsula. This bombardment lasted from about 11 a. m. till 12.30 p. m., and all six ships found themselves exposed to heavy fire from the forts, and from hidden howitzers and field-guns in varied positions upon both shores. At about 12.30 the second squadron, consisting of the four French ships, came up into action, advancing beyond the former line in the direction of Kephez Point. Though suffering considerably (chiefly owing to their inability to maneuver in such narrow waters, thus presenting very visible and almost fixed targets to the enemy's guns), the ten ships maintained the bombardment for about an hour (till nearly 1.30). The enemy's forts then fell silent, and it was hoped that many of them, at all events, had been destroyed.

Accordingly, the third squadron, consisting of six Brit-

ish ships (*Irresistible, Vengeance, Ocean, Swiftsure, Majestic,* and *Albion*), were brought up, with the design of advancing first through the Narrows, so as to insure a clear passage for the greater ships which made the first attack. At the same time the four French ships, together with the *Triumph* and *Prince George,* were ordered to withdraw, so as to leave more room for the rest. During this maneuver, all or nearly all the guns in the forts opened fire again, their silence having been due, not to destruction, but to the absence of the gunners, driven away by the gases or terror of our shells. Most of the ships suffered, and as the *Bouvet* moved down channel with her companion ships, she was struck by three big shells in quick succession. The blows were immediately followed by a vast explosion. It is disputed whether this was due to a shell bursting in her magazine, or to a torpedo fired from the Asiatic coast, or, as the Admiralty report said, to a mine drifting down the current. In two or three minutes she sank in deep water just north of Erenkeui, carrying nearly the whole of her crew to the bottom. The cries of the men dragged down with her, or struggling in the water as they were swept downstream, sounded over the strait.

At 2.30 the bombardment of all the forts was renewed, but they were not silenced. At 4 o'clock the *Irresistible* drew away with a heavy list. Apparently she also was struck by a mine adrift; but she remained afloat for nearly two hours, and nearly all her crew were saved by destroyers, which swarmed round her at great risk to themselves, since they offered a crowded target. A quarter of an hour after she sank, the *Ocean* was struck in a similar manner (6.50 p. m.) and sank with great rapidity. Most of her crew, however, were also saved by destroyers near at hand. Many of the other ships were struck by shell. The *Inflexible* and *Gaulois* suffered especially, and only just crawled back to be beached, the one at Tenedos, the other at Rabbit Island. At sunset the fleet was withdrawn. It had been proved once more that, in an attack upon land forts, ships lie at a great disadvantage. In this case the disadvantage was much increased by the narrowness of the waters, which brought

the ships within range of howitzer and other batteries hidden upon both shores, and also gave special opportunity for the use of mines drifting on the rapid current, or anchored right across the channel in successive rows.

Mr. Churchill wished to renew the attempt at once. Perhaps he thought that English people are given to exaggerate the loss of a battleship. Admiral de Robeck shared this view. It was suspected at the Admiralty that the ammunition in the forts was running short, and, at a much later date, Enver Pasha is reported to have said: "If the English had only had the courage to rush more ships through the Dardanelles, they could have got to Constantinople; but their delay enabled us thoroughly to fortify the Peninsula, and in six weeks' time we had taken down there over 200 Austrian Skoda guns."[2]

That delay of six weeks was fatal, but the navy was not to blame. The British military leaders decided in favor of a land attack.

BY DR. GASTON BODART

With the entry of Turkey into the ranks of the combatants, the military importance of the Dardanelles became evident. This most vulnerable point of the Turkish Empire soon became the center of operations on the part of the English-French naval forces in the Mediterranean. The first enterprises were confined to a repeated bombardment (November 3rd, 1914, and February 19th, 1915) of the outer forts by 8 armored ships of an older type at a distance of 18 k.m., whereby the Allies silenced these forts to the extent that an entry into the outer strait, although hindered somewhat by floating and stationary mines, became possible. The means at hand did not suffice for further successes;

[2] Speaking of this naval attack, Dr. Stürmer writes: "To their great astonishment the gallant defenders of the coast forts found that the attack had suddenly ceased. Dozens of the German naval gunners who were manning the batteries of Chanak on that memorable day told me later that they had quite made up their minds the fleet would ultimately win, and that they themselves could not have held out much longer."—"Two War Years in Constantinople."

so that the commanders of the respective fleets, Vice-Admiral Carden and Rear-Admiral Guépratte, considered it more advisable to establish a naval base on the islands of Lemnos and Tenedos and to make the principal attack, that is, the forcing of the straits, with a much larger force.

This followed on March 18th, after the obstructing mines had been removed, and was accomplished by 16 battle ships (12 English and 4 French, only two of them, however, being of modern type), and a corresponding number of small cruisers, torpedo boats, and submarines. Altogether 38 English and 20 French vessels participated, these being under the command of the new commander-in-chief, the English Vice-Admiral de Robeck. On the Turkish side the intervals between the fighting had been well employed by strengthening the fortifications. German engineers had modernized the existing fortifications, repaired the damaged parts, and constructed supplementary works. The task of defense was chiefly entrusted to Field-Marshal von der Goltz.

At the straits the command was shared by the German Admiral von Usedom and Djewad Pasha, the squadron being under the command of the German rear-admiral Souchon. German marine and foot artillery served the guns. The battle lasted almost the whole day, and, although several Turkish batteries had been silenced, ended with a complete success for the defense. Three battleships of 12-15,000 tons, among them being one French vessel, were so badly damaged by floating mines and artillery-fire that they had to withdraw from the fighting zone. The agreed-upon simultaneous action of the Russian Black Sea fleet did not materialize by reason of a lack of daring on the part of the Russian commander. This fiasco on the part of the Allies demonstrated the superiority of the land defenses as against the floating artillery, even that of greatest caliber, so that the already partially prepared coöperation of a landing corps was definitely determined upon by the Allies.

THE SURRENDER OF PRZEMYSL

AUSTRIA LOSES HER LAST EASTERN STRONGHOLD

MARCH 22ND

GENERAL KROBATIN STANLEY WASHBURN
DIARY OF A RUSSIAN OFFICER

Przemysl, as told in our preceding volume, was the chief Austrian stronghold in the eastern Austrian domain, the Polish province of Galicia. In 1914 it had been twice besieged by the Russians. They had assailed it for a month in vain after their great victory at Lemberg, had withdrawn from the siege at the time of Hindenburg's first advance on Poland, and had then returned to renew the beleaguerment in November. For four months thereafter Przemysl loomed large in the eyes of the world as the one remaining point of Austrian resistance east of the Carpathian Mountains and the plains of Hungary.

The siege of Przemysl presented the only example of such old-time strategic warfare in the European field of the War. The city was completely surrounded and the army within it was reduced to surrender by starvation. This entailed of course much misery to the civilian population. These were mainly of Slavic race and had small sympathy for the Austrian cause in which they suffered. Indeed, as the following anonymous diary of a Russian prisoner within the city shows, the final surrender was to most of the inhabitants an occasion for much rejoicing. They could not guess how soon they were to be once again under Austrian control. The grim seesaw of the hungry armies back and forth across this Polish region of Central Europe meant an awful and repeated tragedy of destruction to the defenseless Poles.

The official Austrian account of the siege is here given by the Austrian Minister of War, and the Russian view is presented by Mr. Stanley Washburn, the official British witness with the Russian army.

BY GENERAL KROBATIN

THE garrison of the fortress held Przemysl to the very last hour that human force could do so in the military sense of the word. General Kusmanek only surrendered when such a course was dictated by feelings of humanity and military consideration. On the day of the surrender there was not one morsel of food in the fortress, and no breakfast could be supplied to the men.

Events developed around Przemysl more quickly than

was expected. The last sortie officially reported was directed towards the east, and was undertaken not with the view of effecting the relief of the fortress, but to find out if the surrounding Russian force was as strong towards Grodek and Lemberg as in the other directions, and whether the Russians had fortified their positions in the Grodek direction, as well as to the south and west of the fortress. It was ascertained during the sorties that this was the case. The Russians, in fact, built counter-fortifications all around the fortress, even in the direction of their own territory, preparing for all eventualities. In fact, the last reports coming from the fortress all confirmed the report that the Russians built a new fortress all around the besieged territory. The fortifications were so constructed as to constitute an impenetrable obstacle to inward attacks, just the counter-form of the fortifications and defensive works of the fortress itself. The Russian ring was constructed exclusively against Przemysl with unparalleled skill and rapidity, and with all available means of modern technic.

On the west a well-fortified defending line and on the south a large Russian army stood in the way of any attempt to relieve Przemysl. In addition, the roads leading towards Russia were well fortified, as the last sortie proved. This was the military situation of the fortress during the last weeks.

With regard to provisions the fortress was well supplied at the outset, but the stores were consumed at the time of the first investment, which lasted until October 11th. On that date the fortress was relieved, and General Borvevich entered the fortress with his army. The railway lines had been blown up by the retreating Russians. On the Galician roads it was impossible to transport anything at that time, and this fact obliged us to provision the army fighting to the east of Przemysl from the stores of the fortress, the army being cut off from all other points of supply.

It was thus necessary to draw provisions from the ample stores of Przemysl in the hope that as soon as the railway line was reconstructed the stores could be replaced. The

railway line was reconstructed, and on October 23rd the first trains began to move towards the fortress.

At the end of ten days, however, and before the deficiencies could be made good, Przemysl was invested anew.

At this period the situation in North Poland made it necessary for us to withdraw our flank in Galicia. During the ten days at our disposal the transport of ammunition took first place. The question of provisioning the fortress appearing at that time to be a secondary matter, when eventually food supplies were dispatched to Przemysl it was too late.

During the first days of the investment, in November, General Kusmanek took stock of the available quantity of foodstuffs, and drew up a scale of rations. He took great care that neither officers nor men should get more than the minimum of everything. For breakfast they had only tea, for their midday meal a small piece of meat and half a pound of bread, and in the evening tea again, with some bread. To add to the meat supply thousands of horses were slaughtered, which was all the more necessary on account of the shortage in fodder. Later on this minimum was further reduced, so that the men of the garrison were on almost starvation diet for the last two months of the siege.

It has been said in some quarters that flying machines and dirigibles might have been used in bringing in supplies, but this idea was excluded from the beginning. Such flour or meat as could have been thus brought in would only have sufficed a few hundred men for a few days, and to have made any appreciable difference all the aëroplanes and dirigibles of the world would have had to have been employed daily. The commander of the fortress vetoed the idea that certain members of the garrison should receive food by this means whilst the rest put up with the rations available in the fortress. Even the game shot by some of the officers was not allowed to be brought in, but was cooked and eaten in the hunting field. The aëroplanes only brought in letters, medicines, and material for the wireless telegraphy.

The food supply grew daily more and more scanty, un-

til on the morning of the 22nd there was not a particle of bread in the stores, not a pound of meat or flour available, so that the commander of the fortress decided to surrender.

The sortie above referred to had no effect whatever but soon after this the Russian besieging army began a violent attack from the north and east with the object of ascertaining what powers of resistance the famished and exhausted garrison still possessed. How our poor soldiers could bear the brunt of these attacks is a mystery, but General Tamàssy's Honvèds succeeded in repulsing them. These weak and famished soldiers had courage and enthusiasm enough to face the onslaught of the healthy, well-fed Russians, and succeeded in repulsing them from beneath the fortress. True, this was their last effort.

After this battle, which lasted seven hours, General Kusmanek and his staff saw that another sortie was impossible, the investing ring being too strong for even a well-fed army to break through.

BY STANLEY WASHBURN

In spite of all the very obvious failures to achieve any definite advantage over the Russians, the spirits of the anti-Russian element were kept buoyed up by the spectacle of the great fortress in Galicia still holding out. "As long as Przemysl stands out there is hope," seems to have been the general opinion of all who wished ill to the Russians. Thus the fortress, which at the outset might have been abandoned with small loss of prestige to the Austrians, gradually came to have a political as well as military significance of the most far-reaching importance. In the general crash after the battle of the Grodek line, the loss of a town which until then had never been heard of in the West, outside of military circles, would have escaped anything more than passing comment. Not until the Russian armies had actually swept past its trenches and masked its forts, did the world at large know that such a place was on the map; even then the greatest interest manifested was in the vexed question as to how its name was pronounced, if indeed it could be done at all, an opinion which was held

by not a few people.[1] This place, which could have been given up earlier in the war without any important sacrifice, was held tenaciously and became one of the vital points of strategy in the whole campaign. An army, which turned out to be a huge one, was isolated from the field armies of Austria at a time when she needed every able-bodied man that she could get; and Przemysl, which, as we see now, was doomed from the start, was allowed to assume an importance in the campaign which made its fall not only a severe military loss but a blow to the hopes of the Austrians, both at home and in Galicia. The fall of this fortress has gone further towards shattering any hopes of ultimate victory that have been entertained than anything that has occurred since the war started.

One's preconceived idea of what a modern fortress looks like vanishes rapidly as one enters Przemysl. In time of peace it is probable that a layman might pass into this town without suspecting at all that its power of resisting attack is nearly as great as any position in all Europe. Now, of course, innumerable field works, trenches, and improvised defenses at once attract the attention; but other than these there is visible from the main road but one fortress, which, approached from the east is so extremely unpretentious in appearance that it is doubtful if one would give it more than a passing glance if one were not on the lookout for it.

Przemysl itself is an extremely old town which I believe was for nearly 1,000 years a Russian city. From remote days of antiquity it has been a fortress, and following the ancient tradition, each successive generation has kept improving its defenses until to-day it is in reality a modern stronghold. Why the Austrians have made this city, which in itself is of no great importance, the site of their strongest position, is not in the least obvious to the layman observer. The town itself, a mixture of quaint old buildings and comparatively modern structures, lies on the east bank of the river San and perhaps 3 kilometers above the point

[1] The pronunciation generally adopted in America is prā-meel.

where the small stream of the Wiar comes in from the south. The little city is hardly visible until one is almost upon it, so well screened is it by rolling hills that lie all about it. Probably the prevailing impression in the world has been that the Russian great guns have been dropping shells into the heart of the town; many people even in Lwow believe it to be in a half-ruined condition. As a matter of fact, the nearest of the first line of forts is about 10 kilometers from the town itself, so that in the whole siege not a shell from the Russian batteries has fallen in the town itself. Probably none has actually fallen within 5 kilometers of the city. There was therefore no danger of the civilian population suffering anything from the bombardment while the outer line of forts held as they did from the beginning.

The only forts or works which we were given the opportunity of seeing, were those visible from the road, the authorities informing us that they had reason to believe that many of the trenches and positions were mined, and that no one would be permitted in them until they had been examined by the engineers of the army and pronounced safe. If the works seen from the road are typical of the defenses, and I believe they are, one can quite well realize the impregnable nature of the whole position. The road from Lwow comes over the crest of a hill and stretches like a broad ribbon for perhaps 5 kilometers over an open plain, on the western edge of which a slight rise of ground gives the elevation necessary for the first Austrian line. To the north of the road is a fort, with the glacis so beautifully sodded that it is hardly noticeable as one approaches, though the back is dug out and galleried for heavy guns. Before this is a ditch with six rows of sunken barbed wire entanglements, and a hundred yards from this is another series of entanglements twelve rows deep, and so criss-crossed with barbed wire that it would take a man hours to cut his way through with no other opposition.

After a few experiments against the works, the Russians seem to have reached the conclusion that it would not be worth while even to attempt carrying the trenches by as-

sault. Indeed, in the opinion of the writer, neither the Russians nor any other troops ever could have taken them with the bayonet; the only method possible would have been the slow and patient methods of sapping and mining which was used by the Japanese at Port Arthur. But methods so costly, both in time and lives, would seem to have been hardly justified here because, as the Russians well knew, it was merely a question of time before the encircled garrison would eat itself up, and the whole position would then fall into their hands without the cost of a single life.

The strategic value of Przemysl itself was in no way acutely delaying the Russian campaigns elsewhere, and they could afford to let the Austrian General who shut himself and a huge army up in Przemysl, play their own game for them, which is exactly what happened. There was no such situation here as at Port Arthur, where the menace of a fleet in being locked up in the harbor necessitated the capture of the Far Eastern stronghold before the Russian second fleet could appear on the scene and join forces with it. Nor was there even any such important factor as that which confronted the Germans at Liege. To the amateur it seems then that the Austrians, with eyes open, isolated a force which at the start must have numbered nearly four army corps, in a position upon which their program was not dependent, and under conditions which made its eventual capture a matter of absolute certainty providing only that the siege was not relieved from without by their own armies from the South.

Between the outer line of forts and the Wiar River are a number of improvised field works, all of which looked as though they could stand a good bit of taking, but of course they were not as elaborate as the first line. The railroad crosses the little Wiar on a steel bridge, but the bridge now lies a tangle of steel girders in the river. It is quite obvious that the Austrian commander destroyed his bridges west of the town because they afforded direct communications with the lines beyond; but the bridge over the Wiar has no military value whatsoever, the others being gone, save to give convenient *all rail* access to the heart of

Przemysl itself. The town was given up the next day and, as the natural consequence of the Austrian commander's conception of his duty, all food supplies had to be removed from the railway trucks at the bridge, loaded into wagons, and make the rest of the journey into the town in that way, resulting in an absolutely unnecessary delay in relieving the wants of the half-famished garrison within. The only bright spot that this action presents to the unprejudiced observer is that it necessitated the dainty, carefully-shod Austrian officers walking three kilometers through the mud before they could embark on the trains to take them to the points of detention for prisoners in Russia. There cannot be the slightest doubt that the rank and file of the garrison were actually on the verge of starvation, and that the civilian population were not far from the same fate. As near as one can learn the latter consisted of about 40,000 persons. I am told that the prisoners numbered 131,000 men and some 3,600 officers, and that perhaps 20,000 have died during the siege from wounds and disease. This, then, makes a population at the beginning of nearly 200,000 in a fortification which, as experts say, could have easily been held by 50,000 troops. One officer even went so far as to declare that in view of the wonderful defensive capacity of the position, 30,000 might have made a desperate stand. The fortress was thus easily three times overgarrisoned. In other words, there were perhaps at the start 150,000 mouths to feed in the army alone, when 50,000 men would have been able to hold the position. This alone made the approach of starvation sure and swift. The fact that in this number of men there were 3,600 officers, nine of the rank of General, indicates pretty clearly the extent to which the garrison was overofficered. Kusmanek, the commander of the fortress, is said to have had seventy-five officers on his personal staff alone.

As far as one can learn there was no particular pinch in the town until everything was nearly gone, and then conditions became suddenly acute. It is improbable that economy was enforced in the early dispensing of food supplies, and the husbanding of such resources as were at hand.

When the crisis came, it fell first upon the unfortunate soldiers, with whom their officers seem to have little in common. Transport horses were killed first, and then the cavalry mounts went to the slaughter house to provide for the garrison. The civilians next felt the pinch of hunger, and every live thing that could nourish the human body was eaten. Cats, I am told, were selling at ten kr. each and fair-sized dogs at twenty-five kr. The extraordinary part of the story is that according to evidence collected from many sources the officers never even changed their standards of living. While the troops were literally starving in the trenches, the dilettantes from Vienna, who were in command, were taking life easily in the Café Sieber and the Café Elite. Three meals a day, fresh meat, wines, cigarettes and fine cigars were served to them up to the last.

One of the haggard starved-looking servants in the hotel where I was quartered told me that several of the staff officers lived at the hotel. "They," he said, "had everything as usual. Fresh meat and all the luxuries were at their disposal until the last. Yet their soldier servant used to come to me, and one day when I gave him half of a bit of bread I was eating, his hands trembled as he reached to take it from me." My informant paused and then concluded sardonically, "No, the officers did not suffer. Not they. It was cafés, billiards, dinners and an easy life for them to the end. But the rest of us. Ah, yes, we have suffered. Had the siege lasted another week we should all have been black in the face for want of food."

An Austrian sister who had been working in the hospital confirmed the story. "Is it true that people were starving here?" I asked her. "Indeed, it is true," she told me, "the soldiers had almost nothing and the civilians were little better off. As for us in the hospitals—well, we really suffered for want of food." "But how about the officers?" I asked. She looked at me sharply out of the corner of her eyes, for she evidently did not care to criticize her own people, but she seemed to recall something and her face suddenly hardened as she snapped out: "The officers starve? Well, hardly. They lived like dukes always." More she

would not say, but the evidence of these two was amply confirmed by the sight of the sleek, well-groomed specimens of the "dukes" that promenade the streets. While the soldiers were in a desperate plight for meat, the officers seemed to have retained their own thoroughbred riding horses until the last day. I suppose that riding was a necessity to them to keep in good health. The day before the surrender they gave these up, and 2,000 beautiful horses were killed, not for meat for the starving soldiers be it noted, but that they might not fall into the hands of the Russians. Perhaps I can best illustrate what happened by quoting the words of a Russian officer who was among the first to enter the town. "Everywhere," he told me, "one saw the bodies of freshly-killed saddle horses, some of them animals that must have been worth many thousand roubles. Around the bodies were groups of Hungarian soldiers tearing at them with knives; with hands and faces dripping with blood, they were gorging themselves on the raw meat. I have never seen in all my experience of war a more horrible and pitiable spectacle than these soldiers, half crazed with hunger, tearing the carcasses like famished wolves." My friend paused and a shadow crossed his kindly face. "Yes," he said, "it was horrible. Even my Cossack orderly wept—and he—well, he has seen much of war and is not overdelicate."

I can quote the statement of the Countess Elizabeth Schouvalov as further corroborative evidence of conditions existing in the town. The Countess, who is in charge of a distribution station to relieve the wants of the civil population, said to me: "It is true that the people were starving. Common soldiers occasionally fell down in the street from sheer weakness for want of food. Some lay like the dead and would not move. But their officers!" A frown passed over her handsome features. "Ah!" she said, "they are not like the Russians. Our officers share the hardships of the men. You have seen it yourself," with a glance at me, "you know that one finds them in the trenches, everywhere in uniforms as dirty as their soldiers, and living on almost the same rations. A Russian would never live in ease while his men starved. I am proud of my people. But these offi-

cers here—they care nothing for their men. You have seen them in the streets. Do they look as though they had suffered?" and she laughed bitterly.

Immediately on reaching the town we sought out the headquarters of the new Russian Commandant of the fortress. Over the door of the building, in large gold letters, were words indicating that the place had formerly been the headquarters of the 10th Austrian Army Corps. At the entrance two stolid Russian sentries eyed gloomily the constant line of dapper Austrian officers that passed in and out, and who were, as we subsequently learned, assisting the Russians in their task of taking over the city. General Artimonov, the new governor, received us at once in the room that had been vacated only a few days before by his Austrian predecessor, General Kusmanek. On the wall hung a great picture of the Austrian Emperor. The General placed an officer, Captain Stubatitch, at our disposal, and with him our way was made comparatively easy. From him and other officers whom we met, we gathered that the Russians were utterly taken by surprise at the sudden fall of the fortress, and dumbfounded at the strength of the garrison, which none believed would exceed the numbers of the Russians investing them; the general idea being that there were not over 50,000 soldiers at the disposal of the Austrian commander.

Three days before the fall a sortie was made by some 30,000 Hungarian troops. Why out of 130,000 men only 30,000 were allotted to this task in such a crisis does not appear. Neither has any one been able to explain why, when they did start on their ill-fated excursion, they made the attempt in the direction of Lwow rather than to the south, in which direction, not so very far away, the armies of Austria were struggling to reach them. Another remarkable feature of the last sorties was, that the troops went to the attack in their heavy marching kit. Probably not even the Austrians themselves felt any surprise that such a half-hearted and badly organized undertaking failed with a loss of 3,500 in casualties and as many more taken prisoners. One does not know how these matters are regarded in Aus-

tria, but to the laymen it would seem that some one should have a lot of explaining to do as to the last days of this siege.

The fall of Przemysl strikes one as being the rarest thing possible in war—namely, a defeat, which seems to please all parties interested. The Russians rejoice in a fortress captured, the Austrians at a chance to eat and rest, and the civilians, long since sick of the quarrel, at their city once more being restored to the normal.

DIARY OF A CAPTURED RUSSIAN OFFICER IN PRZEMYSL

March 15th.

Severe frosts have set in. The cold is terrible. Food is getting scarcer and scarcer. The dinner ration is getting very small. The soldiers' dinner consists of a little white beet-root (cattle food) with a mixture of some sort of acid stuff.

March 17th.

Four days ago they requisitioned the cows of all the inhabitants, in spite of the beseeching and crying of the women and children. The servants and orderlies have been warned that bread will be issued to-morrow for the last time. The day after to-morrow one ration for every four. Our wretched orderly imagines that by washing his stomach with hot water now and then during the day he loses the wish to eat.

The Sisters of Mercy tell us that in the city they openly talk of the speedy surrender of the fortress. The Austrian administration have told us that we must have money to hand over on deposit. This, if you please, on the eve of surrender! Absurd! We have all agreed not to hand over a penny. All day yesterday the artillery crashed from the forts. They say that in two directions from the fortress a force of 70,000 men this morning advanced to try and break through towards the Carpathians. To-day all forts and bridges are to be blown up. There remain in the fortress 40,000 soldiers incapable of fighting. Medicines also have run out. For a long time there has been no soap or vaseline. Iodine for a couple of days only is left. The wounded even are not getting bread now; they are giving

them the last of the biscuits. The Austrian officers are already arranging and packing for the journey into Russia.

During the whole of to-night uninterrupted heavy artillery fire has been going on; all night long rockets have been lighting everything up from the forts. The Russians this morning began the bombardment of the town. Two shells burst close to the hospital; the windows were blown to bits. To-day we had no bread.

March 21st.

To-day is the third day we have had no bread. Our Mother Superior sold a cow for £140 and a three-day-old calf for £12 10s. A dog costs £2 10s. The recent gloomy weather has changed to sunny. The snow has thawed already. The River San is free of ice. They say the Austrians have burned twenty-one millions worth of paper money, four aëroplanes, and have destroyed as far as possible all stores and carriages. They have thrown the guns into the San River. Just before turning in they warned us that the forts and bridges in the town would be blown up at four in the morning.

March 22nd.

The fortress is surrendering. The artillery fired up to 5 a. m. At 5.30 a. m. explosions were heard, at first separately, but later a regular hell was let loose. We opened the windows so that they should not be broken. The sun had already risen, and the plumes of smoke, lit up by the sun, presented a beautiful scene. The thunder and crash of the explosions went on uninterruptedly. It was impossible to get near a window; one was flung backwards. The panic had become terrible. At every explosion the doors were blown open. Bridges, powder magazines, stores, everything was blown up in two hours. The Ruthenes were overjoyed at the Russian victory. We could no longer remain in the hospital, and for the first time we went out into the streets. Our soldiers were embracing the Austrian soldiers. In one place a ring had been formed, and our cavalrymen were dancing with the Ruthene women. All the footpaths were thronged with people.

THE BATTLE OF THE PASSES

RUSSIA REACHES THE PEAK OF HER SUCCESS AGAINST AUSTRIA

MARCH 23RD-APRIL 16TH

COUNT DE SOUZA
GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS

OCTAVIAN TASLAUANU
MAJOR MORAHT

The "Battle of the Passes" must have been one of the most agonizing, as it was one of the most long continued, efforts of human endurance throughout the War. Any dates given to this strange battle must necessarily be vague, as it really began in November of 1914 and continued every day through the long winter; but it reached its peak of violence and of Russian success in April of 1915. The Russian Commander-in-Chief, the Czar's uncle, Grand Duke Nicholas, in his official announcement here given, sets dates to the main struggle as extending from March 23rd to April 16th. But the Austrian officer, Taslauanu, whose frank record we also present, found himself before the end of November with only five soldiers remaining out of over 250.

This long and terribly costly battle was fought for possession of the Carpathian Mountains, or rather of the passes which led over them, the mountains being so desperately contested not for themselves, but because they were the key to Hungary and indeed to the whole Austrian Empire, of which Hungary was the main protector. The Russian Duke had visions, mistaken visions, of winning the War in that one great effort. But that long struggle amid winter storms, often at icy heights above ten thousand feet, was beyond even Russian endurance. The proud tone of the Grand Duke's statement of his soldiers' spirit contrasts strikingly with the mood of both Russian and Austrian common soldiers as pictured by Taslauanu. The latter was a young officer from Fàgàras, a Rumanian district then part of the Austrian domains. His lukewarm obedience to Austrian command and his ready resentment against his Hungarian associates are typical of the difficulties the Austrian generals had to surmount. It is a strange fantasia of fighting that he presents in his book, "With the Austrians in Galicia." Would that we had more such glimpses into the realities of the eastern War!

To these two antagonistic pictures by eye-witnesses of the Carpathian battle, we prefix a general review of its strategic importance by the great French critic, De Souza; and to it all we add a summarizing of the final situation by the noted German critic, Moraht. The latter seems, however, to have been overhopeful. Despite his confidence in the Austrians, they were very definitely beaten. The exhausted Russians needed only a brief respite after mid-April, and

THE BATTLE OF THE PASSES

RUSSIA REACHES THE PEAK OF HER FURY AGAINST AUSTRIA

COUNT DE SOUZA. OCTAVIAN TASEAU.
GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS.

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J[illegible]t-long Battle for the

[illegible]sack Division re-

Anton HOFFMANN-MÜNCHEN

there would have been little to bar them from a swift rush across the Hungarian plain, had not the tremendous German triumph on the Dunajec ensued upon May 1st. It snapped the cord of Russian victory in an instant by separating the army in the Carpathians from its essential line of supplies. The weight of the battle of the Dunajec outweighed a hundredfold even that of the great "Battle of the Passes."

BY COUNT DE SOUZA

WHILST the Russians, with limited means, were trying to oppose and defeat the German attacks in Poland, the Grand Duke, with his main forces, was venturing upon a move which was meant to be the finishing stroke of the war.

The primary object of this move was the capture of the Carpathians, the great range of mountains which separates Galicia from the Magyar plains. This range constituted the strongest position or barrier on the Teutonic front, and the Grand Duke and those of his staff who shared and supported his views calculated that once they were in possession of it they could deal more easily and at leisure with their foes.

With such a pivot in their possession, the Russians, it was said, could maneuver at ease, and take Germany in flank from the south; Hungary would be at their mercy; the Serbs would be definitely relieved; and, finally, Austria would be forced from the list and compelled to sue for a separate peace. Thus Germany would have been left to face the Triple Entente alone. The view seemed sound and it had some factors to recommend it. The peculiar position of two neutral nations at the time, who were neighbors to the Dual Monarchy, was a particular inducement for Russia to act in the way she did; and it must be admitted that had everything turned out in the political sphere as the Grand Duke hoped and expected, there is no saying what success he might have achieved. Unfortunately, the military disadvantages of the enterprise as regards the threatening spirit and strength of the Germans, outweighed appreciably its political prospects. One may take for granted of course that the Grand Duke and his staff did weigh and consider everything, except perhaps one factor

which in spite of their previous experiences, they seemed to have left out of their reckoning—the talent of the leaders of the opposite camp and the latter's facilities for rapid mobilization and concentration. These leaders, however, had been thwarted; and they had been repulsed twice from Poland. This made the Grand Duke overconfident and led him to plunge deeper and deeper into his bold and daring movement.

When he considered that his position was secure in Poland, he proceeded to a vast concentration in Southern and Western Galicia, the movement starting almost as soon as the Austrians, after their unsuccessful attempt to relieve Przemysl, were definitely checked on the San; and thus synchronizing, practically, with Hindenburg's second attempt in Poland. The 3rd Army, under Plehve, pushed across the Vistula, the Biala, and the Dunajec, towards Cracow (December 1st-6th). The 2nd, under Dmitrieff, invaded North Hungary almost as far as Barfeld; whilst the 8th Army advanced frontally against the range itself, and the 9th acted towards Bukovina, along the Dniester and the Pruth, to protect the Russian communications from that direction. Behind all these forces yet another army, which was concentrated in that quarter, laid siege to Przemysl. This was the 7th Army, under General Selivanoff.

It was then, and after their second failure in Poland, that the Germans redrew entirely their plans in regard to Russia; these to be well grasped must be approached from the standpoint of outside events.

At that stage the great German offensive in the West had come to an end; the German armies in France and Flanders stood on the defense on fortified ground, their local needs being reduced to a minimum. Turkey had joined the Central Empires, and it was calculated that the Allies would thereby be appreciably weakened on their main fronts. The Kaiser's generals thought that without too many misgivings they could center, at least momentarily, their attentions on Russia, and endeavor to defeat her, to crush her, to sever her from her alliances and thus remove her from the field of combat, which would pave the way for

another onslaught against France or else lead to the new conditions of peace that Germany, baffled but not crushed, was striving for. For she was unaware of the stringent policy of man-economy that France had deliberately and wisely entered into, and she interpreted Joffre's refusal to attack as a sign of weakness and exhaustion.

The disposition of the Russian forces such as it has been shown, and which was entailed by the Grand Duke's scheme, greatly favored Germany, for it left her free to manipulate at ease her own line, and to prepare behind that line any counter-move that she would wish to attempt. The Russians, as yet, were not too numerous, and besides, attacked by the Turks, they were entering in a remote region (the Caucasus) into a fresh campaign, which would naturally absorb some of their reserves and new formations, and their surplus strength. But the best prospects for Germany lay on the Carpathians; for the assailants could be nailed there and made to pay the full toll of any gains; then, afterwards, Russia would be too weak to stand the accumulated strength of her opponents. Herein lies the key to the great Teuton offensive of 1915, and to the mysterious and apparently aimless German and Austrian moves which preceded it.

Needless to say, as the right view of events was not taken all these moves were misinterpreted, and thereby Germany, although she finally failed, reaped nevertheless the major profits of her undertaking; for she succeeded once more in blinding the world as to the results she achieved and as to her true position, and she succeeded in drawing on to her side yet another well-armed and powerful neutral State—Bulgaria.

The battle of the Carpathians constituted on her part a delaying action; and not as was supposed and believed, an attempt to relieve Przemysl; in the same way the fresh offensives which she carried out in the spring, in Courland, Suwalki, North Poland, and in Bukovina, were not real attacks, but false ones, which were designed to mislead the Russians. Finally, the eventual defeat of the latter was due to faulty distribution and unsound strategy; and not

to lack of means or shortage of materials; so it can be taken for granted that Russia lost the campaign directly she embarked on the conquest of the Carpathians.

This operation, the most tremendous of the kind which has ever been undertaken, imposed on the Grand Duke demands and sacrifices which prevented him from keeping himself at full strength elsewhere; and which, in the end, practically exhausted his forces. Yet, as we shall see, the Grand Duke, at the crucial moment, acquired a sufficiency of troops and material to make good his position, and to hold his gains. He failed to make proper use of them; and this is the true cause of Russia's disappointment.

The capture of the Carpathians in itself, however, was a brilliant feat of arms of which the Russian armies and their leaders, and especially General Ivanof, who devised the operation, could well be proud. It was a triumph in tactics and it displayed to the full the qualities of doggedness and endurance for which the Muscovite soldier is famous. In the teeth of a most formidable and desperate opposition they overcame all difficulties. They fought in the snow-clad peaks with an unconcern and an ease which astonished their opponents; they charged up steep rocky inclines and dislodged the well entrenched defenders from strong and thoroughly prepared positions; they defeated all counter-attacks, and by the end of March they were masters of the Carpathians. The Duklow pass, the Luchow pass, the Rosztoki pass were in their hands and sotnias of Cossacks, pushing forward, sallied into the Hungarian plains, and filled with consternation the apprehensive population who fled in thousands in anticipation of the Muscovite invasion. The number of prisoners made by the victors in that operation was estimated at 80,000. About this time (March 22nd) Przemysl fell, the victors capturing there a whole army (130,000 men), and an immense booty; and thus Russia then looked truly irresistible and triumphant. The world, which was always prone to look away from the main quarter of the struggle, was ready and eager to hand over to the Grand Duke the palm of victory—and there is absolutely no doubt that amongst those who praised and

glorified his action, there was not a single individual who understood the position; and who therefore had an inkling into what was brewing.

We shall see more fully presently the favorable effect of the Russian undertaking on the enemy's plans; ere now it can be shown that far from fearing the result, the Germans did what they could to egg on the Russians on their costly and daring enterprise. They took advantage of the necessity there was at one time of affording tactical help to the Austrians, to foster the belief that considerable German forces were being concentrated in Hungary, behind the Carpathian range. And in order to heighten the effect of their announcements in the matter, they sent two generals of some notability, Marwitz and Lisingen, to take charge of affairs in that quarter. No one in the opposite camp had then a doubt that full German army corps had reënforced the Austrians; and it was owing to this that the Grand Duke took so seriously the enemy's countermove in Bukovina and the occupation of the Uszok pass by a small German contingent. And whilst the Grand Duke, thinking that the enemy was going to make an effort—a frontal effort—to reconquer the Carpathians, kept accumulating troops and material in that direction, the Germans were actively and feverishly busy with their secret preparations, *behind another sector of their front.*

BY OCTAVIAN TASLAUANU

NOVEMBER 16th.

The fighting in the Carpathians, thanks to the difficulties of the ground and the severity of the season, demanded the greatest effort and suffering of which our Army was ever capable. Those who have not taken part in it can have no idea of what a human being is capable. The resources of vital energy accumulated in our organism are simply prodigious. In particular, our Rumanian soldiers compelled the admiration of all by their fortitude. This quality in this country of mountains and winter made them first-rate troops. The great Napoleon said: *"La première qualité du soldat est la constance à supporter la fatigue et*

la privation. La pauvreté, les privations et la misère sont l'école du bon soldat." [1]

You can bet we did our schooling all right, even going so far as the examinations, and if the bold Corsican had been with us and we had had an ideal to defend, we should certainly have been reckoned picked troops in spite of our faults. But our leaders were anything but Napoleons, though, as a matter of fact, the Major of the 22nd Territorials rejoiced in the name of Napoleon. I have no opinion about his military ability, as I was never close to him, but I never heard of him distinguishing himself in any action.

November 17th.

We had some frightful news this morning. The fighting Hungarian Lieutenant Szinte's company had been scattered, and he himself had bolted at top speed, thereby crushing one of his feet and taking all the skin off his nose. Michaelis, the bookseller, had gone forward with fifty men to a wooded height. A few men of my company, including Sergeant Corusa, told me that they saw some thirty Russians stealing away in front of their line. They began to call out, *"Feuer einstellen—Tüzet szüntes"* ("Cease fire!"). At this double command, in German and Hungarian, our men got up and left their shelter behind the trees. Then the Russians were heard to whisper: *"Brzo, brzo!"* ("Quick, quick!"), and they fired rapidly on our poor simpletons and then bolted. In a few seconds we had only dead and wounded left, for hardly fifteen came back untouched. Poor Michaelis, hit in the left shoulder by a bullet which came out the other side, was killed and buried on the frontier. A Rumanian stretcher-bearer laid him on straw at the bottom of a trench and recited a *paternoster* over him. That was a real good soul, in a man devoted to his duty. God rest it. His brother, the engineer, had had his forehead scraped by a bullet. Two other officers had been seriously wounded. I was left alone, of all those who

[1] The highest quality of a soldier is constancy in endurance of fatigue and privation. Poverty, privation and misery are the school of the good soldier.

had left Fàgàras with the battalion. Michaelis, my last companion, had just left me for ever.

In the afternoon I took fifty men to hold a slope covered with juniper trees. The men hastily dug trenches, and I manufactured a shelter of boughs and branches. Once more it snowed, and there was no question of making fires.

November 18th.

Everything was wrapped in a mantle of snow, whose virginal whiteness soothed us and made our thoughts turn calmly to death, which we longed for as never before. The men dug coffin-shaped trenches, so that when in the evening I went to inspect them lying in these ditches covered with juniper, they looked to me as if they had been buried alive. Poor Rumanians!

November 20th.

An unforgetable day. I doubt if fiction has ever recorded scenes more comic, and yet more interesting, than those of November 20th.

First, a description of the situation is necessary.

We were holding the hills between the road from Radoszyce in Hungary and that which passes through Dolzyca to the frontier. The *terrain* was very uneven and thickly wooded. Here and there a clearing or meadow could be seen, though even these were invaded by junipers. The line of our positions was prolonged over the wooded height opposite us, so that we had to fire to our left straight through the woods without seeing anything. The reports of our patrols did not enable us to get any very clear idea of the extent of our front, so Major Paternos and I went out to confirm their news from the spot.

The forest began in face of us, thirty or forty paces down the slope. We made our way into it and reached a stream. On the other side of the stream the woods became thicker, and we could get up the slope only with the assistance of projecting tufts and branches. Beyond the top we found a battalion, about 300 strong, of the 47th Infantry. They had all gone to ground, and their Captain showed us, thirty paces away, the crest covered with junipers, and told us: "The Russians are there." But the un-

dergrowth was so thick that nothing could be seen and no one could get through. This Captain was in despair, feeling that he had no chance of getting away. We understood it. His situation was very difficult. We shivered even as we listened.

Our sector was broken on the right, but on our left, three hundred paces off, the next sector had good trenches, which wound round in a bend to the Dolzyca road. The gaps were due to our lack of men.

In the morning the 12th Company was on duty. Mine rested in shelters in the woods, and we were served out with bread, tinned stuffs, winter underclothes, boots—even children's elastic slippers—and other luxuries.

The men, cold or no cold, lost no time in undressing to change their linen. I then saw human bodies which were nothing but one great sore from the neck to the waist. They were absolutely eaten up with lice. For the first time I really understood the popular phrase, "May the lice eat you!" One of the men, when he pulled off his shirt, tore away crusts of dried blood, and the vermin were swarming in filthy layers in the garment. The poor peasant had grown thin on this. His projecting jaws and sunken eyes were the most conspicuous features of him. Even we officers were regular hives. Fothi yesterday counted fifty. He pulled them one by one from the folds of his shirt collar. He counted them, threw them in the fire, and while we drank our tea and smoked, we scratched ourselves and laughed.

About midday I decided to change also. I began by washing, for I was filthy and black. From the time of our arrival at Laszki-Murowane, six weeks before, I had not known what it was to wash my mouth. The post had brought me from Hungary a toothbrush and some paste. What a joy once more to have white teeth and a clean mouth! In one's daily life at home one cannot imagine that such pleasures can exist. One thing at least war teaches us—to appreciate as never before the pleasures of peace!

I had just put on my shirts again—I always wore two or three—when I heard a shout from all sides: "The Rus-

sians are on us!" Private Torna came to our shelter to announce: "Sir, the Russians are breaking through our line on the top!" I did not yet believe it, but, at any cost, I asked my friend Fothi to conduct the company to the trenches. Meanwhile I hastily put on my boots, took my rifle, and rejoined the company as it was emerging from the wood.

There I stopped. I could hardly believe my eyes. What was it I saw? Along the whole front, the Russians and our men were in contact, staring at, threatening (with bayonets fixed), shouting at, and, in places, blazing away at each other.

Among the junipers, near to the trench we had dug three days back, the Russians and our men were scrambling together, fighting and kicking, around a supply of bread intended for the 12th Company. This struggle of starving animals for food only lasted a few seconds. They all got up, each man having at least a fragment of bread, which he devoured voraciously.

With a rapid glance I counted the Russians. They were not more numerous than ourselves, and I saw them drag our men away one by one by pulling at the corners of their blankets—for our shepherds had turned their blankets into overcoats. One or two of them, a little more knowing than the rest, unfastened these coverings and, with a shake of the shoulders, left them in the hands of the Russians. The latter, well content with their prize, went their way laughing, while our men came back to us. I thought to myself that, after all, it could not be much worse in Siberia than it was here.

Some of the Russians now tried to surround us. One raw young recruit came quite close up to us and raised his rifle at me. I held mine to the ready in response. It was a thrilling moment. I don't know what it was, but something in my look prevented him from firing, and I too refrained. He took to his heels and fled. But the shock had been too much for me, and, like a savage, I yelled in a fury: "Disarm them!" I threw myself on to the group nearest to us, and Fothi and I together wrenched the rifles

out of the hands of the two Russian soldiers. They all surrendered forthwith like lambs. We took sixty of them. All our men wished to escort the prisoners. I selected three as a guard, the third to walk behind and carry the Russian's rifle. I was obliged to have recourse to threats before I could induce them to enter the trench, and I then marched them off in file to the Commander-in-Chief.

And this is how bread, holy bread, reconciles men, not only in the form of Communion before the holy altar, but even on the field of battle. The peasants, who, in their own homes, whether in Russia or elsewhere, sweat blood in order to insure the ripening of the golden ear of corn which is to feed their masters, once they are on the battlefield forget the behests of these masters who have sent them forth to murder their fellows, and they make peace over a scrap of bread. The bread which they have produced and harvested makes them brothers. After this scene not a single shot disturbed the forest, and those who had been able to preserve a whole loaf, quickly shared it brotherly fashion with the prisoners, the latter offering them tobacco in exchange. All this, of course, took place in front of our bivouacs in the heart of the forest.

I sent Fothi to the Major to ask for reënforcements, as I was expecting a second attack. The prisoners told me that the Russians had come about four hundred strong. I did not have long to wait. An hour later, on the edge of the wood, a party of Russians appeared. They were standing with their rifles at the slope, beckoning to us to approach. One of our men left his party and came to tell us that the Russians wished to surrender, but that we ought to surround them. It was no doubt a fresh ruse. A quarter of an hour before I had sent out a patrol of two men—a Rumanian and a Saxon—and they had not returned. The Rumanian had surrendered and the Saxon had been killed. My reënforcements arrived, sixty men of the 10th Company, under Second Lieutenant Szöllösy, the man who was always the best hand at cursing and belaboring our Rumanians. I sent his sergeant-major, a brutal and thoroughly repellent Saxon, together with twenty men, to the right to

surround the Russians. I certainly doomed them to death. I reckoned that if the Russians wished to surrender they would not wait for us to surround them first. They would lay down their arms and give themselves up. On the other hand, if they did fire on our men, all who had gone out to the corner of the forest would fall victims. But calculations are all very fine; on the field of battle they are apt to be misleading.

Surrender was the last thing in the world that the Russians against whom our men were advancing with fixed bayonets had in mind. I went over the top, clambering over the body of a man whose brains were sticking out of his head, and signed to them to surrender—they were at most 200 yards away. But they still continued to call to us without attempting to move. I thereupon gave the command, "Fire!" and held my own rifle at the ready. At this point my calculations broke down. My Rumanians refused to fire, and, what was more, prevented me from firing either. One of them put his hand on my rifle and said:

"Don't fire, sir; if we fire, they will fire too. And why should Rumanians kill Rumanians?" (He was thinking of the Bessarabians.)

I accordingly refrained, but, beside myself with rage, tried to rejoin my right wing, where incredible things were happening. The schoolmaster Catavei and Cizmas barred my way, exclaiming: "Stop, don't go and get yourself shot, too!"

Our men were advancing towards the Russians, and, with their arms at the slope, were shaking hands with them; and the fraternizing business started again.

"Surrender, and we will surrender, too. We're quite ready."

Our men were bringing in Russians, and *vice versa*. It was a touching sight.

I saw one of my Rumanians, towards Saliste, kiss a Russian and bring him back. Their arms were round each other's necks as though they were brothers. They were old friends, who had been shepherd boys together in Bessarabia.

We took ninety Russians as prisoners in this way; whilst they took thirty of our men.

But this was not the last of the adventures of that wonderful day.

I was afraid of a third attack. A Moldavian from Bessarabia, noticing what a handful we were, said to me: "If we had known there were so few of you we should have gone for you with sticks."

I again applied to the Major for reënforcements and a machine gun. As it happened, he had just called up a company of the 96th Infantry Regiment; they arrived almost immediately—125 men, under Lieutenant Petras—and went to lengthen our right wing. As for me, the Major sent me to a bank on the left, to direct two machine guns where to fire in order to cut off the retreat of those Russians who had remained in the wood. I had hardly advanced a hundred yards before I heard a shout of "Hurrah!" in my sector. I called out to the Major to find out what it meant, and went on. In a hollow I found a field officer—unfortunately, I have forgotten his name—who sent a lieutenant to accompany me to the machine guns. But it was a Russian machine gun that welcomed us as soon as we reached the trenches. The bullets whizzed by, thick and fast. One grazed my leg, another came within a hand's-breadth of my head. The Russians employ detachments of snipers, who creep into advanced positions and pick off officers only. Major Paternos had the fingers of his left hand shot off in his observation post. They are wonderful shots. I showed my respect for them by not leaving the trench until nightfall, when I returned to my sector.

Lieutenant Petras had attacked the Russians in the wood. That was the meaning of the cheers I had heard, of which the most patent result was the reduction of the relieving company of the 96ths to twenty-five men. Those who had entered the wood never returned, and had certainly fallen a prey to the Russians.

Once again I had escaped the dangers of that fateful day, which the Commander-in-Chief assured us, in a special Army Order, would be inscribed on the page of history

Our scrap with the Russians may have been extremely comic, but at least we had held our positions—and that alone was a victory. We had been allotted the task of keeping the crest, from which, if they had been able to seize it, the Russians would have threatened our line in the rear and on the flank; and we had fulfilled it. Major Paternos told us to draw up a list of the men who had distinguished themselves. We all received the second-class medal for valor, and three officers—Fothi, Szöllösy and myself—were also awarded the *Signum Laudis* bar. The Hungarian deserved it perhaps least of any of us. He was not even present when we took the prisoners; but he had the impudence to go to the Major and declare, in front of us all, that it was he who captured the first Russian.

We marched through a huge forest to Hocra, where the Command of the Twentieth Division was stationed. We only got there late at night, and our strength had dwindled to a quarter of what we had at the start. Our little Budapest gentlemen had littered the road like flies. Many of them remained behind in the woods, weeping, and no one bothered about them. Some of our veterans had dropped behind, too. It was by the mercy of God if they escaped the frost and the wolves.

November 25th.

All these villages of the Galician frontier were crammed with Jewish refugees from the Galician frontier. We found rooms filled by thirty to forty persons, men, women, little girls, children, and, of course, a seasoning of soldiers, all sleeping together in a heap. It is difficult to imagine a more complete picture of misery.

Our numbers were so seriously reduced that we were obliged to form two companies, a half-battalion, the last unit which preserved its individual supply arrangements, for although we were attached to the 1st Regiment of Honveds, we were messed by ourselves. Here my company was dissolved, as it had now only the strength of a platoon, of which I was still the Commander. There were only two officers with precedence over me, and both of these were Hungarians—Szinte and Szöllösy—so that in spite of the

regret of my men and the indignation of many of my friends, I still remained a subaltern.

The dispersion of my company was the last straw. I made up my mind to say good-by to battlefields, as I was nothing but a shadow and it was all I could do to drag myself along.

NOVEMBER 27th.

At night we returned to Havaj. We left early for Stropka-Polena in a thick mist, cold and penetrating. Marching was a difficult business, for the men were worn out.

At Polena, a halt. But Austrian bureaucracy could not even leave us alone in the field. We had to get out a return of all the men's belongings which were missing, and ever would be. What was there that our poor fellows did not lack? Everything they had on them was in rags, and filthy beyond words. Lice swarmed over them like bees in a hive. Most of them were barefooted, and had wrapped up their feet in rags tied round their tattered socks. The feet of many were terribly torn and sore, but it was useless for them to go to the doctors. Strict orders had been issued that only those half dead should be admitted to hospital. One of our men remained in action for two weeks with his left arm broken by a piece of shrapnel, so he said. He was actually afraid to go to the doctor. There was, in fact, no question that the bone of his forearm was broken, but no flesh wound was to be seen.

About midday we once more took the northwest road for Galicia. We climbed hills which had been well plowed by Russian artillery. To get through a wood we had to swing by the trees. At the top we were stopped by Colonel Gombosh. It was useless to tell him that we had our Major's orders to occupy another hill. He would not hear of it. He needed a reserve, and we must stay. Shells of all kinds fell thick and fast in the forest, and there was violent fighting everywhere, the swish of machine gun bullets being conspicuous.

Colonel Gombosh sent Szinte to take a house about 1,000 meters behind the Russian front line. Then he showed me

a knoll from which I was to watch for his return and shoot his company wholesale if he returned with it. We then began to realize that we were dealing with one who had lost his wits. But Szinte's men went off to the Russian trenches —and few of them came back.

Night fighting in forests, where it is almost impossible to see even in daytime, has something quite unreal about it. All is confusion, and fear reigns supreme. Only the flashes can be seen, and it is by them that the enemy, his strength and position, can be seen. Group fights with group. Often enough you come upon your enemy from behind without knowing that it is your enemy. I once met a lieutenant whose cap was absolutely cut up at the back. He had got up to the Russians, crawling at full length. Bullets had sliced through his clothes. But he had come, dragging himself along from tree to tree.

The men passed the night in a wide trench, dug specially for the reserve, and I myself sheltered behind a tree, shivering with cold. The bullets struck the tree-trunks with a sound like the cracking of a whip. We heard that the Russians were using explosive bullets. The minute you got up or moved from your protecting tree, you were gambling with your life. It was indeed a night of horror. At two o'clock in the morning certain platoons received an order to fix bayonets and drive the Russians from a trench. They approached, sent out scouts ahead, and found the trench full of the—24th Territorials! They were within an ace of executing their orders and killing every single occupant. The Colonel's information was defective. The trench had been only partly occupied by the Russians, and was actually held both by our men and them. In fact, they had been having a shooting-match down the same communication trench. In the morning we returned to Havaj.

NOVEMBER 28th.

We went back to the trenches. Towards five o'clock in the afternoon the Russians were at Stropko-Polena. They bade us good-night by sending over four shells, which burst round the village church. We did trench duty that night, relieving each other every two hours.

In the night one of our patrols brought us in three Russian soldiers, well-clad, healthy young men, two of whom were Russians, the third a Jew, "master of the Hebrew tongue." I can't say where he came from. It was he who had persuaded the others to surrender.

Our popular Major Paternos left us at last. He got poisoning in the wound on his hand and had a sharp fever. That night I felt ill myself: I was reduced to skin and bones —I could hardly stand up. I had had quite enough of soldiering, and so made up my mind to go.

NOVEMBER 29th.

In the morning with tears in my eyes I said good-by to my men. Then, having gone through all the formalities, I walked as far as Bukocz and drove to Eperjes in two days, and from there took the last train to Budapest. Both Eperjes and Cassorie were empty of inhabitants. I was the last officer of the unit who had started out with the battalion from Fàgàras and had left the fighting area. After myself there was none left but Dr. Schuller.

Of our regiment of more than 3,500 men I had left only 170 at Havaj. Of the 11th Company, which had left Fàgàras 267 strong, only five now remained, and six counting myself.

God had willed that I should return alive.

BY GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS

At the beginning of March (Old Style), in the principal chain of the Carpathians, we only held the region of the Dukla Pass, where our lines formed an exterior angle. All the other passes—Lupkow and further east—were in the hands of the enemy.

In view of this situation, our armies were assigned the further task of developing, before the season of bad roads due to melting snows began, our positions in the Carpathians which dominated the outlets into the Hungarian plain. About the period indicated great Austrian forces, which had been concentrated for the purpose of relieving Przemysl, were in position between the Lupkow and Uzsok Passes.

It was for this sector that our grand attack was planned. Our troops had to carry out a frontal attack under very difficult conditions of terrain. To facilitate their attack, therefore, an auxiliary attack was decided upon on a front in the direction of Bartfeld as far as the Lupkow. This secondary attack was opened on March 19th and was completely developed.

On the 23rd and 28th of March our troops had already begun their principal attack in the direction of Baligrod, enveloping the enemy positions from the west of the Lupkow Pass and on the east near the source of the San.

The enemy opposed the most desperate resistance to the offensive of our troops. They had brought up every available man on the front from the direction of Bartfeld as far as the Uzsok Pass, including even German troops and numerous cavalrymen fighting on foot. His effectives on this front exceeded 300 battalions. Moreover, our troops had to overcome great natural difficulties at every step.

Nevertheless, from April 5th—that is, eighteen days after the beginning of our offensive—the valor of our troops enabled us to accomplish the task that had been set, and we captured the principal chain of the Carpathians on the front Reghetoff-Volosate, 110 versts (about 70 miles) long. The fighting latterly was in the nature of actions in detail with the object of consolidating the successes we had won.

To sum up: On the whole Carpathian front, between March 19th and April 12th, the enemy, having suffered enormous losses, left in our hands, in prisoners only, at least 70,000 men, including about 900 officers. Further, we captured more than thirty guns and 200 machine guns.

On April 16th the actions in the Carpathians were concentrated in the direction of Rostoki. The enemy, notwithstanding the enormous losses he had suffered, delivered, in the course of that day, no fewer than sixteen attacks in great strength. These attacks, all of which were absolutely barren of result, were made against the heights which we had occupied further to the east of Telepovce.

BY MAJOR E. MORAHT

The territory of the fighting in the Carpathians still claims the chief interest—especially because everywhere where the general position and the weather conditions and topographical conditions permitted the Austro-Hungarian-German offensive has begun. As has been emphasized on previous occasions, the eagerness for undertaking actions on the part of our allies had never subsided at any point, in spite of the strenuous rigors of a stationary warfare. As early as April 14th an advance enlivened the territory northwest of the Uzsok Pass. The position on the heights of Tucholka has been won. The heights west and east of the Laborcz valley are in the hands of the Austro-German allies, and each day furnishes new proofs of the forward pressure. Of especial importance is the capture of Russian points of support southeast of Koziowa, east of the Orawa valley. The advance takes its course against the Galician town of Stryi. The progress which the Austro-German southern army made has so far been moving in the same direction, and one can understand why the Russians instituted the fiercest counter-attacks in order to force the allied troops to halt in this territory. The counter-attacks, however, ended with a collapse of the Russians, and the resultant pursuit was so vigorous that twenty-six more trenches were wrested from the foe. Daily our front is being advanced in a northeasterly direction, and there is little prospect for the Russians of being able to oppose successful resistance to our pressure. For it is not a matter of the success of a single fighting group that has been shoving forward like a wedge from the great line of attack, but of a strategic offensive led as a unit, and everywhere winning territory, the time for which seems to have arrived.

GERMANY PROTESTS AGAINST AMERICAN MUNITION SALES

SHE DEMANDS A REVISION, IN HER FAVOR, OF NEUTRALITY LAWS

APRIL 4TH

BARON STEPHAN BURIAN ROBERT LANSING

On April 4, 1915, Germany made formal protest against the United States Government for allowing its subjects to send war munitions to the Allies. This first brought the question officially before the American people; but it had already been familiar to them through the widespread German propaganda. The German protest was brief and did not much discuss the merits of the case; but in the following June there came from the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs a similar protest, carefully thought out, and shrewdly worded. The Austrian argument is here presented as making the strongest statement of the case for the Teutonic Powers. We give also the official position taken by the United States Government in the reply of Secretary Lansing.

As to the general merits of the case, and also the misleading character of several of the Austrian official statements, it scarcely seems necessary to add a single word to Mr. Lansing's vigorously phrased "retort courteous," especially to its last two paragraphs. Yet to the American who may have become confused by the floods of argument over this matter, it may be well to reëmphasize the following central fact. What Germany and Austria asked of neutrals was to reject the established International laws and proclaim a new one for their benefit. Quite aside therefore from the wisdom of the new law itself—and it was most unwise—rises the superior consideration that to have altered the old law during the stress of the Great War would have been to shift the scales of combat suddenly, blindly and without that intent, against the other side. The Allies would have been deprived of a great assistance upon which they had counted from the beginning. The change would have brought them measurably near to disaster, would have been only one step removed from declaring open war against them. It was characteristic of the old Germany that she should have expected—or at least requested—the United States thus to defy and do her utmost to ruin the rest of the world for Germany's benefit, and that the request should have been based on the grounds of morality at a moment when Kaiser, Chancellor and all their Generals were vehemently declaring that they themselves would overstep all morality for the sake of victory.

As to the abstract morality of the ammunition trade in times of peace, we face there a solemn problem for the future. It is obvious

that so long as some criminals will rob and murder, honest folk must defend themselves by some form of weapons. To forbid all sale of firearms would be to place these same honest folk wholly at the mercy of the malefactors who chose to manufacture arms in secret. It would be the noble but scarcely practical method of the missionary who blesses the heathen while they devour him. Carried out on the vast scale on which Germany urged it, this new law would have been the surest possible way of surrendering the whole world to the German autocrats. They had declared themselves superior to those American scruples upon which they now sought to build. C. F. H.

BY BARON BURIAN

Vienna, June 29, 1915.

THE far-reaching effects which result from the fact that for a long time a traffic in munitions of war to the greatest extent has been carried on between the United States of America on the one hand and Great Britain and its allies on the other, while Austria-Hungary as well as Germany have been absolutely excluded from the American market, have from the very beginning attracted the most serious attention of the Imperial and Royal Government.

If now the undersigned permits himself to address himself to this question, with which the Washington Cabinet has been concerned until now only with the Imperial German Government, he follows the injunction of imperative duty to protect the interests intrusted to him from further serious damage which results from this situation as well to Austria-Hungary as to the German Empire.

Although the Imperial and Royal Government is absolutely convinced that the attitude of the Federal Government in this connection emanates from no other intention than to maintain the strictest neutrality and to conform to the letter of the provisions of international treaties, nevertheless the question arises whether the conditions as they have developed during the course of the war, certainly independently of the will of the Federal Government, are not such as in effect thwart the intentions of the Washington Cabinet or even actually oppose them. In the affirmative case—and affirmation, in the opinion of the Imperial and Royal Government, cannot be doubted—then immediately follows the further question whether it would not

seem possible, even imperative, that appropriate measures be adopted toward bringing into full effect the desire of the Federal Government to maintain an attitude of strict parity with respect to both belligerent parties. The Imperial and Royal Government does not hesitate to answer also this question unqualifiedly in the affirmative.

It cannot certainly have escaped the attention of the American Government, which has so eminently coöperated in the work of The Hague, that the meaning and essence of neutrality are in no way exhaustively dealt with in the fragmentary provisions of the pertinent treaties. If one takes into consideration particularly the genesis of Article 7 of the Fifth and Thirteenth Conventions, respectively, upon which the Federal Government clearly relies in the present case, and the wording of which, as is in no way to be denied, affords it a formal pretext for the toleration of traffic in munitions of war now being carried on by the United States, it is only necessary, in order to measure the true spirit and import of this provision, which moreover appears to have been departed from in the prevention of the delivery of vessels of war and in the prevention of certain deliveries to vessels of war of belligerent nations, to point out the fact that the detailed privileges conceded to neutral states in the sense of the preamble to the above-mentioned convention are limited by the requirements of neutrality which conform to the universally recognized principles of international law.

According to all authorities on international law who concern themselves more particularly with the question now under consideration, a neutral government may not permit traffic in contraband of war to be carried on without hindrance when this traffic assumes such a form or such dimensions that the neutrality of the nation becomes involved thereby.

If any one of the various criteria which have been laid down in science in this respect be used as a basis in determining the permissibility of commerce in contraband, one reaches the conclusion from each of these criteria that the exportation of war requisites from the United States, as

is being carried on in the present war, is not to be brought into accord with the demands of neutrality.

The question now before us is surely not whether American industries which are engaged in the manufacture of war material should be protected from loss in the export trade that was theirs in time of peace. Rather has that industry soared to unimagined heights. In order to turn out the huge quantities of arms, ammunition, and other war material of every description ordered in the past months by Great Britain and her allies from the United States, not only the full capacity of the existing plants but also their transformation and enlargement and the creation of new large plants, as well as a flocking of workmen of all trades into that branch of industry, in brief far-reaching changes of economic life encompassing the whole country, became necessary. From no quarter then can there come any question of the right of the American Government to prohibit through the issuance of an embargo that enormous exportation of war implements that is openly carried on and besides is commonly known to be availed of by only one of the parties to the war. If the Federal Government would exercise that power it possesses, it could not lay itself open to blame if, in order to keep within the requirements of the law of the land, it adopted the course of enacting a law. For while the principle obtains that a neutral state may not alter the rules in force within its province concerning its attitude toward belligerents while war is being waged, yet this principle, as clearly appears from the preamble to the Thirteenth Hague Convention, suffers an exception in the case *"où l'expèrience acquise en dèmontrerait la nècessitè pour la sauvegarde de ses droits."* [Where experience has shown the necessity thereof for the protection of its rights.]

Moreover, this case is already established for the American Government through the fact that Austria-Hungary, as well as Germany, is cut off from all commercial intercourse with the United States of America without the existence of a legal prerequisite therefor—a legally constituted blockade.

In reply to the possible objection that, notwithstanding

the willingness of American industry to furnish merchandise to Austria-Hungary and Germany as well as to Great Britain and her allies, it is not possible for the United States of America to trade with Austria-Hungary and Germany as the result of the war situation, it may be pointed out that the Federal Government is undoubtedly in a position to improve the situation described. It would be amply sufficient to confront the opponents of Austria-Hungary and Germany with the possibility of the prohibition of the exportation of foodstuffs and raw materials in case legitimate commerce in these articles between the Union and the two Central Powers should not be allowed. If the Washington Cabinet should find itself prepared for an action in this sense, it would not only be following the tradition always held in such high regard in the United States of contending for the freedom of legitimate maritime commerce, but would also earn the high merit of nullifying the wanton efforts of the enemies of Austria-Hungary and Germany to use hunger as an ally.

The Imperial and Royal Government may therefore, in the spirit of the excellent relations which have never ceased to exist between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the United States of America, appeal to the Federal Government in sincere friendship, in view of the expositions here set forth, to subject its previously adopted standpoint in this so important question to a mature reconsideration. A revision of the attitude observed by the Government of the Union in the sense of the views advocated by the Imperial and Royal Government would, according to the convictions of the latter, be not only within the bounds of the rights and obligations of a neutral government, but also in close keeping with those principles dictated by true humanity and love of peace which the United States has ever written on its banner.

BY ROBERT LANSING

Washington, August 12, 1915.

The Government of the United States has given careful consideration to the statement of the Imperial and Royal

Government in regard to the exportation of arms and ammunition from the United States to the countries at war with Austria-Hungary and Germany. The Government of the United States notes with satisfaction the recognition by the Imperial and Royal Government of the undoubted fact that its attitude with regard to the exportation of arms and ammunition from the United States is prompted by its intention to "maintain the strictest neutrality and conform to the letter with the provisions of international treaties," but is surprised to find the Imperial and Royal Government implying that the observance of the strict principles of the law under the conditions which have developed in the present war is insufficient, and asserting that this Government should go beyond the long recognized rules governing such traffic by neutrals and adopt measures to "maintain an attitude of strict parity with respect to both belligerent parties."

To this assertion of an obligation to change or modify the rules of international usage on account of special conditions the Government of the United States cannot accede. The recognition of an obligation of this sort, unknown to the international practice of the past, would impose upon every neutral nation a duty to sit in judgment on the progress of a war and to restrict its commercial intercourse with a belligerent whose naval successes prevented the neutral from trade with the enemy. The contention of the Imperial and Royal Government appears to be that the advantages gained to a belligerent by its superiority on the sea should be equalized by the neutral Powers by the establishment of a system of non-intercourse with the victor. The Imperial and Royal Government confines its comments to arms and ammunition, but if the principle for which it contends is sound it should apply with equal force to all articles of contraband. A belligerent controlling the high seas might possess an ample supply of arms and ammunition, but be in want of food and clothing. On the novel principle that equalization is a neutral duty, neutral nations would be obliged to place an embargo on such articles because one of the belligerents could not obtain them through commercial intercourse.

But if this principle, so strongly urged by the Imperial and Royal Government, should be admitted to obtain by reason of the superiority of a belligerent at sea, ought it not to operate equally as to a belligerent superior on land? Applying this theory of equalization, a belligerent who lacks the necessary munitions to contend successfully on land ought to be permitted to purchase them from neutrals, while a belligerent with an abundance of war stores or with the power to produce them should be debarred from such traffic.

Manifestly the idea of strict neutrality now advanced by the Imperial and Royal Government would involve a neutral nation in a mass of perplexities which would obscure the whole field of international obligation, produce economic confusion and deprive all commerce and industry of legitimate fields of enterprise already heavily burdened by the unavoidable restrictions of war.

In this connection it is pertinent to direct the attention of the Imperial and Royal Government to the fact that Austria-Hungary and Germany, particularly the latter, have during the years preceding the present war produced a great surplus of arms and ammunition, which they sold throughout the world and especially to belligerents. Never during that period did either of them suggest or apply the principle now advocated by the Imperial and Royal Government.

During the Boer War between Great Britain and the South African republics the patrol of the coast of neighboring neutral colonies by British naval vessels prevented arms and ammunition reaching the Transvaal or the Orange Free State. The allied republics were in a situation almost identical in that respect with that in which Austria-Hungary and Germany find themselves at the present time. Yet, in spite of the commercial isolation of one belligerent, Germany sold to Great Britain and the other belligerent, hundreds of thousands of kilos of explosives, gunpowder, cartridges, shot and weapons; and it is known that Austria-Hungary also sold similar munitions to the same purchaser, though in small quantities. While, as compared with the present war, the quantities sold were small (a table of the

sales is appended), the principle of neutrality involved was the same. If at that time Austria-Hungary and her present ally had refused to sell arms and ammunition to Great Britain on the ground that to do so would violate the spirit of strict neutrality the Imperial and Royal Government might with greater consistency and greater force urge its present contention.

It might be further pointed out that during the Crimean War large quantities of arms and military stores were furnished to Russia by Prussian manufacturers; that during the recent war between Turkey and Italy, as this Government is advised, arms and ammunition were furnished to the Ottoman Government by Germany; and that during the Balkan wars the belligerents were supplied with munitions by both Austria-Hungary and Germany. While these latter cases are not analogous, as in the case of the South African War, to the situation of Austria-Hungary and Germany in the present war, they nevertheless clearly indicate the long established practice of the two empires in the matter of trade in war supplies.

In view of the foregoing statements, this Government is reluctant to believe that the Imperial and Royal Government will ascribe to the United States a lack of impartial neutrality in continuing its legitimate trade in all kinds of supplies used to render the armed forces of a belligerent efficient, even though the circumstances of the present war prevent Austria-Hungary from obtaining such supplies from the markets of the United States, which have been and remain, so far as the action and policy of this Government are concerned, open to all belligerents alike.

But in addition to the question of principle there is a practical and substantial reason why the Government of the United States has from the foundation of the republic advocated and practiced unrestricted trade in arms and military supplies. It has never been the policy of this country to maintain in times of peace a large military establishment or stores of arms and ammunition sufficient to repel invasion by a well equipped and powerful enemy. It has desired to remain at peace with all nations and to avoid any

appearance of menacing such peace by the threat of its armies and navies. In consequence of this standing policy, the United States would, in the event of an attack by a foreign Power, be at the outset of the war seriously, if not fatally, embarrassed by the lack of arms and ammunition and by the means to produce them in sufficient quantities to supply the requirements of national defense. The United States has always depended upon the right and power to purchase arms and ammunition from neutral nations in case of foreign attack. This right, which it claims for itself, it cannot deny to others.

A nation whose principle and policy it is to rely upon international obligations and international justice to preserve its political and territorial integrity might become the prey of an aggressive nation whose policy and practice it is to increase its military strength during times of peace with the design of conquest, unless the nation attacked can, after war had been declared, go into the markets of the world and purchase the means to defend itself against the aggressor.

The general adoption by the nations of the world of the theory that neutral Powers ought to prohibit the sale of arms and ammunition to belligerents would compel every nation to have in readiness at all times sufficient munitions of war to meet any emergency which might arise and to erect and maintain establishments for the manufacture of arms and ammunition sufficient to supply the needs of its military and naval forces throughout the progress of a war. Manifestly the application of this theory would result in every nation becoming an armed camp, ready to resist aggression and tempted to employ force in asserting its rights rather than appeal to reason and justice for the settlement of international disputes.

Perceiving, as it does, that the adoption of the principle that it is the duty of a neutral to prohibit the sale of arms and ammunition to a belligerent during the progress of a war would inevitably give the advantage to a belligerent which had encouraged the manufacture of munitions in time of peace and which had laid in the vast stores of arms and ammunition in anticipation of war, the Government of the

United States is convinced that the adoption of the theory would force militarism on the world and work against that universal peace which is the desire and purpose of all nations which exalt justice and righteousness in their relations with one another.

The Government of the United States in the foregoing discussion of the practical reason why it has advocated and practiced trade in munitions of war wishes to be understood as speaking with no thought of expressing or implying any judgment with regard to the circumstances of the present war, but as merely putting very frankly the argument in this matter which has been conclusive in determining the policy of the United States.

While the practice of nations, so well illustrated by the practice of Austria-Hungary and Germany during the South African War, and the manifest evil which would result from a change of that practice render compliance with the suggestion of the Imperial and Royal Government out of the question, certain assertions appearing in the Austro-Hungarian statement as grounds for its contention cannot be passed over without comment. These assertions are substantially as follows: (1) That the exportation of arms and ammunition from the United States to belligerents contravenes the preamble of the Hague Convention, No. 13, of 1907. (2) That it is inconsistent with the refusal of this Government to allow delivery of supplies to vessels of war on the high seas. (3) That "according to all authorities on international law who concern themselves more properly with the question," exportation should be prevented "when this traffic assumes such a form or such dimensions that the neutrality of a nation becomes involved thereby."

As to the assertion that the exportation of arms and ammunition contravenes the preamble of the Hague Convention, No. 13, of 1907, this Government presumes that reference is made to the last paragraph of the preamble, which is as follows: "Seeing that, in this category of ideas, these rules should not, in principle, be altered, in the course of the war, by a neutral power, except in a case where ex-

perience has shown the necessity for such change for the protection of the rights of that Power."

Manifestly the only ground to change the rules laid down by the convention, one of which, it should be noted, explicitly declares that a neutral is not bound to prohibit the exportation of contraband of war, is the necessity of a neutral Power to do so in order to protect its own rights. The right and duty to determine when this necessity exists rests with the neutral, not with a belligerent. It is discretionary, not mandatory. If a neutral Power does not avail itself of the right, a belligerent is not privileged to complain, for in doing so it would be in the position of declaring to the neutral Power what is necessary to protect the Power's own rights. The Imperial and Royal Government cannot but perceive that a complaint of this nature would invite just rebuke.

With reference to the asserted inconsistency of the course adopted by this Government in relation to the exportation of arms and ammunition and that followed in not allowing supplies to be taken from its ports to ships of war on the high seas, it is only necessary to point out that the prohibition of supplies to ships of war rests upon the principle that a neutral power must not permit its territory to become a naval base for either belligerent. A war ship may, under certain restrictions, obtain fuel and supplies in a neutral port once in three months. To permit merchant vessels acting as tenders to carry supplies more often than three months and in unlimited amount would defeat the purpose of the rule and might constitute the neutral territory a naval base. Furthermore, this Government is unaware that any Austro-Hungarian ship of war has sought to obtain supplies from a port in the United States, either directly or indirectly. This subject has, however, already been discussed with the Imperial German Government, to which the position of this Government was fully set forth December 24, 1914.

In view of the positive assertion in the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government as to the unanimity of the opinions of text writers as to the exportation of contraband

being unneutral, this Government has caused a careful examination of the principal authorities on international laws to be made. As a result of this examination it has come to the conclusion that the Imperial and Royal Government has been misled and has inadvertently made an erroneous assertion. Less than one-fifth of the authorities consulted advocate unreservedly the prohibition of the export of contraband. Several of those who constitute this minority admit that the practice of nations has been otherwise. It need not be inopportune to direct particular attention to the declaration of the German authority, Paul Einicke, who states that, at the beginning of a war, belligerents have never remonstrated against the enactment of prohibitions on trade in contraband, but adds "that such prohibitions may be considered as violations of neutrality, or at least as unfriendly acts, if they are enacted during a war with the purpose to close unexpectedly the sources of supply to a party which heretofore had relied on them."

The Government of the United States deems it unnecessary to extend further at the present time a consideration of the statement of the Austro-Hungarian Government. The principles of international law, the practice of nations, the national safety of the United States and other nations without great military and naval establishments, the prevention of increased armies and navies, the adoption of peaceful methods for the adjustment of international differences, and finally, neutrality itself, are opposed to the prohibition by a neutral nation of the exportation of arms, ammunition, or other munitions of war to belligerent Powers during the progress of the war.

THE CANADIANS REPEL THE FIRST GAS ATTACK

THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES

APRIL 22ND

OFFICIAL GERMAN PRESS REPORT
SIR JOHN FRENCH SIR MAX AITKEN

What the British tried to do at Neuve Chapelle, break the deadlock on the western front, the Germans attempted in the second battle of Ypres. They had developed a terrible new agent, the poison-gas, by which they hoped to wipe out every life in an opposing trench and so break the Ally line of defense, sweep over it at will, and drive their foemen to despair with agony and terror.

Such a weapon of death and torture was in direct opposition to the International Laws of war as adopted by the Hague Convention of 1909. The German charge, that France had also been experimenting with some form of gas as a weapon, cannot be as wholly dismissed as most of the official German charges, which were so often, as we have already seen, the boldest falsehoods intended to befog the evidence of their own depravity. Yet the French at most had done no more than consider the use of small quantities of stupefying gas, thrown in shells, and intended to daze an enemy for just a moment while the French attacked. That is to say, the French soldiers themselves were to rush through the stupefying gas. That the reader may balance the two devices, we give here in full the official German charge upon which they sought to excuse their own use of the poison-gas. In reality, of course, the German leaders cared nothing for such excuses. They had made their position fiercely clear, that they would seize on any means whatsoever, no matter how false or cruel, if it would help them to victory.

As to the British, they were too firmly set in the old methods of fighting to have even considered gas as a weapon. Hence they were as astounded as they were infuriated and disgusted when that poisonous cloud swept down on them at Ypres, and they learned the horror of torturing death which it contained. Surely History will never forget the splendid heroism of their resistance.

The glory and the agony of it fell mainly to the Canadians, that first contingent which had rushed so loyally to Britain's aid. So we let a Canadian speak of it here, and give also the official story as narrated by the British commander, Field Marshal—as he had by this time become—Sir John French.

OFFICIAL GERMAN PRESS REPORT OF JUNE 25, 1915

FOR every one who has kept an unbiased judgment, the official assertions of the strictly accurate and truthful German military administration will be sufficient to prove the prior use of asphyxiating gases by our opponents. April 16th the French were making increased use of asphyxiating bombs. But let whoever still doubts, consider the following instructions for the systematic preparation of this means of warfare by the French, issued by the French War Ministry, under date of February 21, 1915:

"Ministry of War, February 21, 1915.

"Remarks concerning shells with stupefying gases:

"The so-called shells with stupefying gases that are being manufactured by our central factories contain a fluid which streams forth after the explosion, in the form of vapors that irritate the eyes, nose, and throat. There are two kinds: hand grenades and cartridges.

"Hand Grenades.—The grenades have the form of an egg; their diameter in the middle is six centimeters, their height twelve centimeters, their weight 400 grams. They are intended for short distances, and have an appliance for throwing by hand. They are equipped with an inscription giving directions for use. They are lighted with a small bit of material for friction pasted on the directions, after which they must be thrown away. The explosion follows seven seconds after lighting. A small cover of brass and a top screwed on protect the lighted matter. Their purpose is to make untenable the surroundings of the place where they burst. Their effect is often considerably impaired by a strong rising wind.

"Cartridges.—The cartridges have a cylindrical form. Their diameter is twenty-eight millimeters, their height ten centimeters, their weight 200 grams. They are intended for use at longer distances than can be negotiated with the hand grenades. With an angle of twenty-five degrees at departure, they will carry 230 meters. They have central lighting facilities and are fired with ignition bullet guns. The powder lights a little internal ignition mass by means

of which the cartridges are caused to explode five seconds after leaving the rifle. The cartridges have the same purpose as the hand grenades but because of their very small amount of fluid they must be fired in great numbers at the same time.

"Precautionary measures to be observed in attacks on trenches into which shells with asphyxiating gases have been thrown.—The vapors spread by means of the shells with asphyxiating gases are not deadly, at least when small quantities are used and their effect is only momentary. The duration of the effect depends upon the atmospheric conditions.

"It is advisable therefore to attack the trenches into which such hand grenades have been thrown and which the enemy has nevertheless not evacuated before the vapors are completely dissipated. The attacking troops, moreover, must wear protective goggles and in addition be instructed that the unpleasant sensations in nose and throat are not dangerous and involve no lasting disturbance."

Here we have a conclusive proof that the French in their State workshops manufactured shells with asphyxiating gases fully half a year ago at least. The number must have been so large that the French War Ministry at last found itself obliged to issue written instructions concerning the use of this means of warfare. What hypocrisy when the same people grow "indignant" because the Germans much later followed them on the path they had pointed out! Very characteristic is the twist of the French official direction: "The vapors spread by the shells with asphyxiating gases are not deadly, at least not when used in small quantities." It is precisely this limitation that contains the unequivocal confession that the French asphyxiating gases work with deadly effect when used in large quantities.

BY SIR JOHN FRENCH

Headquarters, June 15, 1915.

I much regret that during the period under report the fighting has been characterized on the enemy's side by a cynical and barbarous disregard of the well-known usages

of civilized war and a flagrant defiance of the Hague Convention.

All the scientific resources of Germany have apparently been brought into play to produce a gas of so virulent and poisonous a nature that any human being brought into contact with it is first paralyzed and then meets with a lingering and agonizing death.

The enemy has invariably preceded, prepared and supported his attacks by a discharge in stupendous volume of these poisonous gas fumes whenever the wind was favorable.

Such weather conditions have only prevailed to any extent in the neighborhood of Ypres, and there can be no doubt that the effect of these poisonous fumes materially influenced the operations in that theater, until experience suggested effective counter-measures, which have since been so perfected as to render them innocuous.

The brain power and thought which has evidently been at work before this unworthy method of making war reached the pitch of efficiency which has been demonstrated in its practice shows that the Germans must have harbored these designs for a long time.

As a soldier I cannot help expressing the deepest regret and some surprise that an Army which hitherto has claimed to be the chief exponent of the chivalry of war should have stooped to employ such devices against brave and gallant foes.

It was at the commencement of the second battle of Ypres on the evening of April 22nd that the enemy first made use of asphyxiating gas.

Some days previously I had complied with General Joffre's request to take over the trenches occupied by the French, and on the evening of the 22nd the troops holding the lines east of Ypres were posted as follows:

From Steenstraate to the east of Langemarck, as far as the Poelcappelle Road, a French Division. Thence, in a southeasterly direction toward the Passchendaele-Becelaere Road, the Canadian Division. Thence a Division took up the line in a southerly direction east of Zonnebeke to a

back at Amiens

the Germans

ed French Crayon called the "Rampart of Amiens" by Lucien Jonas

Thence a Division took up
east of Zonnebeke to a

point west of Becelaere, whence another Division continued the line southeast to the northern limit of the Corps on its right.

Of the 5th Corps there were four battalions in Divisional Reserve about Ypres; the Canadian Division had one battalion of Divisional Reserve and the 1st Canadian Brigade in Army Reserve. An Infantry Brigade, which had just been withdrawn after suffering heavy losses on Hill 60, was resting about Vlamernighe.

Following a heavy bombardment, the enemy attacked the French Division at about 5 p. m., using asphyxiating gases for the first time. Aircraft reported that at about 5 p. m. thick yellow smoke had been seen issuing from the German trenches between Langemarck and Bixschoote. The French reported that two simultaneous attacks had been made east of the Ypres-Staden Railway, in which these asphyxiating gases had been employed.

What follows almost defies description. The effect of these poisonous gases was so virulent as to render the whole of the line held by the French Division mentioned above practically incapable of any action at all. It was at first impossible for any one to realize what had actually happened. The smoke and fumes hid everything from sight, and hundreds of men were thrown into a comatose or dying condition, and within an hour the whole position had to be abandoned, together with about fifty guns.

I wish particularly to repudiate any idea of attaching the least blame to the French Division for this unfortunate incident.

After all the examples our gallant Allies have shown of dogged and tenacious courage in the many trying situations in which they have been placed throughout the course of this campaign it is quite superfluous for me to dwell on this aspect of the incident, and I would only express my firm conviction that, if any troops in the world had been able to hold their trenches in the face of such a treacherous and altogether unexpected onslaught, the French Division would have stood firm.

The left flank of the Canadian Division was thus left

dangerously exposed to serious attack in flank, and there appeared to be a prospect of their being overwhelmed and of a successful attempt by the Germans to cut off the British troops occupying the salient to the East.

In spite of the danger to which they were exposed the Canadians held their ground with a magnificent display of tenacity and courage; and it is not too much to say that the bearing and conduct of these splendid troops averted a disaster which might have been attended with the most serious consequences.

They were supported with great promptitude by the reserves of the divisions holding the salient and by a brigade which had been resting in billets.

Throughout the night the enemy's attacks were repulsed, effective counter-attacks were delivered, and at length touch was gained with the French right, and a new line was formed.

The 2nd London Heavy Battery, which had been attached to the Canadian Division, was posted behind the right of the French Division, and, being involved in their retreat, fell into the enemy's hands. It was recaptured by the Canadians in their counter-attack, but the guns could not be withdrawn before the Canadians were again driven back.

During the night I directed the Cavalry Corps and the Northumbrian Division, which was then in general reserve, to move to the west of Ypres, and placed these troops at the disposal of the General Officer Commanding the Second Army. I also directed other reserve troops from the 3rd Corps and the First Army to be held in readiness to meet eventualities.

In the confusion of the gas and smoke the Germans succeeded in capturing the bridge at Steenstraate and some works south of Lizerne, all of which were in occupation by the French.

The enemy having thus established himself to the west of the Ypres Canal, I was somewhat apprehensive of his succeeding in driving a wedge between the French and Belgian troops at this point. I directed, therefore, that some of the reënforcements sent north should be used to sup-

port and assist General Putz, should he find difficulty in preventing any further advance of the Germans west of the canal.

At about ten o'clock on the morning of the 23rd, connection was finally insured between the left of the Canadian Division and the French right, about 800 yards east of the canal; but as this entailed the maintenance by the British troops of a much longer line than that which they had held before the attack commenced on the previous night, there were no reserves available for counter-attack until reënforcements, which were ordered up from the Second Army, were able to deploy to the east of Ypres.

Early on the morning of the 23rd I went to see General Foch, and from him I received a detailed account of what had happened, as reported by General Putz. General Foch informed me that it was his intention to make good the original line and regain the trenches which the French Division had lost. He expressed the desire that I should maintain my present line, assuring me that the original position would be reëstablished in a few days. General Foch further informed me that he had ordered up large French reenforcements, which were now on their way, and that troops from the North had already arrived to reënforce General Putz.

I fully concurred in the wisdom of the General's wish to reëstablish our old line, and agreed to coöperate in the way he desired, stipulating, however, that if the position was not reëstablished within a limited time I could not allow the British troops to remain in so exposed a situation as that which the action of the previous twenty-four hours had compelled them to occupy.

During the whole of the 23rd the enemy's artillery was very active, and his attacks all along the front were supported by some heavy guns which had been brought down from the coast in the neighborhood of Ostend.

The loss of the guns on the night of the 22nd prevented this fire from being kept down, and much aggravated the situation. Our positions, however, were well maintained by the vigorous counter-attacks made by the 5th Corps.

During the day I directed two brigades of the 3rd Corps, and the Lahore Division of the Indian Corps, to be moved up to the Ypres area and placed at the disposal of the Second Army.

In the course of these two or three days many circumstances combined to render the situation east of the Ypres Canal very critical and most difficult to deal with.

The confusion caused by the sudden retirement of the French Division, and the necessity for closing up the gap and checking the enemy's advance at all costs, led to a mixing up of units and a sudden shifting of the areas of command, which was quite unavoidable. Fresh units, as they came up from the South, had to be pushed into the firing line in an area swept by artillery fire, which, owing to the capture of the French guns, we were unable to keep down.

All this led to very heavy casualties, and I wish to place on record the deep admiration which I feel for the resource and presence of mind evinced by the leaders actually on the spot.

The parts taken by Major-General Snow and Brigadier-General Hull were reported to me as being particularly marked in this respect.

An instance of this occurred on the afternoon of the 24th, when the enemy succeeded in breaking through the line at St. Julien.

Brigadier-General Hull, acting under the orders of Lieutenant-General Alderson, organized a powerful counter-attack with his own brigade and some of the nearest available units. He was called upon to control, with only his brigade staff, parts of battalions from six separate divisions which were quite new to the ground. Although the attack did not succeed in retaking St. Julien, it effectually checked the enemy's further advance.

It was only on the morning of the 25th that the enemy were able to force back the left of the Canadian Division from the point where it had originally joined the French line.

During the night, and the early morning of the 25th, the enemy directed a heavy attack against the Division at

Broodseinde cross-roads, which was supported by a powerful shell fire, but he failed to make any progress.

During the whole of this time the town of Ypres and all the roads to the East and West were uninterruptedly subjected to a violent artillery fire, but in spite of this the supply of both food and ammunition was maintained throughout with order and efficiency.

During the afternoon of the 25th many German prisoners were taken, including some officers. The hand-to-hand fighting was very severe, and the enemy suffered heavy loss.

During the 26th the Lahore Division and a Cavalry Division were pushed up into the fighting line, the former on the right of the French, the latter in support of the 5th Corps.

In the afternoon the Lahore Division, in conjunction with the French right, succeeded in pushing the enemy back some little distance toward the north, but their further advance was stopped owing to the continual employment by the enemy of asphyxiating gas.

On the right of the Lahore Division the Northumberland Infantry Brigade advanced against St. Julien and actually succeeded in entering, and for a time occupying, the southern portion of that village. They were, however, eventually driven back, largely owing to gas, and finally occupied a line a short way to the south. This attack was most successfully and gallantly led by Brigadier-General Riddell, who, I regret to say, was killed during the progress of the operation.

Although no attack was made on the southeastern side of the salient, the troops operating to the east of Ypres were subjected to heavy artillery fire from this direction, which took some of the battalions, which were advancing north to the attack, in reverse.

Some gallant attempts made by the Lahore Division on the 27th, in conjunction with the French, pushed the enemy further north; but they were partially frustrated by the constant fumes of gas to which they were exposed. In

spite of this, however, a certain amount of ground was gained.

The French succeeded in retaking Lizerne, and made some progress at Steenstraate and Het Sas; but no further progress was made toward the recapture of the original line.

THE COMING OF THE GAS UPON THE FRENCH DESCRIBED BY A BRITISH EYE-WITNESS

Utterly unprepared for what was to come, the [French] divisions gazed for a short while spellbound at the strange phenomenon they saw coming slowly toward them. Like some liquid the heavy-colored vapor poured relentlessly into the trenches, filled them, and passed on. For a few seconds nothing happened; the sweet-smelling stuff merely tickled their nostrils; they failed to realize the danger. Then, with inconceivable rapidity, the gas worked, and blind panic spread. Hundreds, after a dreadful fight for air, became unconscious and died where they lay—a death of hideous torture, with the frothing bubbles gurgling in their throats and the foul liquid welling up in their lungs. With blackened faces and twisted limbs one by one they drowned—only that which drowned them came from inside and not from out. Others, staggering, falling, lurching on, and of their ignorance keeping pace with the gas, went back. A hail of rifle fire and shrapnel mowed them down, and the line was broken. There was nothing on the British left —their flank was up in the air. The northeast corner of the salient around Ypres had been pierced. From in front of St. Julien away up north toward Boesinghe there was no one in front of the Germans.

BY SIR MAX AITKEN

The battle which raged for so many days in the neighborhood of Ypres was bloody, even as men appraise battles in this callous and life-engulfing war. But as long as brave deeds retain the power to fire the blood of Anglo-Saxons, the stand made by the Canadians in those desperate days will be told by fathers to their sons; for in the military records of Canada this defense will shine as brightly as, in the

records of the British Army, the stubborn valor with which Sir James Macdonnel and the Guards beat back from Hougoumont the Division of Foy and the Army Corps of Reille.

The Canadians wrested from the trenches, over the bodies of the dead and maimed, the right to stand side by side with the superb troops who, in the first battle of Ypres, broke and drove before them the flower of the Prussian Guards.

Looked at from any point, the performance would be remarkable. It is amazing to soldiers, when the genesis and composition of the Canadian Division are considered. It contained, no doubt, a sprinkling of South African veterans, but it consisted in the main of men who were admirable raw material, but who at the outbreak of war were neither disciplined nor trained, as men count discipline and training in these days of scientific warfare.

It was, it is true, commanded by a distinguished English general. Its staff was supplemented, without being replaced, by some brilliant British staff officers. But in its higher and regimental commands were to be found lawyers, college professors, business men, and real estate agents, ready with cool self-confidence to do battle against an organization in which the study of military science is the exclusive pursuit of laborious lives. With what devotion, with a valor how desperate, with resourcefulness how cool and how fruitful, the amateur soldiers of Canada confronted overwhelming odds may, perhaps, be made clear even by a narrative so incomplete as this.

The salient of Ypres has become familiar to all students of the campaign in Flanders. Like all salients, it was, and was known to be, a source of weakness to the forces holding it; but the reasons which have led to its retention are apparent, and need not be explained.

On April 22nd the Canadian Division held a line of, roughly, five thousand yards, extending in a northwesterly direction from the Ypres-Roulers railway to the Ypres-Poelcappelle road, and connecting at its terminus with the French troops. The Division consisted of three infantry

brigades, in addition to the artillery brigades. Of the infantry brigades the first was in reserve, the second was on the right, and the third established contact with the Allies at the point indicated above.

The day was a peaceful one, warm and sunny, and except that the previous day had witnessed a further bombardment of the stricken town of Ypres,[1] everything seemed quiet in front of the Canadian line. At five o'clock in the afternoon a plan, carefully prepared, was put into execution against our French allies on the left. Asphyxiating gas of great intensity was projected into their trenches, probably by means of force pumps and pipes laid out under the parapets.

The fumes, aided by a favorable wind, floated backwards, poisoning and disabling over an extended area those who fell under their effects. The result was that the French were compelled to give ground for a considerable distance.[2] The glory which the French Army has won in this war would make it impertinent to assert the compelling nature of the poisonous discharges under which the trenches were lost. The French did, as every one knew they would, all

[1] The great bombardment of Ypres began on April 20th, when the first 42 centimeter shell fell into the Grand Place of the little Flemish city. The only military purpose which the wanton destruction of Ypres could serve was the blocking of our supply trains, and on the first day alone 15 children were killed as they were playing in the streets, while many other civilians perished in the ruined houses.

[2] The French troops, largely made up of Turcos and Zouaves, surged wildly back over the canal and through the village of Vlamertinghe just at dark. The Canadian reserve battalions (of the 1st Brigade) were amazed at the anguished faces of many of the French soldiers, twisted and distorted by pain, who were gasping for breath and vainly trying to gain relief by vomiting. Traffic in the main streets of the village was demoralized, and gun-carriages and ammunition wagons added to the confusion.

The chaos in the main streets of the village was such that any coherent movement of troops was, for the moment, impossible; gun-carriages and ammunition wagons were inextricably mixed, while galloping gun-teams without their guns were careering wildly in all directions. When order had been to some extent restored, Staff Officers learned from fugitives who were in a condition to speak that the Algerians had left thousands of their comrades dead and dying along the four-mile gap in our Ally's lines through which the Germans were pouring behind their gas.

that stout soldiers could, and the Canadian Division, officers and men, look forward to many occasions in the future in which they will stand side by side with the brave armies of France.

The immediate consequences of this enforced withdrawal were, of course, extremely grave. The 3rd Brigade of the Canadian Division was without any left, or, in other words, its left was "in the air."

It became imperatively necessary greatly to extend the Canadian lines to the left rear. It was not, of course, practicable to move the 1st Brigade from reserve at a moment's notice, and the line, extended from 5,000 to 9,000 yards, was naturally not the line that had been held by the Allies at five o'clock, and a gap still existed on its left. The new line, of which our recent point of contact with the French formed the apex, ran, quite roughly, from there southwest to the wood of St. Julien.

As shown above, it became necessary for Brigadier-General Turner (now Major-General), commanding the 3rd Brigade, to throw back his left flank southward, to protect his rear. In the course of the confusion which followed on the readjustment of the position, the enemy, who had advanced rapidly after his initial successes, took four British 4.7 guns, lent by the 2nd London Division to support the French, in a small wood to the west of the village of St. Julien, two miles in the rear of the original French trenches.

The story of the second battle of Ypres is the story of how the Canadian Division, enormously outnumbered—for they had in front of them at least four divisions, supported by immensely heavy artillery—with a gap still existing, though reduced, in their lines, and with dispositions made hurriedly under the stimulus of critical danger, fought through the day and through the night, and then through another day and night; fought under their officers until, as happened to so many, these perished gloriously, and then fought from the impulsion of sheer valor because they came from fighting stock.

The enemy, of course, was aware—whether fully or not may perhaps be doubted—of the advantage his breach in the

line had given him, and immediately began to push a formidable series of attacks on the whole of the newly-formed Canadian salient. If it is possible to distinguish, when the attack was everywhere so fierce, it developed with particular intensity at this moment on the apex of the newly-formed line running in the direction of St. Julien.

It has already been stated that four British guns were taken in a wood comparatively early in the evening of April 22nd. The General Officer Commanding the Canadian Division had no intention of allowing the enemy to retain possession of either the wood or the guns without a desperate struggle, and he ordered a counter-attack towards the wood to be made by the 3rd Infantry Brigade under General Turner.

The assault upon the wood was launched shortly after midnight of April 22nd-23rd by the 10th Battalion and 16th (Canadian Scottish) Battalion, respectively commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Boyle and Lieut.-Colonel (now Brigadier-General) R. G. E. Leckie. The advance was made under the heaviest machine gun and rifle fire, the wood was reached, and, after a desperate struggle by the light of a misty moon, they took the position at the point of the bayonet.

An officer who took part in the attack describes how the men about him fell under the fire of the machine guns, which, in his phrase, played upon them "like a watering pot." He added quite simply, "I wrote my own life off." But the line never wavered.

When one man fell another took his place, and, with a final shout, the survivors of the two Battalions flung themselves into the wood. The German garrison was completely demoralized, and the impetuous advance of the Canadians did not cease until they reached the far side of the wood and entrenched themselves there in the position so dearly gained. They had, however, the disappointment of finding that the guns had been destroyed by the enemy, and later in the same night, a most formidable concentration of artillery fire, sweeping the wood as a tropical storm sweeps the leaves from the trees of a forest, made it impossible for

them to hold the position for which they had sacrificed so much.

Within a few hours of this attack, the 10th Canadian Battalion was again ordered to advance by Lieut.-Colonel Boyle, late a rancher in the neighborhood of Calgary. The assault was made upon a German trench which was being hastily constructed within two hundred yards of the Battalion's right front. Machine gun and rifle fire opened upon the Battalion at the moment the charge was begun, and Colonel Boyle fell almost instantly with his left thigh pierced in five places. Major MacLaren, his second in command, was also wounded at this time.

The fighting continued without intermission all through the night of April 22nd-23rd, and to those who observed the indications that the attack was being pushed with ever-growing strength, it hardly seemed possible that the Canadians, fighting in positions so difficult to defend and so little the subject of deliberate choice, could maintain their resistance for any long period.

Reënforcements of British troops, commanded by Colonel Geddes, of the Buffs, began to arrive in the gap early on Friday morning. At 6 a. m. on Friday, the 2nd Canadian Brigade was still intact, but the 3rd Canadian Brigade, on the left, was bent back upon St. Julien. It became apparent that the left was becoming more and more involved, and a powerful German attempt to outflank it developed rapidly. The consequences, if it had been broken or outflanked, need not be insisted upon. They would not have been merely local.

It was therefore decided, formidable as the attempt undoubtedly was, to try to give relief by a counter-attack upon the first line of German trenches, now far, far advanced from those originally occupied by the French. The attack was carried out at 6.30 a. m. by the 1st (Ontario) Battalion and the 4th Battalion of the 1st Brigade, under Brigadier-General Mercer, acting with Geddes' Detachment. The 4th Battalion was in advance and the 1st in support, under the covering fire of the 1st Canadian Artillery Brigade.

It is safe to say that the youngest private in the ranks, as he set his teeth for the advance, knew the task in front of him, and the youngest subaltern knew all that rested on its success. It did not seem that any human being could live in the shower of shot and shell which began to play upon the advancing troops.

They suffered terrible casualties. For a short time every other man seemed to fall, but the attack was pressed ever closer and closer. The 4th Canadian Battalion at one moment came under a particularly withering fire. For a moment—not more—it wavered. Its most gallant Commanding Officer, Lieut.-Colonel Birchall, carrying, after an old fashion, a light cane, coolly and cheerfully rallied his men, and at the very moment when his example had infected them, fell dead at the head of his Battalion. With a hoarse cry of anger they sprang forward (for, indeed, they loved him) as if to avenge his death.

The astonishing attack which followed, pushed home in the face of direct frontal fire, made in broad daylight by battalions whose names should live forever in the memories of soldiers, was carried to the first line of the German trenches. After a hand-to-hand struggle, the last German who resisted was bayoneted, and the trench was won.

The measure of our success may be taken when it is pointed out that this trench represented, in the German advance, the apex in the breach which the enemy had made in the original line of the Allies, and that it was two and a half miles south of that line. This charge, made by men who looked death indifferently in the face—for no man who took part in it could think that he was likely to live—saved, and that was much, the Canadian left. But it did more.

Up to the point where the assailants conquered, or died, it secured and maintained during the most critical moment of all, the integrity of the Allied line. For the trench was not only taken—it was held thereafter against all comers, and in the teeth of every conceivable projectile, until the night of Sunday, April 25th, when all that remained of the war-broken but victorious battalions was relieved by fresh troops.

Although the gas fumes were extremely poisonous, they were not, perhaps, having regard to the wind, so disabling as on the French lines (which ran almost east to west), and the Canadians, though affected by the fumes, stoutly beat back the two German assaults. Encouraged by this success, they rose to the supreme effort required by the assault on the wood, which has already been described. At 4 a. m. on the morning of Friday, the 23rd, a fresh emission of gas was made both on the 2nd Brigade, which held the line running northeast, and on the 3rd Brigade, which, as has been explained, continued the line up to the pivotal point defined above, and had there spread down in a southeasterly direction.

The Royal Highlanders of Montreal, 13th Battalion, and the 48th Highlanders, 15th Battalion, were more especially affected by the gas discharge. The Royal Highlanders, though considerably shaken, remained immovable on their ground. The 48th Highlanders, who no doubt received a more poisonous discharge, were for the moment dismayed, and, indeed, their trench, according to the testimony of very hardened soldiers, became intolerable. The Battalion retired from the trench, but for a very short distance and for a very short time. In a few moments they were again their own men. They advanced on and reoccupied the trenches which they had momentarily abandoned.

THE ARMENIAN MASSACRES

THE LAST GREAT CRIME OF THE TURKS

APRIL-DECEMBER

LORD JAMES BRYCE — DR. MARTIN NIEPAGE
DR. HARRY STÜRMER — TALAAT PASHA

This most wholesale of all the awful Turkish massacres of the past may, we are confident, be called the last. For surely never again will Civilization sink to such a depth of conscienceless ness as to allow the Turks to rule over any other people. A Turk is not even fit to rule a Turk.

These massacres began by Turkish Government command in April, 1915, and continued just so long as there remained any living Armenians within Turkish reach. As to the German relationship to this particular group of horrors, we let Germans speak for their race. Dr. Niepage and Dr. Stürmer were both German Government employees in Turkey, the one a teacher in Asia Minor, the other a war-correspondent and former army officer in Constantinople. Both recoil in an agony of protest against what they saw; but it is sadly noteworthy that both have to admit that the mass of their countrymen in Turkey showed no such emotional weakness.

Of the torture and slaughter of over a million people, it is impossible to give full details. These two German reports do but brush the edge of the immeasurable foulness. Its general outline is therefore given from Lord Bryce's report to the British Government, made in October of 1915. James Bryce, former British Ambassador to the United States, was a personage of such world-wide honors and high repute both as statesman and as man of letters that his words may always be fully accepted. In this case they are conservative understatements of the unspeakable truth. His full report is sickening with tales of torture and of beastly lust. Talaat Pasha, the Turkish Minister of State and leader of Turkey at the time, was directly responsible for the massacre. His official orders have since been discovered and are printed here. He was assassinated in 1921 by Solomon Teilirian, a vengeful Armenian student. C. F. H.

BY LORD BRYCE

I AM grieved to say that such information as has reached me from several quarters goes to show that the number of those who have perished in Armenia is very large. It has been estimated at the figure of 800,000. Though hoping that figure to be beyond the mark, I cannot venture

to pronounce it incredible,[1] for there has been an unparalleled destruction of life all over the country from the frontiers of Persia to the Sea of Marmora, only a very few of the cities of the Ægean coast having escaped. This is so, because the proceedings taken have been so carefully premeditated and systematically carried out, with a ruthless efficiency previously unknown among the Turks. The massacres are the result of a policy which, as far as can be ascertained, has been entertained for some considerable time by the gang of unscrupulous adventurers in possession of the Government of the Turkish Empire. They hesitated to put it in practice until they thought the favorable moment had come, and that moment seems to have arrived about the month of April, 1915. That was the time when these orders were issued, orders which came down in every case from Constantinople, and which the officials found themselves obliged to carry out on pain of dismissal.

There was no Moslem passion against the Armenian Christians. All was done by the will of the Government, and done not from any religious fanaticism, but simply because they wished, for reasons purely political, to get rid of a non-Moslem element which impaired the homogeneity of the Empire, and constituted an element that might not always submit to oppression. All that I have learned confirms what has already been said elsewhere, that there is no reason to believe that in this case Musulman fanaticism came into play at all. So far as can be made out, though of course the baser natures have welcomed and used the opportunities for plunder which slaughter and deportations afford, these massacres have been viewed by the better sort of religious Moslems with horror rather than with sympathy. It would be too much to say that they have often attempted to interfere, but at any rate they do not seem to have shown approval of the conduct of the Turkish Government.

There is nothing in the precepts of Islam which justifies the slaughter which has been perpetrated. I am told on

[1] Later statistics carry this grim figure above a million.

good authority that high Moslem religious authorities condemned the massacres ordered by Abdul Hamid, and these are far more atrocious. In some cases the governors, being pious and humane men, refused to execute the orders that had reached them, and endeavored to give what protection they could to the unfortunate Armenians. In two cases I have heard of the governors being immediately dismissed for refusing to obey the orders. Others more pliant were substituted, and the massacres were carried out.

As I have said, the procedure was exceedingly systematic. The whole Armenian population of each town or village was cleared out, by a house-to-house search. Every inmate was driven into the street. Some of the men were thrown into prison, where they were put to death, sometimes with torture; the rest of the men, with the women and children, were marched out of the town. When they had got some little distance they were separated, the men being taken to some place among the hills, where the soldiers, or the Kurdish tribes who were called in to help in the work of slaughter, dispatched them by shooting or bayoneting. The women and children and old men were sent off under convoy of the lowest kinds of soldiers—many of them just drawn from gaols—to their distant destination, which was sometimes one of the unhealthy districts in the center of Asia Minor, but more frequently the large desert in the province of Der el Zor, which lies east of Aleppo, in the direction of the Euphrates. They were driven along by the soldiers day after day, all on foot, beaten or left behind to perish if they could not keep up with the caravan; many fell by the way, and many died of hunger. No provisions were given them by the Turkish Government, and they had already been robbed of everything they possessed. Not a few of the women were stripped naked and made to travel in that condition beneath a burning sun. Some of the mothers went mad and threw away their children, being unable to carry them further. The caravan route was marked by a line of corpses, and comparatively few seem to have arrived at the destinations which had been prescribed for them—chosen, no doubt, because return was impossible and

because there was little prospect that any would survive their hardships. I have had circumstantial accounts of these deportations which bear internal evidence of being veracious, and I was told by an American friend who has lately returned from Constantinople that he had heard accounts at Constantinople confirming fully those which had come to me, and that what had struck him was the comparative calmness with which these atrocities were detailed by those who had first-hand knowledge of them. Things which we find scarcely credible excite little surprise in Turkey. Massacre was the order of the day as in Eastern Rumelia in 1876, and, in 1895-6, in Asiatic Turkey.

When the Armenian population was driven from its homes, many of the women were not killed, but reserved for a more humiliating fate. They were mostly seized by Turkish officers or civilian officials, and consigned to their harems. Others were sold in the market, but only to a Moslem purchaser, for they were to be made Moslems by force. Never again would they see parents or husbands—these Christian women condemned at one stroke to slavery, shame and apostasy. The boys and girls were also very largely sold into slavery, at prices sometimes of only ten to twelve shillings, while other boys of tender age were delivered to dervishes, to be carried off to a sort of dervish monastery, and there forced to become Musulmans.

To give one instance of the thorough and remorseless way in which the massacres were carried out, it may suffice to refer to the case of Trebizond, a case vouched for by the Italian Consul who was present when the slaughter was carried out, his country not having then declared war against Turkey. Orders came from Constantinople that all the Armenian Christians in Trebizond were to be killed. Many of the Moslems tried to save their Christian neighbors, and offered them shelter in their houses, but the Turkish authorities were implacable. Obeying the orders which they had received, they hunted out all the Christians, gathered them together, and drove a great crowd of them down the streets of Trebizond, past the fortress, to the edge of the sea. There they were all put on board sailing boats, car-

ried out some distance on the Black Sea, and there thrown overboard and drowned. Nearly the whole Armenian population of from 8,000 to 10,000 were destroyed—some in this way, some by slaughter, some by being sent to death elsewhere. After that, any other story becomes credible; and I am sorry to say that all the stories that I have received contain similar elements of horror, intensified in some cases by stories of shocking torture. But the most pitiable case is not that of those whose misery was ended by swift death, but of those unfortunate women who, after their husbands had been killed and their daughters violated, were driven out with their young children to perish in the desert—where they have no sustenance, and where they are the victims of the wild Arab tribes around them. It would seem that three-fourths or four-fifths of the whole nation has been wiped out, and there is no case in history, certainly not since the time of Tamerlane, in which any crime so hideous and upon so large a scale has been recorded.

Let me add, because this is of some importance in view of the excuses which the German Government put forward, and which their Ambassador in Washington is stated to have given, when he talked about "the suppression of riots," for the conduct of those who were their allies, that there is no ground for the suggestion that there had been any rising on the part of the Armenians. A certain number of Armenian volunteers fought on the side of the Russians in the Caucasian Army, but they came from the Armenian population of Trans-Caucasia. It may be that some few Armenians crossed the frontier in order to fight alongside their Armenian brethren in Trans-Caucasia for Russia, but at any rate, the volunteer corps which rendered such brilliant service to the Russian Army in the first part of the war was composed of Russian Armenians living in the Caucasus. Wherever the Armenians, almost wholly unarmed as they were, have fought, they have fought in self-defense to defend their families and themselves from the cruelty of the ruffians who constitute what is called the Government of the country. There is no excuse whatever upon any such ground as some German authorities and newspapers allege,

for the conduct of the Turkish Government. Their policy of slaughter and deportation has been wanton and unprovoked. It appears to be simply an application of the maxim once enunciated by Sultan Abdul Hamid: "The way to get rid of the Armenian question is to get rid of the Armenians"; and the policy of extermination has been carried out with far more thoroughness and with far more bloodthirsty completeness by the present heads of the Turkish Administration—they describe themselves as the Committee of Union and Progress—than it was in the time of Abdul Hamid.

Even if the statistics were more abundant and more eloquent still, they might fail to convey to our imagination the actuality of what has happened. A nation blotted out! It is easy to say it with the lips, more difficult to realize what it means, for it is something totally beyond our experience. Perhaps nothing brings it home more crushingly than the record which we have of one little community of sensitive, refined Armenian people, and of the terrible fates by which they were individually overtaken. They were the members of an educational establishment in a certain Anatolian town, which was endowed and directed by a society of foreign missionaries; and the following is taken directly from a letter which was written by the President of the College after the blow had fallen.

"I shall try to banish from my mind for the time the sense of great personal sorrow because of losing hundreds of my friends here, and also my sense of utter defeat in being so unable to stop the awful tragedy or even mitigate to any degree its severity, and compel myself to give you concisely some of the cold facts of the past months as they relate themselves to the College. I do so with the hope that the possession of these concrete facts may help you to do something there for the handful of dependents still left to us here.

"(i) *Constituency:* Approximately two-thirds of the girl pupils and six-sevenths of the boys have been taken away to death, exile or Moslem homes.

"(ii) *Professors:* Four gone, three left, as follows:

"Professor A., served College 35 years. Professor of Turkish and History. Besides previous trouble arrested May 1st without charge, hair of head, mustache and beard pulled out in vain effort to secure damaging confessions. Starved and hung by arms for a day and a night and severely beaten several times. Taken out towards Diyarbekir about June 20th and murdered in general massacre on the road.

"Professor B., served College 33 years, studied at Ann Arbor. Professor of Mathematics, arrested about June 5th and shared Professor A.'s fate on the road.

"Professor C., taken to witness a man beaten almost to death, became mentally deranged. Started with his family about July 5th into exile under guard and murdered beyond the first big town on the road. (Principal of Preparatory Department, studied at Princeton.) Served the College 20 years.

"Professor D., served College 16 years, studied at Edinburgh, Professor of Mental and Moral Science. Arrested with Professor A. and suffered same tortures, also had three finger nails pulled out by the roots; killed in same massacre.

"Professor E., served College 25 years, arrested May 1st, not tortured but sick in prison. Sent to Red Crescent Hospital and after paying large bribes is now free.

"Professor F., served the College for over 15 years, studied in Stuttgart and Berlin, Professor of Music, escaped arrest and torture, and thus far escaped exile and death because of favor with the Kaim-makam secured by personal services rendered.

"Professor G., served the College about 15 years, studied at Cornell and Yale (M.S.), Professor of Biology, arrested about June 5th, beaten about the hands, body and head with a stick by the Kaim-makam himself, who, when tired, called on all who loved religion and the nation to continue the beating; after a period of insensibility in a dark closet, taken to the Red Crescent Hospital with a broken finger and serious bruises.

"(iii) *Instructors, Male:* Four reported killed on the road in various massacres, whose average term of service

is eight years. Three not heard from, probably killed on the road, average term of service in the College four years.

"Two sick in Missionary Hospital.

"One in exile.

"One engaged in cabinet work for the Kaim-makam, free.

"One, owner of house occupied by the Kaim-makam, free.

"(iv) *Instructors, Female:*

"One reported killed in Chunkoosh, served the College over twenty years.

"One reported taken to a Turkish harem.

"Three not heard from.

"Four started out as exiles.

"Ten free.

"Of the Armenian people as a whole we may put an estimate that three-fourths are gone, and this three-fourths includes the leaders in every walk of life, merchants, professional men, preachers, bishops and government officials.

"I have said enough. Our hearts are sick with the sights and stories of abject terror and suffering. The extermination of the race seems to be the objective, and the means employed are more fiendish than could be concocted locally. The orders are from headquarters, and any reprieve must be from the same source."

BY DR. MARTIN NIEPAGE

When I returned to Aleppo in September, 1915, from a three months' holiday at Beirout, I heard with horror that a new phase of Armenian massacres had begun which were far more terrible than the earlier massacres under Abdul-Hamid, and which aimed at exterminating, root and branch, the intelligent, industrious, and progressive Armenian nation, and at transferring its property to Turkish hands.

Such monstrous news left me at first incredulous. I was told that, in various quarters of Aleppo, there were lying masses of half-starved people, the survivors of so-called "deportation convoys." In order, I was told, to cover the extermination of the Armenian nation with a political

cloak, military reasons were being put forward, which were said to make it necessary to drive the Armenians out of their native seats, which had been theirs for 2,500 years, and to deport them to the Arabian deserts. I was also told that individual Armenians had lent themselves to acts of espionage.

After I had informed myself about the facts and had made inquiries on all sides, I came to the conclusion that all these accusations against the Armenians were, in fact, based on trifling provocations, which were taken as an excuse for slaughtering 10,000 innocents for one guilty person, for the most savage outrages against women and children, and for a campaign of starvation against the exiles which was intended to exterminate the whole nation.

To test the conclusion derived from my information, I visited all the places in the city where there were Armenians left behind by the convoys. In dilapidated caravansaries (hans) I found quantities of dead, many corpses being half-decomposed, and others, still living, among them, who were soon to breathe their last. In other yards I found quantities of sick and starving people whom no one was looking after. In the neighborhood of the German Technical School, at which I am employed as a higher grade teacher, there were four such hans, with seven or eight hundred exiles dying of starvation. We teachers and our pupils had to pass by them every day. Every time we went out we saw through the open windows their pitiful forms, emaciated and wrapped in rags. In the mornings our schoolchildren, on their way through the narrow streets, had to push past the two-wheeled ox-carts, on which every day from eight to ten rigid corpses, without coffin or shroud, were carried away, their arms and legs trailing out of the vehicle.

After I had shared this spectacle for several days I thought it my duty to compose the following report:

"As teachers in the German Technical School at Aleppo, we permit ourselves with all respect to make the following report:

"We feel it our duty to draw attention to the fact that

our educational work will forfeit its moral basis and the esteem of the natives, if the German Government is not in a position to put a stop to the brutality with which the wives and children of slaughtered Armenians are being treated here.

"Out of convoys which, when they left their homes on the Armenian plateau, numbered from two to three thousand men, women and children, only two or three hundred survivors arrive here in the south. The men are slaughtered on the way; the women and girls, with the exception of the old, the ugly and those who are still children, have been abused by Turkish soldiers and officers and then carried away to Turkish and Kurdish villages, where they have to accept Islam. They try to destroy the remnant of the convoys by hunger and thirst. Even when they are fording rivers, they do not allow those dying of thirst to drink. All the nourishment they receive is a daily ration of a little meal sprinkled over their hands, which they lick off greedily, and its only effect is to protract their starvation.

"Opposite the German Technical School at Aleppo, in which we are engaged in teaching, a mass of about four hundred emaciated forms, the remnant of such convoys, is lying in one of the hans. There are about a hundred children (boys and girls) among them, from five to seven years old. Most of them are suffering from typhoid and dysentery. When one enters the yard, one has the impression of entering a mad-house. If one brings them food, one notices that they have forgotten how to eat. Their stomach, weakened by months of starvation, can no longer assimilate nourishment. If one gives them bread, they put it aside indifferently. They just lie there quietly, waiting for death.

"Amid such surroundings, how are we teachers to read German Fairy Stories with our children, or, indeed, the story of the Good Samaritan in the Bible? How are we to make them decline and conjugate irrelevant words, while round them in the yards adjoining the German Technical School their starving fellow-countrymen are slowly succumbing? Under such circumstances our educational work

flies in the face of all true morality and becomes a mockery of human sympathy.

"And what becomes of these poor people who have been driven in thousands through Aleppo and the neighborhood into the deserts, reduced almost entirely, by this time, to women and children? They are driven on and on from one place to another. The thousands shrink to hundreds and the hundreds to tiny remnants, and even these remnants are driven on till the last is dead. Then at last they have reached the goal of their wandering, the 'New Homes assigned to the Armenians,' as the newspapers phrase it.

"'*Ta'alim el aleman*' ('the teaching of the Germans') is the simple Turk's explanation to every one who asks him about the originators of these measures.

"The educated Moslems are convinced that, even though the German nation discountenances such horrors, the German Government is taking no steps to put a stop to them, out of consideration for its Turkish Ally.

"Mohammedans, too, of more sensitive feelings—Turks and Arabs alike—shake their heads in disapproval and do not conceal their tears when they see a convoy of exiles marching through the city, and Turkish soldiers using cudgels upon women in advanced pregnancy and upon dying people who can no longer drag themselves along. They cannot believe that their Government has ordered these atrocities, and they hold the Germans responsible for all such outrages, Germany being considered during the war as Turkey's schoolmaster in everything. Even the mollahs in the mosques say that it was not the Sublime Porte but the German officers who ordered the ill-treatment and destruction of the Armenians.

"The things which have been passing here for months under everybody's eyes will certainly remain as a stain on Germany's shield in the memory of Orientals.

"In order not to be obliged to give up their faith in the character of the Germans, which they have hitherto respected, many educated Mohammedans explain the situation to themselves as follows: 'The German nation,' they

say, 'probably knows nothing about the frightful massacres which are on foot at the present time against the native Christians in all parts of Turkey. Knowing the German love of truth, how otherwise can we explain the articles we read in German newspapers, which appear to know of nothing except that individual Armenians have been deservedly shot by martial law as spies and traitors?' Others again say: 'Perhaps the German Government has had its hands tied by some treaty defining its powers, or perhaps intervention is inopportune for the moment.'

"I know for a fact that the Embassy at Constantinople has been informed by the German Consulates of all that has been happening. As, however, there has not been so far the least change in the system of deportation, I feel myself compelled by conscience to make my present report."

At the time when I composed this report, the German Consul at Aleppo was represented by his colleague from Alexandretta—Consul Hoffmann. Consul Hoffmann informed me that the German Embassy had been advised in detail about the events in the interior in repeated reports from the Consulates at Alexandretta, Aleppo and Mosul. He told me that a report of what I had seen with my own eyes would, however, be welcome as a supplement to these official documents and as a description in detail. He said he would convey my report to the Embassy at Constantinople by a sure agency. I now worked out a report on the desired lines, giving an exact description of the state of things in the han opposite our school.

Consul Hoffmann wished to add some photographs which he had taken in the han himself. The photographs displayed piles of corpses, among which children still alive were crawling about.

In its revised form the report was signed by my colleague, Dr. Graeter (higher grade teacher), and by Frau Marie Spiecker, as well as by myself. The head of our institution, Director Huber, also placed his name to it and added a few words in the following sense: "My colleague Dr. Niepage's report is not at all exaggerated. For weeks we have been living here in an atmosphere poisoned with

sickness and the stench of corpses. Only the hope of speedy relief makes it possible for us to carry on our work."

The relief did not come. I then thought of resigning my post as higher grade teacher in the Technical School, on the ground that it was senseless and morally unjustifiable to be a representative of European civilization with the task of bringing moral and intellectual education to a nation if, at the same time, one had to look on passively while the Government of the country was abandoning one's pupils' fellow-countrymen to an agonizing death by starvation.

Those around me, however, as well as the head of our institution, Director Huber, dissuaded me from my intention. It was pointed out to me that there was value in our continued presence in the country, as eye-witnesses of what went on. Perhaps, it was suggested, our presence might have some effect in making the Turks behave more humanely towards their unfortunate victims, out of consideration for us Germans. I see now that I have remained far too long a silent witness of all this wickedness.

Our presence had no ameliorating effect whatever, and what we could do personally came to little. Frau Spiecker, our brave, energetic colleague, bought soap, and all the women and children in our neighborhood who were still alive—there were no men left—were washed and cleansed from lice. Frau Spiecker set women to work to make soup for those who could still assimilate nourishment. I, myself, distributed two pails of tea and cheese and moistened bread among the dying children every evening for six weeks; but when the Hunger-Typhus or Spotted-Typhus spread through the city from these charnel houses, six of us succumbed to it and had to give up our relief work. Indeed, for the exiles who came to Aleppo, help was really useless. We could only afford those doomed to death a few slight alleviations of their death agony.

What we saw with our own eyes here in Aleppo was really only the last scene in the great tragedy of the extermination of the Armenians. It was only a minute fraction of the horrible drama that was being played out simul-

taneously in all the other provinces of Turkey. Many more appalling things were reported by the engineers of the Bagdad Railway, when they came back from their work on the section under construction, or by German travelers who met the convoys of exiles on their journeys. Many of these gentlemen had seen such appalling sights that they could eat nothing for days.

One of them, Herr Greif, of Aleppo, reported corpses of violated women lying about naked in heaps on the railway embankment at Tell-Abiad and Ras-el-Ain. Another, Herr Spiecker, of Aleppo, had seen Turks tie Armenian men together, fire several volleys of small shot with fowling-pieces into the human mass, and go off laughing while their victims slowly perished in frightful convulsions. Other men had their hands tied behind their back and were rolled down steep cliffs. Women were standing below, who slashed those who had rolled down with knives until they were dead. A Protestant pastor who, two years before, had given a very warm welcome to my colleague, Doctor Graeter, when he was passing through his village, had his finger nails torn out.

The German Consul from Mosul related, in my presence, at the German club at Aleppo that, in many places on the road from Mosul to Aleppo, he had seen children's hands lying hacked off in such numbers that one could have paved the road with them. In the German hospital at Ourfa there was a little girl who had had both her hands hacked off.

In an Arab village on the way to Aleppo Herr Holstein, the German Consul from Mosul, saw shallow graves with freshly-buried Armenian corpses. The Arabs of the village declared that they had killed these Armenians by the Government's orders. One asserted proudly that he personally had killed eight.

In many Christian houses in Aleppo I found Armenian girls hidden who by some chance had escaped death; either they had been left lying exhausted and had been taken for dead when their companions had been driven on, or, in other cases, Europeans had found an opportunity to buy the poor creatures for a few marks from the last Turkish

soldier who had violated them. All these girls showed symptoms of mental derangement; many of them had had to watch the Turks cut their parents' throats. I know poor things who have not had a single word coaxed out of them for months, and not a smile to this moment. A girl about fourteen years old was given shelter by Herr Krause, Depôt Manager for the Bagdad Railway at Aleppo. The girl had been so many times ravished by Turkish soldiers in one night that she had completely lost her reason. I saw her tossing on her pillow in delirium with burning lips, and could hardly get water down her throat.

A German I know saw hundreds of Christian peasant women who were compelled, near Ourfa, to strip naked by the Turkish soldiers. For the amusement of the soldiers they had to drag themselves through the desert in this condition for days together in a temperature of 40° Centigrade, until their skins were completely scorched. Another witness saw a Turk tear a child out of its Armenian mother's womb and hurl it against the wall.

There are other occurrences, worse than these few examples which I give here, recorded in the numerous reports which have been sent in to the Embassy from the German Consulates at Alexandretta, Aleppo and Mosul. The Consuls are of opinion that, so far, probably about one million Armenians have perished in the massacres of the last few months. Of this number, one must reckon that at least half are women and children who have either been murdered or have succumbed to starvation.

It is a duty of conscience to bring these things into publicity, and, although the Turkish Government, in destroying the Armenian nation, may only be pursuing objects of internal policy, the way this policy is being carried out has many of the characteristics of a general persecution of Christians.

All the tens of thousands of girls and women who have been carried off into Turkish harems, and the masses of children who have been collected by the Government and distributed among the Turks and Kurds, are lost to Chris-

tendom, and have to accept Islam. The abusive epithet *"giaour"* is now heard once again by German ears.

At Adana I saw a crowd of Armenian orphans marching through the streets under a guard of Turkish soldiers; their parents have been slaughtered and the children have to become Mohammedans. Everywhere there have been cases in which adult Armenians were able to save their lives by readiness to accept Islam. Sometimes, however, the Turkish officials first made the Christians present a petition to be received into the communion of Islam, and then answered very grandly, in order to throw dust in the eyes of Europeans, that religion is not a thing to play with. These officials preferred to have the petitioners killed. Men like Talaat Bey and Enver Pasha, when prominent Armenians brought them presents, often tempered their thanks with the remark that they would have been still better pleased if the Armenian givers had made their presents as Mohammedans. A newspaper reporter was told by one of these gentlemen: "Certainly we are now punishing many innocent people as well. But we have to guard ourselves even against those who may one day become guilty." On such grounds Turkish statesmen justify the wholesale slaughter of defenseless women and children. A German Catholic ecclesiastic reported that Enver Pasha declared, in the presence of Monsignore Dolci, the Papal Envoy at Constantinople, that he would not rest so long as a single Armenian remained alive.

The object of the deportations is the extermination of the whole Armenian nation. This purpose is also proved by the fact that the Turkish Government declines all assistance from Missionaries, Sisters of Mercy and European residents in the country, and systematically tries to stop their work. A Swiss engineer was to have been brought before a court-martial because he had distributed bread in Anatolia to the starving Armenian women and children in a convoy of exiles. The Government has not hesitated even to deport Armenian pupils and teachers from the German schools at Adana and Aleppo, and Armenian children from the German orphanages, without regard to all the efforts of

the Consuls and the heads of the institutions involved. The Government also rejected the American Government's offer to take the exiles to America on American ships and at America's expense.

The opinion of our German Consuls and of many foreigners resident in the country about the Armenian massacres will some day become known through their reports. I can say nothing about the verdict of the German officers in Turkey. I often noticed, when in their company, an ominous silence or a convulsive effort to change the subject when any German of warm sympathies and independent judgment began to speak about the Armenians' frightful sufferings.

When Field Marshal von der Goltz was traveling to Bagdad and had to cross the Euphrates at Djerablus, there was a large encampment of half-starved Armenian exiles there. Just before the Field Marshal's arrival, so I was told at Djerablus, these unhappy people, the sick and dying with the rest, were driven under the whip several kilometers away over the nearest hills. When von der Goltz passed through, there were no traces left of the repulsive spectacle; but when I visited the place shortly afterwards with some of my colleagues, we found corpses of men, women and children still lying in out-of-the-way places, and fragments of clothes, skulls and bones which had been partly stripped of the flesh by jackals and birds of prey.

The author of the present report considers it out of the question that, if the German Government is seriously determined to stem the tide of destruction even at this eleventh hour, it would find it impossible to bring the Turkish Government to reason. If the Turks are really so well inclined to us Germans as people say, cannot they have it pointed out to them how seriously they compromise us before the whole civilized world, if we, as their allies, have to look on passively while our fellow-Christians in Turkey are slaughtered in their hundreds of thousands, their women and daughters violated, their children brought up as Mohammedans? Cannot the Turks be made to understand that their barbarities are reckoned to our account, and that we Ger-

mans will be accused either of criminal complicity or of contemptible weakness, if we shut our eyes to the frightful horrors which this war has produced, and seek to pass over in silence facts which are already notorious all over the world? If the Turks are really as intelligent as is said, should it be impossible to convince them that, in exterminating the Christian nations in Turkey, they are destroying the productive factors and the intermediaries of European trade and general civilization? If the Turks are as far-sighted as is said, can they blind themselves to the danger that, when the civilized States of Europe have taken cognizance of what has been happening in Turkey during the war, they may be driven to the conclusion that Turkey has forfeited the right to govern herself and has destroyed once for all any belief in her tolerance and capacity for civilization? Will not the German Government be standing for what is best in Turkey's own interest, if it hinders Turkey from ruining herself morally and economically?

In this report I hope to reach the Government's ear through the accredited representatives of the German nation.

When the Reichstag sits in Committee, these things must no longer be passed over, however painful they are. Nothing could put us more to shame than the erection at Constantinople of a Turco-German palace of friendship at huge expense, while we are not in a position to shield our fellow-Christians from barbarities unparalleled even in the blood-stained history of Turkey. . . .

Even apart from our common duty as Christians, we Germans are under a special obligation to stop the complete extermination of the half-million Armenian Christians who still survive. We are Turkey's allies and, after the elimination of the French, English and Russians, we are the only foreigners who have any say in Turkish affairs. We may indignantly refute the lies of our enemies abroad, who say that the massacres have been organized by German Consuls. We shall not be able to dissipate *the Turkish nation's conviction that the Armenian massacres were ordered by Germany,* unless energetic steps are at last taken by German

diplomatists and officers. And even if we cleared ourselves of everything but the one reproach that our timidity and weakness in dealing with our ally had prevented us from saving half a million women and children from slaughter or death by starvation, the image of the German War would be disfigured for all time in the mirror of history by a hideous feature.

It is utterly erroneous to think that the Turkish Government will refrain of its own accord even from the destruction of the women and children, unless the strongest pressure is exercised by the German Government. Only just before I left Aleppo, in May, 1916, the crowds of exiles encamped at Ras-el-Ain on the Bagdad Railway, estimated at 20,000 women and children, were slaughtered to the last one.

BY DR. HARRY STÜRMER

I have spoken to Armenians who said to me: "Formerly Sultan Abdul Hamid massacred us from time to time by thousands. At stated intervals, in regular pogroms, we were turned over to the knives of the Kurds, and certainly suffered terribly. After that the Young Turks, at Adana, in 1909, showed they, too, could shed the blood of thousands of us. But since our present sufferings, rest assured we look with longing back upon the massacres perpetrated under the old régime. Now we have to complain not of a definite number of murdered people; now our whole race is slowly but surely being exterminated by the chauvinistic hatred of an apparently civilized, apparently modern, but, for that very reason, terribly dangerous Government. Now they are taking our women and children, who die on those long wearisome trips on foot that they have to make while being deported, or in the concentration camps without anything to eat. The few pitiful survivors of our people in the villages and cities of the interior, where the local authorities eagerly carry out the Central Government's orders, are then forcibly converted to Islamism, and our young girls are put into harems and houses of prostitution.

"Now that the Young Turks find themselves bleeding

white in a disastrous war, they are trying to right the balance of the races and permanently establish themselves as the predominant element in the country. That is why these are not merely abortive outbreaks, but calculated political measures against our people; and therefore we can hope for no mercy. Since Germany, weak and conscienceless, permits our extermination, if the war lasts much longer the Armenian people will simply cease to exist. And so we now look back with regret to the terrible Abdul Hamid."

Was there ever any more terrific tragedy in the history of a race? And this was a race quite free of all illusions of nationalism, cognizant that it would be helpless crowded in between two great nations. The Armenians had felt no real impulse toward Russia until the Young Turks, whose comrades they had been in revolt against Abdul Hamid, foully betrayed them. They had been completely loyal to their Osmanli citizenship, more so than any other element of the empire, with the exception of the Turks themselves.

Germany's attitude gave evidence of the most shameless cowardice. We certainly had sufficient control of the Turkish Government in military, financial, and political matters to be able at least to force it to observe the most elementary rules of humanity.

And, unfortunately, the fact has been established by nurses and doctors returning from the interior that German officers, more eager than some of the Turkish officials of local districts, who hated to carry out the instructions of the Committee of Union and Progress, light-heartedly took part in the extermination and expulsion of the Armenians.

Just such a case of criminal interference by military persons, in the interior of Anatolia, was officially brought to the attention of the embassy. At that time Count Wolff-Metternich happened to be the German Ambassador, a man who, in spite of his years, and in contrast to Freiherr von Wangenheim, victim of a weak and criminal optimism and pro-Turk blindness, now and then dared to oppose the Turkish Government. In the present instance he reported the matter to Germany; whereupon this very crime which he reported was made the pretext for his dismissal.

BY TALAAT PACHA

(All of the following official Turkish dispatches are signed by Talaat himself, except the first. This is signed by the "Djemiet" or executive committee of the "Young Turk" organization which was managing the government. Talaat was himself chairman of this committee; so that the Djemiet signature is equivalent to his. The "Djemal Bey" addressed was the chief Turkish official in Asia Minor.)

March 25th, 1915.

To Djemal Bey, Delegate at Adana:

The duty of everyone is to effect on the broadest lines possible the realization of the noble project of wiping out of existence the well-known elements who for centuries have been the barrier to the empire's progress in civilization. We must, therefore, take upon ourselves the entire responsibility, pledging ourselves to this action no matter what happens, and always remembering how great is the sacrifice which the Government has made in entering the World War. We must work so that the means used may lead to the desired end.

In our dispatch dated February 18th, we announced that the Djemiet has decided to uproot and annihilate the different forces which for centuries have been a hindrance; for this purpose it is forced to resort to very bloody methods. Certainly the contemplation of these methods horrified us, but the Djemiet saw no other way of insuring the stability of its work.

Ali Riza [the committee delegate at Aleppo] harshly criticised us and urged that we be merciful; such simplicity is nothing short of stupidity. We will find a place for all those who will not coöperate with us, a place that will wring their delicate heartstrings.

Again let me remind you of the question of property left. This is very important. Watch its distribution with vigilance; always examine the accounts and the use made of the proceeds.

THE DJEMIET.

September 3rd, 1915.

To the Prefecture of Aleppo:

We advise that you include the women and children also

in the orders which have been previously prescribed as to be applied to the males of the intended persons. Select employees of confidence for these duties.

Minister of the Interior, TALAAT.

September 16th.

To the Prefecture of Aleppo:

You have already been advised that the Government, by order of the Djemiet, has decided to destroy completely all the indicated persons [Armenians] living in Turkey. All who oppose this decision and command cannot remain on the official staff of the empire. Their existence must come to an end, however tragic the means may be; and no regard must be paid to either age or sex, or to conscientious scruples. Minister of the Interior, TALAAT.

November 18th, 1915.

To the Prefecture of Aleppo:

It appears, from the interventions which have recently been made by the American Ambassador [Mr. Morgenthau] at Constantinople on behalf of his Government, that the American Consuls are obtaining information by some secret means. They remain unconvinced, despite our assurance that the deportations will be accomplished in safety and comfort. Be careful that events which attract attention shall not occur in connection with those who are near cities and other centres. In view of our present policy, it is most important that foreigners who are in those parts shall be convinced that the expulsion of the Armenians is in reality only deportation. Therefore it is necessary that a show of gentle dealing shall be made for a while, and the usual measures be taken in suitable places. All persons who have given information to the contrary shall be arrested and handed over to the military authorities for trial by court-martial. This order is recommended as very important.

TALAAT.

December 11th, 1915.

To the Prefecture of Aleppo:

We are informed that some correspondents of Armenian

journals are acquiring photographs and letters which depict tragic events, and these they give to the American Consul at Aleppo. Dangerous people of this kind must be arrested and suppressed.

Minister of the Interior,
TALAAT.

December 29th, 1915.

To the Prefecture of Aleppo:

We are informed that foreign officers are finding along the roads the corpses of the indicated persons, and are photographing them. Have these corpses buried at once and do not allow them to be left near the roads. This order is recommended as very important.

Minister of the Interior,
TALAAT.

January 15th, 1916.

To the Government of Aleppo:

We are informed that certain orphanages which have opened also admitted the children of the Armenians. Should this be done through ignorance of our real purpose, or because of contempt of it, the Government will view the feeding of such children or any effort to prolong their lives as an act completely opposite to its purpose, since it regards the survival of these children as detrimental. I recommend the orphanages not to receive such children; and no attempts are to be made to establish special orphanages for them.

Minister of the Interior,
TALAAT.

(Undated.)

From the Ministry of the Interior to the Governor of Aleppo:

Only those orphans who cannot remember the terrors to which their parents have been subjected must be collected and kept. Send the rest away with the caravans.

Minister of the Interior,
TALAAT.

DUNAJEC: THE BREAKING OF THE RUSSIAN FRONT

THE TRIUMPH OF GERMAN ARTILLERY

MAY 1ST

GENERAL VON MACKENSEN — GENERAL KROBATIN
GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS — STANLEY WASHBURN

The battle of the Dunajec River, or of Gorlice as it might be more accurately called, was not only the turning point of 1915; it was the turning point of the entire War upon the eastern front. Up to that time Russia had hoped to win by her own strength; had dreamed of sweeping over the Carpathians, holding Austria in conquest, and sweeping on to Berlin. After the terrible crushing of her defense line which began along the Dunajec, she was forever on the defensive; many of her councilors were urging peace; many almost openly supported Germany. No hope of victory remained to Russia except through a western victory by Britain and France.

The Dunajec was also a revolution in modern warfare. So prodigal an employment of explosives had not even entered the imagination of earlier leaders. The preparation of such quantities of ammunition demanded indeed the labors of an entire nation. Germany was willing to give herself thus utterly to the waging of war. Unless the Allies could come promptly and effectively to the same position, they would be hopelessly outclassed. So important does it thus become to the reader to understand not only the battle of the Dunajec itself but also its influence upon the world in its own immediate hour, that we give here the official reports of the struggle, German, Austrian and Russian, and then a general survey by the British observer sent with the Russian troops.

The Dunajec River flows through northwestern Galicia, not far from the ancient Polish capital of Cracow. East of the Dunajec lies the town of Gorlice, and as the breaking Russians fell back through Gorlice, its name is often given to the battle. The Russians were driven back day by day to the San River in mid Galicia. On the banks of the San lie the two strongly defensible towns of Jaroslav and Przemysl. The Russian withdrawal from the second of these took place on June 3rd; and as this committed the retreating army definitely to the abandonment of western Galicia it may be regarded as the final despairing yielding of the month-long struggle. The Carpathian attack against Austria had to be abandoned wholly. Indeed, only by utmost skill did Brusiloff, the Russian general in the Carpathians, save his army from being surrounded there and so cut off.

BY GENERAL VON MACKENSEN

TO the complete surprise of the enemy, large movements of troops into West Galicia had been completed by the end of April. These troops, subject to the orders of General von Mackensen, had been assigned the task in conjunction with the neighboring armies of our Austrian ally of breaking through the Russian front between the crest of the Carpathians and the middle Dunajec. It was a new problem and no easy undertaking. The heavens granted our troops wonderful sunshine and dry roads. Thus flyers and artillery could come into full activity and the difficulties of the terrain, which here has the character of the approaches of the German Alps, or the Hörsal hills in Thuringia, could be overcome. At several points ammunition had to be transported amid the greatest hardships on pack animals and the marching columns and batteries had to be moved forward over corduroy roads. All the accumulation of information and preparations necessary for breaking through the enemy's line had been quietly and secretly accomplished. On the first of May in the afternoon the artillery began its fire on the Russian positions. These in some five months had been perfected according to all the rules of the art of fortification. In stories they lay one over the other along the steep heights, whose slopes had been furnished with obstacles. At some points of special importance to the Russians they consisted of as many as seven rows of trenches, one behind the other. The works were very skillfully placed, and were adopted to flanking one another. The infantry of the allied [Teutonic] troops in the nights preceding the attack had pushed forward closer to the enemy and had assumed positions in readiness for the forward rush. In the night from May 1st to 2nd the artillery fired in slow rhythm at the enemy's positions. Pauses in the fire served the pioneers for cutting the wire entanglements. On the 2nd of May at 6 a. m. an overwhelming artillery fire, including field guns and running up to the heaviest calibers, was begun on the front many miles in extent selected for the effort to break through. This was maintained unbroken for four hours.

At 10 o'clock in the morning these hundreds of fire-spouting tubes suddenly ceased and the same moment the swarming lines and attacking columns of the assailants threw themselves upon the hostile positions. The enemy had been so shaken by the heavy artillery fire that his resistance at many points was very slight. In headlong flight he left his defenses, when the infantry of the [Teutonic] allies appeared before his trenches, throwing away rifles and cooking utensils and leaving immense quantities of infantry ammunition and dead. At one point the Russians themselves cut the wire entanglements to surrender themselves to the Germans. Frequently the enemy made no further resistance in his second and third positions. On the other hand, at certain other points of the front he defended himself stubbornly, making an embittered fight and holding the neighborhood. With the Austrian troops, the Bavarian regiments attacked Mount Zameczyka, lying 250 meters above their positions, a veritable fortress. A Bavarian infantry regiment here won incomparable laurels. To the left of the Bavarians Silesian regiments stormed the heights of Sekowa and Sakol. Young regiments tore from the enemy the desperately defended cemetery height of Gorlice and the persistently held railway embankment at Kennenitza. Among the Austrian troops Galician battalions had stormed the steep heights of the Pustki Hill, Hungarian troops having taken in fierce fighting the Wiatrowka heights. Prussian guard regiments threw the enemy out of his elevated positions east of Biala and at Staszkowka stormed seven successive Russian lines which were stubbornly held. Either kindled by the Russians or hit by a shell, a naphtha well behind Gorlice burst into flames. Higher than the houses the flames struck up into the sky and pillars of smoke rose to hundreds of yards.

On the evening of the 2nd of May, when the warm Spring sun had begun to yield to the coolness of night the first main position in its whole depth and extent, a distance of some sixteen kilometers, had been broken through and a gain of ground of some four kilometers had been attained. At least 20,000 prisoners, dozens of cannon and fifty ma-

chine guns remained in the hands of the allied troops that in the battle had competed with one another for the palm of victory. In addition, an amount of booty to be readily estimated, in the shape of war materials of all sorts, including great masses of rifles and ammunition, had been secured.

From the German Official Press Headquarters

Reports of prisoners are unanimous in describing the effect of the artillery fire of the [Teutonic] allies as more terrible than the imagination can picture. The men, who were with difficulty recovering from the sufferings and exertions they had undergone, agreed that they could not imagine conditions worse in hell than they had been for four hours in the trenches. Corps, divisions, brigades, and regiments melted away as though in the heat of a furnace. In no direction was escape possible, for there was no spot of ground on which the four hundred guns of the Teutonic allies had not exerted themselves. All the Generals and Staff Officers of one Russian division were killed or wounded. Moreover, insanity raged in the ranks of the Russians, and from all sides hysterical cries could be heard rising above the roar of our guns, too strong for human nerves. Over the remnants of the Russians who crowded in terror into the remotest corners of their trenches there broke the mighty rush of our masses of infantry, before which also the Russian reserves, hurrying forward, crumbled away.

In barely fourteen days the army of Mackensen carried its offensive forward from Gorlice to Jaroslav. With daily fighting, for the most part against fortified positions, it crossed the line of three rivers and gained in territory more than 100 kilometers in an airline. On the evening of the fourteenth day, with the taking of the city and bridgehead, Jaroslav, they won access to the lower San. It was now necessary to cross this stream on a broad front. The enemy, though, still held before Radymo and in the angle of San-Wislok with two strongly fortified bridge-heads the west bank of this river. For the rest he confined himself to the frontal defense of the east bank.

While troops of the guard in close touch with Austrian regiments gained, fighting, the crossing of the river at Jaroslav, and continued to throw the enemy, who was daily receiving reënforcements, continually further toward the east and northeast, Hanoverian regiments forced the passage of the river several kilometers further down stream. Brunswickers, by the storming of the heights of Wiazowinca, opened the way and thereby won the obstinately defended San crossing. Further to the north the San angle was cleared of the enemy that had still held on there. One Colonel, fifteen officers, 7,800 prisoners, four cannon, twenty-eight machine guns, thirteen ammunition wagons, and a field kitchen fell into our hands. The rest found themselves obliged to make a hasty retreat to the east bank.

These battles and successes took place on the 17th of May in the presence of the German Emperor, who, on the same day, conferred upon the Chief of Staff of the army here engaged, Colonel von Seeckt, the order *pour le mérite,* the commander of the army, General von Mackensen, having already received special honors. The Emperor had hurried forward to his troops by automobile. On the way he was greeted with loud hurrahs by the wounded riding back in wagons. On the heights of Jaroslav the Emperor met Prince Eitel Friedrich, and then, from several points of observation, for hours followed with keen attention the progress of the battle for the crossing.

In the days from the 18th to the 20th of May the Teutonic allies pressed on further toward the east, northeast, and north, threw the enemy out of Sieniawa and took up positions on the east bank of the river upon a front of twenty or thirty kilometers. The enemy withdrew behind the Lerbaczowa stream. All his attempts to win back the lost ground were unsuccessful.

In the month of May 863 officers and 268,869 men were taken prisoners in the southeastern theater of war, while 251 cannon and 576 machine guns were captured. Of these numbers, the capturing of 400 officers, including two Generals, 153,254 men, 160 cannon, including twenty-eight

heavy ones, and 403 machine guns, is to the credit of the troops under General Mackensen.

Including prisoners taken in the eastern theater of war, the total number of Russians who have fallen into the hands of the Germanic allied troops during the month of May amounts to about 1,000 officers and more than 300,000 men.

BY GENERAL KROBATIN

VIENNA, May 13th.

From January to the middle of April the Russians vainly exerted themselves to break through to Hungary, but they completely failed with heavy losses. Thereupon the time had come to crush the enemy in a common attack with a full force of the combined troops of both empires.

A victory at Tarnow and Gorlice freed West Galicia from the enemy and caused the Russian fronts on the Nida and in the Carpathians to give way. In a ten days' battle the victorious troops beat the Russian Third and Eighth Armies to annihilation, and quickly covered the ground from the Dunajec and Beskids to the San River—130 kilometers (nearly 81 miles) of territory.

From May 2nd to 12th the prisoners taken numbered 143,500, while 100 guns and 350 machine guns were captured, besides the booty already mentioned. We suppressed small detachments of the enemy scattered in the woods in the Carpathians.

Near Odvzechowa the entire staff of the Russian Forty-eighth Division of Infantry, including General Korniloff, surrendered. The best indication of the confusion of the Russian Army is the fact that our Ninth Corps captured in the last few days Russians of fifty-one various regiments. The quantity of captured Russian war material is piled up and has not yet been enumerated.

North of the Vistula the Austro-Hungarian troops are advancing across Stopnica. The German troops have captured Kielce.

East of Uzsok Pass the German and Hungarian troops took several Russian positions on the heights and advanced

to the south of Turka, capturing 4,000 prisoners. An attack is proceeding here and in the direction of Skole.

In southeast Galicia strong hostile troops are attacking across Horodenka.

BY GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS

PETROGRAD, June 3rd.

As Przemysl, in view of the state of its artillery and its works, which were destroyed by the Austrians before their capitulation, was recognized as incapable of defending itself, its maintenance in our hands only served our purpose until such time as our possession of positions surrounding the town on the northwest facilitated our operations on the San.

The enemy having captured Jaroslav and Radymno and begun to spread along the right bank of the river, the maintenance of these positions forced our troops to fight on an unequal and very difficult front, increasing it by thirty-five versts (about twenty-four miles), and subjecting the troops occupying these positions to the concentrated fire of the enemy's numerous guns.

Przemysl was bombarded with heavy guns up to 16-inch caliber, and the enemy delivered his principal attack against the north front in the region of Forts 10 and 11, which the Austrians had almost completely demolished before the surrender of the fortress.

When we repulsed these attacks the enemy succeeded in taking several of our guns, which had bombarded the enemy's columns until the latter were close to the muzzles, and the last shell was spent.

BY STANLEY WASHBURN

The world's history records nothing that has even approximated to this German drive which fell on one Russian Army, the bulk of which remained at its post and perished. The total number of German army corps sent down to do this job is uncertain. I have heard from many in high authority estimates differing so widely that I can supply no statement as absolutely correct. Perhaps sixteen is not far

from the actual number, though probably reënforcements and extra divisions sent in pretty steadily to fill losses, brought up the total to a larger number than the full strength of sixteen corps. However, the details at this time are immaterial. The main point is that the Russians were entirely outnumbered in men, guns and ammunition. The statements about the German massed guns also vary as widely as from 2,000 to 4,000. Certainly they had not less than 200 guns equal to or exceeding 8-inch types. These were concentrated on the front which was held by three or four corps of the devoted Dunajec army.

Men who know have told me that what followed was indescribable. I have not heard that there was any panic, or attempt to retreat on the part of the troops. In characteristic Russian fashion they remained and took their grueling. For whole versts behind the line, I am told that the terrain was a hash of earth, mangled bodies, and fragments of exploded shell. If the statement that the Germans fired 700,000 shells in three hours is true, and it is accepted in the Russian Army, one can readily realize what must have been the condition of the army occupying that line of works. Much criticism has been brought against the General commanding because he had no well-prepared second line of trenches. No doubt he ought to have had it, but it would have made little difference beyond delaying the advance a few days. The German machine had been preparing for two months, and everything was running as smooth as a well-oiled engine, with troops, munitions and supplies being fed in with precision and regularity.

Russia is not an industrial nation, and cannot turn her resources into war material overnight as the Germans have been able to do. She was outclassed in everything except bravery, and neither the Germans nor any other army can claim superiority to her in that respect. With the center literally cut away, the keystone of the Russian line had been pulled out, and nothing remained but to retire. In this retirement five Russian armies were involved.

The unfortunate army of the Dunajec, whose commander and number are as well known in England as here, began

then to fall back with what there was left of it on the San, tearing up railroads and fighting a rearguard action with what strength it could command. In the meantime the army of Brusiloff, which up to this time had never been defeated, was well through the Carpathians and going strong. The crumbling of their right neighbor left them in a terrible plight, and only skillful and rapid maneuvering got them back out of the passes in time to get in touch with the fragments of the retreating center, which by the time it reached the San had got reënforcements and some ammunition. Brusiloff's right tried to hold Przemysl, but as the commander assured me, there was nothing left of the fortifications. Besides, as I gather from officers in that part of his army, further retirements of the next army kept exposing their flank, and made it imperative for the whole army to commence its retreat toward the Russian frontier.

I have good reason for believing that the Russian plan to retire to their own frontier was decided on when they lost Przemysl, and that the battles on the Grodek line, around Lwow, were merely rearguard actions. In any case, I do know that while the fighting was still in progress on the San, and just as Przemysl was taken, work was commenced on a permanent line of defense south of Lublin and Cholm, the line in fact which is at this moment being held by the Russians. My belief, then, is that everything that took place between the San and the present line must be considered inevitable in the higher interests of Russian strategy. The interim between leaving the San and taking up what is now approximately the line on which they will probably make a definite stand, will make a very fine page in Russian history. I cannot at this time go into any details, but the Allies will open their eyes when they know exactly how little the Russians had in the way of ammunition to hold off this mass of Germans and Austrians whose supply of shell poured in steadily week after week.

Next to the army of Brusiloff is that army which had been assaulting and making excellent headway in the Eastern Carpathians. They, too, were attacked with terrible energy, but taken independently could probably have held

on indefinitely. As it was they never moved until the retirement of all the other armies west of them rendered their position untenable. The German and Austrian communiqués have constantly discussed the defeat of this army. The world can judge whether it was demoralized when it learns that in six weeks, from Stryj to the Zota Lipa, it captured 53,000 prisoners. During this same period, the army of Bukovina in the far left was actually advancing, and only came back to preserve the symmetry of the whole line. The problem of falling back over this extremely long front with five great armies, after the center was completely broken, was as difficult an one as could well be presented. In the face of an alert enemy there were here and there local disasters and bags of Russian prisoners, but with all their skill, and with all their railroads, and superiority in both men and ammunition, the Germans and the Austrians have not been able to destroy the Russian force, which stands before them to-day on a new and stronger line. The further the Russians have retired, the slower has been their retreat and the more difficult has it been for the enemy to follow up their strokes with anything like the same strength and energy. In other words, the Russians are pretty nearly beyond the reach of enemy blows which can hurt them fatally.

The Austrians have followed up the Eastern armies and claim enormous victories, but it must be pretty clear now, even to the Austrians and Germans, that these victories, which are costing them twice what they are costing the Russians, are merely rearguard actions. In any case, the Austrian enthusiasm is rapidly ebbing away. After two months of fighting the Germans have finally swung their main strength back toward the line of Cholm-Lublin, with the probable intent of finishing up the movement by threatening Warsaw and thus closing up successfully the whole Galician campaign, which, as many believe, had this end in view. But now they find a recuperated and much stronger Russian Army complacently awaiting them on a selected position which is in every way the best they have ever had.

THE SINKING OF THE LUSITANIA

GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES AT OPEN CLASH

MAY 7TH

LORD MERSEY PRESIDENT WILSON
GOTTLIEB VON JAGOW

On May 7, 1915, the dispute between Germany and the United States, caused by the U-Boat warfare upon merchant ships, passed from the diplomatic to the acute and embittered stage. The British passenger steamer *Lusitania* was torpedoed, and sank with a loss of nearly twelve hundred lives, one-third of those who perished being women and children. Less than eight hundred of those aboard were saved. Of the slain, 124 were United States citizen passengers. Only 35 Americans survived, the percentage of mortality being higher among them than in any other class aboard. Apparently they gave their chance at the life-boats to others.

The sinking of the *Lusitania* was a deliberate step taken by the German Government in its course of terrorizing the seas. Neutrals had been already threatened, as we have seen, by the decree of February 4th. Yet neutrals continued to sail the oceans. This seemed unendurable to German dignity. Perhaps the threat had been too indefinite; Germany had only implied that neutrals might be slain, and each time this fate had actually happened to citizens of the powerful United States (not when it happened to feebler neutrals), she had apologized and expressed her regret. So now she reversed her method. She warned Americans by newspaper that if they sailed on British ships, specifying in particular the *Lusitania,* they would be slain—and then they were, 124 of them.

It is one of the strangest of human illogicalities that in the minds of all Germans, and some other people, this precedent threat seems somehow to lighten Germany's guilt or even to remove guilt altogether. A man announces, "If anybody in our town comes on the main street to-morrow I'll shoot them." They all come, with or without knowledge of his threat, and he shoots all he can. Then his family congratulate him on his marksmanship, and say, "It's their fault for coming on the public street; he warned them not to."

Of course the real question at issue was that of the February 4th decree, in which Germany had asserted the right to change International Law to the extent of sinking British ships without examination as to their character or effort to save the civilians aboard. Against this, the United States had declared all along, that it would not submit to any such change if it involved killing an American citizen. Germany, not yet prepared to go to the length which she did two years later, of destroying American ships, was nevertheless determined

not to spare British ships because of the presence of Americans on board. She used the *Lusitania* case to make this definite.

Perhaps she was surprised by the vehemence of American resentment. The slaying of 124 people, even if some of them were rather prominent, meant nothing to the German war lords. At first they sought to brazen the matter out; they revived the munition trade question; they asserted that the *Lusitania* was really an armed warship; their propagandists secured affidavits in America—affidavits afterward admitted to be perjuries—declaring that guns had been secretly stored upon the *Lusitania.*

The United States brushed all these minor points aside. The pacifist Secretary of State, Mr. Bryan, resigned; and President Wilson in his own hand wrote to Germany the first of those clear and decisive notes which became so prominent a feature of the War. That note is given here, following upon the earlier official defense by Von Jagow, Germany's Minister of Foreign Affairs. We present also the British law-court report of the disaster, as it was announced by the presiding judge, Lord Mersey, after long and careful investigation.

The United States Federal courts also made an investigation of the case, and declared positively that the *Lusitania* was not armed and carried no store of explosives. The 5,400 cases of cartridges and fuses on board were definitely of such character as under American law would not be classed as explosives. They could in no way aid in destroying the ship, neither could they be used for defending it. Yet such is the old German official temperament that Admiral von Tirpitz, head of the German submarine service, brushed all these official statements aside and in 1919 repeated the first German assertion as if it were a proven fact instead of a proven perjury. Says von Tirpitz: "With criminal recklessness and despite warnings from our accredited ambassador, Americans embarked on this armed cruiser already heavily laden with ammunition." Then he adds: "After the torpedo struck there was a second explosion inside caused by the mass of ammunition on board. This was the sole cause of the immediate sinking of the *Lusitania* and the great loss of human life." Von Tirpitz does not wish to learn the truth; he merely reiterates as fact his own previously asserted opinion.

As regards legality of the submarine sinkings, the fact is worth noting that since the Peace more than one French writer has declared that the German attitude was quite justified and that in case of need France should use her submarines in the same way. The human intellect is not an exactly balanced, evenly running machine.

C. F. H.

BY LORD MERSEY

THE *Lusitania* left New York at noon on the 1st of May, 1915. I am told that before she sailed notices were published in New York by the German authorities that the ship would be attacked by German submarines, and people were warned not to take passage in her. In my view,

so far from affording any excuse the threats serve only to aggravate the crime by making it plain that the intention to commit it was deliberately formed and the crime itself planned before the ship sailed. Unfortunately the threats were not regarded as serious by the people intended to be affected by them. They apparently thought it impossible that such an atrocity as the destruction of their lives could be in the contemplation of the German Government. But they were mistaken: and the ship sailed.

The Ship's Speed

It appears that a question had arisen in the office of the Cunard Company shortly after the war broke out as to whether the transatlantic traffic would be sufficient to justify the Company in running their two big and expensive ships —the *Lusitania* and the *Mauretania.* The conclusion arrived at was that one of the two (the *Lusitania*) could be run once a month if the boiler power were reduced by one-fourth. The saving in coal and labor resulting from this reduction would, it was thought, enable the Company to avoid loss though not to make a profit. Accordingly six of the *Lusitania's* boilers were closed and the ship began to run in these conditions in November, 1914. She had made five round voyages in this way before the voyage in question in this inquiry. The effect of the closing of the six boilers was to reduce the attainable speed from 24½ to 21 knots. But this reduction still left the *Lusitania* a considerably faster ship than any other steamer plying across the Atlantic. In my opinion this reduction of the steamer's speed was of no significance and was proper in the circumstances.

The Torpedoing of the Ship

By May 7th the *Lusitania* had entered what is called the "Danger Zone," that is to say, she had reached the waters in which enemy submarines might be expected. The Captain had therefore taken precautions. He had ordered all the life-boats under davits to be swung out. He had ordered all bulkhead doors to be closed except such as were required to be kept open in order to work the ship. These orders had

been carried out. The portholes were also closed. The look-out on the ship was doubled—two men being sent to the crow's nest and two men to the eyes of the ship. Two officers were on the bridge and a quartermaster was on either side with instructions to look out for submarines. Orders were also sent to the engine-room between noon and 2 p. m. of the 7th to keep the steam pressure very high in case of emergency and to give the vessel all possible speed if the telephone from the bridge should ring.

Up to 8 a. m. on the morning of the 7th the speed on the voyage had been maintained at 21 knots. At 8 a. m. the speed was reduced to 18 knots. The object of this reduction was to secure the ship's arrival outside the bar at Liverpool at about 4 o'clock on the morning of the 8th, when the tide would serve to enable her to cross the bar into the Mersey at early dawn. Shortly after this alteration of the speed a fog came on and the speed was further reduced for a time to 15 knots. A little before noon the fog lifted and the speed was restored to 18 knots, from which it was never subsequently changed. At this time land was sighted about two points abaft the beam, which the Captain took to be Brow Head; he could not, however, identify it with sufficient certainty to enable him to fix the position of his ship upon the chart. He therefore kept his ship on her course, which was S. 87 E. and about parallel with the land until 12.40, when, in order to make a better landfall he altered his course to N. 67 E. This brought him closer to the land, and he sighted the Old Head of Kinsale. He then (at 1.40 p. m.) altered his course back to S. 87° E., and having steadied his ship on that course, began (at 1.50) to take a four-point bearing. This operation, which I am advised would occupy 30 or 40 minutes, was in process at the time when the ship was torpedoed, as hereafter described.

At 2 p. m. the passengers were finishing their midday meal.

At 2.15 p. m., when ten to fifteen miles off the Old Head of Kinsale, the weather being then clear and the sea smooth, the Captain, who was on the port side of the lower bridge, heard the call, "There is a torpedo coming, sir," given by the second officer. He looked to starboard and then saw a

streak of foam in the wake of a torpedo traveling towards his ship. Immediately afterwards the *Lusitania* was struck on the starboard side somewhere between the third and fourth funnels. The blow broke number 5 life-boat to splinters. A second torpedo was fired immediately afterwards, which also struck the ship on the starboard side. The two torpedoes struck the ship almost simultaneously.

Both these torpedoes were discharged by a German submarine from a distance variously estimated at from two to five hundred yards. No warning of any kind was given. It is also in evidence that shortly afterwards a torpedo from another submarine was fired on the port side of the *Lusitania*. This torpedo did not strike the ship: and the circumstance is only mentioned for the purpose of showing that perhaps more than one submarine was taking part in the attack.

The *Lusitania* on being struck took a heavy list to starboard and in less than twenty minutes she sank in deep water. Eleven hundred and ninety-eight men, women, and children were drowned.[1]

Sir Edward Carson, when opening the case, described the course adopted by the German Government in directing this attack as "contrary to International Law and the usages of war," and as constituting, according to the law of all civilized countries, "a deliberate attempt to murder the passengers on board the ship." This statement is, in my opinion, true, and it is made in language not a whit too strong for the occasion. The defenseless creatures on board, made up of harmless men and women, and of helpless children, were done to death by the crew of the German submarine acting under the directions of the officials of the German Government. In the questions submitted to me by the Board of Trade I am asked, "What was the cause of the loss of life?" The answer is plain. The effective cause of the loss of life was the attack made against the ship by those on board the submarine. It was a murderous attack because made with a deliberate and wholly unjustifiable intention of killing the

[1] The commander of the U-boat was Captain Schwieger. He afterward perished in the destruction of his submarine in September, 1917, so joining his victims in the ocean's deeps.

people on board. German authorities on the laws of war at sea themselves establish beyond all doubt that though in some cases the destruction of an enemy trader may be permissible, there is always an obligation first to secure the safety of the lives of those on board. The guilt of the persons concerned in the present case is confirmed by the vain excuses which have been put forward on their behalf by the German Government as before mentioned.

One witness, who described himself as a French subject from the vicinity of Switzerland, and who was in the second-class dining-room in the after part of the ship at the time of the explosion, stated that the nature of the explosion was "similar to the rattling of a maxim gun for a short period," and suggested that this noise disclosed the "secret" existence of some ammunition. The sound, he said, came from underneath the whole floor. I did not believe this gentleman. His demeanor was very unsatisfactory. There was no confirmation of his story, and it appeared that he had threatened the Cunard Company that if they did not make him some immediate allowance on account of a claim which he was putting forward for compensation, he would have the unpleasant duty of making his claim in public, and, in so doing, of producing "evidence which will not be to the credit either of your Company or of the Admiralty." The Company had not complied with his request.

It may be worth while noting that Leith, the Marconi operator, was also in the second-class dining-saloon at the time of the explosion. He speaks of but one explosion. In my opinion there was no explosion of any part of the cargo.

Orders Given and Work Done After the Torpedoing

The Captain was on the bridge at the time his ship was struck, and he remained there giving orders until the ship foundered. His first order was to lower all boats to the rail. This order was obeyed as far as it possibly could be. He then called out, "Women and children first." The order was then given to hard-a-starboard the helm with a view to heading towards the land, and orders were telegraphed to the engine-room. The orders given to the engine-room are diffi-

cult to follow and there is obvious confusion about them. It is not, however, important to consider them, for the engines were put out of commission almost at once by the inrush of water and ceased working, and the lights in the engine-room were blown out.

Leith, the Marconi operator, immediately sent out an S.O.S. signal, and, later on, another message, "Come at once, big list, 10 miles south Head Old Kinsale." These messages were repeated continuously and were acknowledged. At first, the messages were sent out by the power supplied from the ship's dynamo; but in three or four minutes this power gave out and the messages were sent out by means of the emergency apparatus in the wireless cabin.

All the collapsible boats were loosened from their lashings and freed so that they could float when the ship sank.

The Launching of the Life-boats

Complaints were made by some of the witnesses about the manner in which the boats were launched and about their leaky condition when in the water. I do not question the good faith of these witnesses, but I think their complaints were ill-founded.

Three difficulties presented themselves in connection with the launching of the boats. First, the time was very short: only twenty minutes elapsed between the first alarm and the sinking of the ship. Secondly, the ship was under way the whole time: the engines were put out of commission almost at once, so that the way could not be taken off. Thirdly, the ship instantly took a great list to starboard, which made it impossible to launch the port side boats properly and rendered it very difficult for the passengers to get into the starboard boats. The port side boats were thrown inboard and the starboard boats inconveniently far outboard.

In addition to these difficulties there were the well-meant but probably disastrous attempts of the frightened passengers to assist in the launching operations. Attempts were made by the passengers to push some of the boats on the port side off the ship and to get them to the water. Some of these boats caught on the rail and capsized. One or two did, how-

ever, reach the water, but I am satisfied that they were seriously damaged in the operation. They were lowered a distance of 60 feet or more with people in them, and must have been fouling the side of the ship the whole time. In one case the stern post was wrenched away. The result was that these boats leaked when they reached the water. Captain Anderson [the second in command, under the chief commander, Captain Turner] was superintending the launching operations, and, in my opinion, did the best that could be done in the circumstances. Many boats were lowered on the starboard side, and there is no satisfactory evidence that any of them leaked.

There were doubtless some accidents in the handling of the ropes, but it is impossible to impute negligence or incompetence in connection with them.

The conclusion at which I arrive is that the boats were in good order at the moment of the explosion and that the launching was carried out as well as the short time, the moving ship and the serious list would allow.

Both the Captain and Mr. Jones, the First Officer, in their evidence state that everything was done that was possible to get the boats out and save lives, and this I believe to be true.

Captain Turner exercised his judgment for the best. It was the judgment of a skilled and experienced man, and although others might have acted differently and perhaps more successfully, he ought not, in my opinion, to be blamed.

The whole blame for the cruel destruction of life in this catastrophe must rest solely with those who plotted and with those who committed the crime.

BY DUDLEY FIELD MALONE

[As Collector of the Port of New York, Mr. Malone was officially charged to carry out President Wilson's "Proclamation of Neutrality" in so far as it affected shipments from New York to the belligerent countries. He, with a selected staff, examined the *Lusitania* before she sailed on her fatal voyage. After the catastrophe he made a report, with supporting affidavits by his staff, to the Secretary of the Treasury, explaining just what men and cargo the *Lusitania* actually carried. This report was not made public until December 4, 1922. It contains the following statements:]

The *Lusitania* carried neither masked nor unmasked guns.

She carried no troops, neither Canadians nor troops of any other nationality.

She carried no explosives.

She did carry about 5,400 cases of ammunition; but this was not contraband neither was it "explosive" as explosive was defined in American law. It was specifically permissible under the rulings of the Department of Commerce as established in 1911.

In more specific detail on this last item, the report says: "The *Lusitania* on her last trip had on board 4,200 cases of metallic cartridges, three cases of shell castings, eighteen cases of fuses, 1,250 cases of shrapnel, and one package containing an empty high explosive shell cut in half."

"The *Lusitania* carried no explosives of any kind or character. The ammunition above set forth as part of the *Lusitania's* cargo on said voyage did not contain explosives within the interpretation of our statutes and regulations as interpreted and promulgated by the Department of Commerce and Labor."[1]

BY GOTTLIEB VON JAGOW

Official German Statement

BERLIN, May 28, 1915.

The Imperial Government has subjected the statements of the Government of the United States to a careful examination and has the lively wish on its part also to contribute in a convincing and friendly manner to clear up any misunderstandings which may have entered into the relations of the two Governments through the events mentioned by the American Government.

[1] This means that the cartridges, etc., since each contained only a small amount of powder enclosed in a separate metal envelop, could not have been exploded all at once, and were not therefore a danger or possible source of destruction to the ship.

With regard firstly to the cases of the American steamers *Cushing* and *Gulflight,* the American Embassy has already been informed that it is far from the German Government to have any intention of ordering attacks by submarines or flyers on neutral vessels in the zone which have not been guilty of any hostile act; on the contrary, the most explicit instructions have been repeatedly given the German armed forces to avoid attacking such vessels. If neutral vessels have come to grief through the German submarine war during the past few months by mistake, it is a question of isolated and exceptional cases which are traceable to the misuse of flags by the British Government in connection with carelessness or suspicious actions on the part of the captains of the vessels. In all cases where a neutral vessel through no fault of its own has come to grief through the German submarines or flyers according to the facts as ascertained by the German Government, this Government has expressed its regret at the unfortunate occurrence and promised indemnification where the facts justified it. The German Government will treat the cases of the American steamers *Cushing* and *Gulflight* according to the same principles. An investigation of these cases is in progress. Its results will be communicated to the Embassy shortly. The investigation might, if thought desirable, be supplemented by an International Commission of Inquiry, pursuant to Title Three of The Hague Convention of October 18, 1907, for the pacific settlement of international disputes.

In the case of the sinking of the English steamer *Falaba,* the commander of the German submarine had the intention of allowing passengers and crew ample opportunity to save themselves.

It was not until the captain disregarded the order to lay to and took to flight, sending up rocket signals for help, that the German commander ordered the crew and passengers by signals and megaphone to leave the ship within ten minutes. As a matter of fact, he allowed them twenty-three minutes and did not fire the torpedo until suspicious steamers were hurrying to the aid of the *Falaba.*

With regard to the loss of life when the British passenger

steamer *Lusitania* was sunk, the German Government has already expressed its deep regret to the neutral Governments concerned that nationals of those countries lost their lives on that occasion. The Imperial Government must state for the rest the impression that certain important facts most directly connected with the sinking of the *Lusitania* may have escaped the attention of the Government of the United States. It therefore considers it necessary in the interest of the clear and full understanding aimed at by either Government primarily to convince itself that the reports of the facts which are before the two Governments are complete and in agreement.

The Government of the United States proceeds on the assumption that the *Lusitania* is to be considered as an ordinary unarmed merchant vessel. The Imperial Government begs in this connection to point out that the *Lusitania* was one of the largest and fastest English commerce steamers, constructed with Government funds as auxiliary cruisers, and is expressly included in the navy list published by British Admiralty. It is, moreover, known to the Imperial Government from reliable information furnished by its officials and neutral passengers that for some time practically all the more valuable English merchant vessels have been provided with guns, ammunition and other weapons, and reënforced with a crew specially practiced in manning guns. According to reports at hand here, the *Lusitania* when she left New York undoubtedly had guns on board which were mounted under decks and masked.

The Imperial Government furthermore has the honor to direct the particular attention of the American Government to the fact that the British Admiralty by a secret instruction of February of this year advised the British merchant marine not only to seek protection behind neutral flags and markings, but even when so disguised to attack German submarines by ramming them. High rewards have been offered by the British Government as a special incentive for the destruction of the submarines by merchant vessels, and such rewards have already been paid out. In view of these facts, which are satisfactorily known to it, the Imperial Gov-

ernment is unable to consider English merchant vessels any longer as "undefended territory" in the zone of maritime war designated by the Admiralty Staff of the Imperial German Navy, the German commanders are consequently no longer in a position to observe the rules of capture otherwise usual and with which they invariably complied before this. Lastly, the Imperial Government must specially point out that on her last trip the *Lusitania,* as on earlier occasions, had Canadian troops and munitions on board, including no less than 5,400 cases of ammunition destined for the destruction of brave German soldiers who are fulfilling with self-sacrifice and devotion their duty in the service of the Fatherland. The German Government believes that it acts in just self-defense when it seeks to protect the lives of its soldiers by destroying ammunition destined for the enemy with the means of war at its command. The English steamship company must have been aware of the dangers to which passengers on board the *Lusitania* were exposed under the circumstances. In taking them on board in spite of this the company quite deliberately tried to use the lives of American citizens as protection for the ammunition carried, and violated the clear provisions of American laws which expressly prohibit, and provide punishment for, the carrying of passengers on ships which have explosives on board. The company thereby wantonly caused the death of so many passengers. According to the express report of the submarine commander concerned, which is further confirmed by all other reports, there can be no doubt that the rapid sinking of the *Lusitania* was primarily due to the explosion of the cargo of ammunition caused by the torpedo.[2] Otherwise, in all human probability, the passengers would have been saved.

The Imperial Government holds the facts recited above to be of sufficient importance to recommend them to a careful examination by the American Government. The Imperial Government begs to reserve a final statement of its position

[2] All charges that the *Lusitania* had explosives or guns aboard were definitely disproved by the legal proceedings conducted before Justice Mayer in the United States courts.

with regard to the demands made in connection with the sinking of the *Lusitania* until a reply is received from the American Government, and believes that it should recall here that it took note with satisfaction of the proposals of good offices submitted by the American Government in Berlin and London with a view to paving the way for a *modus vivendi* for the conduct of maritime war between Germany and Great Britain. The Imperial Government furnished at that time ample evidence of its good will by its willingness to consider these proposals. The realization of these proposals failed, as is known, on account of their rejection by the Government of Great Britain.

BY WOODROW WILSON

Official Address to the German Government

The Government of the United States notes with gratification the full recognition by the Imperial German Government, in discussing the cases of the *Cushing* and the *Gulflight,* of the principle of the freedom of all parts of the open sea to neutral ships and the frank willingness of the Imperial German Government to acknowledge and meet its liability where the fact of attack upon neutral ships "which have not been guilty of any hostile act" by German aircraft or vessels of war is satisfactorily established; and the Government of the United States will in due course lay before the Imperial German Government, as it requests, full information concerning the attack on the steamer *Cushing.*

With regard to the sinking of the steamer *Falaba,* by which an American citizen lost his life, the Government of the United States is surprised to find the Imperial German Government contending that an effort on the part of a merchantman to escape capture and secure assistance alters the obligation of the officer seeking to make the capture in respect of the safety of the lives of those on board the merchantman, although the vessel had ceased her attempt to escape when torpedoed. These are not new circumstances. They have been in the minds of statesmen and of international jurists throughout the development of naval warfare, and the Government of the United States does not under-

stand that they have ever been held to alter the principles of humanity upon which it has insisted. Nothing but actual forcible resistance or continued efforts to escape by flight when ordered to stop for the purpose of visit on the part of the merchantman has ever been held to forfeit the lives of her passengers or crew. The Government of the United States, however, does not understand that the Imperial German Government is seeking in this case to relieve itself of liability, but only intends to set forth the circumstances which led the commander of the submarine to allow himself to be hurried into the course which he took.

Your Excellency's note, in discussing the loss of American lives resulting from the sinking of the steamship *Lusitania,* adverts at some length to certain information which the Imperial German Government has received with regard to the character and outfit of that vessel, and your Excellency expresses the fear that this information may not have been brought to the attention of the Government of the United States. It is stated in the note that the *Lusitania* was undoubtedly equipped with masked guns, supplied with trained gunners and special ammunition, transporting troops from Canada, carrying a cargo not permitted under the laws of the United States to a vessel also carrying passengers, and serving, in virtual effect, as an auxiliary to the naval forces of Great Britain. Fortunately these are matters concerning which the Government of the United States is in a position to give the Imperial German Government official information. Of the facts alleged in your Excellency's note, if true, the Government of the United States would have been bound to take official cognizance in performing its recognized duty as a neutral power and in enforcing its national laws. It was its duty to see to it that the *Lusitania* was not armed for offensive action, that she was not serving as a transport, that she did not carry a cargo prohibited by the statutes of the United States, and that, if in fact she was a naval vessel of Great Britain, she should not receive clearance as a merchantman; and it performed that duty and enforced its statutes with scrupulous vigilance through its regularly constituted officials. It is able, therefore, to assure

the Imperial German Government that it has been misinformed. If the Imperial German Government should deem itself to be in possession of convincing evidence that the officials of the Government of the United States did not perform these duties with thoroughness, the Government of the United States sincerely hopes that it will submit that evidence for consideration.

Whatever may be the contentions of the Imperial German Government regarding the carriage of contraband of war on board the *Lusitania* or regarding the explosion of that material by the torpedo, it need only be said that in the view of this Government these contentions are irrelevant to the question of the legality of the methods used by the German naval authorities in sinking the vessel.

But the sinking of passenger ships involves principles of humanity which throw into the background any special circumstances of detail that may be thought to affect the cases, principles which lift it, as the Imperial German Government will no doubt be quick to recognize and acknowledge, out of the class of ordinary subjects of diplomatic discussion or of international controversy. Whatever be the other facts regarding the *Lusitania,* the principal fact is that a great steamer, primarily and chiefly a conveyance for passengers, and carrying more than a thousand souls who had no part or lot in the conduct of the war, was torpedoed and sunk without so much as a challenge or a warning, and that men, women, and children were sent to their death in circumstances unparalleled in modern warfare. The fact that more than one hundred American citizens were among those who perished made it the duty of the Government of the United States to speak of these things and once more, with solemn emphasis, to call the attention of the Imperial German Government to the grave responsibility which the Government of the United States conceives that it has incurred in this tragic occurrence, and to the indisputable principle upon which that responsibility rests. The Government of the United States is contending for something much greater than mere rights of property or privileges of commerce. It is contending for nothing less high and sacred

than the rights of humanity, which every Government honors itself in respecting and which no Government is justified in resigning on behalf of those under its care and authority. Only her actual resistance to capture or refusal to stop when ordered to do so for the purpose of visit could have afforded the commander of the submarine any justification for so much as putting the lives of those on board the ship in jeopardy. This principle the Government of the United States understands the explicit instructions issued on August 3, 1914,[3] by the Imperial German Admiralty to its commanders at sea to have recognized and embodied, as do the naval codes of all other nations, and upon it every traveler and seaman had a right to depend. It is upon this principle of humanity as well as upon the law founded upon this principle that the United States must stand.

The Government of the United States is happy to observe that your Excellency's note closes with the intimation that the Imperial German Government is willing, now as before, to accept the good offices of the United States in an attempt to come to an understanding with the Government of Great Britain by which the character and conditions of the war upon the sea may be changed. The Government of the United States would consider it a privilege thus to serve its friends and the world. It stands ready at any time to convey to either Government any intimation or suggestion the other may be willing to have it convey and cordially invites the Imperial German Government to make use of its services in this way at its convenience. The whole world is concerned

[3] The reference made by President Wilson in his first note of May 13th to the German Government regarding the sinking of the *Lusitania* to the "humane and enlightened attitude hitherto assumed by the Imperial German Government in matters of international right, and particularly with regard to the freedom of the seas," was based upon the instructions of August 3, 1914, which the German Government sent to its naval commanders. These German rules are now in the possession of the State Department. While no mention is made in them of submarine warfare, the extent and method of the exercise of the right of search and the stoppage of ships is prescribed with great nicety, and provision is made for the safety of passengers and crew. After outlining the purpose of visiting and searching vessels, they say: "Before destruction all persons on board, if possible with their personal effects, are to be placed in safety."

in anything that may bring about even a partial accommodation of interests or in any way mitigate the terrors of the present distressing conflict.

In the meantime, whatever arrangement may happily be made between the parties to the war, and whatever may in the opinion of the Imperial German Government have been the provocation or the circumstantial justification for the past acts of its commanders at sea, the Government of the United States confidently looks to see the justice and humanity of the Government of Germany vindicated in all cases where Americans have been wronged or their rights as neutrals invaded.

The Government of the United States therefore very earnestly and very solemnly renews the representations of its note transmitted to the Imperial German Government on the 15th of May, and relies in these representations upon the principles of humanity, the universally recognized understandings of international law, and the ancient friendship of the German Nation.

The Government of the United States cannot admit that the proclamation of a war zone from which neutral ships have been warned to keep away may be made to operate as in any degree an abbreviation of the rights either of American shipmasters or of American citizens bound on lawful errands as passengers on merchant ships of belligerent nationality. It does not understand the Imperial German Government to question those rights. It understands it, also, to accept as established beyond question the principle that the lives of non-combatants cannot lawfully or rightfully be put in jeopardy by the capture or destruction of an unresisting merchantman, and to recognize the obligation to take sufficient precaution to ascertain whether a suspected merchantman is in fact of belligerent nationality or is in fact carrying contraband of war under a neutral flag. The Government of the United States therefore deems it reasonable to expect that the Imperial German Government will adopt the measures necessary to put these principles into practice in respect of the safeguarding of American lives and ships, and asks for assurances that this will be done.

BRITAIN DEMOCRATIZED UNDER LLOYD GEORGE

THE MUNITIONS CRISIS

MAY 25TH

JULES DESTRÉE GEORGES CLEMENCEAU

The Britain which emerged from the Great War was a wholly different country under a different form of government from the Britain which had entered the struggle in 1914. The great change took place in 1915 when the mass of the people took over government control from the aristocratic leaders to whom the masses had so long bowed. The most important date in this slow moving and progressive change was May 25th, when a new British Cabinet was formed in which the chosen leader of the masses took a prominent part as Minister of Munitions. Later, this same leader, Mr. Lloyd George, was made Prime Minister and as such carried the war to its successful close; but for the moment the all-important position was this newly created Ministry of Munitions. By it the working classes of Britain were drawn into doing their full part for victory—and right well they did it. They thus learned their power, and learned to use their power; and never again could it be taken from them.

Up to that time Britain had been "muddling along," her leaders working earnestly for victory, but always with the detached British sense of being secure on their island, and thus able to do beyond the island as much or as little as they chose, and at their own good leisure. Slowly in 1915 the success of the German submarine attack roused them from their imperturbability. They saw that for them as for France, invasion, starvation, even ultimate defeat, was no longer impossible. They must fight harder or must perish. So they did the one thing possible, took their people into their confidence, confessed the country's need, and called Democracy to their aid.

The first great need, as Neuve Chapelle and the Dunajec had shown, was ammunition, and after that every form of war supplies. Lloyd George summoned the people to create these. How they succeeded we have let their allies tell. The French Premier, Clemenceau, like Lloyd George a product of the stern necessity of the War, here estimates the work of his great confrère. Another well-known Frenchman, the author Destrée, describes the steps of the transformation.

BY JULES DESTRÉE

ON May 14, 1915, *The Times* Military Correspondent on the Western front wrote that the absence of an unlimited supply of high explosives had proved a fatal ob-

stacle to success. In saying this he gave free and open expression to criticisms that had been rife in the lobby of the House of Commons and in private circles for a long time past. The failure of the British Army to reap the full fruits of its splendid achievements at Neuve Chapelle, and the ebb and flow in the defense of Hill 60 on April 17th were cases in point. An energetic campaign was organized in the newspapers after the publication of *The Times* letter. Questions were put in the Commons. Popular feeling was deeply stirred.

This feeling was unquestionably justified. The War Office had displayed a lack of foresight in its arrangements for the production of munitions, a shortcoming which it shared, however, with the other partners in the Alliance; of that the Russian reverses afforded decisive proof.

The daily output of munitions did not equal the necessary consumption. How immense this consumption is, it would be difficult to realize did we not know that the number of shells consumed at Neuve Chapelle alone was greater than the total employed in the whole South African campaign.

Moreover, the English factories had manufactured a great quantity of shrapnel, but only a comparatively restricted supply of high explosives. This was diametrically opposed to the requirements of the situation. In fact, the nature of the terrain and the strength of the enemy's defensive works were such that, before an infantry attack could be launched, even under protection of shrapnel fire, it was necessary that the hostile positions should be subjected to such a deluge of high explosives as to render the most thoroughly organized defenses untenable.

These defects having been made manifest by bitter experience, measures were taken to remedy them.

May 25, 1915, witnessed the formation of the Coalition Government in England. Mr. Lloyd George became head of a newly-created department—the Ministry of Munitions. No better appointment could have been made. Mr. Lloyd George was endowed with conspicuous organizing ability and possessed great influence with the working classes. The

new Minister lost no time in setting to work. He remedied the most urgent defects and, a month later, laid on the table of the House the Munitions Bill that was to solve the great problem once for all.

To realize the immensity of the task performed by the present Ministry of Munitions it is necessary to read the two speeches delivered by Mr. Lloyd George in the House of Commons on June 23 and July 28, 1915. These frank and open statements show us both the difficulties that had to be confronted and the manner in which they were overcome.

The problem may be stated as follows:

Experience had shown that of the two opposing forces, the advantage would rest with the one that could outdo the other in the expenditure of munitions. From that time onwards the question ceased to be a purely military one: it became a labor question. It was in the workshops, the factories, the arsenals, that victory was to be wrought out.

This had been perfectly well understood by the Germans, and in this as in so many other respects they had the advantage over the Allies of preparation and foresight. These preparations were of two kinds. They consisted, in the first place, in the accumulation of reserves of munitions and of the raw material necessary for their manufacture; and, secondly, in the measures insuring the immediate and effective mobilization of the national industries for the sole and exclusive purpose of carrying on the war. The Central Empires were able to turn out 250,000 shells a day, or nearly 8,000,000 a month. The British rate of production was 2,500 high explosive shells and 13,000 shrapnel shells a day. Thus, the problem before the Allies was first of all to equal and then to surpass the formidable productive capabilities of their adversaries. The sooner they did so, the sooner victory would be theirs.

England's reserves in the matter of labor and machinery were immense. But they were all unsystematized. The problem was to organize these resources, and to organize them without delay.

Mr. Lloyd George's first step was to select his staff. A

large number of business men, technical engineers, and others freely placed their services at his disposal, most of them without demanding any remuneration from the State. Each one of them was put in charge of a particular branch, *e.g.*, metals, explosives, machinery, labor, chemical research, and so on.

But Mr. Lloyd George's principal aim being to obtain quick returns, he regarded it as an urgent necessity to decentralize the work as much as possible. The United Kingdom was split up into a certain number of districts; special committees were formed for the purpose of organizing the work in each district. They consisted of local business men who were familiar with the resources and the labor conditions of the place; of engineers who, in order to fit them for their duties, had undergone a brief period of service in the Government Arsenals or in one of the following works: Elswick, Vickers-Maxim, or Beardmore; and of a technical engineer and a Secretary in touch with the Ministry of Munitions.

One of the great difficulties was the matter of raw material. Some England possessed in abundance, some could only be obtained with difficulty. The department had also to see to it that no attempt was made by unscrupulous suppliers to make a corner in their goods. The doings of the metal markets were carefully looked into, with immediately beneficial results.

Having provided the raw material, the next thing was to get to work on it. Where was the plant to come from?

A vast registration scheme was set on foot, and in a short time the Government had an accurate idea of the machinery at their disposal. As soon as the process of classification was completed it was of course evident that what was chiefly lacking were certain machines required in the manufacture of large shells. The Government thereupon took all the big machine works under its direct control for the duration of the war. Henceforth these works were Government works, and on July 28, 1915, Mr. Lloyd George remarked with satisfaction that there had not been a word of protest on the part of any machine-tool manufacturers,

although the change involved a considerable diminution in their profits. Owing to this measure, supplemented by the creation of a committee of machine-tool manufacturers of the United Kingdom, the output of material required for the manufacture of munitions was greatly increased, and will increase still further as time goes on.

The Government was thus able to reorganize the production works themselves. These were of two kinds. First, there were the munition works properly so called, where it was necessary to extend the plant or increase the rate of production. Then there were factories which had to be altered so as to adapt them to the new kind of work. Finally, the Government decided to create sixteen large works—a number subsequently increased to twenty-six—the equipment of which is being carried out with the utmost dispatch.

The next thing was to organize the labor and recruit fresh hands. There was a choice of two methods, the compulsory and the voluntary. After going into the matter with the Trades Union leaders it was the latter method that was decided upon. It was more in accordance with English traditions and sentiment. A vast recruiting campaign was started, the headquarters being the town hall, in one hundred and eighty different centers. It lasted a week, and was an immense success. Mr. Lloyd George stated, on July 23, 1915, that the Government had got together 100,000 workmen, most of whom were experts in machinery and shipbuilding. True, it was not possible to employ them all, some already doing Government work, others being indispensable to the civil life of the country. But when all deductions were made it was found that the number of men was amply sufficient for present needs. To them we must add the skilled workmen who had joined the army and who, as far as possible, were brought home to serve their country in an industrial capacity.

All the workmen were assigned either to the works already in existence—which in many cases were short of hands and unable for this reason to fulfill their contracts—or else they were allotted to the new factories.

But in view of influence wielded by the Labor Unions,

various provisions were inserted in the Munitions Act. They related to the settlement of labor disputes, and to the prohibition of strikes and lock-outs the grounds for which had not been submitted to the Board of Trade.

To obviate such disputes, which were generally called forth by the excessive profits accruing to the employers and the demands of the wage-earners, the system of "Controlled Establishments" was instituted. Every establishment engaged on munition work was placed, so far as the regulation of profits and salaries was concerned, under direct Government control. Any modification in the rate of wages had to be submitted to the Ministry of Munitions, which had power to refer the question to an Arbitration Board specially set up by the Act.

To complete this rapid survey it must be added that a department was created by the Ministry of Munitions, under the control of an Under-Secretary, whose special business it was to examine war inventions.

On December 20, 1915, Mr. Lloyd George, in a speech delivered in the House of Commons, summarized the results of the first six months of his tenure of office.

From every point of view his report was exceedingly satisfactory. We will take a few points.

Orders placed before the formation of the department were delivered with an increase of 16 per cent. on previous deliveries. The number of new orders placed increased by 80 per cent.

The State regulation of the metal market resulted in a saving of from 15 to 20 million pounds sterling.

The output of shells for a single week became three times as great as the entire output for May, 1915, which means that the rate of production was twelve times as great.

The enormous quantity of shells consumed during the offensive of September, 1915, was made good in a month.

The output of machine guns was five times as great; that of hand grenades increased fortyfold.

The production of heavy artillery was accelerated, and the heaviest guns of the early days of the war are now among the lightest.

An explosive factory in the South of England which on October 15, 1915, started to fill bombs at the rate of 500 a week with a staff of 60 was in March, 1916, turning out 15,000 a week, with a staff of 250.

An entirely new factory which started work at the end of October, 1915, with one filling shed and six girl fillers and an output of 270 a week, was, in March, 1916, employing 175 girls and handling 15,000 bombs a week.

The Ministry of Munitions built housing accommodation for 60,000 workers, and canteens and mess-rooms in munition works.

The number of strikes was reduced to three.

These figures speak volumes in themselves.

Mr. Kellaway, M. P., Parliamentary Secretary to Dr. Addison (Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Munitions), stated on July 7, 1916, the following facts:

"Of the 4,000 controlled firms now producing munitions, 95 per cent. had never produced a gun, shell or cartridge before the war. In ten months they produced more shells than all the Government arsenals and great armament shops existing at the outbreak of war; and that was only a very small percentage of the total weekly production of shells in the country. Ninety arsenals have been built or adapted, and all except a very few are producing heavy guns, howitzers, big shells or explosives. Our weekly output of .303 cartridges is greater by millions than our annual output before the war, while the output of *guns* and *howitzers* has been increased by several hundreds per cent. . . . One of our leading armament firms has a factory devoted entirely to the provision of a particular gun for the French Government" —"Russia has been supplied with great quantities of grenades, rifle cartridges, guns and explosives. . . ."

We have already referred to the eagerness with which the workers responded to the appeal made to them by the Ministry of Munitions. As soon as ever the people understood the urgency of the situation thousands upon thousands of fresh hands—both men and women—thronged to offer their services at factory and workshop.

It should be noted that women were among the very

first to come forward, even before the Munitions Act came into force. In one of the largest and best-known arsenals in the north, as far back as January, 1915, thousands of young girls were at work, and 65 per cent. of them were quite new to the task. They came to it straight from their villages.

The tangible results of this effort have been immense. At present the all-important question of munitions and equipment has been solved so far as Great Britain is concerned. The extension of the British front proves not merely that the British are numerically in a position to take an increased share of the burden, but that they have sufficient reserves of ammunition to await an enemy attack, or to take the offensive themselves, with equanimity, unbeset by any of the anxieties that troubled them at Neuve Chapelle.

Looking at the moral aspect of the thing, the manner in which the English people, so strongly individualistic in their ideas, so stoutly opposed to State interference, came to recognize the necessity of submitting to a discipline as strict as that introduced by the Munitions Act, is a fresh proof that the gravity of the present crisis and the loftiness of their duty are alike appreciated by them.

This immense effort is bound to result, not merely in the British Army's having everything it requires and in its being enabled to carry on the campaign with effect: it enables a similar service to be rendered to the Allies, whose industrial centers are in the hands of the enemy.

"We know," said Mr. Lloyd George, "that the Allies are awaiting an effort on our part which seems to be almost superhuman. That effort we shall make. To-morrow we shall be in a position to provide the people who are fighting with us for the cause of humanity with all that they need for the common task. It should be known that our wealth, like our natural resources and the output of our factories, is a common patrimony which we shall share with our Allies. . . . There is not a sacrifice which our people—the whole of our people, from the highest to the lowest—is not prepared to make. We are, and shall be, sparing in nothing; we are seeking day and night for an opportunity of doing

more, and there is nothing, nothing in the world, we are not determined to attempt. Tell those who have been disturbed by the Labor situation, of the magnificent sacrifices which have been made by our trade unions in renouncing until the end of the war their dearest privileges. Tell them that our workmen are fully conscious of the vital importance of the task which is entrusted to them. Tell them that the Government has now under its control all the factories capable of producing guns, rifles and shells, as well as all the foundries and machine-tool factories, and that all this world of industry does not produce a single pound of metal which is not destined for the needs of the armies. A numerous and expert body of labor is concentrated in these immense workshops and I have not hesitated to bring back from the front all the engineers and other useful workmen. Both in the firing line and in the country there is not a single person who does not understand our needs, and who has not endeavored to facilitate my task. . . ."

BY GEORGES CLEMENCEAU

England did not want war. It must be said once more to her credit, and, alas! to her confusion, that she had not prepared for it. Had not Belgian neutrality been violated, who could say when she would have drawn the sword?

But now, behold her in the midst of the conflict. Slowly, but with a stubborn determination that nothing avails to diminish or to daunt, she has transformed herself into a military power.

She has accumulated vast numbers of guns, shells, and men. She has fenced herself about with four million bayonets. Wheresoever throughout all the length and breadth of the earth the noisome German weed had taken root, the British Tommy has turned up his sleeves and set about clearing the ground.

People render thanks to the British Fleet because, without stirring from its stations and without firing a shot, it has destroyed the German menace, blockaded the enemy's ports, and insured the provisioning of our armies. It is true! The silence of the long vigil it has kept detracts

nothing from its grandeur. But England's miracle lies not there. It is not on the sea that England's miracle has been wrought. Dreadnoughts, cruisers, torpedo flotillas—these, after all, belonged to the England of tradition. The reason why the ancient Northern Island has grown in the esteem and admiration of men is that, for the first time in her immemorial history, she has ceased to be an island, ceased to desire to be but an island.

She has made herself one with the continent of Europe by giving those splendid tall sons of hers who are fighting heroically in the Flanders trenches, by her guns, her convoys, and, above all, by the lofty serenity with which she has accepted (on our historic soil) the destiny of suffering and passionate strife.

And the splendor of the deed resides in this—that it is not the work of an hour, but the inevitable culmination of a history of ten centuries.

Other nations there are that have shed more freely of their life blood on the storied battlefields of Europe. Others have withstood the shock of mightier assaults, and been called upon to oppose with grimmer heroism the onrush of the barbarous foe. No other nation has resolved with such method and inflexibility to see through to the bitter end the task to which it has set its hand. No other nation has been conscious of such a complete metamorphosis in its customs, in the exercise of its rights and its claims to individual freedom.

ITALY JOINS THE ALLIES

THE ITALIAN "PEOPLE'S WAR" ON AUSTRIA

MAY 23RD

EMPEROR FRANZ JOSEF VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG
ANTONIO SALANDRA

Few events of history have been viewed from such widely differing standpoints as the entry of Italy into the Great War. We give here first the view of the aged Austrian Emperor, Franz Josef, as expressed in his official proclamation. This is presumably the last document of the Middle Ages that will ever appear in the world, and as such it is worth preserving. Quaintly medieval indeed is its attitude and phrasing. This war of all the universe is made a private matter. "The King of Italy," says Franz Josef, "has declared war on *me*." Did this still clear-minded old aristocrat of eighty-seven years actually regard the contest in this light, as a personal clash between himself and the Italian monarch? As such, it would have been hopeless indeed for him. Or is the Austrian's whole attitude as false as the boasts of victory by which he seeks to encourage his already despondent armies and ignore his placing of German generals in control?

We give also the official German attitude toward Italy as expressed by the Imperial Chancellor in his speech to his parliament announcing the new war. This is in a way but an expansion of Franz Josef's charge that Italy, beloved and even pampered by the two Teuton empires, had broken faith with them, had treacherously betrayed and deserted their alliance.

Let the historian, once more, for the sake of saving future generations from the deliberately created confusion of the War, speak here with clearest definiteness. For any such charge against Italy there is absolutely no ground whatever. No Teuton leader of the inner circle believed, or could possibly have believed, this charge when it was made. No one who had read the public records could have believed it. It was an absolutely mendacious charge made by the Teuton Governments for the purpose of inflaming the passions and blinding the judgment of their ignorant subjects—and perchance of ignorant neutrals.

There was, however, a charge against the Italian Government, less absurd than this flat falsehood, a charge seriously considered in many neutral lands. This was that Italy had entered the War merely as a move in the old-style game of statecraft, merely as a business venture in which she hoped to win a valuable increase of territory. This charge may now be dismissed almost as completely as the other. In briefest form, the facts of Italy's relations with the Teuton empires were as follows:

Italy had by repeated warfare up to 1866 won her own freedom

from the tyranny of Austrian rule. But the Hapsburg emperors and their almost equally guilty Austrian subjects still held by force their lordship over the Italian peoples of Trieste and other Alpine and Adriatic districts, known in Italy as the lands "unredeemed." While this tyranny still continued no real friendship of Italy for Austria was possible; and Italy had allied herself with the Teuton empires only on the practical basis of necessity. The limits of that alliance were very narrow, and there was never the slightest obligation on Italy to join the Teutons in the War in 1914, or the slightest possibility that she would. There was, on the contrary, every probability of her seizing any opportunity she could to demand from Austria the freedom of her helpless brothers.

Recognizing this, Germany from the beginning of the War maintained in Italy a propaganda system of the largest kind. Its head was Prince von Bülow, the former Imperial Chancellor. He expended millions of money in Italy in whatever secret form seemed most of use for Germany. He bought newspapers and financed politicians. He even negotiated with the Italian Government, and in Austria's name offered to yield to Italy much if not all of the "unredeemed" lands. The only question was, would he "deliver the goods." Both Austria and Germany insisted that the lordship of the territory should not be transferred until "after the war." The Italians put no faith in this Teuton promise.

There, really, is why Italy entered the War. She had grown like all the rest of the world to fear Germany and to distrust her. She believed that the Teutons if victorious would reduce her again to her ancient vassalage. She concluded, just as America came afterward to conclude, that she must either fight the Teutons at once with the Allies' aid, or be left to fight them afterward alone. It is true that before declaring war she made with the Allies secret treaties promising her all and rather more than all of her "unredeemed" Austrian lands. But even to the extremest of her territorial claims there was some color of "national" right. We cannot blame her for seeing that right in its fullest and most Italian form.

Signor Salandra, in the official address given herewith in which he explains his country's action, takes for granted that the preceding facts are known. To the Italian public of 1915 they were of course fully known. Indeed, the Italian Government was to a considerable extent carried perforce into the War by the vehement popular demand. The Italian masses had weighed the need of war and were everywhere clamorously urging it. The Government ministry which had held off from war was overwhelmingly swept aside. The old Austrian Emperor was indeed as wrong in that as in most other things when he referred to the war as coming from the Italian King. The Italian Democracy was for the moment fiercely awake; and this was for Italy a "people's war."

C. F. H.

BY EMPEROR FRANZ JOSEF

Official Austrian Proclamation of War

THE King of Italy has declared war on me. Perfidy whose like history does not know was committed by the Kingdom of Italy against both allies. After an alliance of more than thirty years' duration, during which it was able to increase its territorial possessions and develop itself to an unthought of flourishing condition, Italy abandoned us in our hour of danger and went over with flying colors into the camp of our enemies.

We did not menace Italy; did not curtail her authority; did not attack her honor or interests. We always responded loyally to the duties of our alliance and afforded her our protection when she took the field. We have done more. When Italy directed covetous glances across our frontier we, in order to maintain peace and our alliance relation, were resolved on great and painful sacrifices which particularly grieved our paternal heart. But the covetousness of Italy, which believed the moment should be used, was not to be appeased, so fate must be accommodated.

My armies have victoriously withstood mighty armies in the north in ten months of this gigantic conflict in most loyal comradeship of arms with our illustrious ally. A new and treacherous enemy in the south is to you no new enemy. Great memories of Novara, Mortaro, and Lissa, which constituted the pride of my youth; the spirit of Radetzky, Archduke Albrecht, and Tegetthoff, which continues to live in my land and sea forces, guarantee that in the south also we shall successfully defend the frontiers of the monarchy.

I salute my battle-tried troops, who are inured to victory. I rely on them and their leaders. I rely on my people for whose unexampled spirit of sacrifice my most paternal thanks are due. I pray the Almighty to bless our colors and take under His gracious protection our just cause.

BY VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG

When I last spoke there was still a glimpse of hope that Italy's participation in the war could be avoided. That hope

proved fallacious. German feeling strove against the belief in the possibility of such a change. Italy has now inscribed in the book of the world's history, in letters of blood which will never fade, her violation of faith.

I believe Macchiavelli once said that a war which is necessary is also just. Viewed from this sober, practical, political standpoint, which leaves out of account all moral considerations, has this war been necessary? Is it not, indeed, directly mad? Nobody threatened Italy; neither Austria-Hungary nor Germany. Whether the Triple Entente was content with blandishments alone history will show later. Without a drop of blood flowing, and without the life of a single Italian being endangered, Italy could have secured the long list of concessions which I recently read to the House—territory in Tyrol and on the Isonzo as far as the Italian speech is heard, satisfaction of the national aspirations in Trieste, a free hand in Albania, and the valuable port of Valona.

Why have they not taken it? Do they, perhaps, wish to conquer the German Tyrol? Hands off! Did Italy wish to provoke Germany, to whom she owes so much in her upward growth of a great power, and from whom she is not separated by any conflict of interests? We left Rome in no doubt that an Italian attack on Austro-Hungarian troops would also strike the German troops. Why did Rome refuse so light-heartedly the proposals of Vienna? The Italian manifesto of war, which conceals an uneasy conscience behind vain phrases, does not give us any explanation. They were too shy, perhaps, to say openly what was spread abroad as a pretext by the press and by gossip in the lobbies of the Chamber, namely, that Austria's offer came too late and could not be trusted.

What are the facts? Italian statesmen have no right to measure the trustworthiness of other nations in the same proportion as they measured their own loyalty to a treaty. Germany, by her word, guaranteed that the concessions would be carried through. There was no occasion for distrust. Why too late? On May 4th the Trentino was the same territory as it was in February, and a whole series of

concessions had been added to the Trentino of which nobody had thought in the winter.

It was, perhaps, too late for this reason, that while the Triple Alliance, the existence of which the King and the Government had expressly acknowledged after the outbreak of war, was still alive, Italian statesmen had long before engaged themselves so deeply with the Triple Entente that they could not disentangle themselves. There were indications of fluctuations in the Rome Cabinet as far back as December. To have two irons in the fire is always useful. Before this Italy had shown her predilection for extra dances. But this is no ballroom. This is a bloody battlefield upon which Germany and Austria-Hungary are fighting for their lives against a world of enemies. The statesmen of Rome have played against their own people the same game as they played against us.

It is true that the Italian-speaking territory on the northern frontier has always been the dream and the desire of every Italian, but the great majority of the Italian people, as well as the majority in Parliament, did not want to know anything of war. According to the observation of the best judge of the situation in Italy, in the first days of May 4th-5th of the Senate and two-thirds of the Chamber were against war, and in that majority were the most responsible and important statesmen. But common sense had no say. The mob alone ruled. Under the kindly disposed toleration and with the assistance of the leading statesmen of a Cabinet fed with the gold of the Triple Entente, the mob, under the guidance of unscrupulous war instigators, was roused to a frenzy of blood which threatened the King with revolution and all moderate men with murder if they did not join in the war delirium.

The Italian people were intentionally kept in the dark with regard to the course of the Austrian negotiations and the extent of the Austrian concessions, and so it came about that after the resignation of the Salandra Cabinet nobody could be found who had the courage to undertake the formation of a new Cabinet, and that in the decisive debate no member of the Constitutional Party in the Senate or Chamber even

attempted to estimate the value of the far-reaching Austrian concessions. In the frenzy of war honest politicians grew dumb, but when, as the result of military events (as we hope and desire), the Italian people become sober again it will recognize how frivolously it was instigated to take part in this world war.

We did everything possible to avoid the alienation of Italy from the Triple Alliance. The ungrateful rôle fell to us of requiring from our loyal ally, Austria, with whose armies our troops share daily wounds, death, and victory, the purchase of the loyalty of the third party to the alliance by the cession of old-inherited territory. That Austria-Hungary went to the utmost limit possible is known. Prince von Bülow, who again entered into the active service of the empire, tried by every means, his diplomatic ability, his most thorough knowledge of the Italian situation and of Italian personages, to come to an understanding. Though his work has been in vain, the entire people are grateful to him. Also this storm we shall endure. From month to month we grow more intimate with our ally. From the Pilitza to the Bukowina we tenaciously withstood with our Austro-Hungarian comrades for months the gigantic superiority of the enemy. Then we victoriously advanced.

So our new enemies will perish through the spirit of loyalty and the friendship and bravery of the central powers. In this war Turkey is celebrating a brilliant regeneration. The whole German people follow with enthusiasm the different phases of the obstinate, victorious resistance with which the loyal Turkish Army and fleet repulse the attacks of their enemies with heavy blows. Against the living wall of our warriors in the west our enemies up till now have vainly stormed. If in some places fighting fluctuates, if here or there a trench or a village is lost or won, the great attempt of our adversaries to break through, which they announced five months ago, did not succeed, and will not succeed. They will perish through the heroic bravery of our soldiers.

Up till now our enemies have summoned in vain against us all the forces of the world and a gigantic coalition of

brave soldiers. We will not despise our enemies, as our adversaries like to do. At the moment when the mob in English towns is dancing around the stake at which the property of defenseless Germans is burning, the English Government dared to publish a document, with the evidence of unarmed witnesses, on the alleged cruelties in Belgium, which are of so monstrous a character that only mad brains could believe them. But while the English press does not permit itself to be deprived of news, the terror of the censorship reigns in Paris. No casualty lists appear, and no German or Austrian communiqués may be printed. Severely wounded invalids are kept away from their relations, and real fear of the truth appears to be the motive of the Government.

Thus it comes about, according to trustworthy observation, that there is no knowledge of the heavy defeats which the Russians have sustained, and the belief continues in the Russian "steam-roller" advancing on Berlin, which is "perishing from starvation and misery," and confidence exists in the great offensive in the west, which for months has not progressed. If the Governments of hostile States believe that by the deception of the people and by unchaining blind hatred they can shift the blame for the crime of this war and postpone the day of awakening, we, relying on our good conscience, a just cause, and a victorious sword, will not allow ourselves to be forced by a hair's breadth from the path which we have always recognized as right. Amid this confusion of minds on the other side, the German people goes on its own way, calm and sure.

Not in hatred do we wage this war, but in anger—in holy anger. The greater the danger we have to confront, surrounded on all sides by enemies, the more deeply does the love of home grip our hearts, the more must we care for our children and grandchildren, and the more must we endure until we have conquered and have secured every possible real guarantee and assurance that no enemy alone or combined will dare again a trial of arms. The more wildly the storm rages around us the more firmly must we build our own house. For this consciousness of united strength, unshaken

courage, and boundless devotion, which inspire the whole people, and for the loyal coöperation which you, gentlemen, from the first day have given to the Fatherland, I bring you, as the representatives of the entire people, the warm thanks of the Emperor.

BY SIGNOR SALANDRA

I address myself to Italy and to the civilized world in order to show not by violent words, but by exact facts and documents, how the fury of our enemies has vainly attempted to diminish the high moral and political dignity of the cause which our arms will make prevail. I shall speak with the calm of which the King of Italy has given a noble example, when he called his land and sea forces to arms. I shall speak with the respect due to my position and to the place in which I speak. I can afford to ignore the insults written in Imperial, Royal, and Archducal proclamations. Since I speak from the Capitol, and represent in this solemn hour the people and the Government of Italy, I, a modest citizen, feel that I am far nobler than the head of the house of the Hapsburgs.

The commonplace statesmen who, in rash frivolity of mind and mistaken in all their calculations, set fire last July to the whole of Europe and even to their own hearths and homes, have now noticed their fresh colossal mistake, and in the Parliaments of Budapest and Berlin have poured forth brutal invective of Italy and her Government with the obvious design of securing the forgiveness of their fellow-citizens and intoxicating them with cruel visions of hatred and blood. The German Chancellor said he was imbued not with hatred, but with anger, and he spoke the truth, because he reasoned badly, as is usually the case in fits of rage. I could not, even if I chose, imitate their language. An atavistic throwback to primitive barbarism is more difficult for us who have twenty centuries behind us more than they have.

The fundamental thesis of the statesmen of Central Europe is to be found in the words "treason and surprise on the part of Italy toward her faithful allies." It would be

easy to ask if he has any right to speak of alliance and respect for treaties who, representing with infinitely less genius, but with equal moral indifference, the tradition of Frederick the Great and Bismarck proclaimed that necessity knows no law, and consented to his country trampling under foot and burying at the bottom of the ocean all the documents and all the customs of civilization and international law. But that would be too easy an argument. Let us examine, on the contrary, positively and calmly, if our former allies are entitled to say that they were betrayed and surprised by us.

Our aspirations had long been known, as was also our judgment on the act of criminal madness by which they shook the world and robbed the alliance itself of its closest *raison d'être*. The "Green Book" prepared by Baron Sonnino, with whom it is the pride of my life to stand united in entire harmony in this solemn hour after thirty years of friendship, shows the long, difficult, and useless negotiations that took place between December and May. But it is not true, as has been asserted without a shadow of foundation, that the Ministry reconstituted last November made a change in the direction of our international policy. The Italian Government, whose policy has never changed, severely condemned, at the very moment when it learned of it, the aggression of Austria against Serbia, and foresaw the consequences of that aggression, consequences which had not been foreseen by those who had premeditated the stroke with such lack of conscience.

In effect, Austria, in consequence of the terms in which her note was couched, and in consequence of the things demanded, which, while of little effect against the Pan-Serbian danger, were profoundly offensive to Serbia, and indirectly so to Russia, had clearly shown that she wished to provoke war. Hence we declared to von Flotow that, in consequence of this procedure on the part of Austria and in consequence of the defensive and conservative character of the Triple Alliance Treaty, Italy was under no obligation to assist Austria if, as the result of this démarche, she found herself at war with Russia, because any European war would in

such an event be the consequence of the act of provocation and aggression committed by Austria.

The Italian Government on July 27th and 28th emphasized in clear and unmistakable language to Berlin and Vienna the question of the cession of the Italian provinces subject to Austria, and we declared that if we did not obtain adequate compensation the Triple Alliance would have been irreparably broken. Impartial history will say that Austria, having found Italy in July, 1913, and in October, 1913, hostile to her intentions of aggression against Serbia, attempted last summer, in agreement with Germany, the method of surprise and the *fait accompli.*

The horrible crime of Serajevo was exploited as a pretext a month after it happened—this was proved by the refusal of Austria to accept the very extensive offers of Serbia—nor at the moment of the general conflagration would Austria have been satisfied with the unconditional acceptance of the ultimatum. Count Berchtold on July 31st declared to the Duke of Avarna that, if there had been a possibility of mediation being exercised, it could not have interrupted hostilities, which had already begun with Serbia. This was the mediation for which Great Britain and Italy were working. In any case, Count Berchtold was not disposed to accept mediation tending to weaken the conditions indicated in the Austrian note, which, naturally, would have been increased at the end of the war.

If, moreover, Serbia had decided meanwhile to accept the aforementioned note in its entirety, declaring herself ready to agree to the conditions imposed on her, that would not have persuaded Austria to cease hostilities. It is not true, as Count Tisza declared, that Austria did not undertake to make territorial acquisitions to the detriment of Serbia, who, moreover, by accepting all the conditions imposed upon her, would have become a subject State. The Austrian Ambassador, Herr Merey von Kapos-Mere, on July 30th, stated to the Marquis di San Giuliano that Austria could not make a binding declaration on this subject, because she could not foresee whether, during the war, she might not be obliged, against her will, to keep Serbian territory.

On July 29th Count Berchtold stated to the Duke of Avarna that he was not inclined to enter into any engagement concerning the eventual conduct of Austria in the case of a conflict with Serbia.

Where is, then, the treason, the iniquity, the surprise, if, after nine months of vain efforts to reach an honorable understanding which recognized in equitable measure our rights and our liberties, we resumed liberty of action? The truth is that Austria and Germany believed until the last days that they had to deal with an Italy weak, blustering, but not acting, capable of trying blackmail, but not enforcing by arms her good right, with an Italy which could be paralyzed by spending a few millions, and which by dealings which she could not avow was placing herself between the country and the Government.

I will not deny the benefits of the alliance; benefits, however, not one-sided, but accruing to all the contracting parties, and perhaps not more to us than to the others. The continued suspicions and the aggressive intentions of Austria against Italy are notorious and are authentically proved. The Chief of the General Staff, Baron Conrad von Hoetzendorf, always maintained that war against Italy was inevitable, either on the question of the irredentist provinces or from jealousy, that Italy intended to aggrandize herself as soon as she was prepared, and meanwhile opposed everything that Austria wished to undertake in the Balkans, and consequently it was necessary to humiliate her in order that Austria might have her hands free, and he deplored that Italy had not been attacked in 1907. Even the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs recognized that in the military party the opinion was prevalent that Italy must be suppressed by war because from the Kingdom of Italy came the attractive force of the Italian provinces of the empire, and consequently by a victory over the kingdom and its political annihilation all hope for the irredentists would cease.

We see now on the basis of documents how our allies aided us in the Lybian undertaking. The operations brilliantly begun by the Duke of the Abruzzi against the Turkish torpedo boats encountered at Preveza were stopped by Aus-

tria in a sudden and absolute manner. Count Aehrenthal on October 1st informed our Ambassador at Vienna that our operations had made a painful impression upon him and that he could not allow them to be continued. It was urgently necessary, he said, to put an end to them and to give orders to prevent them from being renewed, either in Adriatic or in Ionian waters. The following day the German Ambassador at Vienna, in a still more threatening manner, confidentially informed our Ambassador that Count Aehrenthal had requested him to telegraph to his Government to give the Italian Government to understand that if it continued its naval operations in the Adriatic and in the Ionian Seas it would have to deal directly with Austria-Hungary.

And it was not only in the Adriatic and in the Ionian Seas that Austria paralyzed our actions. On November 5th Count Aehrenthal informed the Duke of Avarna that he had learned that Italian warships had been reported off Salonika, where they had used electric searchlights—and declared that our action on the Ottoman coasts of European Turkey, as well as on the Ægean Islands, could not have been allowed either by Austria-Hungary or by Germany, because it was contrary to the Triple Alliance Treaty.

In March, 1912, Count Berchtold, who had in the meantime succeeded Count Aehrenthal, declared to the German Ambassador in Vienna that, in regard to our operations against the coasts of European Turkey and the Ægean Islands, he adhered to the point of view of Count Aehrenthal, according to which these operations were considered by the Austro-Hungarian Government contrary to the engagement entered into by us by Article VII. of the Triple Alliance Treaty. As for our operations against the Dardanelles, he considered it opposed, first, to the promise made by us not to proceed to any act which might endanger the status quo in the Balkans, and, secondly, to the spirit of the same treaty, which was based on the maintenance of the status quo.

Afterward, when our squadron at the entrance to the Dardanelles was bombarded by Fort Kumkalessi and replied, damaging that fort, Count Berchtold complained of what had happened, considering it contrary to the promises we

had made, and declared that if the Italian Government desired to resume its liberty of action, the Austro-Hungarian Government could have done the same. He added that he could not have allowed us to undertake in the future similar operations or operations in any way opposed to this point of view. In the same way our projected occupation of Chios was prevented. It is superfluous to remark how many lives of Italian soldiers and how many millions were sacrificed through the persistent vetoing of our actions against Turkey, who knew that she was protected by our allies against all attacks on her vital parts.

We were bitterly reproached for not having accepted the offers made toward the end of May, but were these offers made in good faith? Certain documents indicate that they were not. Franz Josef said that Italy was regarding the patrimony of his house with greedy eyes. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg said that the aim of these concessions was to purchase our neutrality, and, therefore, gentlemen, you may applaud us for not having accepted them. Moreover, these concessions, even in their last and belated edition, in no way responded to the objectives of Italian policy, which are, first, the defense of Italianism, the greatest of our duties; secondly, a secure military frontier, replacing that which was imposed upon us in 1866, by which all the gates of Italy are open to our adversaries; thirdly, a strategical situation in the Adriatic less dangerous and unfortunate than that which we have, and of which you have seen the effects in the last few days. All these essential advantages were substantially denied us.

To our minimum demand for the granting of independence to Trieste the reply was to offer Trieste administrative autonomy. Also the question of fulfilling the promises was very important. We were told not to doubt that they would be fulfilled, because we should have Germany's guarantee, but if at the end of the war Germany had not been able to keep it, what would our position have been? And in any case, after this agreement, the Triple Alliance would have been renewed, but in much less favorable con-

ditions, for there would have been one sovereign State and two subject States.

On the day when one of the clauses of the treaty was not fulfilled, or on the day when the municipal autonomy of Trieste was violated by an imperial decree or by a lieutenant's orders, to whom should we have addressed ourselves? To our common superior—to Germany? I do not wish to speak of Germany to you without admiration and respect. I am the Italian Prime Minister, not the German Chancellor, and I do not lose my head. But with all respect for the learned, powerful, and great Germany, an admirable example of organization and resistance, in the name of Italy I declare for no subjection and no protectorate over any one. The dream of a universal hegemony is shattered. The world has risen. The peace and civilization of future humanity must be founded on respect for existing national autonomies. Among these Germany will have to sit as an equal, and not as a master.

But a more remarkable example of the unmeasured pride with which the directors of German policy regard other nations is given in the picture which Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg drew of the Italian political world.

I do not know if it was the intention of this man, blinded by rage, personally to insult my colleagues and me. If that was the case, I should not mention it. We are men whose life you know, men who have served the State to an advanced age, men of spotless renown, men who have given the lives of their children for their country.

The information on which this judgment was based is attributed by the German Chancellor to him whom he calls the best judge of Italian affairs. Perhaps he alludes to Prince von Bülow, with the brotherly desire to shoulder responsibilities upon him. Now, I do not wish you to entertain an erroneous idea of Prince von Bülow's intentions. I believe that he had sympathies for Italy, and did all he could to bring about an agreement. But how great and how numerous were the mistakes he made in translating his good intentions into action! He thought that Italy could be diverted from her path by a few millions ill-spent and

by the influence of a few persons who have lost touch with the soul of the nation—by contact, attempted, but, I hope, not accomplished, with certain politicians.

The effect was the contrary. An immense outburst of indignation was kindled throughout Italy, and not among the populace, but among the noblest and most educated classes and among all the youth of the country, which is ready to shed its blood for the nation. This outburst of indignation was kindled as the result of the suspicion that a foreign Ambassador was interfering between the Italian Government, the Parliament, and the country. In the blaze thus kindled internal discussions melted away, and the whole nation was joined in a wonderful moral union, which will prove our greatest source of strength in the severe struggle which faces us, and which must lead us by our own virtue, and not by benevolent concessions from others, to the accomplishment of the highest destinies of the country.

THE FALL OF WARSAW

RUSSIA LOSES ITS WHOLE OUTER LINE OF DEFENSE

AUGUST 4TH

GENERAL VON DER BOECK MARGARETE MUNSTERBERG
PRINCESS CATHARINE RADZIWILL

When the Von Mackensen battering ram had driven the Russians out of Galicia, General Von Hindenburg, the German commander-in-chief in the East, resolved to carry this victory to a yet larger success. He hoped to break the Russian power completely. For this purpose he launched his own forces from Prussia southward into Poland; while Mackensen attacked it from Galicia, marching north. Between them they hoped to entrap in Warsaw the main Russian armies.

The chief defenses of the Russians were a series of strong fortress cities. The main ones, naming them from north to south, were Riga on the Baltic coast, Kovno and Grodno on the Niemen River, which in part separates Russia and East Prussia, Ossowiec and Lomza defending Poland from East Prussia, Novo Georgiewsk directly in front of Warsaw and guarding the junction of the two great Polish rivers, the Vistula and the Bug. Further south upon the Vistula lies Ivangorod.

The fortresses to the south fell first, Ivangorod and then Warsaw itself. But following this in quick succession came the storming of the northern strongholds. Their line was broken first at Lomza, then at Kovno. Kovno was chief of the northern bulwarks of Russia; and the German reports glowed with accounts of the tremendous battle there. Russia, however, regarded the Kovno defense as so feeble that its commander was accused of selling out to the enemy and was publicly disgraced.

Very different was the gallant defense of Ossowiec and Novo Georgiewsk. Even these fell at last; but their resistance gave the Russian armies time to escape the enclosing pincers of the German generals. The Russians fell back to a second line of which the central defense was Brest-Litovsk, on the truly Russian border east of the Polish capital, Warsaw.

But Brest-Litovsk was also doomed to fall. Its surrender on August 26th was the crown of Germany's victory. After this success the noted German bulletin, here given, was issued, boasting that Russia's main army was destroyed, and her strength was broken. General Boeck here outlines for us the course of German victory which led to Warsaw's capture. Miss Margarete Munsterberg has then condensed for us the popular Berlin narratives of enthusiastic victory, including the extravagant official bulletin. Princess Radziwill gives the Russian view, or rather the Russian court view. The epic of the

Russian soldier himself, the patient courage with which he opposed the tremendous German artillery, the loyalty with which he rushed into hopeless battle, often unarmed and never fitly protected by artillery, these have not yet found a voice. Perhaps they never can find a sufficient one.

BY GENERAL VON DER BOECK

IN order to understand the significant events of the last four months on the eastern front, it will be necessary to recall briefly the military situation that obtained there during the winter of 1914-15.

As a result of the battles at Lodz and at Limanova during November and December, the Russian front in Poland and in Galicia over a stretch of almost 400 kilometers was compelled to retreat, thus shattering the Russian plan of an offensive. During the early months of 1915, the Russians mobilized their great numerical superiority in the hope of smashing through the Carpathians into Hungary and thus, if possible, of coming to the aid of the Serbs; this plan, too, miscarried.

The time had therefore arrived for the allied Central Powers to launch a crushing blow at their mighty eastern antagonist by a combined attack of their victorious troops. The execution of this ambitious plan had been prepared with great care and secrecy by the German and the Austro-Hungarian chief command, so that the Russians were taken quite unawares when, during the early days of May, 1915, the allied Powers inaugurated a successful attack against the right flank and the rear of the invader's position on the Dunajec.

Because of this great but stubbornly contested victory of the Teuton Powers under the command of General von Mackensen (May 1st), the Russian front was pushed in many places from its position near the Hungarian border back upon the confluence of the Dunajec and the Vistula. The immediate and energetic pursuit of the eastward retreating enemy placed those of his forces still in the Carpathians in great jeopardy. It is easy to understand, therefore, that the Russians made obstinate attempts to check the further advance of the allied [Teuton] Powers. This resistance

was broken, however, in the battle of Tarnow-Gorlice (May 13th), so that the Russians had to withdraw their right wing beyond the San, and their left wing to the vicinity of the fortress of Przemysl, which had been in their possession since March 22nd; to Przemysl, too, they withdrew the troops that had been driven in the meantime from the western ranges of the Carpathians.

After a short breathing-spell for the establishment of communications and the advance of the rearguard, the allied Powers renewed the pursuit. While the army of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, which constituted the left wing, was pushing its way over the San, the right wing of Von Mackensen's army drove the enemy from the vicinity of Przemysl, at the same time recapturing the fortress (June 3rd). The enemy withdrew his right wing in the direction of Lublin, his center and his left wing, in part northeastward, in part eastward, back upon Lemberg. Thus the situation offered a division of the Russian forces, and bore in itself the germ of the defeat of the Russians in Poland.

As a matter of course, the events in West Galicia just recounted did not remain without influence on the situation along the west bank of the Vistula. Here the Russians abandoned the positions that they had held for months on the Nida between the Vistula and Pilica, withdrawing northeasterly toward Radom. The Woyrsch army-group followed on their heels. West of Warsaw, however, the Russians still occupied very strong positions.

On the other hand, the Russian retreat had an ever increasing effect on their left wing in the eastern Carpathians, especially since the army of Von Linsingen, which faced this wing, developed considerable activity, with the result that these Russian troops were driven across the upper Dniester (June 24th). By this success, the army-group under Pflanzer-Baltin, at the extreme right wing of the allied Powers, was relieved of the pressure of continual attacks by strong Russian forces.

After the ejection of the enemy from West and Central Galicia, Mackensen's army continued its advance without a pause, again defeating the Russians at Grodek (June 20th)

and shortly thereafter occupying Lemberg, the capital of Galicia (June 22nd).

While Linsingen's army and the right wing of Mackensen's army followed the rapidly retreating enemy eastward to the sector of the Zlota-Lipa and the upper Bug, the greater part of Mackensen's army turned northward in order (along with the army of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand) to remain on the heels of the main part of the Russian army, which was yielding between the Bug and the Vistula.

However, before we can follow the movements of both these armies further, it will be necessary to turn to the left wing of the German forces in the east, which had undertaken an offensive at the same time—an offensive that was related to the attack of the right wing just described in so far as both had the purpose of embracing from both sides the so-called "central-position" of the enemy in Russian Poland.

In the winter battle in the Masurian district (February 7th and 8th), Field-Marshal von Hindenburg had again trounced the Russian forces invading East Prussia so severely that since that time they had taken up a defensive position, on Russian soil, on the strongly fortified Niemen-Bobr-Narew line, venturing only occasionally to disturb our weak covering forces in this region. One such aggression was undertaken against the border-city Memel (March 17th), resulting in a short-lived occupation of this city by the Russians. In order to punish them for this attack on an unfortified city and to prevent a repetition of similar unamiable behavior, a special army was created in the northern part of East Prussia under the command of General von Below, which was entrusted with the task of driving out the Russian forces that had appeared north of the Niemen, as well as occupying Samogitia and Courland. Despite the obstinate resistance of Russian forces hurriedly summoned to this region, Von Below's army accomplished its task in the course of a few months; supported by our marines, it occupied the Baltic ports Libau and Windau and forced the Russians back in the direction of Dünaburg, Friedrichstadt, and Riga.

Eichhorn's army assumed the defense of East Prussia against the fortress of Kovno and the Russian troops still stationed west of the Niemen. In order effectively to oppose invasion of the southern boundary of East and West Prussia from the strongly fortified river-line Bobr-Narew, and at the same time to carry out the planned offensive against the right wing of the "central position" in Russian Poland, two new armies were created in North Poland in the end of June under Generals von Gallwitz and von Scholtz. In close coöperation, both these armies then drove the strong Russian forces opposing them back upon the Bobr-Narew line and then advanced to the attack of this line from Novo-Georgiewsk to Lomza. After they had occupied the fortresses of Ostrolenka and Rozan and Pultusk, they crossed the Narew at several points; then they broke the resistance of the strong Russian troops opposing them on the left bank, and resumed their advance between the Narew and the Bug, in a southeasterly direction. In the early days of August, the fortress of Lomza was taken, and the fortress of Novo-Georgiewsk surrounded and besieged.

Let us return now to the right wing, to Mackensen's army, which we left pursuing its way northward after the crossing of the San and the capture of Lemberg, following up the retreat of the main Russian forces between the Bug and the Vistula. Naturally, the Russians resisted this pursuit most obstinately, summoning fresh troops for the purpose; failure to check the triumphant advance of the armies of the allied Central Powers meant that the Russian position along the fortified Vistula line would prove untenable. During the month of July, therefore, severe engagements developed south of the line Cholm-Lublin, ultimately terminating in favor of the [Teuton] Allies. After the army of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, fighting on the left wing of the Mackensen army-group, had succeeded in breaking the desperate resistance of the Russians in the vicinity of Krasnik, the right wing advanced between the Bug and along both banks of the Wieprz, so that by the end of July the stretch of the vital railway line, Kiev-Ivangorod-Warsaw,

between Cholm and Lublin, had fallen into the possession of this army-group.

This strong pressure from the south was not without its effect upon the Russian forces still battling along the left bank of the Vistula. Their left wing forthwith withdrew between the Vistula and the Pilica mainly in the direction of the fortress Ivangorod, energetically followed by the troops under Woyrsch. While the right wing of this army-division, consisting of Austro-Hungarian troops, turned toward Ivangorod, General Woyrsch himself, with his Silesian *Landwehr,* effected the crossing of the Vistula below the fortress, where, despite strenuous counter-attacks by the Russians, he succeeded in maintaining himself in a hurriedly improvised bridgehead-like position. This success was of great moment for the later operations along the right bank of the Vistula.

North of the Pilica also, fighting continually, the Russians withdrew toward Warsaw, and finally, after they had been compelled to abandon the Blonie position they had so long held (August 3rd), they sought shelter behind the outer fortifications of Warsaw, the evacuation of which, first by the civilian population, and then by the greater part of the garrison, had already been ordered by the Russian High Command.

In the meantime, Mackensen's army had continued its pursuit of the Russians between the Bug and the Vistula. Its right wing, which touched the Bug, had already won a safe crossing of this river at Vladimir-Volynski, and it fought its way against strong opposition through the narrows between the lakes northeast of Leczna, reaching the line Vlodava-Parczev; at the former point a second crossing of the Bug was won and made tenable. On the left wing of Mackensen's army-group, the army under Archduke Joseph Ferdinand defeated the strong Russian forces opposing it at Lubartov and drove them northward across the lower Wieprz.

This uninterrupted pursuit of the Russians between the Bug and the Vistula on the part of Mackensen's army-group, together with the advance of the right wing of Hindenburg's

army-group (the armies of von Scholtz and von Gallwitz) against the lower Bug, described above, as well as the pressure of those forces of the allied Central Powers still on the left bank of the Vistula, made the situation of the Russians in their central position in Russian Poland untenable, so that only a speeding up of the retreat they had already inaugurated could save them from worse, as the events which now followed blow on blow clearly demonstrate.

On August 4th, the army-group under Prince Leopold of Bavaria captured and penetrated the outer and inner fortifications of Warsaw and occupied the city with the exception of the suburb of Praga on the right bank of the Vistula, whence the Russian rearguard still bombarded Warsaw. Simultaneously the Austro-Hungarian troops under General von Kövess captured and occupied the fortress of Ivangorod and soon established on the right bank of the Vistula a junction with the left wing of Mackensen's army-group.

By the occupation of both these Vistula strongholds the long series of successes achieved by the allied Powers since the early days of May, on the Dunajec in Galicia, in South and North Poland, and in the Baltic Provinces, were fittingly crowned.

BY MARGARETE MUNSTERBERG

Condensed from the accounts in the popular Berlin periodical, *"Kriegs-Rundschau"*

On July 20, 1915, German troops forced a crossing over the Narew River. Meanwhile Austrian-Hungarian and German armies captured Kostrzyn and Radom, and after bitter fighting pressed onward from the south, between the Bug and Vistula Rivers, toward the Vistula Fortress Ivangorod. This was closely hedged in by the allied [Teuton] troops on July 21st, after the opponent had made vain efforts to hinder our forward march toward the north and toward the east. In the early morning of July 28th General von Woyrsch forced the crossing over the Vistula at several points. The Mackensen army, after a short interruption, resumed its attack on July 29th, and broke through the Rus-

sian position to the west of Wieprz. This success as well as the attacks of Austrian-Hungarian and German troops just east of the Vistula, of Prussian guard troops near Kruke and of other German troops in the region of Wojslawice made the Russian front give way between the Vistula and the Bug. On July 30th the enemy evacuated his positions along the whole line.

During the pursuit we captured Lublin and passed through Cholm.

An exceedingly obstinate defense of the Russian positions round Ivangorod ensued. It was marked by the following official communication from Vienna on August 2, 1915: "To the west of Ivangorod our Siebenbürgen regiments have wrested from the enemy at the point of the bayonet eight concrete bulwarks built in storied form. Four of these works were captured alone by the infantry regiment, 50, which consists chiefly of Rumanians. The semicircle around Ivangorod was drawn considerably tighter. We captured 15 officers and over 2,300 men and carried off 29 pieces of artillery, among them 21 heavy guns, further 11 machine guns, a large deposit of tools and much munition and war material. Our proved Siebenbürgen troops may count this day among the most glorious of their honorable history."

The Austrian-Hungarian troops of the Woyrsch army took possession of the western part of Ivangorod on August 3rd. Meanwhile Mackensen once more drove to flight the Russians who were fighting desperately to the northeast of Cholm and to the west of the Bug. On August 4th Ivangorod fell into the hands of the allied Austrian-Hungarian and German troops.

On the same day Warsaw was conquered.

After the Russians on August 3rd had been thrust back to the outer line of defense, Prince Leopold of Bavaria had his army start the attack on Warsaw. The announcement of victory from the great headquarters on August 5, 1915, read thus: "The army of Prince Leopold of Bavaria broke through and yesterday and to-night took possession of the outer and inner lines of forts of Warsaw, in which the Rus-

sian rearguard still offered stubborn resistance. This morning the city was occupied by our troops."

The Russian command dismissed the fall of Warsaw in the official communication of August 6th in the following words: "As a result of the conditions brought about by the general situation, our troops to the west of Warsaw were commanded to fall back on the right shore of the Vistula. According to the report which has arrived, this command was carried out. The troops that covered Warsaw returned, without being attacked by the enemy, to the new front marked out for them, after they had blown up behind them all bridges over the Vistula."

At a stormy session of the Duma on August 1st, the Russian War Minister, Polivanof, said in a long speech: "At this moment the enemy has concentrated unusually strong forces against us, which step by step are encompassing the territory of the military district of Warsaw, whose strategic boundary lines have always been the weak spot on our western border. Under these conditions we may leave a part of this district to the enemy, and fall back upon positions where our army can prepare once more to take the offensive. This is the end which crowns the tactics tried in 1812. To-day we may leave Warsaw to the enemy, as we evacuated Moscow at that time, in order to insure final victory."

The revolutionary papers of Warsaw during the critical days of the evacuation are said to have spread declarations inciting the people to oppose the military authorities. The men of the Ochrana kept up a reign of terror.

In the papers of Germany and its friends the conquest of Warsaw was celebrated as the "crowning event of the first war year." The voices of the enemy press everywhere betrayed ill-concealed worry over the "successful withdrawal" of the Russian armies. The irresistible advance of the German and Austrian-Hungarian armies from the south as well as in the north brought these worries to the point of despair, of accusations and foolish hopes. Russia scolded the "inactivity" of the allies on the West front, France complained of the desultoriness of the Russian strategy, England

smoothed things over by pointing to Constantinople. There was much racking of brains over the German "pincers" in the east.

Meanwhile the German group on the Narew was fast approaching its goal—the closing in of Novo-Georgiewsk. In spite of the stubborn resistance of the Russians on the line from Lomza to the mouth of the Bug River, on August 7th our troops took possession of Zegrze, an outer fortification of Novo-Georgiewsk. The next day the strongest Vistula fortress in the east was isolated between the Narew and the Vistula.

From August 9th to 10th Lomza was stormed. Consequently the Russian defensive positions gave way at the Bobre in the direction of Ossowiec and farther on toward the Niemen; the strength of the fortresses of Grodno and Kovno, however, still made resistance possible.

Fort Benjamin, east of Novo-Georgiewsk, which the enemy had evacuated, was occupied August 10th; our airships at the same time threw bombs on Novo-Georgiewsk and Brest-Litovsk. In forced marches the groups of Generals von Scholz and von Gallwitz pressed on toward the southeast as far as Sokolow, breaking the stubborn resistance of the Russians section by section. Toward the northeast the crossing over the Nurzec between the Narew and the Bug was forced after bloody fighting.

Contemporaneously with the advance of the German group at the Narew, the troops of Archduke Josef Ferdinand, of General von Woyrsch and Marshal von Mackensen broke the resistance of the Russians between the Bug and the Vistula. After the capture of Lubartow and a victory near Miechow, they advanced on August 7th and 8th across the Wieprz; on August 14th they gained the railroad Lukow-Brest-Litovsk, to which Mackensen had pressed on across the Rokitno marshes. German troops under Mackensen protected the eastern wing of the victoriously advancing armies.

While the pincers from the Narew and the Bug-Vistula were closing tighter and tighter, an event of great significance was going on by the Niemen:

The Storming of Kovno

On August 16th troops of the army of General von Eichhorn under the leadership of General Litzmann stormed the forts of the southwestern front of Kovno. Forty-five hundred men and 240 guns were captured. On August 18th, so memorable in German war history, the following official announcement of victory was made: "The fortress Kovno with all forts and innumerable material, including more than 400 guns, is in German hands since to-night. It was taken by storm in spite of the most stubborn resistance."

A few days later a longer account was given out from high headquarters:

"On August 17th the chief bulwark of the Niemen line, the first-class fortress Kovno, fell into our hands. As early as July the extensive forests in front of the western side of the fortress were evacuated by the enemy; thus it was made possible to prepare adequate ways of approach and to make the necessary explorations. On August 6th the attack on the fortress began. Through the daring assistance of the infantry, observation points were won for the artillery, and the guns were successfully installed, though with extreme difficulty in the roadless wooded regions. So it was possible, on August 8th, for the artillery to open fire. While it directed an overwhelming fire on the protecting outposts and at the same time on the permanent works of the fortress, infantry and pioneers were working their way forward unceasingly, day and night, with constant heavy fighting. Not less than eight bulwarks were taken by storm up to August 15th, each a fortress by itself, which had been built during months of toil with all the means of the engineering art and obviously enormous expenditure in money and labor. Frequent very strong counter-attacks of the Russians against the front and the southern flanks of our attacking troops were repulsed with heavy losses for the opponent.

"On August 16th the attack was carried nearly up to the permanent line of forts. By means of artillery fire of the utmost strength, brilliantly directed with the aid of balloon and aircraft observations, the garrison of the forts, the con-

necting lines and the intermediate batteries were shaken to such a degree and the works so greatly damaged that the latter too could be stormed. By pressing on irresistibly, the infantry at first broke through Fort 2; then, by wheeling in against its rear and crushing the front, it stormed the whole line of forts between the Jesia and Niemen. The artillery, which was hurriedly moved forward, immediately began to bombard the central fortification of the Western front and after its fall, on August 17th, to bombard the enemy forces which had retreated to the eastern shore of the Niemen. Under cover of the artillery, which had been drawn up close to the Niemen, the river was won in the midst of enemy fire, at first by single small sections, then by stronger forces. A double set of bridges was quickly erected in place of the bridges destroyed by the enemy.

"In the course of August 17th, the forts of the northern front, which had already been attacked from the north, as well as the eastern front and finally the southern front capitulated. Besides more than 20,000 prisoners, we won an immeasurable booty, over 600 guns, among them innumerable ones of heavy caliber and highly modern construction, huge stores of munitions, innumerable machine guns, searchlights and army tools of all kinds, automobiles and rubber tires, provisions worth millions. Considering the great extension of this modern fortress, an exact counting of the booty will naturally be the work of days. The booty increases from hour to hour. Hundreds of recruits were picked up in the city deserted by the enemy. According to their statements, in the last moment 15,000 unarmed reserves were removed like fugitives from the city.

"This circumstance obviously proves that the Russian command considered the speedy fall of the strongest Russian fortress an impossibilty; so also do the desperate counter-attacks of the Russians—though unsuccessful, like the previous ones—which started once more from the south, even after the fall of the fortress. How highly they valued the possession of this fortress is proved not only by its powerful structure and its unusually plentiful artillery equipment, but also by the fact that the resistance of the outer

garrison was kept up till the last moment and by the number of prisoners which fell into our hands, which, under these conditions, was comparatively large."

The success on the Niemen was followed immediately by the conquest of Novo-Georgiewsk.

As early as August 16th a large fort and two intermediate works on the northeastern front of the strong Vistula fortress had been taken by storm. Twenty-four hundred prisoners and 19 guns fell into the hands of the victor. On the next day, two more forts on the northeastern front were stormed and 20 guns captured. On August 18th, while the German colors were being hoisted over Kovno, the German storm troops occupied the Wkra section on the northeastern side of Novo-Georgiewsk and captured 125 guns. Then the fate of the defenders was decided. The report of our highest command of August 20th says: "The fortress Novo-Georgiewsk, the last stronghold of the enemy in Poland, has been taken after stubborn resistance. The whole garrison was captured: 6 generals, over 85,000 men, in the final battle yesterday alone over 20,000. The number of captured guns rose to over 700, the amount of the remaining war material taken by us cannot yet be determined."

The irresistible advance of the victorious armies next caused the enemy to evacuate Ossowiec, the stronghold in the marshes which had already cost much blood; for he had learned his lesson from the fall of Kovno and Novo-Georgiewsk. On August 22nd Ossowiec was occupied. The small fortress, Olita, and the larger one, Grodno, could still maintain themselves, protected as they were by marshes and lakes, which reminded one of the Masurian district.

Meanwhile after having occupied the city Sidlice (August 12th), the Woyrsch army had advanced across the Bug near Miolnik on August 18th. The opponent offered strong resistance to our advance, especially to the west of Brest-Litovsk. On the eastern shore of the Bug around Wlodawa the northward pursuit of the Mackensen group was kept up energetically. For the Russians the railroad to the north from Brest-Litovsk played an important part; for the departure from Brest-Litovsk might be endangered by the

troops of General von Gallwitz which were marching from the north via Bialystok, and by the group of Prince Leopold of Bavaria which was advancing eastward to Litovsk. On August 22nd, therefore, in the region round Bielsk as well as to the east of Wlodawa as far as the neighborhood of Kovel, the enemy started violent counter-attacks which, however, could not long prevent the advance of our troops.

After Austrian, Hungarian, and German cavalry had entered Kovel on August 23rd, German forces drove the enemy northeast of Wlodawa deeper and deeper into the woody and marshy zone. Heavily beaten, the Russians fled also before the army of Prince Leopold of Bavaria into the interior of the Bialovieska forest. On August 26, 1915, Brest-Litovsk had fallen.

The official communication read: "The fortress of Brest-Litovsk has fallen. While the Austrian-Hungarian corps of Field-Marshal von Arz, after fighting, took two forts of the western front yesterday afternoon, the Brandenburg reserve corps 22 took by storm the works of the northwestern front and penetrated by night into the central fortification. Thereupon the enemy gave up the fortress. On the whole front of the army group, from Bialovieska forest to the marshy district by the Pripet, the pursuit is in full swing.

"HIGHEST COMMAND."

The official statement from Vienna said: "The fortress Brest-Litovsk has fallen. The Hungarian *'Landwehr'* troops of General von Arz wrested from the enemy the village Kobylany, situated southwest of the fortress, thereby broke through the outer circle of defense and fell upon the nearest fortification. At the same time West Galician, Silesian and North Moravian army infantry took by storm a fort south of the municipality Koroszczyn. German troops took possession of three works on the northwestern front and early this morning occupied a citadel situated by the railroad bridge. Meanwhile the allies also forced back the enemy across the Lesna and in the woody and marshy region southeast of Brest-Litovsk. Our cavalry, which pursued them northward from Kovel, beat Russian rearguards near Bucin and Wyzwa."

The result of the offensive in Russia was officially summed up thus at the end of August:

"At the present point of time, when a certain end has been reached in our continuous operations through the fall of the interior Russian line of defense, it is instructive to recall briefly the result reached so far by the offensive, which began on May 2nd when we broke through near Gorlice.

"The strength of the united Russian forces which gradually suffered the main brunt of our attack may be estimated low, at about 1,400,000 men. In the battles the round sum of 1,100,000 men were captured and at least 300,000 men were killed or wounded, if the number of those thus put out of combat (not including the sick) is estimated very low. It must be higher, for the enemy has naturally suffered enormous bloody losses since he tried to cover his hasty retreat chiefly by infantry without any consideration of human life, in order to save the remainder of his artillery.

"Thus we may say that the armies which had the brunt of our offensive have been completely annihilated.

"The fact that our opponent still has troops on the battlefield may be explained thus: he has drawn upon the divisions held in readiness for an offensive against Turkey in Southern Russia; he has hastily brought forward a great many half-trained reserves from the interior of Russia; finally he has moved numerous soldiers, singly and in small companies, to the north from those fronts where our pressure made itself less felt. All these measures have not been able to check disaster.

"The enemy has been driven from Galicia, Poland, Courland, Lithuania; his closed front has been torn open, his armies are rushing back in two wholly divided groups. Not less than twelve fortresses, among them four large ones of wholly modern construction, fell into the hands of our brave, loyal fighters and with them the outer as well as the inner line of protection of the Russian Empire."

BY PRINCESS RADZIWILL

The loss of Kovno, strange as it may appear, produced in Petrograd a far deeper impression than the fall of Warsaw.

Important as the latter undoubtedly was from the political point of view, it lay far more within the limits of probability to see the Polish capital taken by the enemy, who, ever since the beginning of the war, had lain almost at its doors, than to admit the possibility of one of the greatest and strongest Russian fortresses being stormed by the German troops. Besides, Kovno was in Russia, and its possession by the Kaiser meant a good deal more to every Russian patriot than any Polish territory. Apart from sentimental reasons, Kovno represented an immense quantity of war material, guns, ammunition, and provisions of every kind, which had accumulated within its walls from the beginning of the campaign. It was bitter to see all this captured, and even more so to find that we had not been given a chance to defend it. The evacuation of the fortress began late in June, when, by order of the Grand Duke, a certain quantity of guns had been withdrawn. In July some of the advance forts which defended the entrance to the stronghold had fallen into the hands of the Germans, but it was only on the 6th of August that a serious attack was started, and on the 8th heavy siege artillery opened a murderous fire against our positions. Eight forts in succession were stormed between that date and the 15th of August, and the cannonade surpassed in intensity anything ever experienced before. The firing was heard farther than Vilna, and carried terror into the hearts of the unfortunate inhabitants of the country surrounding the besieged town. On the 16th of August the German infantry had been able to advance as far as the line of the permanent fortifications which defended the immediate approach to the fortress, taking by assault trenches and positions which, when not held by a small number of men—many of them wounded,—were already abandoned. The whole day of the 17th of August passed in one attack on the eastern side of the Niemen; the bridge was destroyed by German shells, the forts on the north flank were burned down, and in the evening the entire southern side fell into the hands of the enemy. The town itself, with its last line of fortifications, then had to capitulate, together with the 20,000 men still left of its once strong garrison.

It was this capitulation which was so bitterly resented by Russian society. It produced a disastrous impression in Petrograd, and shook the last remnants of the Grand Duke's former popularity. A letter received from the Russian capital, which bore the date August 20th, expressed itself in the following terms upon this subject:

"I do not know what impression the fall of Kovno may have produced abroad. Here the consternation surpasses everything I have ever seen before, and even after the disasters of Mukden and Tsu Shima, at the time of the Japanese war, there was not such a general depression as now pervades the whole atmosphere of Petrograd. The pessimists, who prophesied that no good could ever result from the Grand Duke being in supreme military command, rejoice to see their prognostications verified, but even they forbear from indulging in the usual 'I told you so' dear to the human heart. The situation is felt to be far too serious for vain boasting. The one thing which dominates is the knowledge that not only we have been beaten, but also that we did not defend ourselves as we ought to have done. It is most difficult to persuade a whole nation as bitterly disappointed as Russia has been that strategical reasons require us to retire and avoid the chance of an encounter face to face with our enemy. One must be a soldier to judge of such things, and laymen can only feel the disgrace of this surrender of our positions. One cannot understand how it happens that our army, which, according to what we have been told, was plentifully supplied with all that it required, found itself suddenly without the means of defense. The nation does not differentiate between a retreat executed in perfect order, as ours has been, and a flight. It easily mistakes the one for the other, and its intelligence fails to grasp how it comes about that, after we have been assured all along that our territory was secured against any invasion of the enemy by a line of fortresses so strong that no army in the world could possibly take them, this line, the erection of which had cost so much money, was suddenly pronounced to be worth nothing at all—to constitute, indeed, a danger for our troops had they remained. The impression that lies have been told

is possessing the mind of the public, which begins to say definitely that somebody has been guilty of systematic deceit. It is a thousand pities, because once the confidence of the nation in its leaders is shaken it will not respond with the one-time readiness to future appeals to its spirit of self-sacrifice and devotion. The great danger of such a frame of mind is too serious not to engross the attention of all those who look farther than the present day.

"It is now that the mistake made from the very beginning of confiding the supreme command to a member of the Imperial family becomes apparent in all its nakedness. It would have been easy to punish any Commander-in-Chief of lesser birth, but with a Grand Duke this could not be thought of. A certain portion of Petrograd society is clamoring for the dismissal of the Grand Duke Nicholas, and curious stories are related concerning his growing unpopularity among the army, his tyrannical character and general recklessness; but either these stories do not reach Tsarskoye Selo, or the Sovereign is afraid of deposing a relative quite capable of resisting his authority. This at least is what one hears from all sides, though, personally, I do not believe any of these stories. Ruthless as the Grand Duke may be, he would not dream of opposing the Emperor or failing in the performance of any Royal command. I am satisfied that the story of his refusal to defend Kovno has been invented by busybodies anxious to appear to know everything. The retreat was a necessity in consequence of the lack of ammunition. Had we stopped to meet the Prussians and their big guns, we should simply have sacrificed the bulk of our army to no purpose. Besides, the conditions of modern warfare have quite done away with the old tradition of strong fortresses. It is too little realized that not one of them can resist the murderous fire of the fat and lean Berthas with which the Prussians are provided. And so mankind is bound to be impressed by events of such magnitude as the loss of Ivangorod and of Kovno, which most probably will be followed by the fall of the other fortresses on the Vistula and beyond it. In military circles they are quite convinced that Brest-Litovsk, too, will fall, after which arises the que-

estion

whether the Germans will be able to cope with the difficulty of the Pinsk Marshes and to cross that most dangerous region. My private opinion is that they will not succeed in this part of their devilish program. It is August already, and in another three weeks the autumn rains will start, which, even in the best of cases, must considerably delay them, and turn their attention to their winter quarters in preference to everything else.

"I also fail to see the reason for the panic which seems to have got hold of the population of Petrograd; in these days of aircraft and railways one is apt to forget the distances which make our country such a wonderful place. It is easy for newspaper reporters to say that within a few days the enemy will be at the gates of our capital. In reality, such a thing is out of the range of human possibility if we take into account the difficulty of moving a whole army, with its baggage and artillery, in an unknown country, where the roads are full of obstacles of a nature this enemy does not even suspect. Certainly the situation is serious, but not desperate. The Germans are far from having won the war, which will turn out to be a question of patience and endurance. Strong as they are, their number will diminish sooner than that of the Allies, and this day twelve months we shall see whether they stand as well as they do at the present moment. If only we remain quiet in regard to matters of home politics, I quite believe that we shall teach the Germans a lesson they will be compelled to take to heart, whether they wish it or not."

My correspondent saw perhaps clearer than most people the unfortunate turn which the campaign had taken during that summer of 1915. If one had been assured that ammunition would be forthcoming in the near future, one might have looked at things with more equanimity. Unfortunately, such was far from being the case. On the contrary, one dreaded that, despite the promises of the Government, the indifference of officials would allow the important matter of the armaments to remain in a condition of shocking and culpable neglect. People clamored for the day when the Duma would meet again, and all kinds of things were fore-

seen in connection with that impending event. Rumors of a revolution went about, which were further strengthened by unrestrained gossip.

On the 21st of August the railway line of Wlodawa-Brest-Litovsk was in the hands of the Germans, who began with their usual thoroughness to mass their armies around Brest-Litovsk, the most important point of defense upon which the Grand Duke had reckoned in his continual retreat. It must not be forgotten, when reviewing the events of that memorable month of August, 1915, that the principal aim of the German Staff was to cut the communications between the different Russian armies, especially of the groups which were still gathered about the Niemen, and which constituted, even without sufficient ammunition, a formidable source of danger to the enemy, who advanced toward Vilna as hurriedly as circumstances allowed, hoping to enter this town even before they had captured Brest-Litovsk, and thus cut off our troops from their base. But all their efforts to surround us, or to oblige us to accept the battle which they hoped would end in our defeat, were useless. The Grand Duke began to reproach himself for not having insisted that he must have ammunition enough to cope with the enterprising adversary. With great courage he accepted blame which was not his alone, and determined to save the army at all costs. A retreat, painful though it might be, would not rob the troops of their courage and affect their morale in a dangerous manner, as would a lost battle. No matter at what cost, the army had to be saved. This point established, the Grand Duke acted in accordance with it, and so, in spite of a storm of indignation, and even of ridicule, he brought the Russian army beyond the reach of the German artillery, there to entrench and prepare itself for the day when once more it would take the offensive.

The Austrians, who were sent forward to attack the advance works of the fortification that guarded the entrance to Brest-Litovsk, were commanded nominally by their own officers, in reality by Germans. They started a desperate assault during the early hours of the 25th of August against the line of forts which stretched from the village of Wys-

sokie-Litovsk, where stood the splendid castle of the Countess Potocka, up to the town of Brest itself. For a whole day they fought without intermission, and thousands of men perished in trenches that had to be carried with the bayonet. The Russians retired towards the Bug, defending their ground inch by inch, burning the town, blowing up the railway station, the post-office (buildings that might prove of some utility to the enemy), and the barracks which had been occupied by their troops. After nearly twenty-four hours of uninterrupted struggle, and as the last line of fortifications was about to be stormed, the Prussians, who up to that time had remained passive spectators of the battle which had been raging, sent one of their reserve corps to the assistance of the Austrians, and it was this corps which was the first to enter the still burning ruins of what had once been the flourishing town of Brest-Litovsk. The railway line had already been occupied by the Germans a few days, and they started at once to repair it, so as to assure their line of communication with Warsaw and with Eastern Prussia in the north and west, and with Kowal in the south.

In spite of their clamorous joy at this new success, it remains to be proved whether later on it turns out to be of real advantage to them. The whole population of Brest, which was mostly Jewish, did not take kindly to the invaders, or to the new regulations which the latter introduced into the happy-go-lucky Lithuanian town. In Warsaw they had received some sympathy of a kind, but in Brest it was different. First of all, most of the inhabitants had fled, and those who remained were utterly ruined, and could not be of much use to their conquerors. Provisions also were lacking. The factories were devoid of machinery, and the whole place presented an aspect of desolation. The Germans were in possession of the fortress which they had coveted for such a long time; they found nothing but ruin. This is the plain and unvarnished truth. The great successes of the Prussians were only obtained because they met with absolutely no resistance. Had the Russians possessed as much ammunition as their enemies, it is a question whether the Germans could have advanced into the interior of Poland and Lithua-

nia as easily as they did. This was a fact to which they were very careful not to draw the attention of the world. On the contrary, they hastened to issue a notice which they hoped would excite German enthusiasm, so as to prepare the nation for the further sacrifices which its Government perfectly well knew it would have to ask from it within a very short time. This notice is so typical of German lies that it deserves to be reproduced here, if only to point out the numerous inaccuracies with which it abounds:

"The strength of the Russian armies which opposed us," begins this extraordinary official communiqué, "cannot be estimated as less than 1,400,000 men. Of this number, 1,100,000 have fallen into our hands and are prisoners, whilst *at least* 300,000 men have been killed or are completely disabled. Probably the numbers *are even higher* than stated, if we take into account that, in order to save what was left of their artillery, the Russians covered the retreat of the latter with their infantry, which must, in consequence, have suffered enormously.

"We can therefore assume with absolute certainty that once for all our enemy has been entirely annihilated, and if he can still bring into the field some troops to oppose us, this can only be explained by the fact that a few divisions were left in the south of Russia, against the possibility of an attack from Turkey. But these are composed of only half-trained men, gathered together from all parts of Russia, who are absolutely incapable of holding the field against us. We have driven our enemy out of Galicia, Poland, Courland, and Lithuania; we have broken through his lines, and no fewer than twelve fortresses, of which four are large and modern, have been captured by us; with them has fallen the last line of defense which Russia possessed against us." [1]

It is amusing to enter into the details of this document, and to ask those who had composed it how they could explain the fact that, according to their own account, they had

[1] We have presented two translations of this noted German Government announcement so that the reader may choose for himself between the spirit in which it is read by a Russian and by a German-American (see the preceding account). Both translations are honest, but note the difference of expression.

killed and taken prisoners more men than the number which they had indicated themselves as having opposed them. Among the many wonderful things which the Germans have performed, this is surely one of the most remarkable achievements.

We would also ask the Germans how it happened that this destroyed Russian army revived suddenly from the dead, and succeeded in preventing the famous Marshal von Hindenburg himself from taking Riga, which he had declared he could capture whenever he liked. Why, too, was the important fortress of Dunaburg—or Dwinsk, to give it its Russian name—at Christmas, 1915, still in possession of the Czar, in spite of the repeated assurances of the German military authorities that its capture was but a matter of a few hours. The Prussian Staff is no longer so eager to talk to us about the annihilation of the Russian armies as it was in August, 1915.

It was fondly expected at Berlin, and among the native German population, that the capture of Brest-Litovsk would open the way to Southern Russia, and that Kiev would be the next town to fall into the hands of Von Mackensen and of Prince Leopold of Bavaria, who suddenly had been entrusted with the leadership of the German vanguard. In reality, the conquest of the old Lithuanian town had no such results, and proved rather a source of embarrassment than anything else to the further successes of the Kaiser's soldiers. It must not be forgotten that the aim of the Germans was to strike terror into the hearts of their adversaries, and that a good deal of their triumphs lay in the rapidity of their march forward. To capture Petrograd, Kiev, Odessa, the territories surrounding the Black Sea, the Germans would have to be very much more advanced before the winter interfered with further progress. And winter, or rather autumn with its rains, was almost at hand. As far as Brest-Litovsk the road had been relatively easy to follow, owing to the absence of serious resistance on the part of the Russians; but after Brest matters would prove very different, because this town lies on the confines of the Pripet Marshes —far more formidable enemies than an army of soldiers.

BRITAIN'S FAILURE AT THE DARDANELLES

THE "ANZACS" WIN AND LOSE THE MAIN ASSAULT AT SARI BAIR

AUGUST 6TH-10TH

LORD KITCHENER — GENERAL HAMILTON
ELLIS BARTLETT — AIDE OF GENERAL VON SANDERS

Britain tried for months to win the Dardanelles by naval power alone, as a previous section of our work has shown. Then in April of 1915 she brought land troops also to the Dardanelles and gradually developed a resolute assault, employing at length over 120,000 men. By this time, however, the Turks, previously unready and uncertain of their will to war, were well equipped with German guns, were led by German officers, and were self-confident, eager and fanatically aroused.

The Dardanelles peninsula is steeply mountainous, and its excellent defensive positions were resolutely held by a Turkish army much exceeding the Britons in numbers. So that while the British struggled doggedly for months, they never succeeded in fighting their way beyond the protection of the ships' guns which guarded their landing places. Even their landings were sharply opposed, and every foot of ground along the rugged coast was dearly bought.

The main British assault was the one herein described. It aimed to win the summit of the peninsula ridge, from which the other shore, within the mouth of the Dardanelles, could have been bombarded. For the section of this topmost ridge known as Sari Bair, the British fought for five days. On the fourth day, August 9th, they held the summit for a moment, but lost it the next morning before reënforcements could reach the exhausted remnant of survivors.

We have here the story of their gallant attack as their Minister of War, Lord Kitchener, told it officially, also as their commanding general, Sir Ian Hamilton, reported it, and then as a noted British war-correspondent and eye-witness enthusiastically described it. General Sanders, the German commander in Turkey, authorized the report of the fighting as here given from the Turkish viewpoint.

Not until the end of the year did the Britons admit that their advance was hopeless in face of the determined Turkish resistance and the great natural strength of the peninsula. Then they suddenly withdrew their troops, lest a worse fate befall them. Their total casualties at the Dardanelles exceeded fifty thousand.

For this daring expedition upon a foreign coast, Britain relied mainly on her colonial troops from Africa and Asia. The volunteers from Australia and New Zealand were gathered here; and from their initials and those of the other colonials, their force was known as

the Anzacs. Regular "Ghurka" troops from India also fought here, and some Frenchmen, besides a few home troops from the British Isles. To Britons the Dardanelles expedition ranks as the chief disaster of the War, as also the occasion of some of its most desperate battles.

BY LORD HERBERT KITCHENER

ON the Gallipoli Peninsula during the operations in June several Turkish trenches were captured. Our own lines were appreciably advanced and our positions were consolidated.

Considerable reënforcements having arrived, a surprise landing on a large scale at Suvla Bay was successfully accomplished on the 6th of August without any serious opposition.

At the same time an attack was launched by the Australian and New Zealand corps from the Anzac position, and a strong offensive was delivered from Cape Helles in the direction of Krithia. In this latter action French troops played a prominent part and showed to high advantage their usual gallantry and fine fighting qualities.

The attack from Anzac, after a series of hotly contested actions, was carried to the summit of Sari Bair and Chunuk Bair, dominating positions in this area. The arrival of transports and the disembarkation of troops in Suvla Bay were designed to enable troops to support this attack. Unfortunately, however, the advance from Suvla Bay was not developed quickly enough, and the movement forward was brought to a standstill after an advance of about two and one-half miles.

The result was that the troops from Anzac were unable to retain their position on the crest of the hills, and after being repeatedly counter-attacked they were ordered to withdraw to positions lower down. These positions were effectively consolidated, and, joining with the line occupied by the Suvla Bay force, formed a connected front of more than twelve miles.

From the latter position a further attack on the Turkish entrenchments was delivered on the 21st, but after several hours of sharp fighting it was not found possible to gain

the summit of the hills occupied by the enemy, and the intervening space being unsuitable for defense, the troops were withdrawn to their original position.

In the course of these operations the gallantry and resourcefulness of the Australian and New Zealand troops frequently formed the subject of eulogy in General Hamilton's reports.

It is not easy to appreciate at their full value the enormous difficulties which attended the operations in the Dardanelles or the fine temper with which our troops met them.

There is now abundant evidence of a process of demoralization having set in among the German-led, or rather German-driven Turks, due, no doubt, to their extremely heavy losses and to the progressive failure of their resources.

It is only fair to acknowledge that, judged from a humane point of view, the methods of warfare pursued by the Turks are vastly superior to those which have disgraced their German masters.

Throughout, the coöperation of the fleet was intensely valuable, and the concerted action between the sister services was in every way in the highest degree satisfactory.

BY GENERAL SIR IAN HAMILTON

The first step in the real push—the step which above all others was to count—was the night attack on the summits of the Sari Bair ridge. The crest line of this lofty mountain range runs parallel to the sea, dominating the underfeatures contained within the Anzac position, although these fortunately defilade the actual landing-place. From the main ridge a series of spurs run down towards the level beach, and are separated from one another by deep, jagged gullies choked up with dense jungle. Two of these leading up to Chunuk Bair are called Chailak Dere and Sazli Beit Dere; another deep ravine runs up to Koja Chemen Tepe (Hill 305), the topmost peak of the whole ridge, and is called the Aghyl Dere.

It was our object to effect a lodgment along the crest of the high main ridge with two columns of troops, but, seeing the nature of the ground and the dispositions of the enemy,

the effort had to be made by stages. We were bound, in fact, to undertake a double subsidiary operation before we could hope to launch these attacks with any real prospect of success.

(1) The right covering force was to seize Table Top, as well as all other enemy positions commanding the foothills between the Chailak Dere and the Sazli Beit Dere ravines. If this enterprise succeeded it would open up the ravines for the assaulting columns, whilst at the same time interposing between the right flank of the left covering force and the enemy holding the Sari Bair main ridge.

(2) The left covering force was to march northwards along the beach to seize a hill called Damakjelik Bair, some 1,400 yards north of Table Top. If successful it would be able to hold out a hand to the Ninth Corps as it landed south of Nibrunesi Point, whilst at the same time protecting the left flank of the left assaulting column against enemy troops from the Anafarta valley during its climb up the Aghyl Dere ravine.

(3) The right assaulting column was to move up the Chailak Dere and Sazli Beit Dere ravines to the storm of the ridge of Chunuk Bair.

(4) The left assaulting column was to work up the Aghyl Dere and prolong the line of the right assaulting column by storming Hill 305 (Koja Chemen Tepe), the summit of the whole range of hills.

To recapitulate, the two assaulting columns, which were to work up three ravines to the storm of the high ridge, were to be preceded by two covering columns. One of these was to capture the enemy's positions commanding the foothills, first to open the mouths of the ravines, secondly to cover the right flank of another covering force whilst it marched along the beach. The other covering column was to strike far out to the north until, from a hill called Damajkelik Bair, it could at the same time facilitate the landing of the Ninth Corps at Nibrunesi Point, and guard the left flank of the column assaulting Sari Bair from any forces of the enemy which might be assembled in the Anafarta valley.

The whole of this big attack was placed under the command of Major-General Sir A. J. Godley, General Officer Commanding New Zealand and Australian Division.

Amongst other stratagems the Anzac troops, assisted by H.M.S. *Colne,* had long and carefully been educating the Turks how they should lose Old No. 3 Post, which could hardly have been rushed by simple force of arms. Every night, exactly at 9 p. m., H.M.S. *Colne* threw the beams of her searchlight onto the redoubt, and opened fire upon it for exactly ten minutes. Then, after a ten-minute interval, came a second illumination and bombardment, commencing always at 9.20 and ending precisely at 9.30 p. m.

The idea was that, after successive nights of such practice, the enemy would get into the habit of taking the searchlight as a hint to clear out until the shelling was at an end. But on the eventful night of the 6th, the sound of their footsteps drowned by the loud cannonade, unseen as they crept along in that darkest shadow which fringes the searchlight's beam—came the right covering column. At 9.30 the light switched off, and instantly our men poured out of the scrub jungle and into the empty redoubt. By 11 p. m. the whole series of surrounding entrenchments were ours.

Once the capture of Old No. 3 Post was fairly under way, the remainder of the right covering column carried on with their attack upon Bauchop's Hill and the Chailak Dere. By 10 p. m. the northernmost point, with its machine gun, was captured, and by 1 o'clock in the morning the whole of Bauchop's Hill, a maze of ridge and ravine, everywhere entrenched, was fairly in our hands.

The attack along the Chailak Dere was not so cleanly carried out—made, indeed, just about as ugly a start as any enemy could wish. Pressing eagerly forward through the night, the little column of stormers found themselves held up by a barbed-wire erection of unexampled height, depth, and solidity, which completely closed the river bed—that is to say, the only practicable entrance to the ravine. The entanglement was flanked by a strongly-held enemy trench running right across the opening of the Chailak Dere. Here that splendid body of men, the Otago Mounted Rifles, lost

some of their bravest and their best, but in the end, when things were beginning to seem desperate, a passage was forced through the stubborn obstacle with most conspicuous and cool courage by Captain Shera and a party of New Zealand Engineers, supported by the Maoris, who showed themselves worthy descendants of the warriors of the Gate Pah. Thus was the mouth of the Chailak Dere opened in time to admit of the unopposed entry of the right assaulting column.

Simultaneously the attack on Table Top had been launched under cover of a heavy bombardment from H.M.S. *Colne*. No general on peace maneuvers would ask troops to attempt so break-neck an enterprise. The flanks of Table Top are so steep that the height gives an impression of a mushroom shape—of the summit bulging out over its stem. But just as faith moves mountains, so valor can carry them. The Turks fought bravely. The angle of Table Top's ascent is recognized in our regulations as "impracticable for infantry." But neither Turks nor angles of ascent were destined to stop Russell or his New Zealanders that night. There are moments during battle when life becomes intensified, when men become supermen, when the impossible becomes simple —and this was one of those moments. The scarped heights were scaled, the plateau was carried by midnight. With this brilliant feat the task of the right covering force was at an end. Its attacks had been made with the bayonet and bomb only; magazines were empty by order; hardly a rifle shot had been fired. Some 150 prisoners were captured, as well as many rifles and much equipment, ammunition and stores. No words can do justice to the achievement of Brigadier-General Russell and his men. There are exploits which must be seen to be realized.

The right assaulting column had entered the two southerly ravines—Sazli Beit Dere and Chailak Dere—by midnight. At 1.30 a. m. began a hotly-contested fight for the trenches on the lower part of Rhododendron Spur, whilst the Chailak Dere column pressed steadily up the valley against the enemy.

The left covering column, under Brigadier-General

Travers, after marching along the beach to No. 3 Outpost, resumed its northerly advance as soon as the attack on Bauchop's Hill had developed. Once the Chailak Dere was cleared the column moved by the mouth of the Aghyl Dere, disregarding the enfilade fire from sections of Bauchop's Hill still uncaptured. The rapid success of this movement was largely due to Lieutenant-Colonel Gillespie, a very fine man, who commanded the advance guard, consisting of his own regiment, the Fourth South Wales Borderers, a corps worthy of such a leader. Every trench encountered was instantly rushed by the Borderers, until, having reached the predetermined spot, the whole column was unhesitatingly launched at Damakjelik Bair. Several Turkish trenches were captured at the bayonet's point, and by 1.30 a. m. the whole of the hill was occupied, thus safeguarding the left rear of the whole of the Anzac attack.

Here was an encouraging sample of what the New Army, under good auspices, could accomplish. Nothing more trying to inexperienced troops can be imagined than a long night march, exposed to flanking fire, through a strange country, winding up at the end with a bayonet charge against a height, formless and still in the starlight, garrisoned by those specters of the imagination, worst enemies of the soldier.

The left assaulting column crossed the Chailak Dere at 12.30 a. m., and entered the Aghyl Dere at the heels of the left covering column. The surprise, on this side, was complete. Two Turkish officers were caught in their pajamas; enemy arms and ammunition were scattered in every direction.

The grand attack was now in full swing, but the country gave new sensations in cliff climbing even to officers and men who had graduated over the goat tracks of Anzac. The darkness of the night, the density of the scrub, hands and knees progress up the spurs, sheer physical fatigue, exhaustion of the spirit caused by repeated hairbreadth escapes from the hail of random bullets—all these combined to take the edge of the energies of our troops. At last, after advancing some distance up the Aghyl Dere, the column split

up into two parts. The Fourth Australian Brigade struggled, fighting hard as they went, up to the north of the northern fork of the Aghyl Dere, making for Hill 305 (Koja Chemen Tepe). The Twenty-ninth Indian Infantry Brigade scrambled up the southern fork of the Aghyl Dere and the spurs north of it to the attack of a portion of the Sari Bair ridge known as Hill Q.

Dawn broke, and the crest line was not yet in our hands, although, considering all things, the left assaulting column had made a marvelous advance. The Fourth Australian Infantry Brigade was on the line of the Asmak Dere (the next ravine north of the Aghyl Dere) and the Twenty-ninth Indian Infantry Brigade held the ridge west of the farm below Chunuk Bair and along the spurs to the northeast. The enemy had been flung back from ridge to ridge; an excellent line for the renewal of the attack had been secured, and (except for the exhaustion of the troops) the auspices were propitious.

Turning to the right assaulting column, one battalion, the Canterbury Infantry Battalion, clambered slowly up the Sazli Beit Dere. The remainder of the force, led by the Otago Battalion, wound their way amongst the pitfalls and forced their passage through the scrub of the Chailak Dere, where fierce opposition forced them ere long to deploy. Here, too, the hopeless country was the main hindrance, and it was not until 5.45 a. m. that the bulk of the column joined the Canterbury Battalion on the lower slopes of Rhododendron Spur. The whole force then moved up the spur, gaining touch with the left assaulting column by means of the Tenth Gurkhas, in face of very heavy fire and frequent bayonet charges. Eventually they entrenched on the top of Rhododendron Spur, a quarter of a mile short of Chunuk Bair—*i.e.,* of victory.

At 7 a. m., the Fifth and Sixth Gurkhas, belonging to the left assaulting column, had approached the main ridge northeast of Chunuk Bair, whilst, on their left, the Fourteenth Sikhs had got into touch with the Fourth Australian Brigade on the southern watershed of the Asmak Dere. The Fourth Australian Brigade now received orders to leave

half a battalion to hold the spur, and, with the rest of its strength, plus the Fourteenth Sikhs, to assault Hill 305 (Koja Chemen Tepe). But by this time the enemy's opposition had hardened, and his reserves were moving up from the direction of Battleship Hill. Artillery support was asked for and given, yet by 9 a. m. the attack of the right assaulting column on Chunuk Bair was checked, and any idea of a further advance on Koja Chemen Tepe had to be, for the moment, suspended. The most that could be done was to hold fast to the Asmak Dere watershed whilst attacking the ridge northeast of Chunuk Bair, an attack to be supported by a fresh assault launched against Chunuk Bair itself.

At 9.30 a. m. the two assaulting columns pressed forward whilst our guns pounded the enemy moving along the Battleship Hill spurs. But in spite of all their efforts their increasing exhaustion, as opposed to the gathering strength of the enemy's fresh troops, began to tell—they had shot their bolt. So all day they clung to what they had captured, and strove to make ready for the night. At 11 a. m. three battalions of the Thirty-ninth Infantry Brigade were sent up from the general reserve to be at hand when needed, and, at the same hour, one more battalion of the reserve was dispatched to the First Australian Division to meet the drain caused by all the desperate Lone Pine fighting.

By the afternoon the position of the two assaulting columns was unchanged. The right covering force were in occupation of Table Top, Old No. 3 Post and Bauchop Hill, which General Russell had been ordered to maintain with two regiments of mounted infantry.

At 4.30 a. m. on August 9th, the Chunuk Bair ridge and Hill Q were heavily shelled. The naval guns, all the guns on the left flank, and as many as possible from the right flank (whence the enemy's advance could be enfiladed) took part in this cannonade, which rose to its climax at 5.15 a. m., when the whole ridge seemed a mass of flame and smoke, whence huge clouds of dust drifted slowly upwards in strange patterns on to the sky. At 5.16 a. m. this tre-

mendous bombardment was to be switched off on to the flanks and reverse slopes of the heights.

General Baldwin's column had assembled in the Chailak Dere, and was moving up towards General Johnston's headquarters. Our plan contemplated the massing of this column immediately behind the trenches held by the New Zealand Infantry Brigade. Thence it was intended to launch the battalions in successive lines, keeping them as much as possible on the high ground. Infinite trouble had been taken to insure that the narrow track should be kept clear, guides also were provided; but in spite of all precautions the darkness, the rough scrub-covered country, its sheer steepness, so delayed the column that they were unable to take full advantage of the configuration of the ground, and, inclining to the left, did not reach the line of the Farm—Chunuk Bair —till 5.15 a. m. In plain English, Baldwin, owing to the darkness and the awful country, lost his way—through no fault of his own. The mischance was due to the fact that time did not admit of the detailed careful reconnoissance of routes which is so essential where operations are to be carried out by night.

And now, under that fine leader, Major C. G. L. Allanson, the Sixth Gurkhas of the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade pressed up the slopes of Sari Bair, crowned the heights of the col between Chunuk Bair and Hill Q, viewed far beneath them the waters of the Hellespont, viewed the Asiatic shores along which motor transport was bringing supplies to the lighters. Not only did this battalion, as well as some of the Sixth South Lancashire Regiment, reach the crest, but they began to attack down the far side of it, firing as they went at the fast-retreating enemy. But the fortune of war was against us. At this supreme moment Baldwin's column was still a long way from our trenches on the crest of Chunuk Bair, whence they should even now have been sweeping out towards Q along the whole ridge of the mountain. And instead of Baldwin's support came suddenly a salvo of heavy shell.

These falling so unexpectedly among the stormers threw them into terrible confusion. The Turkish commander saw

his chance. Instantly his troops were rallied and brought back in a counter-charge, and the South Lancashires and Gurkhas, who had seen the promised land, and had seemed for a moment to have held victory in their grasp, were forced backwards over the crest, and on to the lower slopes whence they had first started.

But where was the main attack—where was Baldwin? When that bold but unlucky commander found he could not possibly reach our trenches on the top of Chunuk Bair in time to take effective part in the fight, he deployed for attack where he stood—*i.e.*, at the farm to the left of the New Zealand Brigade's trenches on Rhododendron Spur. Now his men were coming on in fine style, and, just as the Turks topped the ridge with shouts of elation, two companies of the Sixth East Lancashire Regiment, together with the Tenth Hampshire Regiment, charged up our side of the slope with the bayonet. They had gained the high ground immediately below the commanding knoll on Chunuk Bair, and a few minutes earlier would have joined hands with the Gurkhas and South Lancashires, and, combined with them, would have carried all before them. But the Turks by this time were lining the whole of the high crest in overwhelming numbers.

The New Army troops attacked with a fine audacity, but they were flung back from the height and then pressed still further down the slope, until General Baldwin had to withdraw his command to the vicinity of the Farm, whilst the enemy, much encouraged, turned their attention to the New Zealand troops and the two New Army battalions of No. 1 Column still holding the southwest half of the main knoll of Chunuk Bair. Constant attacks, urged with fanatical persistence, were met here with a sterner resolution, and although, at the end of the day, our troops were greatly exhausted, they still kept their footing on the summit. And if that summit meant much to us, it meant even more to the Turks.

At daybreak on Tuesday, August 10th, the Turks delivered a grand attack from the line Chunuk Bair Hill Q against these two battalions, already weakened in numbers,

though not in spirit, by previous fighting. First our men were shelled by every enemy gun, and then, at 5.30 a. m., were assaulted by a huge column, consisting of no less than a full division plus a regiment of three battalions. The North Lancashire men were simply overwhelmed in their shallow trenches by sheer weight of numbers, whilst the Wilts, who were caught out in the open, were literally almost annihilated. The ponderous masses of the enemy swept over the crest, turned the right flank of our line below, swarmed round the Hampshires and General Baldwin's column, which had to give ground, and were only extricated with great difficulty and very heavy losses.

BY ELLIS ASHMEAD BARTLETT

The great battle, the greatest fought on the Gallipoli Peninsula, closed on the evening of August 10th. Both armies then busily engaged in consolidating their new positions, in taking stock of gains and losses, replenishing their ammunition and munitions, and reorganizing the divisions, brigades, and battalions which of necessity became intermingled in this rugged, mountainous country.

I have visited the ground over which the Anzac corps advanced in its desperate efforts, extending over four consecutive days, to reach the crest of Sari Bair, commanding the ridge overlooking the Dardanelles. The New Zealand infantry, the Gurkhas, and some other battalions almost reached the objective, but were unable, through no fault of their own, to hold their position. A battalion of Gurkhas actually reached the crest of the plateau, but the Turks, taking advantage of the confusion, counter-attacked in great force, and the gallant men from the hills were driven from the crest to the lower spurs beneath.

It was a bitter disappointment to have to relinquish the crest when it almost seemed to be within their grasp after so many months, but there was no alternative. The Anzac corps fought like lions and accomplished a feat of arms in climbing these heights almost without a parallel. All through, however, they were handicapped by the failure of

the corps to make good its positions on the Anafarta hills, further north, and thus check the enemy's shell fire.

When all the details of these complicated arrangements are collected and sifted, they will form one of the most fascinating pages of the history of the whole war. It was a combat of giants in a giant country, and if one point stands out more than another it is the marvelous hardihood, tenacity, and reckless courage shown by the Australians and New Zealanders.

The main force debouched from the Anzac position in Lone Pine—a position situated on a plateau 400 feet high, southeast of the Anzac lines. The Australians rushed forward to the assault with the fury of fanatics, taking little heed of the tremendous shrapnel fire and enfilading rifle fire. On reaching the trenches the great difficulty was to force a way in, for the cover was so strong and heavy it had to be torn away by main force. Groups of men effected entrances at various points and jumped in on top of the Turks, who fought furiously, caught as they were, in a trap. Some surrendered, but the majority chose to die fighting. In every trench and sap and dugout desperate hand-to-hand fighting took place, four lines of trenches being captured in succession, and fresh infantry being poured in as the advancing lines were thinned by losses.

In this fighting bombs played the most important rôle, and it was only by keeping up and increasing the supply that the Australians were able to hold the position after it had been won. The Turks massed their force, and for three nights and days made desperate counter-attacks, frequently retaking sections of the line, only to be driven out again. In this extraordinary struggle, which took place almost under ground, both sides fought with utter disregard of life. The wounded and dead choked the trenches almost to the top, but the survivors carried on the fight over heaps of bodies. In spite of immense reënforcements, with most determined courage the Australians held the ground thus won, and finally the Turks wearied of the struggle.

The trenches were now merely battered shambles, and the task of removing the dead and wounded took days to

accomplish. The bodies of 1,000 Turks and Colonials were removed from the trenches alone, while hundreds of others lie outside. The total Turkish losses in this section alone are estimated at 5,000, chiefly incurred in furious counter-attacks, among which each bomb burst with fearful effect.

The capture of Lone Pine is the most desperate hand-to-hand fight that has taken place on the peninsula, but this was but a diversion and preliminary to the main movement northward, which began the same evening under cover of darkness. No finer feat has been accomplished in the course of the war than the manner in which the troops destined for the main movement against Sari Bair Ridge were deployed for the attack. Millions of rounds of ammunition and thousands of shells were successfully concentrated at advanced posts without the enemy becoming aware of the movement. Neither did he know of the strong reënforcements which had reached the Australian corps. All this required the utmost skill, and was successfully kept a profound secret.

It was at 9 p. m., August 6th, when the force crept forward from the outposts. For nights past the navy had thrown searchlights on this and other lower positions and had bombarded them at frequent intervals. This procedure was not departed from on the 6th, and the Turks had no suspicion of the coming attack. When the lights were switched on to another position the Australians dashed forward and speedily captured the positions in succession, and throughout the night Bauchop's Hill and Big and Little Table Tops were occupied.

By the morning of the 7th our whole force was holding the front and slowly moving toward the main Sari Bair position in face of great difficulties, harassed by the enemy's snipers and checked by the difficulties of the ground and the scarcity of water. It was decided to postpone a further advance until nightfall. The forces were reorganized into three columns.

For the final assault on Chunuk Bair, which was timed to begin at dawn on August 9th, large reserves from another division were thrown into the firing line to assist the New

Zealand and Indian infantry, and the men, as far as possible, rested through the day and the early part of the night. The advance on the morning of the 9th was preceded by a heavy bombardment of Chunuk Bair and Q Hill by the naval and land guns. The advance of No. 3 column was delayed by the broken nature of the ground and the enemy's resistance.

Meanwhile the Gurkhas charged gallantly up the slope of Sari Bair, and actually succeeded in reaching the heights on the neck between Chunuk Bair and Q Hill. It was from here that they looked down on the Dardanelles, but were unfortunately unable to hold the position in face of violent counter-attacks and heavy shell fire.

During this time the Turks counter-attacked the left column in great strength, and the column was compelled to withdraw to the lower slopes of Sari Bair.

Meantime throughout the day and night the New Zealanders succeeded in maintaining their hold on Chunuk Bair, although the men were thoroughly exhausted. During the night of the 9th the exhausted New Zealanders were relieved by two other regiments. At dawn the Tenth Regiment of the Turks, which had been strongly reënforced, made a desperate assault on our lines from Q Hill and Chunuk Bair. To the strength of a division, in successive lines, they hurled themselves, quite regardless of their lives, on the two regiments which, after desperate resistance, were driven from their position by artillery fire and sheer weight of numbers further down the slopes of Chunuk Bair.

Following up their success, the Turks charged right over the crest and endeavored to gain the great gully south of Rhododendron Ridge, evidently with the intention of forcing their way between our lines and the Anzac position. But they had reckoned without our artillery and ships' guns. This great charge of four successive lines of infantry in close formation was plainly visible to our warships and all our batteries on land. In this section the Turks were caught in a trap. The momentum of their charge down hill prevented them from recoiling in time, and they were swept

away by hundreds in a terrific storm of high explosive shrapnel, and common shells from the ships' guns and our howitzers and field pieces.

As the shells from the ships exploded, huge chunks of soil were thrown into the air, amid which you saw human bodies hurled aloft and then chucked to earth or thrown bodily into deep ravines. But even this concentrated artillery fire might not have checked the Turkish advance, unless it had been assisted by the concentrated fire of ten machine guns at short range. For half an hour they maintained a rapid fire until the guns smoked with heat.

During the whole of this time the Turks were pouring across the front in dense columns, attempting to attack our men. Hardly a Turk got back to the hill. Their lines got mixed up in a wedge as those in front tried to retire while others pressed them from the rear. Some fled back over the crest, seeking to regain their trenches; others dashed downward to the ravines. In a few minutes the entire division had been broken up and the survivors scattered everywhere.

If they succeeded in driving us from the crest of Chunuk Bair, the Turks paid a terrible price for their success. Thus closed, amid these bloodstained hills, the most ferocious and sustained "soldiers' battle" since Inkerman.

BY AN OFFICER OF THE GERMAN STAFF

This Narrative Received the Direct Approval of the German General in Command, Marshal Liman von Sanders

Toward 4 p. m. on August 6th artillery preparation was begun against our positions, with a stupendous expenditure of ammunition. Days before, the enemy, after fair fighting, had set up great tents at this point, marking them each with the sign of the Red Cross; and for this reason they had not been fired upon. As a matter of fact, however, these tents were not intended to serve as shelters for the wounded. Under cover of night, the English set up heavy howitzers at this point,—only thus was it possible for them to undertake

a surprise attack here.[1] After drumfire of an hour and a half, 4,000 Britons attacked the strongly entrenched positions of the defenders. The situation grew critical. Indeed, the enemy's plan of compelling the Turks to call up reserves and thus to divert troops succeeded. Essad Pasha could do nothing but call up reënforcements from all quarters. Marshal von Sanders offered the services of Kannengiesser's division, which in the interval had arrived from the southern front. But it was soon evident that their active participation was unnecessary, although for the time being the troops were held at this point against possible eventualities.

By means of sham maneuvers at various points of attack, though "sham" is scarcely the word, since extraordinarily bloody battles developed both at the south group and at Kanly Sirt, the British general, Hamilton, believed that he had sufficiently committed his opponent; and so, on the evening of August 6th, he inaugurated his grandiose plan, which was to lay open the Dardanelles for the Allies from Kodja Djemendagh on, and at the same time to cut off the rearward communications of the Turkish army. Had this operation been successful, the way to Constantinople would have been open; hard-pressed Russia could have received the longed-for help by way of the Black Sea; the Turkish army on Gallipoli would have been put in an extremely dangerous situation, and the name of Sir Ian Hamilton would have been inscribed on the roster of the great strategists of the world.

Any one who observed the ensuing conflicts will unhesitatingly give the highest praise to the death-defying courage of the troops who landed on Suvla Bay. The "Anzacs," as the English newspapers called the Australia-New Zealand Army

[1] This is typical of the way in which German writers made such charges, loosely, casually, and without offering any evidence, or apparently making any investigation. Their method is not that of honest men disgusted at an opponent's act of almost unbelievable treachery, and determined to prove this evil deed despite the amazed doubt of their hearers. It is the shallow method of those who seek only to increase the anger of an audience already so prejudiced that they will believe anything on the strength of a loose assertion. The high repute of the Anzac fighters makes the accusation as unbelievable in matter as it is slovenly of manner.

Corps, fought like lions. If the brilliantly planned operation failed, it was because Sir Ian Hamilton met in the commander of the Fifth Turkish Army [2] a master who in a few moves answered "check" with "checkmate."

The night of the 6th of August settled down pitch black. All day the rain had fallen unceasingly. Not a ray from the moon, not a sparkle from the stars, could penetrate the thick canopy of clouds. It was so dark that a man could scarcely see his hand before his face. The great transports entered Suvla Bay with all lights out. Not even their outlines were visible. Phosphorescence gleamed in the foam of the waves breaking on the beach. But beyond stretched the eerie blankness of the night. Everything that happened out there was as if behind a veil. Without a word, without a sound, the troops entered the lighters brought for the purpose. On the northern and southern promontories and opposite Tuslagöl Australians and New Zealanders landed with noiseless footsteps.

The Turkish outposts before the main positions on the rim of the heights which on the west overlook the lowland of Tuslagöl drew back in the face of overwhelming numbers, and immediately a field telephone informed the army high command of the landing of strong forces. Liman Pasha without delay sent an alarm to the two divisions stationed in the northeastern part of the peninsula for the protection of the Gulf of Saros, and started them for Anaforta by forced marches. At the same time the division of Djemil Bey, part of the right wing of the southern troops, was started toward Kodja Djemendagh. The enemy on Suvla Bay at once made bridgeheads of Softa and Laletepe to assure the safety of further landings.

Another part of the Anzac corps landed south of Suvla Bay at the mouth of the Asmakdere. At the same time the Thirteenth Kitchener Division and a mixed division made up of New Zealanders and Australians, which had made use of the landing place at Ari Burun, marched northward, hugging the coast. Then turning eastward, they followed

[2] Marshal Liman von Sanders.

the dry river beds of the Saslidere and the Agylldere and a ravine running parallel to and between the two valleys toward Kodja Djemendagh. On the morning of the 7th two new divisions which had landed on Suvla Bay in the night marched to the south to join those which had landed at the Asmakdere.

During the night of the 7th-8th Colonel Kannengiesser received orders to march against the right wing of the northern group. As the dawn began to break, he reached with two regiments Djonk Bahir, a southeasterly spur of Kodja Djemendagh, just as the enemy, after climbing to these heights from the sea under cover of darkness, was making preparations to dig in there. The order to attack was quickly given. Some rapid fire salvos were discharged at the Anzacs, busy at the work of entrenching; then the colonel himself led his troops in an assault on the surprised foe.

The Anzacs were about to abandon the heights in wild flight when the colonel, pressing forward far in advance of his men, was struck in the breast by a rifle bullet and fell unconscious. At the sight the ranks of the attackers wavered. Their dearly loved German leader might have led them to certain victory, but now they hesitated, and though they had already won much ground, were inclined to retire slowly, when Djemil Bey appeared with the Fourth Division. He took in the situation at once, assumed command of the troops and infused in them the spirit to carry forward their invincible attack. Everywhere the British were thrown from the heights. Not till halfway down the slope could they make a stand, and under the protection of their ships' guns dig in.

On the same morning a regiment of the enemy moved from the landing place at Softatepe, the northern promontory of Suvla Bay, toward Kiretschtepe and attacked a battalion of Gallipoli gendarmerie. These were oldish men—the beards of some were white—recruited entirely from the peninsula. But they were defending their homes, and the greater strength of the enemy was unable to drive the gallant fellows from their carefully prepared positions. Another body of the enemy had proceeded through Tuslagöl, now almost completely dried up, and from Laletepe against

Mestamtepe. At this point the attackers succeeded in holding their positions.

During the night of the 7th-8th still other troops in considerable numbers disembarked on Suvla Bay. The lack of heavy artillery and the shortage of ammunition were now seriously felt by the Turks. Had conditions in this respect been different, the enemy's transport and battle fleet, which was now calmly anchored between the two tongues of land forming the bay, protected against U-boat attack by a steel net stretched between the two headlands, could not have stayed there, and the landing of troops would have been very much more difficult.

Gradually, on the morning of the 8th, the pale gray of the ships' hulls was detached from the fog wreaths which still veiled the sea. Lightning flashed from the muzzles of cannon. The roar came up like thunder from the sea. Endless seconds passed. Then, from the slopes of Kodja Djemendagh, there was the noise of the Anzac guns that had been landed there; a shorter sound wave struck the ear. And now broke loose a storm of iron and lead. The entire fleet off shore directed its fire against the summit of Kodja Djemendagh, which soon looked precisely like an active volcano. The whole mountain cone was enveloped in a cloud of many-colored smoke and dust. A terrible and yet a fascinating sight! Still nothing stirred in the Turkish lines.

Just as the hellish concert reached its climax, the Turkish howitzers, which during the night, through prodigious exertions, had been placed on the heights north and south of Anafarta, joined in. Only a single shot fell here and there. On our side the costly ammunition had to be most carefully husbanded. Very cleverly the enemy had set up on the landing places field hospitals, from which fluttered, in plain view from a great distance, the sign of the Red Cross. This, according to army orders, must be rigorously respected.

The Marshal mounted his horse. His presence was needed. Up on Kodja Djemendagh two divisions were stationed under the command of Djemil Bey. He had placed his men so skillfully in the numerous fissures, ravines, and declivities of the mountain that they were enduring fairly

well the terrific fire from the ships' guns. Signals flashed among the fleet, and suddenly, at one stroke, every cannon stopped firing. This was the moment Djemil Bey was waiting for. Quickly he hurried to the observer's stand of the mountain artillery, which high above on Jonkbahir was stationed in the front line. His surmise was right. There they came, the Anzacs, ascending the heights in broad storming columns. In good order so far as the difficulty of the ground permitted. Even the new Kitchener troops had learned much during their short period of training.

The artillery commander, trembling with excitement and eagerness for the fray, looked questioningly but vainly at Djemil Bey, whose orders had so far condemned him to inactivity. Further waiting was exacted by that man of iron nerves. Now the attackers, climbing laboriously, were crowding closely together in the ravines and gullies, two thousand meters away; they drew nearer—to fifteen hundred meters, to a thousand. White stones visible only to the defenders, the other side being painted dark, marked for the Turks the exact distances from their lines. At this moment the mountain artillery started its salvos; the machine guns began to crackle and snap; from the lines of riflemen a hail of bullets sped forth against the Anzacs. It was a scene of Death, of raging, frightful Death, mowing down all. Not a man of those that peopled the slope survived.

New troops stormed forward in dense masses—a broad front was impossible over the broken terrain of the ascent—led by athletic young officers overflowing with enthusiasm. Many of them perhaps had but recently left the benches of the colleges of Cambridge, Oxford, London, or Edinburgh. The foremost ranks faltered before the heaped-up bodies of fallen comrades. Too late! Struck by the ceaseless hail of iron, hundreds rolled upon the ground. Those who followed, as soon as they came within range of the Turkish artillery and machine guns, suffered the same fate. Fearful confusion resulted. The instinct for self-preservation gained the upper hand. First single individuals, then small groups, and finally great masses of the survivors, turned back. It was the signal for the Turkish lines everywhere to advance.

With bayonet and rifle stock the Ottoman horde stormed down the slope. The Anzacs suffered terrible losses. Only a few remained alive. Hundreds of unwounded prisoners fell into the hands of the Turks.

That night Liman Pasha assigned Mustafa Kemal, who had in many ways distinguished himself in the recent battles, to the command of the troops in the Anafarta sector. The general Turkish attack began on the morning of August 9th, and halted any new Anzac attempt to advance.

The enemy realized this only too soon, and changed his tactics. His next move was to attack on the line Kiretschtepe-Asmakdere. The only high ground he was able to hold here was the hill of Mestantepe, and that was hotly contested. From the greater height of Ismailtepe Colonel Salahheddin threw a division against Mestantepe in a wild forward rush. The Turks were prevented from taking the whole hill by the numerous machine guns which had been set up there and by the guns of the fleet, but they pressed the enemy back a considerable distance. The division pushed forward south of Asmakdere and pressed the enemy back close to the coast; the same thing occurred north of Mestantepe. By noon of the 9th the English everywhere except on Mestantepe had been crowded back to the coast.

The center of the fighting in the days that followed was at Kiretschtepe. At that point the battalion of Gallipoli gendarmerie, led by the brave Captain Kadri Bey, was holding back constantly increasing superior forces. The reënforcements ordered up by Liman Pasha from the Asiatic side arrived on the evening of the 9th. On the morning of the 10th Mustafa Kemal placed himself at the head of fresh troops and once more attacked the Anzacs west of Kodja Djemendagh. A bullet went through his coat and penetrated his watch, in which it became imbedded. When shortly afterwards Liman Pasha arrived on the scene, Kemal Bey handed him the watch for a souvenir. The Marshal accepted the gift and responded by presenting to the Bey his own valuable watch. All through that day the English brought up reenforcements. But to no avail! They had been decisively beaten back; and no later effort changed the situation.

THE SECRET ATTACK UPON AMERICA

DISCLOSURE OF THE CRIMINAL METHODS EMPLOYED TO WEAKEN AND TERRORIZE NEUTRALS

SEPTEMBER 9TH

SECRETARY LANSING — AMBASSADOR DUMBA
PROFESSOR E. E. SPERRY — COUNT BERNSTORFF

This volume has already been called on to describe the growing antagonism against Germany roused in America by the unjustified German protests and the submarine attacks. For a long time Germany was doing worse deeds than these. She was, under the mask of diplomatic friendship, conducting a secret war upon the United States. Her agents seem without exception to have adopted that crafty doctrine that all falsity was righteous in Germany's cause. Even her highest representatives there broke their pledged honor, and hired agents as tricky as themselves to perpetrate every form of crime, not hesitating even at wholesale murder. The aim of this carnival of evil was threefold. First, it sought to prevent trade between the United States and the Allies. Second, it sought to give the United States authorities so much trouble at home, whether with strikers, with disasters, with Mexico or with Japan, that they would have no heart for a vigorous opposition to Germany abroad. Third, it sought to manufacture a public sentiment favorable to German designs. It sought friends not through noble actions but through bribery, threat or deception.

This secret warfare came first into the open on September 9, 1915, when the Austrian Ambassador, Dr. Constantin Theodor Dumba, was caught in a particularly flagrant misuse of his official privileges. The U. S. Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, sent the following note, formally demanding the Ambassador's recall. The Ambassador's official defense is also given. The Archibald there mentioned was afterward proved to be a paid employee of the German Embassy, hired as a propaganda writer. He used his American citizenship and his American passport rights to enable him to act as a secret service agent of the Teuton Governments. Dr. Dumba devotes himself to explaining that the letters secretly intrusted to Archibald were harmless—which of course does not touch upon the fact that he was wrong to carry any letters whatever. Whether Dumba's proposals were really as harmless as he says can best be gathered from Professor Sperry's article, which follows.

As the official publicist for the U. S. Government, Dr. Sperry briefly reviews the entire field of unlawful Teutonic actions in America, so far as these were known when the United States entered the War. The American Secret Service proved really far more efficient than that of the Germans. Their agents were checkmated at almost every point, by using only the ordinary processes of civil law to convict them of their crimes. Dr. Dumba could not be thus convicted because of his

diplomatic immunity. As for the German Ambassador, Count Johann von Bernstorff, he has published his "Memoirs." In them he makes the defense and explanation here given, a defense which is practically a confession, as he only shifts responsibility to his military aide, Captain von Papen.

C. F. H.

BY SECRETARY LANSING

His Official Note to the Austrian Government, September 9, 1915

MR. CONSTANTIN DUMBA, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Washington, has admitted that he proposed to his Government plans to instigate strikes in American manufacturing plants engaged in the production of munitions of war. The information reached this Government through a copy of a letter of the Ambassador to his Government. The bearer was an American citizen named Archibald, who was traveling under an American passport. The Ambassador has admitted that he employed Archibald to bear official dispatches from him to his Government.

By reason of the admitted purpose and intent of Mr. Dumba to conspire to cripple legitimate industries of the people of the United States and to interrupt their legitimate trade and by reason of the flagrant violation of diplomatic propriety in employing an American citizen protected by an American passport as a secret bearer of official dispatches through the lines of the enemy of Austria-Hungary, the President directs me to inform your Excellency that Mr. Dumba is no longer acceptable to the Government of the United States as the Ambassador of his Imperial Majesty at Washington.

Believing that the Imperial and Royal Government will realize that the Government of the United States has no alternative but to request the recall of Mr. Dumba on account of his improper conduct, the Government of the United States expresses its deep regret that this course has become necessary and assures the Imperial and Royal Government that it sincerely desires to continue the cordial and friendly relations which exist between the United States and Austria-Hungary.

BY AMBASSADOR DUMBA

His Official Statement

There was nothing in the dispatches which Archibald carried that cannot be satisfactorily explained. The proposals regarding embarrassing steel works were nothing more than a very open and perfectly proper method to be taken to bring before men of our races employed in the big steel works the fact that they were engaged in enterprises unfriendly to their fatherland, and that the Imperial Government would hold the workers in munition plants where contracts are being filled for the Allies as being guilty of a serious crime against their country, something that would be punishable by penal servitude should they return to their own country.

There are thousands of workingmen in the big steel industries, natives of Bohemia, Moravia, Carniola, Galicia, Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia, and other peoples of the races from Austria-Hungary, who are uneducated and who do not understand that they are engaged in a work against their own country. In order to bring this before them I have subsidized many newspapers published in the languages and dialects of the divisions mentioned, attempting in this way to bring the felonious occupation to their attention. But this has been difficult. In some of the great steel plants of Pennsylvania these uneducated men of my country are nothing more or less than slaves. They are even being worked twelve hours a day, and herded in stockades. It is difficult to get at these workers except en masse, and a peaceful walkout of these workingmen would be of the greatest advantage to my Government, as well as an indemnity to themselves.

It is my duty as the representative of Austria-Hungary to make known these facts to the Imperial Government, and in so doing I am performing a service for which I was sent to this country. The dispatches or letters carried by Archibald contained nothing more than a proposal that we attempt to call out the workmen of our own country from these steel and munition works and provide for them other em-

ployment. To do so money would be necessary and a labor employment bureau would have to be organized. This is one of the things I shall bring before the Secretary of Labor in Washington this week. This seems to me to be a legitimate and entirely satisfactory means of preventing the making and shipping of war materials to our enemies.

My letter which Mr. Archibald carried does not contradict anything that Count von Bernstorff has said, for his people and the great bulk of those who make up our Austro-Hungarian races are entirely different types. The greater part of German workmen of all ranks are educated. They read and discuss matters and can be easily reached. Not so with the many races and the great ignorant mass of our peoples. Promises of better wages and easier employment must be made and their position in aiding the enemy must be brought home to them. Where there are a hundred German-born men working in the factories there are thousands of Austrians. Remedies for reaching these races must differ, and there is no conspiracy in an open attempt to call out the Austrian citizens at Bethlehem or elsewhere. Such a proposal as this was the letter of which it is said a photographic copy was made and its contents cabled to the State Department at Washington.

BY PROF. E. E. SPERRY [1]

The President of the United States, in his address to Congress asking for a declaration of war, said of the German Government: "One of the things that has served to convince us that the Prussian autocracy was not and could never be our friend is that from the very outset of the present war it has filled our unsuspecting communities, and even our offices of Government, with spies and set criminal intrigues everywhere afoot against our national unity of counsel, our peace within and without, our industries and our commerce. Indeed, it is now evident that its spies were here even before the war began; and it is unhappily not a matter of conjecture, but a fact proved in our courts of

[1] Condensed from the U. S. Government's official publication.

justice, that the intrigues which have more than once come perilously near to disturbing the peace and dislocating the industries of the country have been carried on at the instigation, with the support, and even under the personal direction of official agents of the Imperial Government accredited to the Government of the United States."

The information on which the President based his statements was drawn from a varied and miscellaneous body of documentary material. This includes first of all a great number of such papers and records as are produced in the usual course of business transactions. Among them are telegrams from the German Government to its diplomatic representatives in the United States; letters and telegrams exchanged by them with their hired agents here; records of financial dealings, as checks, receipts, bank books, deposit slips, orders to banks that money be paid and acknowledgments thereof; reports of subordinates to superiors; hotel registers and lists of telephone calls.

Another rich mine of information concerning the machinations of Germany in the United States has resulted from the legal prosecution of certain of her agents here for criminal acts. This evidence includes confessions by accused persons and their confederates to United States officials, examinations before Government officials, and testimony offered in the courts of law.

From the evidence contained in such sources of information as these there can be no appeal. It is conclusive and unimpeachable. And it is the only kind of evidence on which are based the statements in this pamphlet.

The commander-in-chief of Germany's agents here was Count Johann von Bernstorff, Imperial German Ambassador to the United States. His coadjutor and able adviser during some months was Constantin Theodor Dumba, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador. His chief lieutenants in the execution of his plans were Captain Franz von Papen, military attaché of the German Embassy, Captain Karl Boy-Ed, its naval attaché, Dr. Heinrich F. Albert, commercial attaché, and Wolf von Igel, who also had diplomatic status. Assisting this central group were many of the consuls of

Germany and Austria-Hungary scattered over the United States, and beneath them were the rank and file of obscure servitors who carried out the plans conceived by the General Staff in Berlin and sent to the German Ambassador.

Franz von Rintelen, although a leader in similar enterprises, was not a member of this band nor responsible to Ambassador von Bernstorff. He had a separate supply of funds and operated as a free lance.

Interference with Industry [2]

One chief purpose of the German and Austrian Ambassadors was to prevent the export from the United States of military supplies. Since Germany's shipping had been driven from the seas early in the war, her overwhelming superiority in accumulated munitions and in power to manufacture was certain to be lost as the passing months brought to the Entente states an increasing volume of American products.

To strike at the very source of these supplies, the American factory, was obviously an effective means to prevent their export, and in a letter to Baron Burian, Foreign Minister of Austria-Hungary, Ambassador Dumba writes concerning this design: "Besides, a private German employ-

[2] The French papers have published certain secret circulars from the German General Headquarters, among which the following (translated from the French text) occurs:

"CIRCULAR OF NOVEMBER 2, 1914

"General Headquarters to the military representative on the Russian and French fronts, as well as in Italy and Norway:

"In all branch establishments of German banking houses in Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, China, and the United States, special military accounts have been opened for special war necessities. Main headquarters authorizes you to use these credits to an unlimited extent for the purpose of destroying factories, workshops, camps, and the most important centers of military and civil supply belonging to the enemy. In addition to the incitement of labor troubles, measures must be taken for the damaging of engines and machinery plants, the destruction of vessels carrying war material to enemy countries, the burning of stocks of raw materials and finished goods, and the depriving of large industrial centers of electric power, fuel, and food. Special agents, who will be placed at your disposal, will supply you with the necessary means for effecting explosions and fires, as well as with a list of people in the country under your supervision who are willing to undertake the task of destruction.

"(Signed) DR. E. FISCHER."

ment office has been established which provides employment for persons who have voluntarily given up their places, and it is already working well. We shall also join in and the widest support is assured us."

This German employment bureau had a central office in New York City and branches in Bridgeport, Philadelphia, Pittsburg, Cleveland, Chicago, and Cincinnati. It was established early in August, 1915, by the attachés and responsible agents of the German and Austrian Embassies. The pretended purpose of the Bureau was to provide employment for German and Austrian subjects who had voluntarily left positions in factories supplying the Allies.

That coercion and intimidation were regularly used by the Bureau to drive employees from munition factories has been proved by an examination of over 5,000 letters and other papers in its files. The Austrian Government reenforced these efforts by circulating in this country, through the foreign language press, a proclamation which threatened with a penalty of ten to twenty years' imprisonment, all subjects who after working in such plants returned to their native land. Captain von Papen also sent out a circular letter of similar import.

Success rewarded these energetic efforts to harass American manufacturers. The Bureau manager's monthly report, made to the German Embassy for February, 1916, contains the following statements:

"Since the Bureau began its work in August, 1915, through February, 1916, 2,828 Germans and 1,638 subjects of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy have been provided for. The total number of applicants is now 8,000. Of these 60 per cent. came from factories producing munition and war material, and 40 per cent. would have been employed in such plants if the agency had not provided for them."

"Engineers and persons in the better class of positions were persuaded by the propaganda of the Bureau to leave war material factories."

"The commercial employment bureaus of the country have no supply of unemployed technicians. Many disturbances and suspensions which war material factories have

had to suffer, and which it was not always possible to remove quickly, but which on the contrary often lead to long strikes, may be attributed to the energetic propaganda of the employment bureau."

Causing Strikes

The strike was a weapon which both the German and Austrian Ambassadors intended to use with destructive effect on American industry. Ambassador Dumba, in a letter to his Foreign Office, thus expressed their fundamental purpose: "It is my impression that we can disorganize and hold up for months, if not entirely prevent, the manufacture of munitions in Bethlehem and the Middle West, which in the opinion of the German Military Attaché, is of importance and amply outweighs the comparatively small expenditure of money involved."

The most comprehensive and successful effort to provoke strikes was made by Labor's National Peace Council, an organization financed by Franz von Rintelen, who came to the United States early in April, 1915.

The alleged purpose of the Council was to express the pacific sentiments of the workers and to prevent the United States from entering the war. At its first meeting, on June 22, 1915, it adopted among others the following resolution: *"Resolved,* By the representatives of labor in Peace Congress assembled in the City of Washington, that an organization be and is hereby established, to be known as Labor's National Peace Council, having for its purpose the establishment and maintenance of peace universal by all honorable means."

A serious attempt was made to paralyze America's foreign commerce by a strike of stevedores. One of Rintelen's men had an interview with the President of the International Longshoremen's Union, and other officials were approached. Rintelen agreed to pay the strikers ten dollars a week while idle, and asserted that he could command the $1,035,000 necessary for this purpose. He spent $10,000 on this project, but the strike did not occur.

The total of his known expenditures was $468,000, and

between the United States and Mexico is the following telegram sent by the German Foreign Office to Count von Bernstorff for transmission to the German Ambassador in Mexico, Heinrich von Eckhardt:

"BERLIN, January 19, 1917.

"On the first of February we intend to begin submarine warfare unrestricted. In spite of this, it is our intention to endeavor to keep neutral the United States of America. If this attempt is not successful, we propose an alliance on the following basis with Mexico: That we shall make war together and together make peace. We shall give general financial support, and it is understood that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona. The details are left to you for settlement. You are instructed to inform the President of Mexico of the above in the greatest confidence as soon as it is certain that there will be an outbreak of war with the United States, and suggest that the President of Mexico, on his own initiative, should communicate with Japan suggesting adherence at once to this plan; at the same time, offer to mediate between Germany and Japan.

"Please call to the attention of the President of Mexico that the employment of ruthless submarine warfare now promises to compel England to make peace in a few months.

"ZIMMERMANN."

Destruction of Ships and Their Cargoes

If strikes should fail to close American munition plants, if money were lacking to buy up all their products, and if the Government refused an embargo, Germany's agents had yet another resource—to destroy war materials and other supplies for the Entente States while in course of shipment by sea. One project of this kind was carried out under the direction of Captain von Papen and Wolf von Igel. It consisted in placing in the holds of steamers incendiary bombs which, at a fixed time, would explode and ignite the surrounding cargo. The bomb shells were manufactured from designs by Dr. Walter T. Scheele, a German chemist of Hoboken, on the *Friedrich der Grosse* of the North German

Lloyd line, and were then taken to Dr. Scheele's laboratory and filled with combustibles.

When the conspirators were tried, one of the witnesses called was a detective who belonged to the New York bomb squad and had worked on the case. Under the pretense that he was a German secret service man employed by Wolf von Igel, he had succeeded in making an appointment with Captain von Kleist, superintendent of Scheele's factory, and thus recounted the conversation with him:

"We sat down and we spoke for about three hours. I asked him the different things that he did, and said if he wanted an interview with Mr. von Igel, my boss, he would have to tell everything. So he told me that von Papen gave Dr. Scheele, the partner of von Kleist in this factory, a check for $10,000 to start this bomb factory. He told me that he, Mr. von Kleist, and Dr. Scheele and a man by the name of Becker on the *Friedrich der Grosse,* were making the bombs, and that Captain Wolpert, Captain Bode, and Captain Steinberg, had charge of putting these bombs on the ships; they put these bombs in cases and shipped them as merchandise on these steamers, and they would go away on the trip and the bombs would go off after the ship was out four or five days, causing a fire and causing the cargo to go up in flames. He also told me that they have made quite a number of these bombs; that thirty of them were given to a party by the name of O'Leary, and that he took them down to New Orleans, where he had charge of putting them on ships down there, this fellow O'Leary."

Between 300 and 400 bombs were manufactured, and fires were started by them on thirty-three ships sailing from New York alone.

Four of the bombs were found at Marseilles on a vessel which sailed from Brooklyn in May, 1915. The evidence collected in the case led to the indictment of the following men for feloniously transporting on the steamship *Kirk Oswald* a bomb or bombs filled with chemicals designed to cause incendiary fires: Rintelen, Wolpert, Bode, Schmidt, Becker, Garbade, Praedel, Paradies, von Kleist, Schimmel, Scheele, Steinberg, and others. The last three named fled

from justice, Scheele being supplied with $1,000 for that purpose by Wolf von Igel. He eluded the Federal authorities until April, 1918, when he was found hiding in Cuba under the protection of German secret service agents. All the others except Schmidt were found guilty and sentenced, on February 5, 1918, to imprisonment for eighteen months and payment of a fine of $2,000 each. It was proved during the trial that Rintelen had hired Schimmel, a German lawyer, to see that bombs were placed on ships.

A similar scheme was conceived by Albert Kaltschmidt, of Detroit, who hoped, however, not only to disable ships but to destroy them entirely. He hired Charles Respa, Richard Hermann, and a man known as "Frenchy," for $150 each, to undertake this work. Provided with an ample supply of dynamite, painted to resemble coal, they went to New York City and tried by the use of a launch to approach coal barges and place the dynamite in the fuel intended for ocean-going steamers. Guards were so vigilant, however, that nothing could be accomplished.

Germany's official representatives on the Pacific coast were engaged in similar enterprises. The leader was Franz Bopp, German Consul-General at San Francisco. His chief assistants were Baron Eckhardt von Schack, the vice-consul, Lieutenant Wilhelm von Brincken of the consulate, and Charles C. Crowley, a detective employed by Bopp as secret investigator. Lewis J. Smith, a confederate, describes a part of their operations in a statement made to Federal officials.

Johannes H. van Koolbergen, born in Holland and naturalized in Canada, made a statement before British officials at San Francisco, concerning his relations with Consul-General Bopp. After describing a pretended attempt to blow up a tunnel on the Canadian-Pacific Railroad, van Koolbergen says that he was again summoned to meet von Brincken and that the following conversation occurred: "I went up to the Palace Hotel in San Francisco. Von Brincken took me to his room and explained to me how an instrument could be made for the purpose of causing an explosion at the time set, and asked me if I was capable and willing to

make such an instrument, and asked me how much I would want for it. He explained to me that a club or association of fifteen Germans who all worked as longshoremen on the docks of San Francisco would have access to outgoing boats and could place one or more of these infernal machines on board boats of German enemies.

"The whole had to be small enough to go into a thermos bottle. The object of it being that a man at the harbor could carry a thermos bottle with him without being suspected of having anything injurious or dangerous with him."

Van Koolbergen then describes the making of a dummy bomb, and proceeds thus: "I then went to see von Brincken in his room and showed him my work and he exclaimed that it was *'famos.'* Mr. Bopp [who saw it at the consulate] said that Mr. von Brincken was very satisfied with this machine and ordered the thermos bottle put in the safe, where I saw it yesterday, August 26, 1915."

The statements of Smith and van Koolbergen, combined with a mass of other evidence consisting in part of letters and telegrams, caused the Grand Jury to indict Consul-General Bopp, his staff and his hired agents, for conspiracy to undertake a military enterprise against Canada. Among the purposes of this enterprise specified in the indictment was the following: "To blow up and destroy with their cargoes and crews any and all vessels belonging to Great Britain, France, Japan or Russia found within the limits of Canada, which were laden with horses, munitions of war, or articles of commerce in course of transportation to the above countries."

As the first ships marked for destruction sailed from Tacoma, Smith rented a house there with half cleared land attached, in order that he might have dynamite in his possession with the pretended purpose of blowing up stumps. Crowley followed him to Tacoma within a day or two, and Smith's narrative of the events there is here given in condensed form:

"When the *Talthybius* [a British freighter] was ready to sail Smith says that he prepared the bomb made of 40 sticks of dynamite, put the sticks in the suitcase. He did

not put dynamite either on the cars or on the boat, but told Crowley that he did.

"At a later date, May 28th [1915], Crowley came and wanted another bomb prepared.

"The *Shinsei Maru* was the ship which they looked for that Friday night, Crowley telling Smith that the bomb must be gotten off on the first string of cars off the wharf. He says that Crowley left him and that after a time he threw the dynamite away; that he went to Crowley's hotel and deceived him in the belief that he had put a bomb on board the ship that night.

"About the 29th of May, Saturday, Smith says they tried to get a bomb into the cotton that the *Hazel Dollar* was loading and that he told Crowley that he had put the bomb in. Smith says he threw the dynamite away in a cesspool." [3]

Attacks on Canada

The next chief purpose of the German Ambassador and his lieutenants in America was to prevent Canada from giving military aid to England. That this enterprise was carried on at the command of the German General Staff is indicated by the following telegrams sent in January, 1916, to Count von Bernstorff:

"January 3rd. (Secret.) General Staff desires energetic action in regard to proposed destruction of Canadian Pacific Railway at several points with a view to complete and protracted interruption of traffic. Captain Boehm, who is known on your side and shortly returning, has been given instructions. Inform the Military Attaché and provide the necessary funds. (Signed) ZIMMERMANN."

"January 26th. For Military Attaché. You can obtain particulars as to persons suitable for carrying on sabotage in the United States and Canada from the following persons: (1) Joseph McGarrity, Philadelphia, Penn. (2) John P. Keating, Michigan Avenue, Chicago. (3) Jeremiah

[3] Of such revelations subsequent to the date of Prof. Sperry's report, perhaps the most startling was the confession of L. Witcke, in August, 1919, that he had caused the terrible "Black Tom" disaster that shook New York City, and had blown up other explosive stores and factories.

O'Leary, 16 Park Row, New York. One and two are absolutely reliable and discreet. No. 3 is reliable, but not always discreet. These persons were indicated by Sir Roger Casement. In the United States sabotage can be carried out on every kind of factory for supplying munitions of war. Railway embankments and bridges must not be touched. Embassy must in no circumstances be compromised. Similar precautions must be taken in regard to Irish pro-German propaganda.

"(Signed) Representative of General Staff."

The earliest attempt to carry out these plans of the German General Staff was made by Horst von der Goltz, a German citizen who came to the United States from Mexico. In an affidavit he thus describes the origin and purposes of this project:

"Shortly after my arrival at New York [from Mexico], I received a letter signed by Dr. Kraske, Vice-Consul at the German Consulate in New York, requesting me to attend at the consulate at a certain hour, in order that I might meet a gentleman who was interested in me. The letter was a mere matter of form, intended to inform me of the hour of a meeting proposed to me by Capt. von Papen.

"Attending to this request I had at first some conversation with Capt. von Papen concerning events in Mexico, and afterwards was asked to give my opinion about a proposal made in a letter to the German Embassy, the writer of which asked for financial support, in order to carry out a scheme by which he wrote he would be able to make raids on towns situated on the Canadian coast of the Great Lakes.

"The proposal being rejected on account of the Embassy receiving unfavorable information about the writer, I was first requested to give my assistance to a scheme of invasion intended to be put in execution by seizing some spot on the west coast of Canada with the assistance of German warships. Reservists from the United States were to be sent to another neutral country, where they were to be embarked. Such a step it was supposed would:

"(1) Prevent the Canadian contingents then under training from sailing for Europe.

"(2) Prevent Canada from supplying England with necessaries on account of their being needed in the country itself.

"(3) Bringing matters in the United States to a decision, the Government being forced either to supply both parties with arms and ammunition, or to prohibit the export of those articles altogether."

After these plans had been discussed at the German Consulate and at the German Club in New York City, it was decided that von der Goltz should attempt to blow up the Welland Canal, the grain elevators at Fort William, and, if possible, the Sault Ste. Marie locks and railroad bridges. Capt. von Papen supplied him at the German Club with the needed fuses, wire, and generators, and referred him for dynamite to Capt. Hans Tauscher, American agent for Krupp and other German makers of munitions. Von der Goltz told Tauscher about the plan to blow up the Welland Canal and received from him an order for dynamite.

Von der Goltz then went to Buffalo on the New York Central railroad with two suitcases containing about one hundred pounds of dynamite, but was unable to carry out his plans, because John Ryan, a Buffalo lawyer, did not give him the telegraphic instructions which von Papen had sent.

With his confederates, Tauscher, von Papen, von Igel, Fritzen, Tuchendler, and Covani, von der Goltz was indicted for conspiracy to set on foot a military enterprise against Great Britain. Von Papen and Boy-Ed, being attached to the German Embassy, were recalled by Germany on December 10, 1915, as the result of requests made by our Department of State. Von Igel returned to Germany with Ambassador Bernstorff in February, 1917, forfeiting his bond. Tauscher was acquitted, the jury appearing to believe his statement that he did not know the intended use of the dynamite which he assisted von der Goltz to procure. Fritzen pleaded guilty on another indictment on which he was sentenced to eighteen months in prison.

Another attempt to blow up the Welland Canal was made in September, 1915, by Paul Koenig, head of the Bureau of Investigation of the Hamburg-American Line. This Bu-

reau, increased in number after the war began, and operating from the offices of the steamship company at 45 Broadway, became the most dangerous sub-center of criminal intrigue maintained in America by the German Government. Among Koenig's papers is one entitled, "History of the Bureau of Investigation," and under the year 1914 occurs this entry:

"August 22nd. German Government, with consent of Dr. Buenz, entrusted me with the handling of certain investigation. Military Attaché von Papen called at my office later and explained the nature of the work expected. (Beginning of Bureau's services for Imperial German Government.)"

The measures adopted by Koenig to serve the German Government by blowing up the Welland Canal were described in a sworn statement made by George F. Fuchs, a member of the secret service division of the Hamburg-American Line, with whom Koenig had a conversation in Buffalo. Fuchs made a written report to Koenig stating, "that with the use of explosives the canal could be crippled at a spot where the Chippewa River runs under the canal at Welland."

Koenig communicated with the German Embassy concerning the execution of this criminal plot, and frequently received money from both Boy-Ed and von Papen for various kinds of subterranean work. Koenig endeavored to protect himself and his fellow conspirators by depositing in the German Embassy at Washington toward the close of October, 1915, such papers as contained evidence of the many criminal plots in which they were engaged.

He did not succeed, however, in concealing all of the incriminating evidence of his plot to destroy the Welland Canal, and with an accomplice, Emil Leyendecker, was indicted on December 23, 1915, for "setting on foot a military enterprise" against Great Britain.

Another military enterprise against Canada was undertaken by a prosperous citizen of the German Empire living in Detroit, Albert Kaltschmidt. He was a leader among the German-Americans of his city, had organized the *Deutscherbund* there and was its secretary. The purposes of Kalt-

schmidt and his confederates are thus specified in their indictment by the Grand Jury:

"(a) To blow up the factory of the Peabody's Company, Limited, at Walkerville, Ontario, . . . engaged in manufacturing uniforms, clothing, and military supplies. . . .

"(b) To blow up . . . the building known as the Windsor Armories of the City of Windsor. . . .

"(c) To blow up and destroy other plants and buildings in said Dominion of Canada, which were used for the manufacture . . . of munitions of war, clothing, uniforms. . . .

"(d) To blow up and destroy the great railroad bridges of the Canadian Pacific Railroad Co. at Nipigon. . . .

"(e) To employ and send into said Dominion of Canada spies to obtain military information. . . ."

The first grant of money which Kaltschmidt received to carry out these plans was $2,000, deposited on January 27, 1915, in a New York bank by Wolf von Igel. The original order of von Igel that this sum be telegraphed to Kaltschmidt and the latter's receipt for it were introduced as evidence during the trial.

With this working capital Kaltschmidt obtained the materials for his enterprise. In order that suspicion might not be aroused by the purchase of explosives in Detroit, he sent agents to Duluth, where they purchased the necessary dynamite, took it to Detroit, and began the construction of bombs. Two German reservists, Richard Herman and William M. Jarasch, were hired as confederates in Chicago, where the German consul-general, Baron Kurt von Reiswitz, was privy to the plot. They laid plans under Kaltschmidt's direction, to blow up the Detroit Screw Works, where shrapnel was being made, and the St. Clair tunnel which connects Canada with the United States, but failed in both attempts.

Kaltschmidt was arrested in April, 1917, and his trial completed during December of the same year. The jury found him guilty on all charges in the indictment, and he was sentenced to four years in the Federal prison at Leavenworth, Kansas, and to pay a fine of $20,000. His sister, Ida

K. Neef, was sentenced to three years in the Detroit House of Correction and to pay a fine of $15,000. Her husband, Fritz A. Neef, was sentenced to two years at Leavenworth and to pay a fine of $10,000. Two other accomplices received lighter sentences.

Another and more successful attack on the Grand Trunk Railway was made at Vanceboro, Maine, where it crosses the international bridge between the United States and Canada. Captain von Papen ordered Werner Horn, a German reserve lieutenant, to blow up the bridge and supplied him with $700. Horn was arrested immediately after an explosion which partly damaged the bridge, and at his trial in Boston, during June, 1917, made confession on the advice of his lawyers.

Attempts to Give Germany Military Aid
Forgery of Passports

The third chief purpose of Germany's diplomatic officials in the United States was to send troops and munitions to the Central Empires. When the war began in July, 1914, large numbers of German reservists were living in America, and in order to avoid capture on their way home many of them sought under false names to obtain passports as American citizens. They thus violated the law that American passports shall be issued only to citizens of the United States, and also discredited genuine passports, thereby causing delay and distress to American citizens abroad. Their action also was a violation of America's neutrality and endangered its national honor and safety.

In order to have at hand an adequate supply of counterfeit passports, the German Embassy maintained an office in New York City, directed by Captain von Papen, where they were forged by wholesale. German consuls in distant cities, as Chicago and St. Paul, were informed concerning this office and sent there for passports the reservists from their several localities.

These operations were known almost from the first to the United States Secret Service. Hans A. von Wedell, who managed the office, took alarm and fled in November, 1914,

supplied with money by von Papen. In the following letter, found on one of his associates, who was arrested before he had an opportunity to post it, von Wedell exonerates himself from the charge of deserting his post and shows the complicity of the German Ambassador in the business of forging passports:

"*His Excellency, The Imperial German Ambassador, Count von Bernstorff, Washington, D. C.:*

" . . . My work was done. At my departure, I left the service well organized, and worked out in minute detail, in the hands of my successor, Mr. Karl Ruroede, picked out by myself. . . . Also, Ruroede will testify to you that without my preliminary labors, it would be impossible for him, as well as for Mr. von Papen, to forward officers in any way whatever. [He then explains in detail his reason for hiding.] . . . Ten days before my departure I learned from a telegram sent me by Mr. von Papen . . . that Dr. Starck had fallen into the hands of the British. That gentleman's forged papers were liable to come back and could . . . be traced to me. Mr. von Papen had repeatedly and urgently ordered me to hide myself. Mr. Igel told me that I was taking the matter altogether too lightly, and that I ought, for God's sake, to disappear. . . .

"With expressions of the most exquisite consideration, I am your Excellency's,

"Very respectfully,

"(Signed) HANS ADAM VON WEDELL."

There are many cases, from which the following are a selection, in which American passports were fraudulently procured and used for unneutral purposes. Captain Boy-Ed, Richard P. Stegler, a German citizen, Richard Madden, and Vincent Cook secured through conspiracy an American passport to be used by Stegler while serving as a spy in Europe. Boy-Ed financed and directed Stegler's operations, but was protected from prosecution by his diplomatic immunity. Madden and Cook were sentenced to ten months and Stegler to sixty days in jail.

Albert Sanders and Charles Wunnenberg, German agents in this country, have pleaded guilty in New York to the

charge of sending German spies to England equipped with American passports. Gess D. Berko, an American citizen, secured an American passport which was stolen by Stephan Csiszàr, an attaché of the Austrian-Hungarian Consulate at New York City, to return to Austria.

The diplomatic officials of Germany hired American citizens protected by genuine passports to use them for dishonorable and unneutral purposes, such as to carry German dispatches and to act as spies in England. E. G. Woodford, for example, who was sent to Europe by German officials here, was paid $550 for his services on orders from Berlin. The payments to him are recorded in the cashbook of Wolf von Igel.

Fraudulent Manifests

German agents in the United States also endeavored to give military aid to their country by sending coal and other supplies to German warships which were raiding commerce in both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Such action was a violation of American neutrality, and in order to evade the law the conspirators took false oaths before Federal officials concerning the ownership of vessels, the nature of their cargoes, and their destination. These acts, even more than the use of forged passports, were likely to cause friction between the United States and countries with which it was at peace.

The Hamburg-American Line, through its high officials in New York, repeatedly defrauded the United States by procuring false manifests. Among those involved were Dr. Buenz, managing director, George Koetter, superintending engineer, Adolph Hachmeister, purchasing agent, and Joseph Pappinghaus, who together worked up an elaborate machinery to deceive the Government. They confessed at their trial that they had sent out twelve ships, which were proved by the Government to have fraudulent papers and all of which were captured and interned before reaching their destination. Nine of these vessels were chartered, and the Hamburg-American Line paid to the owners for their losses about $1,400,000. The copy of Captain Boy-Ed's account

at a New York bank indicates that he had large sums at his disposal for conducting Germany's naval operations from the United States, and that he reimbursed the Hamburg-American Line for this and other expenditures.

Gustav B. Kulenkampf of New York, who was employed by the Hamburg-American Line to draw up the false manifests, stated at the trial that he received $750,000, which was subject to the order of Captain Boy-Ed, naval attaché of the German Embassy, and was largely spent on the Pacific Coast. His evidence proved that, like the forgery of passports, fraud and perjury were committed under the direction of German officials protected by the diplomatic privileges which all civilized nations consider sacred. Buenz, Koetter, and Hachmeister were found guilty of conspiracy to defraud the United States, and were sentenced in December, 1915, to eighteen months in the Federal penitentiary at Atlanta. Pappinghaus was sentenced to a year and a day.

Similar means were employed by German agents on the western coast under the direction of Captain Boy-Ed to send provisions and coal to German raiders in the Pacific. The steamers *Sacramento* and *Mazatlan* were there engaged in this illicit traffic. When the *Sacramento* once cleared with a large cargo for Valparaiso, Chile, but reached there empty, the captain explained that on the way down she had been commandeered by the German fleet and her cargo removed. Besides the Hamburg-American officials already mentioned, more than fifteen individuals and firms have been convicted in the United States courts of fraud or perjury in their efforts to assist Germany by illegal means.

Perjury was also employed in a notable instance to justify Germany's conduct. When the passenger liner *Lusitania* was sunk by a submarine on May 7, 1915, with its great load of non-combatants, the German Government and its Ambassador in America asserted that she was in law and fact a ship of war, because laden with ammunition and armed with four cannon. In order to prove this statement, Ambassador von Bernstorff sent to the Department of State four affidavits swearing that the *Lusitania* was armed.

Three of these were worthless as testimony, and the fourth had been procured by Paul Koenig, of the Hamburg-American Line, from Gustav Stahl, a German reservist. Federal officials knew that the *Lusitania* was not armed and that Stahl must have sworn falsely. He was accordingly tried for perjury, confessed his guilt, and was sentenced to eighteen months in the Federal penitentiary at Atlanta.

Violations of Parole

When the British fleet was clearing the seas of enemy warships, two German cruisers, *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* and *Kronprinz Wilhelm,* sought refuge in the harbor of Norfolk, where they were interned. The German officers pledged their word of honor to our Government, which had opened the harbor for their protection, that they would not escape from the jurisdiction of the United States, and accordingly were allowed every liberty.

Several officers of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* purchased a yacht after some weeks had passed, on the pretense that it was for pleasure cruises. They secretly stocked it with supplies and one night sailed away. They were given the necessary funds for their escape by the German Consul at Richmond, and Captain Boy-Ed filed a message at Sayville, asking the German authorities in Berlin for instructions for these officers. Paroled German officers at San Francisco and Guam also violated their oaths to remain within the jurisdiction of the United States.

Propaganda in German Interest

Ambassador von Bernstorff took a direct and active part in purchasing the services of those who would aid Germany by creating opinion in her favor. His expenditures for this purpose during one month exceeded $20,000, as shown by receipts sent to him personally.

Checks and receipts for other amounts show that Ambassador von Bernstorff paid into the treasury of *Fair Play,*

a violently pro-German sheet edited by Marcus Braun, the sum of $10,000.

Another paper of the same character which suddenly sprang into existence after the war began was the *Bull,* now suppressed by the United States Government for its seditious expressions. That its editor, Jeremiah O'Leary, received money from Franz von Rintelen is proved by the sworn statements of some of Rintelen's other tools, and there is good evidence, though not absolutely conclusive, that he received money from other German agents.

Another paper founded since the war began and supported by the German Government was *The Fatherland,* established by George Sylvester Viereck. While this publication professed to teach "undiluted Americanism" and persistently boasted of its loyalty to the American Government and ideals, it steadily attacked the President and other public men, and demanded the adoption of policies which would make the United States an ally of Germany.

The German Government maintained on the Pacific coast at least one similar periodical, the *American Independent,* controlled by the American Independence Union, which was a branch of the American Embargo Conference of Chicago. Its editor, A. D. Bauer, has stated that he received from the German Consul-General, Franz Bopp, $1,500 per month, the payments being made in cash by Lieutenant von Brincken, of the consulate.

The publications which were maintained in the United States by the German Government or were subsidized by it, supported in general the following measures: Enactment by Congress of a law forbidding Americans to travel on the ships of the belligerent states; an embargo on munitions; prohibition by the Government of loans to the Allied powers and the boycott of banks which made them; defeat of Wilson for reëlection in 1916 and also of Senators and Representatives who would not vote for bills favored by the German Government; pacificism in the sense that the United States should not defend the lives and property of its citizens from attack by Germany. They also systematically

defamed our Government and the public men of the United States.[1]

All the criminal plots and conspiracies narrated in the foregoing pages were undertaken prior to the summer of 1915. The German Government, nevertheless, in December of that year, sent to the United States for publication in the press the following authorized official lie:

"*The German Government has naturally never knowingly accepted the support of any person, group of persons, society or organization seeking to promote the cause of Germany in the United States by illegal acts, by counsel of violence, by contravention of law, or by any means whatever that could offend the American people in the pride of their own authority.*"

BY COUNT JOHANN VON BERNSTORFF

Shortly after the outbreak of the war Great Britain's naval superiority enabled its war vessels upon foreign stations to prevent German reservists in North and South America from returning to their native land. This caused German citizens and German-Americans in the United States to resort to measures which, though not directed primarily against the American Government, violated the laws of that country. Over and above this, several acts of violence were committed against Germany's enemies at different points in the course of 1915, and preparations were made for other similar deeds, which likewise constituted more or less serious violations of the American laws. All these plots were employed to our damage, being designated as German conspiracies against American neutrality. The agitation they aroused injured the German cause, and in particular the policy I had adopted.

[1] Of such cases subsequent to the period of this Government report, the most notable was perhaps that of the man, Fox, who wrote a number of articles describing as an eye-witness the atrocities committed by the Russians while invading East Prussia. Fox confessed that he had seen nothing of the sort whatever, that his articles were wholly inventions, and that their character was dictated to him by German officials who paid him for his falsehoods.

A prominent instance in which the laws of the country were broken without direct acts of violence, occurred when the New York branch of the Hamburg-American Line, acting upon instructions from the head office in Hamburg, dispatched about a dozen chartered vessels with coal and provisions to meet German cruisers and auxiliary cruisers upon the high seas. These vessels were declared for foreign ports lying beyond the points on the high seas where they were to meet German vessels. When it was discovered later that the New York agents of the Hamburg-American Line had thus coaled our warships, they were indicted for knowingly swearing to false declarations. Their honored chief, Dr. Bunz, and three other members of the firm were sentenced to eighteen months' imprisonment.

Furthermore, several German reserve officers who chanced to be in America were able to get home, in spite of the sharp watch Great Britain kept over sea traffic, through a secret office organized in New York by a German-American named Von Wedell, and later managed by Karl Ruroede, which provided them with counterfeit or forged American passports. This bureau was broken up by the American Department of Justice when four German reservists possessing such passports were taken off a Norwegian ship in New York harbor. Wedell is alleged to have fled from New York some time before, to have been captured by the British, and to have been drowned by the sinking of a transport. The reservists escaped with heavy fines. Ruroede was sentenced to three years' imprisonment.

These actions by the Hamburg-American Line and the false passport office had already done the German cause great harm in America, when it was injured far more seriously by the acts of destruction committed by German citizens and German-Americans in America against our enemies. Any person free from prejudice would have recognized that in the cases where such acts were proved, they were undertaken on private initiative. They were the mad enterprises of hot-headed patriots and not conspiracies organized or approved officially by representatives of Germany. Innumerable other alleged plots were pure fictions

of the imagination without the slightest basis of fact. Every accident which occurred in an American munition works—and a mushroom growth of such enterprises covered the country, operated in the vast majority of cases by inexperienced and unskilled workers—was invariably ascribed to German agents.

Apparently I was held responsible for at least permitting these atrocities to be committed under the direction of officers or secret agents to the Embassy. In order to prove this several cipher telegrams from the German War Office to the Embassy in Washington were deciphered in England, which were alleged to counsel such acts on Canadian soil. I do not know whether these dispatches were genuine or not. Military cipher telegrams addressed, "Attention, Military Attaché," did indeed reach the Embassy in great numbers, but were invariably forwarded at once to the office of Captain Von Papen in New York without my knowing their contents. Mr. Von Papen, very naturally, never informed me of any instructions he might have received from his superiors to arrange for questionable enterprises of the character indicated. Without further evidence I do not consider it to have been proved that such instructions were received by him. But in regard to these questions I can only speak for myself; for I never concerned myself with purely military matters. Soon after Captain Von Papen started home I energetically protested against the government's sending a successor, because I considered that with a situation such as existed in America, there was nothing for a military attaché to do, and that the presence of such an officer at the Embassy would merely feed enemy agitation.

I never knew at the time what secret agents, who might have been sent to the United States by the German military authorities, were possibly doing in violation of the laws of the country, either under explicit instructions or through exceeding their instructions. Neither have I been able to learn anything under this head since returning to Germany.

THE BIG ALLIED OFFENSIVE IN THE WEST

THE BATTLES OF CHAMPAGNE AND LOOS

SEPTEMBER 25TH-OCTOBER 6TH

COUNT DE SOUZA — COLONEL A. M. MURRAY
FRENCH AND GERMAN GOVERNMENTAL STATEMENTS
GENERAL VON FALKENHAYN

The constant fierce and heavy trench battle all along the Western front was ever and again flaring up to special intensity, so that we have local names for a hundred battles there, each of which would have been accounted great in any earlier war. Of these, by far the largest in 1915 was the French attack in Champagne in September. With this was combined a formidable French and British attack further north, usually called the battle of Loos. So that the united assault was the nearest to a big general offensive which the west had seen since the Germans had checked their eager foes at the Aisne in 1914.

This September offensive had been widely advertised, doubtless with the intent of drawing the Germans back from their terrible onslaught on staggering Russia; and this publicity of the offensive has led to endless dispute as to its purpose. Marshal Joffre announced ahead of time that he meant to drive the Germans out of France at once. But later French Governmental reports declared that such threats had been issued only to weaken the enemy in Russia. Hence it is easy to view the September attack in very diverse lights, as do the following narratives—as a failure since it did not break the German lines, or as a victory since it captured some of their strongest defenses and compelled them to use huge forces in heavy counter-attacks.

Probably the historian of a future generation will summarize the assault as simply another evidence that defense was in 1915 much stronger than attack. He will weigh the diverse statements and estimates of losses and conclude that while both sides suffered more than they dared admit, the Ally losses were probably the heavier. He will declare that the assault was a strategic necessity, that the Allies simply had to make it so as to test their own power and to satisfy their world, and that it was accomplished in about the best way and at the least cost that human skill could devise. The heroism displayed on every side was of that highest character which so gloriously distinguished the Great War.

THE BIG ALLIED OFFENSIVE IN THE WEST



The constant fierce and heavy trench batt… front was ever and again flaring up to sp… have local nam… for a hundred bat… have been acc… largest in 1915 wa… With this was combine… dier north, us… assault wa… th… a staggering Russia… ceaseless dispute as to its… of mine that he meant to drive the Germans out… but later French Governmental reports declared th… were issued only to weaken the enemy in Russia. …the September attack in very diverse ha… …ctives—as a failure since it did not break… …ry since it captured some of their strongest… …them to use huge forces in heavy… …ably the historian of … future … …ssion is simply another … …an attack. He will w… …ses and conclude … … admit, the Ally … … heavier. …that the assault … strategic necessity, that the … …make it so as to test their own power and to sa… their … that it was accomplished in about the best way … at the … that human skill could devise. The heroism … …played … … was of that highest character which so glorio… distinguish… …eat War.

ermany in the Air

German airplanes in battle with the French

Painting by Prof. M. Zeno Diemer

BY COUNT CHARLES DE SOUZA

IT was during the latter stages of the Russian retreat that there was a notable increase of artillery activity on the side of the Allies on the Western front—and during that period also started the munitions campaign for increasing the output of the war factories in England and in France. This question was an involved one, but its aim was clear, at least to those who viewed the progress of affairs with an impartial eye: it was meant to replace an "advance" in kind by a stationary one with shells; in other words, to achieve the results of a general offensive without incurring the losses which such a movement would have entailed.

Up to then all artillery actions in the siege warfare had been of a local character; but gradually as the Teutonic eastern armies pressed on in Russia, more and more batteries were brought into play by the Allies in France; until the whole front from the Belgian coast to the Swiss frontier became a continuous blaze of guns, the tremendous line of fire being prolonged seawards by a fleet of seventy-five vessels which bombarded the shore from Ostend to Zeebrugge; and the general bombardment being supplemented by numerous air raids which were carried out on the enemy's field depots and communications.

Such action was calculated to disturb the German generals, who were bound to interpret it as an ominous sign of a coming onslaught on the part of their Western foes; and the immediate result of it was that strong German reserves, not less than sixteen divisions—divisions which had been intended for the Russian front—together with a certain number of units which had fought in Poland, were immediately sent to France; and there was a distinct slackening of the German forward movement in Russia. This occurred during the first stage of the Allied general bombardment (August-September).

Owing to a momentary shortage of shells, however, due to excessive and unforeseen expenditure, the bombardment abated somewhat, and as no attacks followed, the enemy, who was still in doubt as to the real intentions of the Allies,

resumed his action in the East, towards Riga, Wilna, and the Pripet Marshes. The Russians were not demoralized, and they had been allowed some respite; so, in an endeavor to establish themselves at last on some sound defensive line, they frustrated Hindenburg's attempts to reach Riga; to envelop a portion of their forces at Wilna; and to drive their southwestern armies in confusion over the Marshes; and they were also able to maintain their footing on the banks of the Dniester from where the Austrians attempted vainly to dislodge them. Nevertheless, they were in great difficulties and would probably have been compelled to retire further back, had not Joffre in the West been able to resume his own action, and to launch combined attacks which compelled the Germans to relinquish their object and to divert more of their central reserves to France.

It was towards the end of September that the Allied movement, which has been inaccurately described as a "general" offensive, began. The true aim of the Allied offensive was made sufficiently clear by the restricted sectors of the front on which it was executed, but the issue was confused by a variety of factors which made it appear that the chief object of Joffre and his Generals was to pierce the German lines; and which thereby spoilt some of the effects which the movement was intended to produce. The proclamations which the Allied Generals issued to stimulate the ardor of their troops were wrongly interpreted, and, as usual, the popular imagination assigned to Joffre objects which the great commander had not the faintest intention nor the slightest reasons to strive for. As always his mind was intent on the strategic problem; and barring the help he was called on to afford Russia, he had no further aims, as regards the Germans, than those he wished to attain through his "nibbling" policy. In other words, he meant to refuse, right to the end, to be drawn into a costly general attack on the German fortified positions which, he knew, extended for miles *behind* their main front.

But it must be said that General Joffre prepared his move in a way which was bound, at least momentarily, to mislead not only the enemy, but the Allies themselves.

The renewed artillery activity was increased to the utmost intensity; and finally powerful concentrations were carried out at various points besides those on which to deliver the attacks. The outcome of it all was that eight French army corps out of a total of forty-two on the line took action on a length of front not exceeding twenty miles; and that the British forces, which, on the receipt of further reënforcements consisted of six army corps portioned into three armies and had extended their front to fifty miles, took action simultaneously on a front of not more than ten miles; so the much expected and tremendously advertised "general" offensive of the Allies on the Western front resolved itself into a minor one, in which only a small fraction of the troops on the spot were employed.

The British forces on the fighting front consisted of two armies, the 1st under Sir Douglas Haig, which had since June gradually extended its front south of La Bassée towards the Lorette Plateau which the French had captured in June; the 2nd army (General Plumer) to the north of it extended as far as Boesinghe on the Yperlée Canal, where it was in touch with the 36th French army corps (General Hely d'Oissel). Other British forces, termed the 3rd army, were mostly still in process of formation, and they lay in reserve in the bases and training camps at the rear. Some portions of it being intercalated, for training purposes, in the French lines on the Somme. Of all these troops only the portions under the immediate command of General Haig took action in the battle of Loos.

In the center of the Allied line, in Champagne, portions of the 4th and 5th French armies, under the higher control of General de Castelnau, assaulted the German positions between Souain and Massiges; whilst in Artois half-a-dozen divisions of the 10th French army, under General d'Urbal, supported the action of the 4th British army corps towards Lens.

The British, renewing the tactics of Neuve Chapelle, advanced suddenly and boldly on a broad front and carried the German advanced lines very rapidly. The Germans locally, were taken by surprise; besides, the demands of the

Argonne attack they had unwittingly started, prevented them from reënforcing sufficiently and in time the sectors at which they were themselves attacked. Thus it was that after an artillery preparation, lengthy and powerful, which wrecked the more advanced German defenses, the assailants both in Artois and in Champagne were able to capture, at a minimum cost, a good deal of ground, and to inflict severe losses on the foe.

In Champagne especially the French, carried away by a tremendous enthusiasm, played havoc amongst the enemy; they cleared with comparative ease the field-works, dug-outs and trenches which their guns had demolished, and they stormed stronger strongholds bristling with arms and defenses of every description. Colonials, infantry of the line and reserve troops behaved equally well; and mounted units shared in the exhilarating work of rounding up the routed enemy. The difficulty on that occasion was not so much of vanquishing the foe, but of restraining the victorious troops once the main task was accomplished.

In the general elation which prevailed some battalions consisting of very young men got out of hand, and they were seen rushing forward over the devastated ground towards the rear of the enemy's second positions, where they were naturally promptly slain, or taken prisoners, this enabling the Germans to claim some captures, which were paltry indeed in comparison with those the French had made. The latter at the end of a week's fighting summed up the enemy losses as follows: 100,000 casualties, 23,000 prisoners, 155 guns, and over a hundred smaller pieces—quick-firers, trench mortars, etc.—together with a considerable amount of other material; *all this for the Champagne battle alone.*

Such a victory, had it been won by the other side, would have filled the world with awe and admiration. Unfortunately for the victors, it was won by them *on French soil,* and it failed thereby to give satisfaction to the immense army of amateur critics who were looking to an advance on Berlin. The British army, especially, which had done wonders in the north, came under the lash of the irrepressible fire eaters. Its more apparent—and inevitable—faults and

deficiencies were laid bare; and whilst what it had achieved was thrust aside or forgotten, what it had not achieved, and was *not* intended to achieve, was constantly dwelt upon.

BY COLONEL A. M. MURRAY

The Paris *communiqué* issued on the night of Saturday, September 25th, conveyed the first news of the beginning of the Anglo-French offensive between the La Bassée Canal and Arras, and of the French offensive in Champagne. According to a secret order issued by General Joffre on September 14th, and found by the Germans on a fallen French officer, the troops engaged in the attack comprised thirty-five divisions under General Castelnau, who had command of the Champagne operations, eighteen divisions under General Foch, who commanded the Tenth French Army, thirteen British divisions under Field-Marshal French, and fifteen cavalry divisions, of which five were British. In addition to these first line troops, twelve infantry divisions and the Belgian Army were held in reserve. Five thousand guns were to be brought into action, 2,000 being heavy guns, and 3,000 field pieces. Eliminating non-combatants, these formations would yield something like 1,200,000 infantry, with 60,000 cavalry, and 100,000 artillerymen. When he issued his first order General Joffre evidently hoped for decisive results, for he followed it up next day with a second order telling Generals commanding divisions that his intention was to "drive the Germans out of France, liberate those of our countrymen who have been suppressed for the last twelve months, and snatch away from the enemy the valuable possession of the occupied territory."

In the north, in the neighborhood of Loos, operations began at 6.30 a. m. on Saturday, September 25th, the agreed plan of attack being for the 2nd British Army under Sir Douglas Haig to push its way between the La Bassée Canal and Lens, while the French advance was to be made south of Lens, the two forces forming a junction east of the town with the object of surrounding it. With this purpose in view, Sir Douglas Haig deployed the 1st Corps under Lieut.-General Hubert Gough between the Canal and Vermelles,

while the 4th Corps, under Lieut.-General Sir Henry Rawlinson, prolonged the line of attack down to Grenay. The attack of the first Corps had only a limited success. The 2nd Division was pulled up at the start, and its failure to secure the left flank interfered with the operations of the 9th Division fighting on its right. The 26th Brigade of the latter Division carried the Hohenzollern Redoubt, but failed to reach Haisnes for want of support. The 27th Brigade arrived at 11 a. m., but by that time the Germans had been reenforced. The 7th Division had no better luck. One of its brigades, the 22nd, broke through the German lines into the Quarries, and reached Cité St. Elie, but not being reënforced, it was compelled to withdraw. The attack of the 1st Corps failed.

The 4th Corps did better. The objective of the 1st Division was Hulluch, and that of the 15th Division Cité St. Auguste, while the 47th Division was ordered to secure the right flank of the attacking force. The latter Division carried out its mission as directed, while the 15th Division, advancing with great *élan,* pushed through Loos, the 44th Brigade going over Hill 70 to Cité St. Auguste. There it was heavily counter-attacked, and not being supported, fell back behind the crest of Hill 70. The 1st Division was heavily engaged on its way to Hulluch, and reënforcements arriving too late, it had to fall back west of the La Bassée-Lens road. The net result of the attack was a gain of from 4,000 to 5,000 yards of depth along a front of between 4 and 5 miles.

The causes of failure were two. The preliminary bombardment had been only partially effective, many of the German trenches remaining intact, with the wire entanglements uncut, and machine guns left in position. There were not enough guns of a heavy nature brought into action, and the bombardment was not sufficiently prolonged. The second cause of failure was due to the error committed in placing the reserve troops, the 11th Corps and Guards Division, under the Commander-in-Chief instead of handing them over to the general commanding the 2nd Army. The 11th Corps, consisting of two divisions, was four and a half miles be-

hind the fighting line, and the Guards Division still further away. These troops did not leave their rendezvous till 9.30 a. m., and then it was too late, the battle being practically over before midday. If they had been thrown into the fighting line in the early morning they might have turned a failure into a success.

Simultaneously with this, which was the main attack, other attacks were made north of the La Bassée Canal, and east of Ypres, but beyond holding the enemy and diverting strong bodies of reserve troops towards these points, no advance was made, and no results were obtained. The attacks were not pushed home, and were only undertaken as diversions.

While the 1st British Army was attacking between La Bassée and Lens the 10th French Army, under General Foch's direction, drove the Germans out of the village of Souchez, and then advanced towards Givenchy, gaining a footing on Hill 119, while further south on the northeast of Neuville St. Vaast our Allies reached the farm of La Folie. This French army was strongly opposed on September 25th, and was unable to penetrate into the German lines south of Loos as far as the British troops did on the north of the village, but 1,500 prisoners were taken, and Souchez was left well in the rear.

On the night of the 25th the Crown Prince of Bavaria, who was in command of the army opposing Sir John French, brought up reserve troops from Belgium, and began a series of vigorous counter-attacks with the intention of regaining the ground he had lost. Being specially apprehensive about the British advance towards the La Bassée-Hulluch road, he concentrated large reënforcements of men and guns north and south of Haisnes, and succeeded on the afternoon of the 26th in recapturing Fosse 8, but elsewhere our troops held their ground. On October 1st, during another violent counter-attack, the Germans recovered the greater part of Fort Hohenzollern. On October 8th a general attack was made by the Germans along the whole Anglo-French line, but this attack, which was made with four divisions,

was everywhere beaten back with enormous loss to the enemy.

While the events narrated above were taking place in Artois General de Castelnau gained a notable victory in Champagne. After a heavy artillery bombardment lasting over three days the French infantry were launched against the German first-line trenches extending along a fifteen-mile front from Auberive to Ville sur Tourbe, and by the impetuosity of their attack carried the whole of the enemy's entrenchments, capturing 16,000 unwounded prisoners with 200 officers and some seventy or more guns. The heaviest fighting took place along the Souain-Somme Py road, and north of Massiges, where the Breton and Vandean troops were in force. North of Souain was the division of General Marchand, of Fashoda fame. The farm of Navarin, which was the objective of this division, lies on the summit of the plateau between Souain and Somme Py, and to reach it General Marchand's men had to fight their way through two miles of German trenches and field redoubts; but they swept over the barrier with an *élan* which was irresistible, gaining the position, but losing their gallant leader, who had to leave the field wounded at the moment of victory.

After this memorable battle General de Castelnau continued his offensive unceasingly, and forced his way into the German second line north of Navarin farm and Massiges. On October 5th, after another terrific bombardment, the French infantry carried by assault the village of Tahure, and reached the summit of Hill 192, which is known as the Butte de Tahure, and which the Germans regarded as invincible. After losing this important tactical point the Germans daily tried to recover it by means of violent attacks, which cost them many lives, but without any result. The artillery preponderance obtained by the French was the determining factor of the situation, and promised well for further victories.

The French objective in Champagne was the Bazancourt-Challerange railway, which, like the Lens-La Bassée railway in Artois, ran behind the enemy's positions, and was the main line of supply for the German Army. The French on the

Butte de Tahure were within two miles of this railway, and soon began to make it untenable with their gunfire and aëroplanes. Their object was to reach the railway and force the Germans back to the Aisne, so as to isolate the Crown Prince from General Heeringen, who was in command of the army facing Rheims. This was a strategical object worth fighting for, and they went a long way towards achieving it.

FRENCH GOVERNMENTAL STATEMENT

During September 26th and 27th we succeeded north of Souain and Perthes in occupying a front facing north and in contact with the German second line along a stretch of seven and a half miles. The ground thus conquered represented an area of some fifteen and a half square miles, and was traversed by lines of trenches graduated to a great depth. The borders of the woods were organized for defense, and innumerable subterranean passages, trenches, and parallels facilitated a resistance foot by foot.

We overcame all these obstacles, imposing our ascendancy on the enemy, and progressing from trench to trench, and on our way seizing batteries, munition depots, and material. Our soldiers were out to conquer, and the joy of knowing that a powerful German fortress was crumbling in the face of their efforts spurred them forward with greater dash. Our Generals and Colonels took up their posts of command in the shelter of the German officers' huts, and the casemates on which there still hung notices, *"Stab Bataillons," "Kompagnie führer."* The soldiers gayly made a rapid inventory of the dwellings and the rustic canteens installed in the woods.

Our artillery took up positions in the open country, as in the days of war of movement. Our advance progressed with success, for continuing which great honor is due to our troops, in particular the *Franc-Comtois* and *Africains,* who had assumed the task of taking a string of wooded hills stretching between Auberive and Souain to the north Roman road. The Epine de Vedegrange and Hill 150 are the only points which mark this district on the map. It was there that the Germans resisted with much determination in one

of their systems of trenches. Our troops advanced by successive bounds, digging themselves in after each rush, so as to indicate that they had taken possession of the terrain. Thus they succeeded in reaching the enemy's second position at this point, which we have baptized the "parallel of the Epine de Vedegrange." This trench extends eastward unbroken toward Hill 193. Our military vocabulary furnishes many names for it—"Parallel of the wood of Chevron," "Trench of Lubeck." Up to the Navarin farm, further east, it is named "Trench of Kultur," "Trench of Satyrs," and "Trench of Pirates." On the evening of the 25th we had not attained the second line to the east of Navarin farm. The Germans were holding out in the pine woods which terrace the eastern section of the Souain basin.

The next day our troops, who had gone forward west to a point where the Souain-Tahure road traverses the woods, succeeded in joining hands with those installed on Hill 193. Thus the last defenders of the works in the woods were surrounded. Here we made nearly 2,000 prisoners.

Meanwhile our African troops were gaining ground toward the north, clearing the woods and taking possession of the "Camp of Sadowa," which contained large quantities of material, and the existence of which had already been revealed by our airmen. Further east we pushed forward our line, installing ourselves on the summit of Hill 201, facing the Butte of Tahure, on which the enemy dug a second line, named "Trench of the Vistula." An attack put us in possession of a little fort at the extremity of the latter.

Along the remainder of the front the pressure was kept up by violent bombardments, by grenade throwing, and by swift attacks. On the *"Main de Massiges"* ground was thus gained by a sustained action of the colonial infantry. Alternating the fire of the heavy artillery and the field guns with assaults by grenadiers, we succeeded greatly in increasing our gain of September 25th along the northern portion of the promontory.

Germans surrendered in groups, even though not surrounded, so tired were they of the fight, and so depressed

by hunger and convinced of our determination to continue our effort to the end.

A German trench stood in the way of our advance. Our artillery concentrated its fire upon it. Toward the end of the afternoon of the 26th, when the observation officer suddenly gave the order to cease fire, he saw the Germans stand up on the crest and put up their hands. "Seventy-fives! Send a screen of fire behind," ordered the general commanding the division, and immediately the Germans were to be seen running toward our lines, while our colonial infantry went off and installed themselves in the trenches. There they stuck up the pennants with which they had directed our artillery fire and which on the crest torn by shells unfurled themselves like glorious standards.

GERMAN GOVERNMENTAL STATEMENT

October 4th.

The object of the attack was to drive the Germans out of France. The result achieved is that the Germans on a front of about 840 kilometers, at one place 23 kilometers, and at another 12 kilometers wide (and at this latter not by any soldierly qualities of the English attack, but by a successful surprise by gas attack), have been pressed back from the first line of their system of defense into their second line, which is not their last.

After a careful computation the French losses in killed and wounded and prisoners are at least 130,000, those of the English 60,000, and the German losses are not one-fifth of this number.

Whether the enemy has still the idea of attaining his object need not be considered. Anyway, such a success fought with a superiority of 6 or 7 to 1 and prepared for after many months of work on war material in the factories of half the world, including those of America, cannot be styled a "brilliant victory." Still less can it be said that the attack has compelled us to do anything which was not in our plans, and especially to direct our advance against the Russian army toward him. Apart from the fact that a certain division which was to have been transported away from

the western front when the offensive started was held back, and that another division was sent away in its stead to the place where the former should have gone, the attack did not cause the German chief army administration to use a single soldier anywhere where they had not previously intended to use him, arrangements having long before been settled. Moreover, the attack has not been carried out without respite day and night; neither has our defense been pushed back at any point beyond our second line. Neither has the enemy hindered us from removing our reserve troops as safely and effectively as we were able to do during the May offensive to the north of Arras.

Letter Found on a German Officer Slain in the Champagne Assault

September 26th.

One o'clock in the morning. At 7 it will have been seventy-two hours since, without interruption, we have been frightfully bombarded—seventy-two hours of endless, deafening uproar, which even the steadiest nerves can hardly endure!

I was ordered into the trenches as an observer at 7 a. m. Naturally, telephone lines were broken. I reached the position of the reserves without much trouble, their trenches being destroyed only here and there; but there the difficulties began.

Mines and bombs were exploding at brief intervals, interspersed with bullets from machine guns. From that point on the trenches were so damaged that we were obliged to crawl on all fours.

I left my telephone operator and went ahead, amid uninterrupted cracklings, the bursting of grenades, the explosion of shells, the whistling of bullets, the howling of shell fragments, and fogs of smoke. By holding my breath behind my respirator I got to a point where a trench had been repaired thirty-five times. The communication trench was completely leveled. Creeping closer and closer to the ground, I arrived at the second trench, ten yards behind the first.

Of the latter nothing remains. The second trench is just deep enough to kneel in.

Profiting from a period of relative calm, I cast a glance ahead. Our barbed-wire fences are destroyed. I signal our batteries, which resume a rapid fire. Then I creep back to get my telephone operator. It takes me four hours to cover ground which ordinarily could have been covered in twenty-five minutes.

This is becoming frightful. An explosion throws me against a wall of a trench. A Lieutenant tells me a shell struck in his shelter also. I rush out and see that all the bombproofs on the slope are burning. A shell striking an ammunition magazine causes a formidable explosion. The French keep on firing into the fire. How I hate them!

How I admire the French artillery! They are the master gunners. We really cannot imitate them, I regret to say. Continuing to fire into the fire, the enemy provokes a more violent explosion than the preceding ones.

God knows what they have blown up now! From this moment I have lost all sensation of fear.

BY GENERAL VON FALKENHAYN

The failure of the long-expected attacks in France to materialize led us in August to doubt whether the attempt at relief, now that it could no longer be of use to the Russians, would be undertaken at all. For a time we were disposed to regard the enemy's advancing preparations for attack as a feint. However, from the beginning of September onwards, more and more frequent reports went to show that we had to expect an early attack by the British, supported by the French, in the neighborhood of Lille, with a simultaneous offensive by the French alone in Champagne.

In Flanders and Artois, on a front of over 50 miles as the crow flies, the Sixth Army of the Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria (Chief of Staff being Major-General Kuhl) held the line with sixteen divisions from south of Ypres, immediately east of Armentières, west of Lens, east of Arras, to a point 10 miles from the latter town. In Champagne, the Third Army, under General von Einem,

with seven and a half divisions, held, on a front of fully 30 miles, positions which ran from north of Rheims to Massiges. In touch on the left, as far as the Argonne, stood the right wing of the Fifth Army of the German Crown Prince, with two divisions in line.

On the 21st September drum fire began against the Sixth Army, and on the 22nd against the Third and the right wing of the Fifth, of an intensity similar to that which we had for the first time employed on a large scale at Gorlice-Tarnow.

Reinforcements from the scanty general reserve had already been sent to the threatened armies, and were now sent in greater numbers. The Third and Sixth Armies received heavy batteries and one infantry division each, the Third having a brigade of infantry in addition.

The bombardment raged with almost undiminished fury in Champagne until the 24th, and in Flanders until the 25th September. On those days the infantry attacks began on both fronts.

Although the terrible gunfire had caused hitherto unheard-of destruction both in and far behind our positions, in addition to very heavy losses in men, the French were unable to gain any vital advantages on the 24th in Champagne. The English, on the other hand, on the first day of their attack, by the employment of gas, succeeded in occupying our foremost positions at Loos over a breadth of 7½ miles. They were, however, unable to develop this success. Incessant counter-attacks of the brave defenders not only prevented this, but also recovered substantial portions of the lost positions. The French, who attacked the Sixth Army on both sides of the Scarpe in conjunction with the English, achieved no successes worthy of mention at all.

The position in Champagne on the 25th September was much more serious. Continuing their offensive, the French on this day, on and to the east of the Souain-Somme-Py road, with seventeen divisions, drove the remnants of two German divisions, on a front of 15 miles, with a depth of 2½ miles, back into their rear positions, which unfortu-

nately had also been shot to pieces. A serious crisis arose, leading the Staff of the Third Army to consider the advisability of a further withdrawal of the whole army front. Such a step would of necessity have led to very serious consequences, firstly in the moral effect, which would inevitably have been general, secondly in the tactical results on the neighboring fronts, and finally by giving space to the enemy masses, which were crowded helplessly together against present positions, to escape from their momentarily intolerable situation.

Fortunately the proposed withdrawal was never carried out. On the urgent advice of the Chief of Staff of the neighboring Fifth Army, Major-General Schmidt von Knobelsdorf, the consideration of the matter was adjourned until the arrival of G. H. Q., who were on their way to the Western front, and after their arrival at noon on the 25th September, there was no further question of any voluntary withdrawal. There were still reserves available. They at once threw into Champagne one of the last divisions of the general reserve from Alsace, and the 10th Army Corps, the Guards Corps going to the Sixth Army. Both these corps had just reached Belgium from the East.

This additional strength sufficed to some extent to break the weight of the enemy's first attacks on the fighting fronts, but it was insufficient to repel the whole offensive, which lasted for many days. The heavy fighting wore down the strength even of formations freshly thrown in, all the more quickly because heavy rain had set in on the evening of the 25th September, turning the shell-torn battlefield into a marsh. True, the difficulties thus caused were no doubt even more noticeable in attack than in defence. The enormous numerical superiority against which we had to contend is well illustrated by the fact that there were thrown in against the Third Army no less than thirty-five French divisions, with 2,000 heavy and 3,000 field guns. Behind them were numerous cavalry divisions, of which considerable portions actually took part, ready to attack.

Accordingly, in the first half of October, G. H. Q. had many worn troops replaced by fresh divisions, drawn from

quiet sectors of the front, until the arrival of further forces from the East relieved them of the task. Apart from the modest initial successes above-mentioned, the enemy had no further advantages of any importance to record. The fighting did not, however, die down in Flanders until the 13th, or in Champagne until the 20th October.

"The greatest battle of all time," as the commander of an English Guards division described it in divisional orders on the eve of the battle, had been fought. But it had not achieved the success contemplated by the French C.-in-C., General Joffre, in his battle orders.

They had not driven the Germans out of France, not a single one of their countrymen had been freed from his twelve months' "slavery," and a splendid victory had not been won over the Germans. The only effect one must admit is that, not the attack, but the anticipation of it, and the preparation to meet it, had an influence on the German operations against Russia. But this fact cannot be credited to the battle, being a simple result of waging war on many fronts. The "greatest battle of all time" became a terrible defeat for the attackers. Tremendous sacrifices in men and material were made for a result which was nothing in comparison to the objectives aimed at, and in itself amounted to but little, for it was of no importance from the general point of view whether a few narrow sectors of the German positions had to be withdrawn a few miles or not. The defensive system remained absolutely unshaken.

Nor could we have done any more with all the additional men we might have brought up by breaking off the Eastern operations earlier. The troops and material available would not even then have been sufficient for counter-attacks, or attacks on other fronts, with large objectives. And to have made any sacrifice for the sake of local successes was not at that time in our interests. Without involving any prejudice to the aims which we could, on a sober calculation of all the conditions, reasonably pursue in the East, the reinforcements arrived in the West at exactly the right moment for the task allotted to them there. Had they arrived earlier they might have ensured that the small

indentations in our front should be smaller still, but that was of no importance for the general position, while their earlier recall from the Eastern front would have crippled the operations in progress there, the prospects of which were most emphatically described by the commanders on the spot as extraordinarily good.

Finally, it must not be forgotten that the German soldier on the Western front is entitled to most of the credit for the fact that the reinforcements from the East came up in time. His marvellous resistance in the pitifully shattered positions in Flanders and Champagne warded off the danger of their reaching the front line too late.

Amid death and terror he clung firm, in accordance with his battle orders, to the spot he had to defend, in countless cases even when there had long been no officer or N. C. O. left to set him an example. Not content with that, he attacked with magnificent self-sacrifice the enemy masses surging over and around him, whenever opportunity arose. Thus were formed firm islands and islets in the sea of destruction created by the enemy artillery. Against these, the first waves of the enemy infantry attacks were broken, but the masses following them pressed forward unceasingly. Blocks and bunches of men formed, in which the German artillery tore tremendous gaps, while it became impossible to maintain order. Enemy reinforcements failed. The more men were brought up, the worse the position became. The offensive was throttled by his own mass.

No language could be too strong to describe the achievements of the German troops in the Champagne battlefield in those days. Every great deed hitherto done in war paled beside their heroism.

This tribute to the German soldier involves no depreciation of his enemies. To be defeated in a fight against heroes is no disgrace. If the French and English cannot be placed on the same level as the defenders, they certainly did their duty nobly. Their losses are the best proof of this. The lack of success was due to no failure of theirs. It was probably mainly due to the plan of operations.

RUSSIA'S DESPERATE RALLY

THE CZAR TAKES PERSONAL COMMAND OF HIS ARMIES

SEPTEMBER 5TH

CZAR NICHOLAS II.
AN ANONYMOUS HUNGARIAN OFFICER
EDWIN GREWE

On November 15, 1915, General Russky, then in command of the Russian armies, issued an announcement pointing out that the Germans had been driven back in several places during the past month. "By thus failing to advance," said the resolute general, "the Germans are really retreating."

The words were true. Germany had reached the limit to which she could, or at least to which she judged she safely could, carry her advance. On September 5th the Czar, recognizing Russia's desperate need, assumed personal command of his armies on the German front. The former commander, his uncle Nicholas, was transferred to take command of the Turkish front in the Caucasus. This did not mean that the Czar really directed his armies, but only that by his presence he encouraged them, and that the traitors and "profiteers" in office who had done so much toward the betrayal of their fighting countrymen dared no longer act so openly against their country.

Russian resistance now strengthened, and the advance of the Germans slackened as they entered real Russia and must struggle across its vast swamps. Their huge artillery became too heavy to transport, and without it they found the Russians could still fight them with equal strength. So Russia was saved by her marshes and her courage. At the end of October the fighting line extended from Riga, which had withstood all assaults in the north, to Dvinsk strongly fortified on the Dvina River, then to Pinsk east of Brest-Litovsk, and then to Rovno in the south where General Ivanoff gained repeated Russian successes as early as September.

BY NICHOLAS II.

Proclamation Addressed to the Grand Duke Nicholas

AT the beginning of the war I was unavoidably prevented from following the inclination of my soul to put myself at the head of the army. That was why I intrusted you with the Commandership-in-Chief of all the land and sea forces.

Under the eyes of the whole of Russia your Imperial

Highness has given proof during the war of steadfast bravery which caused a feeling of profound confidence, and called forth the sincere good wishes of all who followed your operations through the inevitable vicissitudes of fortune of war.

My duty to my country, which has been intrusted to me by God, impels me to-day, when the enemy has penetrated into the interior of the Empire, to take the supreme command of the active forces and to share with my army the fatigues of war, and to safeguard with it Russian soil from the attempts of the enemy.

The ways of Providence are inscrutable, but my duty and my desire determine me in my resolution for the good of the State.

The invasion of the enemy on the Western front necessitates the greatest possible concentration of the civil and military authorities, as well as the unification of the command in the field, and has turned our attention from the southern front. At this moment I recognize the necessity of your assistance and counsels on our southern front, and I appoint you Viceroy of the Caucasus and Commander-in-Chief of the valiant Caucasian Army.

I express to your Imperial Highness my profound gratitude and that of the country for your labors during the war.

[This proclamation by the Czar was, on October 23rd, reenforced by the following official statement:]

From May till October the Russian Army was subjected to uninterrupted blows along a front of 700 miles. The Austro-Germans applied every possible means, not excepting such as are forbidden by international treaties, in order to increase the pressure against us. Masses of their troops were flung against this front and sent to destruction regardless of losses. Military history does not afford another example of such pressure.

During these months of continuous and prolonged action the high qualities and mettle of our troops under the difficulties and arduous conditions of the retreat were demonstrated afresh. Notwithstanding his obstinacy in fighting

and his persistency in carrying out maneuvers, the enemy is still confronted by an army which fully retains its strength, morale, and its ability, not only to offer a stanch and successful resistance, but to assume the offensive and inflict blows which have been demonstrated by the events of recent days. This affords the best proof that the Austro-Germans failed to destroy, or even to disorganize, our army.

Seeing that they failed in that effort during the five months which were most favorable to them, it would be impossible for them to repeat the Galician and Vistula exploits now that the successes of the Allies in the west have complicated the strategical position. The crisis has passed favorably for us. We issued safely from the difficult position in the advanced Vistula theater, where we were enveloped on three sides, and now stand based upon the center of our empire, unexhausted by the war.

It is true that there is still much fierce and determined fighting ahead. There may be movements rearward, but there will certainly be advances also. Our army lives in the expectation of a general offensive and looks with full confidence to the armies of its allies. It will march boldly and cheerfully forward, conscious that in so doing it is defending the interests of our country and the interests of our allies. Stern struggle with the forces of nature has schooled the Russians to hardships and ingrained in them the instinct to hasten to the succor and relief of a brother in need. Hence an appeal from our allies will always find a warm response from the Russian Army.

LETTER FROM AN HUNGARIAN OFFICER ON THE RUSSIAN FRONT

Every tree is a little islet standing out of the gloomy marshland, and shallow lakes which extend for mile after mile. The roads are inundated by the water, which has risen high owing to the floods of rain, and from the miserable cottages, which at intervals are to be seen partly submerged along the highways, strange looking men with long beards and thick, matted hair, mostly woodcutters and

others earning a precarious living from the products of the surrounding wilderness, creep out and stare with amazement at the Austrian and German cavalrymen.

According to the figures almost half of the territory is covered by wet, impassable, and uncultivated forest, wooded territory, most of it being useless, bushy, and impenetrable. The ground itself is divided into different kinds of marshy lands, impassable muddy districts, immense weedy and grassy territories, also regions covered by some kind of more solid grassy substance, and other thousands and thousands of acres of land perpetually under water.

The resources of this gigantic wilderness are naturally very scanty, and the number of inhabitants very small. One may not even think of any military comfort of billeting or the kind, and camping in the open air, on account of the climate, the lack of water, and owing to the milliards of most dangerous insects and snakes, seems to be an impossible undertaking. How an army of many hundred thousands of men could undertake an advance movement on this marshy ground covered with thick forest, mud, and water is almost unimaginable, for only the hilly districts contain roads used by pedestrians or the Russian ponies used to these kinds of roads. The climate itself is unbearable for those used to healthy and dry districts; the vaporings of the marshes are liable to cause fever and typhoid.

BY EDWIN GREWE

In the German campaign against Russia the Germans had not unlimited time to spare. Time would merely repair the Russian strength; it was essential to Germany to break it beyond repair. The time remaining in 1915 before the autumn rains was very short for any such decisive result. At the beginning of September it might be put at six weeks, or eight weeks at most. Consequently, in the early part of September, with the advantages that had been recorded in hand, the Germans pushed their effort to the utmost. On September 1st they reached the outer defenses of Grodno, and next day stormed it, though the small number of prisoners they took is an evidence that the Russians made no

strong resistance but began to retreat when the outer forts collapsed. Farther north they offered more determined resistance between Grodno and Vilna at Orany, which is on the railway line, but the fact was only significant that the whole line between Warsaw and Vilna was now gone.

In order to prevent reënforcements being moved down, von Below renewed his attacks in the Riga district and stormed the bridgehead at Friedrichstadt on the Dvina.

At this, almost the blackest moment in Russian affairs, a change was announced in the leadership of the Russian armies which took most people by surprise. The Grand Duke Nicholas, who had been compared a year before by Mr. Balfour to the Prince Eugène of Marlborough's campaigns, was transferred to the command in the Caucasus, and the Czar, with General Alexieff as Chief of Staff, assumed supreme command of the Russian armies.

The days immediately following the announcement of the Czar's decision brought little improvement in the northern situation, though victory in Galicia, to which fuller reference will be made, was significant that the German eggs were all being put into one basket. They were now fighting east of Grodno, and, despite a vicious counter-attack of the Russians at Skidel, were beginning to thrust their forces into such positions north and south of the Vilna railway junction as to create a new salient, in which, as in previous loops, they hoped to lasso some considerable portion of the Russian forces. On paper their chances of doing so seemed more favorable than at any previous juncture in this summer and autumn campaign, because the Russian retreating units were in a state of disorder which was consequent on the events that have been described, and there was no part of their line from which reënforcements could profitably be drawn to help any other.

The Germans, on September 7th, were almost within striking distance of Vilna, at Novo Troiki; farther south, they took Volkovysk, which is east of Grodno, and is the junction of the railway lines from Grodno and Bielostok; and a few days later they repaired their check at Skidel by capturing the town. They had now the essential railway

communications south of Vilna and the main roads; and they had cut the railway north of Vilna, between Vilna and Dvinsk, at Svientsiany. They followed this up by a concentration of large forces on this section north of Vilna, and laid the foundations of their attempt to encircle Vilna and the forces still holding the railway line there. That was on September 13th. On the 12th Lord Kitchener, in a review of the military situation, declared to the House of Lords that in his belief the Germans would prove before the end of the next month to have "shot their bolt." It was a prediction which caused a good deal of surprise in England, and in Berlin it was received with derision; but events proved that Lord Kitchener was a prophet whose insight was founded on a right appreciation of the weakening effect of the German strivings.

The Germans had failed to advance quickly enough to capture any considerable number of Russians retreating from Grodno. The prospect of capturing those who might be forced to retreat from Vilna represented their last chance, and they accelerated their movements to the utmost to seize it. The taking of Novo Troiki, a few miles east of Vilna, and Orany, more to the southeast, represented the frontal grip on the salient; the seizure of Skidel after the heavy fighting for it and the subsequent advance eastwards of that place formed the southern prong of the pincers; the massing of troops in the line between Dvinsk and Vilna were precedent to the application of the northern prong. On Monday, the 13th, the capture by the Germans of Podbrozie and Novo Svenziany on the railway line north of Vilna must have convinced the Russian command that the moment for the complete evacuation of Vilna had arrived. Stores, material, and machinery had been removed long before: the problem was the removal of the main body of troops from the entrance of the salient.

While this removal was in progress a new menace was developing in the north. Masses of German and Austrian cavalry began, on September 15th, to pour over the region of Svenziany, and beyond, to Widzy. It has been estimated that their numbers were about 40,000 and that they were

accompanied by 140 guns. They swarmed all over the region which lies in the triangle formed by the two railways, one of which goes northward from Vilna to Dvinsk and the other eastwards from Vilna to Minsk. It was the last-named which they aimed to get astride, and by Friday, the 17th, they had arrived at Vileika on the Vilia, just to the north of the railway junction Moldecezno. The Russians before and during the raid had been lined up along the line of the River Vilia.

This cavalry raid, imposing as it was on paper, and daring as it was in conception, failed of its effect. It never got near enough to Moldecezno to close the gap here; and meanwhile the great body of the Russian troops were steadily retreating, not along the railway line but along the great main road to Minsk, which lies south of the railway and forms an acute angle with it at Vilna. Thus the northern prong of the pincers, of which the Germans had sought to make a long arm, proved too weak for its purpose. The southern prong, which was of stronger stuff, could not move its men fast enough. They forced their way past Skidel to Mosty, and though they were only a day's march from Lida, another junction which would have proved a danger point to the Russian retreat, they could not fight their way across that narrow space in time. They got as far as Slonim by the 18th, but that was much too far south. Thus the lower prong of the pincers could not close up, and by September 18th the failure of the encircling movement was sealed.

Vilna, of course, was lost to the Russians, and the railway line which went with it, but yet again the salient had been straightened out, and there was little prospect that another would be formed. The failure had cost the Germans more than the attempt was worth. The Russians had struck hard at the cavalry at Vilecka on the 23rd, capturing men and eight guns; they inflicted other checks on them at Smorgon and along the line of the Vilia while they made their own retreat good.

This plan, for which the credit or the blame must be assigned to von Hindenburg, sums up the more northerly

operations, except for heavy and continuous fighting, which continued long after the movement was ended, at Dvinsk, and similar operations nearer Riga.

In the middle zone Prince Leopold of Bavaria had advanced as fast as the Russians would let him, eastwards of Bielostok. An attempt on his part to hasten their retirement met with a damaging check at Slonim; but on the whole the German line from Vilna to the marshes progressed slowly eastwards. Von Mackensen's part at this time was subordinate to that of von Hindenburg. His was the section which joined up the Germans of the north to the Germans of the south across the Pripet Marshes.

If the advance eastwards of Prince Leopold and of von Mackensen had been slow and unproductive of much beyond wasted territory and desolate marsh, the German-Austrians in Galicia south of the Pripet Marshes fared a good deal worse. The Pripet River gives its name to a vast basin of 50,000 square miles of sluggish tributary rivers overflowing into vast swamps. More difficult fighting-ground can hardly be imagined. It is the Russian version of the Masurian Lakes. Theoretically, this vast region cut the fighting lines and the armies operating between them into two halves. In practice, connection could be maintained by the Russians during much of the operations, along the railway line running from Vilna. The occupation of Pinsk by the Germans interrupted this intercommunication, and Ivanoff's southern armies then became an independent unit served by the Kiev railway. His was a splendid isolation, which never ceased to give the Germans trouble; and even in the darkest hours of the Russian retirement north of the Pripet his soldiers were constantly able to respond with a victory as a consolation. These operations were part of the Russian strategic plan of never entirely losing touch with Rumania and their former conquests in Galicia.

BULGARIA JOINS THE CENTRAL POWERS

SHE SEEKS THE DESTRUCTION OF SERBIA

OCTOBER 11TH

A. MENSHEKOFF PRINCESS RADZIWILL
PRIME MINISTER RADOSLAVOFF
ITALIAN PRESS DISPATCH

We do not need to ask why Bulgaria entered the Great War. Her prime minister, M. Radoslavoff, was very frank about it, and we give here his official announcement to his people. He tells them it will be good business, that he is convinced Germany is going to win; and moreover he has tried bargaining with both sides and Germany makes him much better offers of extra territory than the Allies can afford to. In this last statement the Bulgarian premier is quite right. Germany compelled Turkey to surrender some territory to Bulgaria at once, and promised her rule over most of unhappy Serbia as well. The Allies could make no such reckless gifts of lordship over alien peoples.

In other words, the Bulgarian leaders plunged eagerly into the partnership of greed and conquest. Both the prime minister and his chief, King Ferdinand, seem to have assumed that everybody concerned in the War was equally venal, equally murderous, as themselves. There was, however, an opposition party in Bulgaria, who disapproved this course; and that the fact may not be overlooked, we give here a noted Italian dispatch describing the protest of the opposition leaders to the king. This King Ferdinand was not himself a Bulgarian. He was a member of the ruling family of Coburg, a German state, and had been forced upon Bulgaria by the western Powers when the Balkan kingdom was released from Turkish vassalage. Neither was Ferdinand a mere figure-head like some western kings; he was the real ruler of his state.

Bulgaria, as our previous volumes have told, had bitter reason for enmity against the other Balkan states, and especially against Serbia; as they had all leagued against her in the last Balkan war (1913), when her ambitious king had attempted to override them and seize the lordship of the Balkans. Having failed in that larger scheme, Ferdinand was now willing to rule the region as Germany's viceroy. As to the eternal territorial disputes between Bulgaria and Serbia, the unhappy fact was that the two races had become so intermingled during the centuries of Turkish conquest that no man could have drawn boundary lines and said, these regions hold Serbian people, those Bulgarian. Historically, the Serbs had ruled almost the entire peninsula at one time, and the Bulgars at another. So intense had now become the rivalry between the two, that either people might have been guilty

of rejoicing over the annihilation of the other. To Bulgaria had come the chance to put her hatred into action.

As to the other states among the Allies, the one which felt most aggrieved by Bulgaria's action was Russia. Her feeling and her claim to Bulgarian loyalty is here stated by two of her writers, M. Menshekoff, the well-known conservative republican leader, and Princess Catharine Radziwill, the shrewdly observant lady of the court, retailing the court gossip.

BY A. MENSHEKOFF

A FOURTH front has been presented. War is declared on Bulgaria. For us—the old generation of Russians, who well remember the time when there was no such thing as Bulgaria, when in her place were only Turkish raiders, it is especially hard to think of this fratricidal war. The war for Bulgaria's freedom in 1877 deeply shook all Russia, and even that part of our youth too young to go forth to the front, took a most ardent unreserved part in waging the combat. That war was undertaken by Russia for no advantage or conquest, but with a view of freeing the Slav subjects from the Turkish yoke and persecution, threatening them with total destruction. The Bashibazooks, who soon after the outbreak of the war overran defenseless Bulgaria, subjected the Bulgars, their wives and children to ruthless death and destruction. Previous to an attempt at freeing the Bulgars, Russia had to save them from an imminent death. That the threat of total destruction was not merely a threat is amply proved by the present wholesale murder of the Armenians, which still goes on in those outlying villages not as yet reached by our Caucasian troops. The saving of 2,000,000 Bulgars from certain death cost us, even according to Bulgarian figures, 200,000 lives, and two milliards in money.

Of course, we had every right to expect that the little Slav nation, virtually dragged by us from the jaws of a waiting grave and returned to a life of right and freedom, would remain with us—united in heart and mind for a long time to come, if not forever. It is useless to say that we made a bitter mistake. The mistake we made was already known to those Russian heroes who fought under the banners of Radyetsky, Gurko, and Skobelyoff, covering Bulgaria

with their bodies and drenching her soil with their blood. Many of the officers and men coming home from the war of 1877 had a great deal to say about the treatment they received at the hands of our "little brothers."

Having learned to know the Mussulmans and Bulgars alike, many of our warriors showed a decided preference for the manly and honest character of the Turk, as compared with the evasive and shrewd traits of our co-religionists. Apparently the 500 years of slavery did not fail to effect a decided change in the Slav blood, of which little, indeed, runs through the veins of the present-day Bulgars.

By what miracle has Germany accomplished the subjugation, by peaceful means, of the monarchs and Governments of Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria? Some great and tempting concessions were undoubtedly offered by the Governments of Central Europe, and, like scattered robbers gradually flocking in the well-organized band, Turkey and Bulgaria hastened to throw their fortunes in with that of the Teutonic powers. They are clearly tempted with the outlook of a huge world robbery, Bulgaria swayed from side to side for a whole year. But when she saw the Germans, according to the Bulgarian Premier Radoslavoff, "capture a great strip of the enemy's territory, without losing one foot of their soil," the argument advanced was final and decisive.

The Government, which came into life thirty-seven years ago, now joined hands with the highway nations of Europe, and together with them it will undoubtedly suffer a terrible fate. A hunger for the property belonging to other peoples, the ambition to set up the Bulgarian crown supreme in the entire Balkan Peninsula, a desire not to give Russia her right of way to her only outlet to the ocean—here is the Bulgarian plot in a nutshell. This we must realize as a fact and deal with it accordingly.

BY PRINCESS RADZIWILL

The fact that Bulgaria threw in her lot at last with Germany was not viewed in Russia with great surprise. Public opinion had expected that something of the kind would

happen ever since King Ferdinand had begun to exhibit his German sympathies and to turn a deaf ear to the advice which the Allies had tried to give him. Relations between the cabinets of Petrograd and of Sofia had been strained by the Balkan wars, when Serbia had won in Russia the sympathies which, by her conduct, Bulgaria had lost.

M. Sazonof hoped against hope that wisdom would prevail among the Bulgarian politicians, and that even if the King were determined to throw in his lot with that of the German States and with Austria-Hungary, the secular enemy of the Slav cause, his advisers and ministers would not allow him to embark on such a suicidal policy. Unfortunately these hopes proved entirely false, partly on account of the weak diplomacy of the Russian representative at the court of Sofia, M. Savinsky, who was anything but a statesman, and who instead of giving his whole attention to the difficult political situation of Bulgaria preferred spending his time playing tennis and flirting with fair ladies. He had been a great favorite in his circle at Petrograd, where he had taken himself much too seriously, and at Stockholm, previous to his appointment in Sofia, he had been greatly petted by society. He was absolutely no match for King Ferdinand, who did not even consider it a triumph to hoodwink him. By the disquieting reports which M. Savinsky sent to his immediate chiefs, he lured them on to a false security that allowed the crafty Coburger to commit treason the moment he thought he could do so without risk.

It would be difficult to find a more mismanaged affair than the Balkan crisis. Bulgaria ought to have been persuaded into accepting the conditions offered to her, instead of being merely irritated. Action should have been taken instead of letting things drift until it became impossible to improve them, or to remedy the decisions taken by the unscrupulous ruler of an unscrupulous people. But the Russian Foreign Office always kept a latent feeling of kindness for Bulgaria, and never quite realized that all its efforts to win her as an ally had not only failed, but had had the opposite influence. Bulgaria did not care any longer for Russia; it is to be doubted whether she had ever cared for

her at all. Bulgaria was ambitious; Bulgaria had dreams about Constantinople, which she considered as her future possession, and knowing that Russia would prove a serious rival for her in that direction, she aspired to liberate herself from any obligations in regard to her old patron, whom she began to hate as events unfolded themselves in the Near East, with a hatred the more ferocious that it was absolutely unjustified. Russian influence, which in spite of official opinion in Petrograd, had never been firmly established in Bulgaria, and which, in his brief day of power, Prince Alexander of Battenberg had attempted to shake off, was quite dead when the Great War began; the Turk had far more chance to be listened to at Sofia than M. Sazonof.

Nevertheless, there existed still in Petrograd enthusiastic though weak-minded people who could not reconcile themselves to the accomplished facts of Bulgaria's misdeeds. It was partly due to this foolish faction that a considerable portion of Russian society felt that we ought not to draw the sword against those Slav brethren, or *bratouschki*, whom, earlier, we had delivered from the Turkish yoke.

To many, therefore, the treason of Bulgaria, bound as she ought to have been by the closest ties of gratitude, came as a shock; but the majority, who had seen it coming, declared that, after all, it was a thousand times preferable to have an avowed foe than to run the risk of being betrayed by a false friend.

This, however, was poor consolation in the face of the fact that the alliance of Bulgaria with Germany and with Turkey would assure the direct communication of these two powers with each other, and thus add considerably to the already numerous difficulties with which the Allies were finding themselves confronted in the Balkans. Some people said that it would perhaps have been more judicious on the part of Russia not to have issued its ultimatum to King Ferdinand until he had thrown off his mask and spontaneously announced his intentions of becoming untrue to all the promises which he had made. All the same, considering the dignity of a great country like Russia, it could hardly have been expected that she would remain quiet under provo-

cations which were as insolent as they were disgraceful.

King Ferdinand acted throughout with that hypocrisy in which he had always shown himself a master. He began by saying that he had done all that lay within his power to remain upon good terms with the Russian Government, but that the bulk of the Bulgarian nation, being opposed to Russia, were not going to continue to be bullied by the latter country, as had been the case lately. He therefore found himself compelled to submit to the wishes of his people. He also considerately added that he was convinced the Central Powers would be victorious, and so he could not pursue any other policy, an avowal which had at least the merit of being perfectly frank, a thing that must have astonished Ferdinand himself, so little used was he to tell the truth.

The Greek question also was causing trouble and anxiety, and altogether the position in the Balkans seemed to have assumed a most grave character, one of the worst features being the possibilities of new surprises every day coming from the most unexpected quarters. With a man like King Ferdinand treason was a matter of indifference, and he could with perfect equanimity try to win the friendship of those whom he had reviled a few days before. A man who knew him well, and who happened to have been at Sofia while negotiations were still going on between the Bulgarian Government and Serbia, wrote to me as follows on his return:

"My journey has been a most interesting one, but I am not at all sorry it has come to an end. Bulgaria is not a nice country to live in at the present moment. One has all the time the feeling that one is allowed to exist on sufferance, and that the inhabitants of this land look upon one with the eyes of a crocodile about to swallow the victim he has been watching for a long time. King Ferdinand is surely meditating some big *coup* from which he probably hopes to obtain at last supremacy over the whole of the Balkan Peninsula, an ambition he has had ever since his acceptance of the Bulgarian throne. It was a tremendous mistake not to oblige Serbia to concede everything her neighbor asked from her, rather than furnish Bulgaria with a pretext for joining

the ranks of her enemies. The idea that it would have been useless because Ferdinand would always have remained the tool of Austria was a perfectly foolish one. First of all, Ferdinand has never been the tool of anybody, or of anything, save perhaps of his own ambition. He has absolutely no sympathies for Austria, or for Francis Joseph, who more than once has humiliated him, and made him feel that they had nothing in common. He hates Russia just as much, and tolerates Germany and its Kaiser simply because it seems to him that from that quarter he may expect the most. The great strength of the man consists in his knowledge of his own importance at this moment of crisis, when his going over to one side or to the other means so much to those with whom he chooses to throw in his lot. His uncommon cuteness makes him realize that where two quarrel then is the opportunity for a third party to take what he considers his own, and to get what he wants: Ferdinand certainly does not belong to the people who miss their opportunities. He has been preparing himself all along for the part he means to play now, and he has contrived to assure himself of the cooperation of many influential persons in Bulgaria, who from quite different motives from his own would like to get rid of Russian influence and Russia's constant interference in the affairs of their country and of the Balkan Peninsula. Being perfectly aware that it is highly improbable that Russia will be allowed to take Constantinople, he would like to be the one personage indicated to supplant the Sultan on that throne of ancient Byzantium which he has coveted ever since he set foot on Bulgarian soil.

"With quite an artistic touch King Ferdinand has slowly fomented an intense distrust against Russia amongst his subjects, and persuaded them that Russia, instead of having their interests at heart, is aspiring to put one of her Grand Dukes in the Palace of Sofia, and to make Bulgaria a Russian province. The idea, of course, is a most distasteful one, and Ferdinand has found in it one of his best pretexts for persuading his ignorant and unsuspicious people that it would be to their advantage to join the Central Powers in their struggle against the Allies. His excellent argument for en-

forcing his opinions has been to put into prison all those who ventured to question them or to challenge their sincerity. Sofia swarms with spies, who keep the Government informed of all the persons whose influence might be exercised against the King and his schemes. I can assure you that though King Ferdinand received me, and asked me to dinner, and showed himself most gracious toward me—in memory of the past, I suppose—yet I was not at all sure when I went to bed that I might not be wakened during the night by gendarmes come to arrest me, and I heaved a deep sigh of relief when I had crossed the Bulgarian frontier. Nothing that can happen in that land of surprises will astonish me, and even if Ferdinand decided to pass over to the enemy, and to put his army at the disposal of Germany, this would not mean at all that he could not change his mind at the eleventh hour, because after he had started on the war path he might, if the allurement proved sufficiently strong to tempt him, invoke that conscience of which he has made such profitable use, and explain to his subjects that he had convinced himself the Allies were in the right. No man alive has ever practiced better than he has done the art of forgetting his resolutions of the day before in favor of his sympathies of the next."

There was certainly a good deal in what my correspondent wrote, and it is most likely that if the Russian Foreign Office had been a little more tactful, Bulgaria's neutrality might have been secured. M. Sazonof, however, was far too honest to promise what he did not intend or mean to grant. Rather than compromise himself by negotiations which might have been interpreted in a false light, he preferred to send the ultimatum to the Bulgarian Government, which resulted in the rupture of diplomatic relations between Petrograd and Sofia. Very soon afterwards the Czar announced to his faithful subjects that the Bulgaria which we had created and delivered from the Turkish yoke had turned traitor to us, and joined the ranks of our enemies.

The great question which followed upon this announcement was how to get to the help of Serbia before the latter country had been entirely annihilated by the combined Aus-

trian and German armies. Whilst these events were taking place, the Allies were landing as many men as they could at Salonika, but were confronted by new difficulties coming from Greece. The war was beginning once more to assume a character more favorable to our enemies than it had done for the last three months, and it was also getting more and more agonizing, owing to the suspense which it entailed on all those who were immediately concerned.

For Russians the fact of having to fight against Slav brethren was inexpressibly bitter and painful. It added a new horror to all those already experienced; but hard as it was to draw the sword to punish people with whom one had believed most sincerely that one would always remain on brotherly and affectionate terms, awful as it seemed to find that one's own familiar friend had turned false, the moral disaster did not destroy the confidence which Russia felt as to the ultimate issue of the war. That war had to be won, even if the struggle lasted ten years, even if it extended to a whole century. The German tyrant had to be crushed, German arrogance had to be destroyed.

BY M. RADOSLAVOFF

To-day we see races that are fighting, not indeed for ideals, but solely for their material interests. The more, therefore, we are bound to a country in a material way, the greater is that country's interest in our maintenance and increase, since thereby that one will profit who helps us and is tied to us by economic bonds.

If, therefore, we are to change our previous policy for indefinite, unsafe, and to us even unknown advantages, that means the ruin of our agriculture and trade, and indeed everything that we have built up in thirty-six years, the reconstruction of our entire business as a people, and the seeking of new export markets for our goods.

The figures show that our trade, our interests, and our economic life are inseparably linked with Turkey, Germany, and Austria-Hungary. . . .

What would become of Bulgaria if Constantinople should become Russian and we should lose the Constantinople

market? We have seen that almost our entire export trade in live stock, cheese, kashkawal, flour, etc., goes to Turkey —that is to say, to Constantinople. If, now, Constantinople is conquered by Russia, it will introduce there its autonomous protective staff, and will make impossible the present exports of Bulgarian products to Constantinople. Even as Bulgaria cannot now export anything to Russia, so it will be unable to export anything to the Russian Constantinople. There are no other export markets for these products at present, and such cannot be easily found.

But if we go against Germany, it would for sanitary and veterinary reasons immediately cut off the imports of Bulgarian eggs and make more difficult our tobacco imports. All this would cause an economic crisis in Bulgaria such as we have never before witnessed and of which we can scarcely form a conception. Our live stock industry, as well as all mills that have been set up in Varna and Burgas to grind flour for Constantinople, will be ruined. Our finest and most useful industry will be destroyed, and the millions invested in them lost. The live stock industry is the basis of our agricultural life.

In heavy days for Bulgaria, Germany assisted and gave it the required loan without any political conditions whatsoever. Every impartial Bulgar is in duty bound to confess that through this loan Germany saved us from bankruptcy, as well as from political subjugation. The war has shown how mighty Germany, and even Austria-Hungary, is in an economic sense. If these States, therefore, desire it, they have always the power to render us valuable support. They have done so till now, and we have no reason to suppose that they will not support us also in the future. On the contrary, from the assurances in German newspapers and statements of German statesmen, we can with full confidence count upon German financial help. Even as we write these lines we are informed that Germany has again granted us a loan of 125,000,000 lewas ($25,000,000) for the defraying of current debts, without any political conditions.

Our greatest foe to-day is Serbia. It has subjugated the purely Bulgarian Macedonia and is administering it in

a barbarian manner never before witnessed. For the Macedonian populace there are no laws and no human rights of any sort. This populace is, without exception, exposed to slaughter; the streams are red with blood; women have been violated, and the male population suitable for military service has been sent into the field to die for the creation of a "Greater Serbia." One need only profess to be a Bulgar in Macedonia to be beaten to death like a dog, so great is the hatred of Serbia toward Bulgaria. After the wars the Serbs had grown so arrogant that the transit of a Bulgar through Serbia—no matter who he was—was absolutely dangerous to his life, because in that State, which, according to our Government organ, *Narodni Prava,* is ruled by liars, there exist no laws for Bulgars. If we do not more quickly deliver our brothers in Macedonia from the unbearable, cruel, and bloody yoke, not a Bulgar will be left in this purely Bulgarian land. Things are, moreover, already in such a condition that Bulgaria cannot possibly exist next to a "Greater Serbia," inasmuch as the latter, which lays claim to our country up to the Jantra, will continually challenge us until it destroys us.

We do not know the wording of the famous note which the Quadruple Entente has delivered to the Bulgarian Government, but from what has been said and written in the newspapers, these facts are seen:

1. That Russia and its allies give us nothing for our neutrality, but, on the other hand, demand that we shall take part in the war as soon as possible.

2. That Bulgaria is to turn over its armies to the Quadruple Entente, placing them fully at the Entente's disposal, leaving the Entente to command them and send them wherever it seems advisable.

3. That the Bulgarian Army must conquer Constantinople and then hand it over to Russia; and,

4. In return for all this Bulgaria is permitted to retain the territory up to the Enos-Midia line, and it is promised some obscure and insufficient compensations in Macedonia, but only in case Serbia is sufficiently compensated by Austria.

That means: give your army, so that we may mix it up with our wild hordes and send them out for destruction on the various scenes of battle; and then, when Serbia has grown great and has taken South Hungary, Croatia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, and has grown to a State of from fifteen to twenty millions Bulgaria will get a small bit of land.

This shows most clearly how strongly the Quadruple Entente is allied to Serbia; how it is unwilling to persuade the latter to make concessions, and how it mocks our legitimate demands. The Quadruple Entente is known for its noise and its making of alarms. It is known, too, that during our last negotiations for a loan they published secret notes and even meddled in our internal affairs merely in order to evoke disturbances in the country to win Bulgaria for the Quadruple Entente. In this respect Germany and Austria-Hungary work quietly and without noise. From what well-informed persons have told us we can with certainty state that the promises of Germany and Austria-Hungary to Bulgaria for its neutrality are, in the main, as follows:

1. All of Macedonia, including Skopie, Bitolia, Ochrida, etc.

2. Friendly mediation between Bulgaria and Turkey for the purpose of ceding the line to Dedeaghatch and the territory west of the right bank of the Maritza. This agreement with Turkey is expected in a short time.

Still further territorial promises have been made to us at the expense of Serbia by the Central Powers in case of our active military assistance. These promises are in accordance with our demands for a common frontier with Austria-Hungary along the Danube. The present war has shown how absolutely necessary it is that we should have a direct and immediate connection with Hungary in order that we may be independent of a Serbia that has gone crazy. But also other parts of Old Serbia have been set forth for us in prospect.

Here we can see clearly the Quadruple Entente, in return for slight, uncertain, and doubtful advantages, demands great sacrifices from us, and that Germany and Austria-

Hungary give us clearly and categorically to understand the things they are willing to give us in return for incomparably slighter sacrifices on our part. But the question has another side as well—we do not believe in promises of any sort any more, anyway, and still less those of the Quadruple Entente, which took up Italy as an ally after it had in such treacherous fashion trampled under foot its word of honor and broken a thirty-three-year-old treaty of alliance. On the contrary, we have full reason to believe in a treaty with Germany, which has always fulfilled its treaty obligations, and is fighting the whole world merely in order to live up to its treaty obligations to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

Finally, we must hold to that group of the powers which will win the victory in the present war, since only so can the important territorial extensions and further developments be insured. From the developments of the operations in the various theaters of the war, on the front against France and Belgium as well as the fronts against Italy, Russia, and Serbia, one recognizes more clearly day by day that victory is inclining on the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary. We need not linger long over the question, inasmuch as it has become clear to the point of certainty for every observer that Russia, which has lost fortresses like Warsaw and Ivangorod, will soon be overthrown, and then the turn will come for France, Italy, England, and Serbia. Germany has proved that it is so strongly organized in a military and material sense and can dispose of such enormous, superior, and inexhaustible forces as will enable it soon to overthrow its foes.

ITALIAN DISPATCH FROM LONDON "DAILY TELEGRAPH"

Five opposition members of the parliament, MM. Gueshoff, Danoff, Malinoff, Zanoff, and Stambulivski, were received by the King in the Red Room at the Royal Palace, and chairs had been placed for them around a big table. The King entered the room, accompanied by Prince Boris, the heir apparent, and his Secretary, M. Bobcovitch. "Be seated, gentlemen," said the King, as he sat down himself

as if for a very quiet talk. His Secretary took a seat at a table a little apart to take notes, but the conversation immediately became so heated and rapid that he was unable to write it down.

The first to speak was M. Malinoff, leader of the Democratic Party, who said: "The policy adopted by the Government is one of adventure tending to throw Bulgaria into the arms of Germany, and driving her to attack Serbia. This policy is contrary to the aspirations, feeling, and interests of the country, and if the Government obstinately continues in this way it will provoke disturbances of the greatest gravity."

It was the first allusion to the possibility of a revolution, but the King listened without flinching. M. Malinoff concluded: "For these reasons we beg your Majesty, after having vainly asked the Government, to convoke the Chamber immediately, and we ask this convocation for the precise object of saving the country from dangerous adventures by the formation of a coalition Ministry."

The King remained silent, and, with a nod, invited M. Stambulivski to speak.

M. Stambulivski is the leader of the Agrarian Party, a man of sturdy rustic appearance, accustomed to speak out his mind boldly, and exceedingly popular among the peasant population. He grew up himself as a peasant, and wore the laborer's blouse up till very recently. He stood up, and, looking the King straight in the face, said in a resolute tone:

"In the name of every farmer in Bulgaria I add to what M. Malinoff has just said, that the Bulgarian people hold you personally responsible more than your Government for the disastrous adventure of 1913. If a similar adventure were to be repeated now its gravity this time would be irreparable. The responsibility would once more fall on your policy, which is contrary to the welfare of our country, and the nation would not hesitate to call you personally to account. That there may be no mistake as to the real wishes of the country, I present to your Majesty my country's demand in writing."

He handed the King a letter containing the resolution

voted by the Agrarians. The King read it, and then turned to M. Zanoff, leader of the Radical Democrats, and asked him to speak. M. Zanoff did so, speaking very slowly and impressively, and also looking the King straight in the face:

"Sire, I had sworn never again to set foot inside your palace, and if I came to-day, it is because the interests of my country are above personal questions, and have compelled me. Your Majesty may read what I have to say in this letter, which I submit to you in behalf of our party."

He handed the letter, and the King read it and still remained silent. Then he said, turning to his former Prime Minister and ablest politician: "Gueshoff, it is now your turn to speak."

M. Gueshoff got up and said: "I also am fully in accord with what M. Stambulivski has just said. No matter how severe his words may have been in their simple, unpolished frankness, which ignores the ordinary formalities of etiquette, they entirely express our unanimous opinion. We all, as representing the Opposition, consider the present policy of the Government contrary to the sentiments and the interests of the country because by driving it to make common cause with Germany it makes us the enemies of Russia, which was our deliverer, and the adventure into which we are thus thrown compromises our future. We disapprove most absolutely of such a policy, and we also ask that the Chamber be convoked and a Ministry formed with the cooperation of all parties."

After M. Gueshoff, the former Premier M. Daneff also spoke and associated himself with what had already been said.

The King remained still silent for a while. Then he also stood up and said: "Gentlemen, I have listened to your threats and will refer them to the President of the Council of Ministers that he may know and decide what to do."

All present bowed, and a chilly silence followed. The King had evidently taken the frank warning given him as a threat to him personally, and he walked up and down nervously for a while. Prince Boris turned aside to talk with the Secretary, who had resumed taking notes. The King

continued pacing to and fro, evidently very nettled. Then, approaching M. Zanoff, and as if to change the conversation, he asked him for news about this season's harvest.

M. Zanoff abruptly replied: "Your Majesty knows that we have not come here to talk about the harvest, but of something far more important at present, namely, the policy of your Government, which is on the point of ruining our country. We can on no account approve a policy that is anti-Russian. If the Crown and M. Radoslavoff persist in their policy we shall not answer for the consequences. We have not desired to seek out those responsible for the disaster of 1913, because other grave events have been precipitated, but it was a disaster due to criminal folly. It must not be repeated by an attack on Serbia by Bulgaria, as seems contemplated by M. Radoslavoff, and which, according to all appearances, has the approval of your Majesty. It would be a premeditated crime, and deserve to be punished."

The King hesitated a moment, and then held out his hand to M. Zanoff, saying: "All right; at all events, I thank you for your frankness." Then approaching M. Stambulivski, he repeated to him his question about the harvest.

M. Stambulivski, as a simple peasant, at first allowed himself to be led into discussion of this secondary matter, and had expressed the hope that the prohibition of the export of cereals would be removed, when he suddenly remembered, and said: "But this is not the moment to speak of these things. I again repeat to your Majesty that the country does not want a policy of adventure, which cost it so dear in 1913. It was your own policy, too. Before 1913 we thought you were a great diplomatist, but since then we have seen what fruits your diplomacy bears. You took advantage of all the loopholes in the Constitution to direct the country according to your own views. Your Ministers are nothing; you alone are the author of this policy, and you will have to bear the responsibility."

The King replied frigidly: "The policy which I have decided to follow is that which I consider the best for the welfare of the country."

"It is a policy that will only bring misfortune," replied

the sturdy Agrarian. "It will lead to fresh catastrophes and compromise not only the future of our country but that of your dynasty, and may cost you your head."

It was as bold a saying as ever was uttered before a King, and Ferdinand looked astonished at the peasant who was thus speaking to him. He said: "Do not mind my head; it is already old. Rather mind your own," he added, with a disdainful smile, as he turned away.

M. Stambulivski retorted: "My head matters little, Sire. What matters more is the good of our country."

The King paid no more attention to him, and took M. Gueshoff and M. Danoff apart, who again insisted on convoking the Chamber, and assured him that M. Radoslavoff's Government would be in a minority. They also referred to the Premier's oracular utterances.

"Ah!" said the King, "has Radoslavoff spoken to you? And what has he said?"

"He has said," replied the leaders, "that Bulgaria would march with Germany and attack Serbia."

The King made a vague gesture, and then said: "Oh, I did not know!"

The incidents of this famous interview are beginning to be gradually known in Sofia, and have created a deep impression in political circles.

THE CRUSHING OF SERBIA

THE HEROIC STRUGGLE AGAINST HOPELESS ODDS

OCTOBER 6TH—NOVEMBER 30TH

VLADISLAV SAVIC — ROBERT MACHRAY
GENERAL VON FALKENHAYN — GENERAL VON CRAMON

Bulgaria's entrance into the War sealed Serbia's doom. Too late, the Allies hurried an army to the Greek city of Salonika, the nearest seaport on the Mediterranean, and endeavored to advance from there to Serbia's aid. Bulgaria controlled the railroad route which led from Salonika toward northern Serbia; and from the north an overwhelming German-Austrian attack was launched on October 6th. As soon as this Teuton invasion was assuredly begun, Bulgaria made her sudden declaration of war and swooped like a vulture on the hard-pressed Serbs.

The Allied army at Salonika and the Ally supplies might have sufficed to save Serbia from the Teuton attack; but the Allied army could not fight its way through the mountain passes held by the Bulgarians. Thus this second Ally army in the Balkans, like the first at the Dardanelles, met only repulse and brought disrepute to the Ally cause throughout the East. Serbia was crushed, and to all the Balkans German victory must have seemed assured.

The story of the disaster is told here by Vladislav Savic, a Serbian soldier, and by the British authority on Serbian affairs, Robert Machray. For the German view we quote the memoirs of Falkenhayn who still held the rank to which Ludendorf later succeeded, Chief of the High Staff. We then give the gossipy yet authoritative account of General von Cramon, Chief Aide to the Austrian commander Hoetzendorff, whom he so admires.

BY VLADISLAV SAVIC

AFTER the German success in Russia during the summer of 1915, Germany, realizing the full importance of the Balkan front, turned her attention to the south and decided upon an offensive against Serbia. Having no trust in Austrian forces or leadership and perfectly aware of the resistance Serbia would offer, this time the new army of invasion consisted mainly of German troops and its command was intrusted to Mackensen, decidedly one of the ablest German generals. On their part the Entente Powers were misguided in their Balkan policy and totally failed to grasp the situation. Instead of reënforcing the Serbian front as the best means of inducing Rumania and Greece to side with

the Allies and of preventing Bulgaria from joining the Central Powers, their diplomacy began the fruitless negotiations with Bulgaria which only accelerated the German offensive and the terrible disaster which befell Serbia.

In September, 1915, the Austro-German forces under the command of Field-Marshal Mackensen were massed on the Serbian front along the Save and the Danube. Meanwhile the negotiations undertaken by the diplomacy of the Entente Powers with Bulgaria were protracted without leading to any result. Bulgaria played her double game very adroitly. She could not move before the Austro-German forces were ready for coöperation with her. On the 19th of September the Germans opened the bombardment of the Serbian front. Four days later, on the 23rd of September, Bulgaria ordered the general mobilization. The Serbian headquarters entertained no doubt concerning the objective of the Bulgarian military action. With an enormous front some 320 miles in length towards Bulgaria, with her main line of communication, Nish-Salonika, within reach of the first successful Bulgarian raid, Serbia's military position was extremely dangerous. The only chance to improve it was quick, energetic action against Bulgaria. The Serbian headquarters did not expect by such a move to conquer Bulgaria or to annihilate her army completely, but they rightly judged that it would hinder the Bulgarian mobilization in the western districts, and by occupation of some important centers it might cripple her forces considerably and greatly hamper her action. In that way the enemy's victory might be delayed, and by gaining some weeks the Allies might fulfill their promise of assisting Serbia. The Serbian population and army might have retreated to the south, using the railway line Nish-Salonika, which would have saved many thousands of lives and enormous quantities of war material. With this object in view, the Serbian headquarters ordered a new concentration of the army along the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier. But the diplomacy of the Entente Powers allowed itself to be the perfect dupe of Bulgaria. Fearing that the Serbian action might spoil its cherished play at Sofia, it brought strong pressure to bear upon the Serbian

Government, which prevented the Serbian military action against Bulgaria. From that moment Serbia was doomed, the crushing of her army by the united Bulgaro-Austro-German forces was inevitable, and her population was exposed to fearful sufferings and privations unparalleled in modern times.

But to the eternal glory of Serbia, even in the moment of such supreme danger, she organized her small forces as best she could, and offered a resistance which, better than any victory could, speaks of the indomitable spirit of the Serbs.

At the end of September, 1915, the Austro-German forces were disposed along the Danube and the Save in the following way:

Opposite the Serbian front Ram-Smederevo-Grocka was the army of General Gallwitz, consisting of nine German divisions. Against the front Grocka-Belgrade-Ostruznica were two German and two Austrian divisions. From Obrenovac to the mouth of the Drina was the 19th Austrian army corps, with some detached brigades along the Drina. That whole army numbered 111 German and 53 Austrian battalions.

To oppose them the Serbians could concentrate on the northern front only 116 battalions, of which 40 battalions belonged to the third ban. The remaining troops were engaged on the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier. Besides outnumbering the Serbs by three to two in the infantry, the Austro-German division disposed of two regiments of artillery, but especially in heavy artillery their advantage over the Serbian troops was enormous.

On October 6th the Austro-Germans, after heavy artillery preparation from pieces of every caliber, and without sparing ammunition, began the crossing of the Drina, the Save and the Danube. Bloody encounters took place at Obrenovac, Ostruznica, Belgrade, Smederevo and Ram. At all these places the first enemy's detachments, after having succeeded in crossing the rivers, were annihilated before being able to secure a footing or to develop their front. Only after seven days of incessant battle of the most stubborn character did the enemy succeed in forcing the rivers.

The weight of his heavy guns was telling, the English, French and Russian batteries of heavy artillery defending Belgrade were silenced on the first day and their ramparts shattered to dust, thus leaving the whole burden of defense upon the Serbian infantry. Notwithstanding all this, the defense was splendid and called forth the admiration of German correspondents in the enemy's army. The enemy suffered very heavy losses, and was only able to advance owing to his numbers, which outflanked the Serbian positions and pounded to pieces Serbian defensive works. But every new position was fully taken advantage of by the Serbians, who retreated contesting every inch and ceding only inch by inch their territory.

On the 14th of October the Bulgarians, repeating their treachery of 1913, attacked the Serbians on the entire front without previously declaring war. The Bulgars had concentrated against Serbia seven divisions, each consisting of six regiments and one brigade, of infantry, in all 176 battalions of infantry; whereas Serbia was only able to oppose them with 78 battalions. In spite of being so greatly outnumbered, the Serbians offered stubborn resistance, and every retreat of the Serbs on the Bulgarian front was caused by the pressure of the Austro-Germans. Thus on the river Timok during twelve days, from October 13th to 24th, the Bulgarians penetrated only one and a half miles into Serbian territory, all their attacks being bloodily repulsed. But when Austro-Germans penetrated deeper to the south, the Serbs ordered the evacuation of Negotin, Zaecar and Knazevac. In the direction of the valley of the Nishava the Serbians and the Bulgarians had nearly equal forces, therefore all Bulgarian attacks were very costly and fruitless. Nowhere were the Bulgars able to dislodge the Serbs by their own forces; these were obliged to retreat before the Bulgars in view of the situation on the other fronts.

On the southern part of their front the Bulgars attacked the Serbs on the front of Vlassina, east of Vrana, with sixteen battalions, where the Serbs had only four or five battalions. They penetrated into the valley of the Morava, but their advance was stopped. Further south the Serbs

had only two newly organized divisions, whose battalions had no more than 600 rifles, with very small numbers of machine guns and artillery pieces. The Bulgars had there four brigades belonging to the 5th and 7th divisions and parts of the 2nd and 11th divisions. Therefore their advance to Skoplje and Veles could not be prevented, and they occupied both towns after much sanguinary fighting. The Bulgars sent strong numbers to Kacanik Pass and to Karadag, but their advance was stopped there, until circumstances on the other front obliged the Serbs to abandon those positions also.

Always fighting and retreating until the end of October, the Serbians entertained the hope that the British and French troops would arrive in time, and in joining with the Serbian army would be able to frustrate all enemy schemes. Not only were the military operations influenced by this hope, but the Serbian population also remained calm until the last moment, and very few took any measures to protect their lives or to save a portion of their property by escaping to Greece and allied countries.

In the first days of November the Serbian headquarters became aware that the Allied contingents would not be able to join the Serbian army north of Skoplje, therefore the higher command resolved to abandon the northern front altogether, and always fighting, to retreat to the south, in order to join the Allies and continue the resistance. The Serbian army, pressed by overwhelming enemy forces, had to execute the passage over the Western and Southern Morava, and these movements were executed by both armies without leaving either men or material in enemies' hands.

The Bulgars, by being in possession of the passes Koncul and Kacanik, cut off the communication of the Serbian army with the Allies, who by now had reached Krivolak, on the railway line from Salonika. In order to join the Allies and beat the Bulgarian forces occupying the passes, it was necessary to extricate the Serbian army from both the valleys of the Southern and Western Morava. This was executed in spite of enormous difficulties, there being only two traversable roads for the retreat of the entire army. The situation was saved by a bold attack of the Serbian 3rd army in the

flank of the enemy, but the retreat was continued under the heaviest pressure of the enemy.

Nevertheless, headquarters was able to concentrate five divisions and two brigades against the Bulgars for the battle for the possession of the passes. With these forces, the Serbs attacked the Bulgars on the front Novo Brdo-Kacanik. The main enemy positions were on the Velika Planina and Zegovac mountains. In fierce battles from November 17th to 21st, the Serbs took the Zegovac mountain, and their operations against Velika Planina were also very successful. The Bulgars were in a rather critical situation and began to give way on the northern portion of the front. Everything pointed to the complete success of the Kacanik operation, if the Serbs had had time to develop their advantage. But again the pressure of the Austro-Germans was brought to bear upon the whole military situation. On the 21st of November the Austro-Germans were already in the possession of the Prepolac, and were attacking the Serbs defending the Tenedol pass on the road to Pristina. Therefore the whole operation was abandoned. But still the Serbian successes on the Kacanik front enabled them to retire on the left bank of the Sitnica river unmolested by the enemy, and without leaving in his hands either arms or ammunition. Thus the Serbs definitely failed to join the Allies, who, being small in numbers, were unable to push further than Krivolack, and soon were obliged to beat a retreat.

It was on the memorable Kossovo Field that the Serbian army and nation realized that the great tragedy of her history was to be repeated once again. The curtain rose upon the last act of the Serbian tragedy. Fate had yet some fearful sufferings in store for them. In 1915, as in 1389, on the eve of the battle of Kossovo, the Serbian king and nation were forced to choose between the Kingdom of Heaven and Earth; to make peace with the hereditary foes and to betray the noble cause of European freedom and liberty for which they had fought so long. Now, as then, the Serbs did not hesitate. They preferred honor and martyrdom to shameful peace and treason. Like true heroes of Kossovo, without fear or reproach, they had accepted battle on a front

800 miles long, and for two months they had kept in abeyance the overwhelming forces of three military states single-handed. An ally—Greece—betrayed them; the others, through blunders, were unable to come in time to be of assistance. The struggle proved vain; and the Serbian state, built up by so much fighting and noble self-sacrifice, was crushed by a shameful coalition of all its old-time foes.

BY ROBERT MACHRAY

Serbia, at the outset of the present War, was far from strong, even relatively, and if during its initial months she was amazingly successful in repulsing the first and second Austrian invasions, she achieved her victory at a price which was very heavy to so small and war-worn a State and weakened her sensibly. This being the case, her even more wonderful success in throwing back in absolute disaster the third invasion by the Austrians, who had made sure of her ruin, will remain one of the great, heroic stories of all time. But her losses were again most serious and hard to bear. Not only did she suffer in men and in war material, but the ruthless invaders had devastated and laid waste all the northwest part of the country—one of the best districts of poor Serbia—which they had temporarily occupied, deliberately outraging and murdering with fiendish cruelty its civilian population. At the end of 1914 Serbia, though triumphant, was much weaker than before, and was already become a tragic land—with the shadows deepening over her.

On being driven out of Valievo in December, 1914, the Austrians had left behind them a frightful legacy in the form of typhus and other malignant maladies, and these diseases attacked the unfortunate Serbians, spread all over the country, and claimed thousands of victims. Utterly unprepared to combat with any prospect of success these fresh and more insidious enemies, which threatened her with extermination, Serbia sent forth a cry for help, which was heard and responded to in Great Britain, France, Russia, the United States and other lands. The Red Cross did

what it could; other organizations, notably the society of women doctors known as the Scottish Women's Hospitals, bestirred themselves actively in raising, equipping, and forwarding hospital units to the scene; and many private persons, touched to the heart by o'er-true tales of Serbia's plight, furnished money for the much-needed medical supplies.

It is known that the Serbs might have avoided the fourth invasion; that is, on terms. Serbia was offered a separate peace by the enemy but declined to accept it. She was resolved to live free or die. "It is better to die in beauty than live in shame," said Pashitch, her Prime Minister, and these immortal words expressed her very soul. A few weeks after they had been uttered and had gone echoing round the globe, another Serbian, Vassitch, the splendid soldier the memory of whose glorious defense of the Babuna Pass will endure forever, said, when the agony of Serbia had come full upon her: "The Serbians will await at the foot of their cross the hour of crucifixion, without deserting. Dying, they will make their sacrifice, and will live again in history as an example to future generations."

At the outset it seemed that all was well. Two days after the issue of the order for the mobilization of Bulgaria, Greece began mobilizing her army, and as M. Venezelos publicly stated that this was done as a precautionary measure, because it was common knowledge that Bulgaria did not intend to abide by the *status quo* in the Balkans, the Entente believed that Greek help for Serbia was assured, and all the more from the fact that Greece was under treaty obligations to defend Serbia against Bulgaria. Venezelos went so far as to affirm that if the treaty had not existed the true interests of Greece were bound up with the success of the Entente Powers, and consequently she must take her stand with them in the War. He invited the Allies to send to Salonika a force of 150,000 men, this being the number Serbia had convenanted under the treaty to contribute to any joint action in the field by herself and Greece against Bulgaria, but which she was not in a position to produce owing to her having to fight the Austro-Germans.

But King Constantine intervened, and Venezelos resigned, and the hopes of the Entente were shattered. Greece announced that she would remain neutral, this neutrality towards the Entente being defined as of the most benevolent kind. After entering a formal protest, she permitted the troops of the Allies to disembark at Salonika. On the 12th of October she categorically refused Serbia's request for assistance; by that date events had marched, Serbia had been invaded, and was enduring with high courage and fortitude the first days of her dreadful agony. Belgrade in flames, smoking towns and villages, and a ruined countryside, south of the rivers that were her northern frontier, with its population in flight, had proclaimed the beginning of the immolation of Serbia on the horrible altars of German ambition and German *Kultur*.

With the beginning of October came the development in force of the Austro-German offensive against Serbia on the north, and its plan of operations had been carefully thought out long beforehand in the thorough and efficient German manner. Under Mackensen there were two large armies, commanded respectively by General von Gallwitz, the German leader who had won fame in the campaign in Russia by forcing the Narew, and by General Kövess von Kövessaza, an Austrian soldier of distinction. Gallwitz covered the line of the Danube from Orsava to a point opposite Semendria with forces exclusively German; Kövess's troops, partly Austrian and partly German, the former predominating, extended from the point opposite Semendria along the Danube, the Save, and the Lower Drina; while on the Upper Drina an Austrian army was in position near Vishegrad, over against Ushitze. The right wing of Gallwitz touched the left wing of Kövess, and Mackensen's scheme was that simultaneously with a general advance along the front these two wings together should move up the Morava Valley, and capture the railway running south to Nish and thence southeast to Sofia-Constantinople and south to Salonika. He was, no doubt, well informed as to what he might expect from Bulgarian coöperation in the Timok Valley, the Nishava Valley, and in Macedonia. His intention naturally was

to defeat the Serbians in a decisive battle, and he hoped to maneuver them into such a position that his object would be achieved. He had difficult terrain to surmount, and a desperate resistance by the Serbians to overcome, but he had taken these factors into account. He knew in truth from the start that Serbia, attacked on all sides with more than double the numbers she could command and with far superior artillery, was definitely in his hands unless her Allies could give her help sufficient to withstand him. She did not get that help, and he and the Bulgarians overran and occupied her territory, but neither he himself nor they brought about that decisive battle, about two-thirds of the Serbian forces making good their retreat.

For several days early in October the Serbian works on the riverine frontier were heavily shelled, and attempts which though unsuccessful were persistent were made to force a passage. As the bombardment increased in intensity and more and more determined efforts to get across the rivers were made, Serbia realized that the long-expected serious attack was in progress, and every Serbian braced himself to meet it. King Peter, according to an Austrian statement which may be accepted as authentic, issued on the 2nd of October an Order of the Day that expressed the feeling of himself and his country. He said he was well aware that every Serbian was ready to die for his native land; as for himself, old age prevented him from leading his armies in this struggle for life and death. "I am a weak old man," he went on, pathetically, "who can send only his blessings to his Serbian soldiers, to the women and children. If this fresh struggle should end in defeat, it will be a glorious death for us all." This Order is melancholy but not uninspiring, and it is curious to observe in it the same somber yet splendid note which pervades so many other Serbian allusions to this agonizing contest—not death or glory, but death *and* glory. The strange thing about this Order is that King Peter made no allusion in it to the assistance that was anticipated from the Allies, though he must have known the tenor of Sir Edward Grey's speech which promised aid, and he surely had heard that French and British officers had arrived at

Salonika on the 1st of October, the day before it was issued, and were making arrangements for the landing of troops. These landings began on the 5th of that month. The news flashed throughout Serbia, bringing such joy and gladness that Nish and many other of her towns and villages decorated the public buildings with the flags of the Allies—poor emblems which afterwards were found still flying by the victorious enemy on his entrance into these places. What wreck of great hopes! How piteous and sad it all was!

On the afternoon of the day of the first landing of forces by the Entente Powers at Salonika, Belgrade was subjected to a tremendous bombardment, which continued for three days and reduced to ruins considerable portions of it, not even the hospitals being spared. In a semi-official *communiqué* Serbia stated that the Austro-Germans, unable to demoralize her troops in their positions on the Danube and the Save, endeavored to destroy the city systematically and annihilate its population by firing thousands of shells on the town, which was "open," that is, unfortified. The bombardment, it was said, was carried out methodically with the object of killing as many persons as possible in the city and of creating a panic. To further their own diabolical ends, it was declared, the Germans, before the shelling of Belgrade itself began, placed a curtain of fire upon the suburbs and the roads leading into the country, so that civilians trying to flee might be destroyed or thrown back into the town. In other words, the attack on the Serbian capital was a characteristic exhibition of German "frightfulness," and to bring it to a close before Belgrade was utterly destroyed the Serbian army evacuated the city on the 8th of October. Of course the Germans did not publish any of these shocking details of their savage brutality. They announced that on the 6th and the 7th they forced the crossing of the Danube, Save, and Drina at various points, and had established themselves firmly on the Serbian side of these rivers, Belgrade being captured apparently with no great difficulty. It afterwards came out that the capital was not taken without a desperate struggle, which went on even in the streets and from house to house, and in which not a Ser-

bian asked quarter and women and children died fighting. Nor did the enemy achieve the crossing of the rivers till after a magnificent resistance on the part of the defenders at every point. On the 6th, 3,000 Germans and Austrians who had got across the Danube near Belgrade were hurled back, only 500 escaping, the rest being killed or captured, and somewhat similar successes fell to the Serbians elsewhere. But in the end the big guns of the Austro-Germans prevailed, and the Serbians were driven out of the river trenches, only, however, to withdraw to the hills behind.

Despite the merciless rain of shells, multitudes of the citizens of Belgrade had managed during its bombardment to get away—on foot, in ox-wagons, or in some sort of conveyance, with part of their belongings; but the weather was bad, rain fell heavily, the roads were deep in mud, and the misery of most of these poor creatures was indescribable. The exodus from Belgrade and the neighboring towns and villages was the commencement of the flight from before the enemy of what was left of a people, the remnant consisting of old men, women, and children, for every male who could hold a rifle or throw a bomb was in the fighting line. As, thanks to their powerful artillery, the Austro-Germans advanced, slowly yet victoriously, though the Serbian armies of the north, under the aged and ailing Marshal Putnik, their Commander-in-Chief, stubbornly disputed every inch of ground, and Semendria, Ram, Obrenovatz, and other places on the frontier were occupied by the invaders, the same dolorous scenes always occurred—endless processions of fleeing refugees in motion southward, those who could afford it going by train to Nish, others in carts, and the rest, the vast majority of these unfortunates, plodding laboriously along the roads hour after hour in the mud and rain, carrying the dearest of their possessions and accompanied by their small flocks and herds. The sacrifice of Serbia was begun, and it might be thought that her agony had already come full upon her, but it was to deepen with every day that passed.

In his advance up the Morava Mackensen, having taken Semendria on the 11th of October, three days later captured Pojarevatz, after extremely bitter fighting in which he had

exceptional losses. The Morava Valley was now open to him, but his march forward was not rapid, as the Serbians did not cease to oppose him in the mountainous region of Podunavlie lying south of the fallen fortress. By the 23rd of October, in spite of the tenacious courage with which he was fought, he had, however, pressed on beyond Rakinatz on the road to Petrovatz, and had reached the south bank of the Jasenitza. About the same date his left wing crossed the Danube at Orsava. In the fourth week of that month he took Livaditza on the Morava plain, stormed Svilajnatz on the 30th, and on November 1st was in Kragujevatz, which the Serbians had evacuated after setting fire to the arsenal and destroying the military stores they could not remove. He had had to battle for every position, and more than once was severely checked; an engagement which took place on the hills before Kragujevatz, and in which the famous Shumadia division of the Serbian army figured splendidly, was a distinct reverse.

On the 11th of October Bulgaria had dropped the mask, and her armies, without a declaration of war, invaded the eastern frontier of Serbia. Feeling between the two Slav nations of the Balkans had long been most bitter; during the First Balkan War it appeared to be assuaged, but that almost immemorial hatred of theirs quickly revived because of the Serbian occupation of Macedonia in and after that war, and with greater intensity than before. The war that the Bulgarians now waged was in a large measure one of extermination. They put into the field over 300,000 men, against whom the Serbians could place little more than a third of that number, as their main forces were in the north; the struggle was far too unequal, and the result was inevitable. In this area the resistance of the Serbians was of an even more determined nature, if that were possible, than in the north, but it was beaten down. The first efforts of the Bulgarians were directed to gaining control of that part of the Belgrade-Constantinople railway which lay between the frontier and Nish and the portion of the Nish-Salonika line lying in Serbian territory. By the 17th of October they had made good their hold on the latter from Vrania to

Ristovatz, took Veles on the 20th, lost it two days later, but recaptured it on the 29th. Uskub was taken on the 22nd. They also were successful in their attack on the other railway, Kniashevatz and Pirot both falling into their hands on the 28th, and Nish itself on the 5th of November. On the northeast, in the third week of October, they succeeded in entering Negotin, Prahovo, and Kladovo, and acquired the Serbian side of the Danube over against Rumania, thus permitting the Austrians forthwith to send munitions to them and to the Turks.

Dr. Momchiloff, President of the Bulgarian Sobranje, spent several days on this front, and described the fighting as exceeding in ferocity anything ever seen in previous Balkan wars, terrible as they had been. He stated that the Bulgarians found in the Serbian trenches old men, women, and children acting as bomb-throwers, and that in many cases they were "compelled to annihilate" whole villages, with all their inhabitants, because of the hostility of the population. According to German newspapers, this was not the only area in which, after the forcing of the rivers in the north, civilians shared in the conflict. The *Frankfurter Zeitung* recorded the fact that the "war in Serbia had become a savage contest of the people," and a Vienna journal reported that the campaign resembled those of "ancient times in which not one stone was left upon another." How dark is the picture these words conjure up! To German "frightfulness" add Bulgarian hatred in face of Serbian desperation, and something of the horror of the tragedy will be understood. Serbia had had a good harvest, but the enemy seized it all; famine stalked through the land, and many perished of starvation. The strain Serbia was enduring was set forth on the 26th of October in a telegram sent by M. Pashitch to London; it read:

"Serbia is making superhuman efforts to defend her existence, in response to the advice and desire of her great Ally. For this she is condemned to death by the Austro-Germans and Bulgarians. For twenty days our common enemies have tried to annihilate us. In spite of the heroism of our soldiers our resistance cannot be expected to be maintained indefinitely. We beg you, the many friends of Serbia in Eng-

land, to do all that you possibly can to insure your troops reaching us that they may help our army, and that we may defend together that common cause which is now so gravely menaced."

The common cause was indeed gravely menaced. The crushing of Serbia proceeded apace, and shortly after the middle of November the enemy obtained complete possession of the Belgrade-Nish railway, his engineers were hard at work repairing the line, and easy communication with the Bosporus and Asia Minor was only a question of a few weeks' time. The gate of the East had been thrown wide open by the Germans, some part of their dreams had come true, and all the brave blood that had been shed in the Dardanelles to gain Constantinople appeared to have flowed in vain. The threat to Egypt was evident; indeed, Mackensen's forces now were styled "The Army of Egypt," and all Germany exulted.

In the other areas the Serbian armies, always resisting stubbornly and snatching a success now and again, continued to be pressed back steadily, if slowly, upon Montenegro, who all the while on her own territory had been bravely fighting the Austrians, and upon Albania, whose tribes as a rule are none too friendly to the Serbians. On the 30th of November the Serbian Government, which had been compelled to move westward from place to place as events dictated, reached Scutari, then held by the Montenegrins, and established itself there. By that date the Austro-Germans had occupied Novi Bazar and Mitrovitza, and the Germans and Bulgarians had taken Prishtina, according to an official *communiqué,* after "ten days' bitter fighting."

German Headquarters announced later that "with the flight of the scanty remains of the Serbian army into the Albanian mountains, our great operations against the same are brought to a close. Our object of effecting communication with Bulgaria and the Turkish Empire has been accomplished."

BY GENERAL VON FALKENHAYN

While the great battle in France was developing and raging, the deployment and preparations for attack in South Hungary pursued their allotted course. Instead of the one division that was to come from France, another that was on its way from Russia to the West was diverted to the South-East. That was the sum total of the influence on the Serbian campaign of all that the English and French had sacrificed in the West.

In the course of the month of September, the Serbian bank was repeatedly shelled for purposes of deception, without any further steps being taken, but on the 6th October the bombardment preparatory to the real crossing was begun, the crossing following on the 7th. The Third Austro-Hungarian Army crossed on the line Kupinovo-Belgrade, and the left half of our Eleventh Army at Ram, the right following on the next day at Semendria. Feints by the troops on the Drina and at Orsova riveted the attention of the enemy at those points. Tactically, they were completely taken by surprise. The assurances of the Entente that the Central Powers could only be pretending to attack, and that they would reinforce the Serbians in ample time, had lulled the Serbians into a sense of security. Their main forces were assembled to meet the Bulgarians. It was not until, at the beginning of October, the gravity of the danger threatening from the North was recognized and more or less unsystematic troop movements in that direction were undertaken.

Accordingly, the Third Austro-Hungarian and our Eleventh Army, while they were often bravely opposed, were nowhere resisted with real determination. The speed of their advance was reduced, not so much by the enemy's resistance as by the difficulties of ensuring supplies. Thus, the bridging material for the Eleventh Army could not be brought up until the hill country between Belgrade and Semendria had been cleared. Then bridging work was prevented for several days by one of the notorious Danube storms, called the Kossowa. It was not until the 21st October that we succeeded in building two bridges for this army.

On this day the First Bulgarian Army had reached the Timok valley and its left wing was fighting round Pirot. The Second Bulgarian Army was approaching the sector of the Vardar which it had already cut at Veles. The railway communications of the Serbians to Salonica were thus broken. All the armies were complaining bitterly of the great difficulties caused by the lack of roads, and still more by the condition during wet weather of such roads as there were. This was especially the case with the Third Austro-Hungarian Army, which, even without that disadvantage, found it more difficult to overcome the enemy resistance than the neighboring army, which consisted wholly of German formations.

The position on the left wing of the Eleventh Army, too, was not wholly satisfactory. The Austro-Hungarian group at Orsova, not, it is true, a very large one, had not yet succeeded in crossing the river. As a result, the preparations for opening communications with Bulgaria, which the shortage of munitions and equipment that was already making itself felt among the Bulgarian forces made most urgent, could not be carried out.

The advance continued at all points, in spite of temporary stoppages at one point or another through difficulties of supply or resistance by the enemy. At times considerable persuasion was required to induce the First Bulgarian Army to advance.

Nish fell on the 5th November. The inner wings of the two Bulgarian armies occupied the capitol of Serbia. South of Strumitza weak attempts at attack by the French, who had meanwhile landed at Salonika, were easily beaten off.

After suffering very heavy losses in the fighting up to this point, the Serbians were now retreating on the whole front in the general direction of the plateau of Kossovo ("the plain of the blackbirds"), near Prishtina. They offered no determined resistance save to the southern half of the Second Bulgarian Army, whose swift advance threatened to cut off their retreat to Albania, the only line of escape that still remained open to them. Attempts to hasten the advance of this army by sending portions of the

First Bulgarian Army to its aid had no success. The roads and the problem of supply presented insuperable obstacles to all troop movements that could not be thoroughly worked out long beforehand. For this reason it proved impossible to employ German forces on the southern wing, as was repeatedly urged by the Austro-Hungarian High Staff. In addition, there was no ground for the fear that the Serbians might break through at Veles in order to join the Entente troops that were advancing from Salonika up the Vardar. That this might be attempted was within the bounds of probability, but it could have no prospects of success in face of the pressure of the main body of Mackensen's forces, which could operate from the north against the flank and rear of any such movement. Signs, too, of the breaking up of the Serbian Army became ever more clearly recognizable on the line of their retreat. If they were not given breathing space, their end would come in a few weeks. Their escape to Albania, it is true, could not be wholly prevented, but it could be rendered more difficult by accelerating the advance of a column of the Third Austro-Hungarian Army along the road from Kralievo, through Rashka, and that of the Bulgarians up to and beyond Prishtina in the direction of Mitrovitza. The topographical conditions compelled the pursuing armies simply to keep on the march along the few roads that were still available. But there was little to be feared from a flight into Albania. In that wild mountain country, the Serbians could not take with them artillery or transport, or wheeled vehicles of any description. Again, they could find no food there, nothing indeed but a population largely hostile to them, and unlikely to neglect the opportunity to rob them of anything they had left.

While the columns of the allied armies climbed up in the course of November to the Kossovo plateau, under indescribable difficulties of marching, increased by bad weather, and soon also by difficulties of supply, the question arose for urgent decision what measures, apart from mere defence, were to be taken against the Entente forces that had landed in Salonika from Gallipoli, Egypt and Northern

France to relieve the Serbians. They had been disembarking since the beginning of October. As the Greek Government had not consented to this, their action involved a serious breach of international law, which deprived the Entente even of ostensible justification for any further outcry against the march through Belgium as an act of incredible oppression. Greece did not, however, dare to oppose the invaders by force of arms. The defenceless position of her open coasts and towns against the English and French naval guns, and the fact that the Greek people would starve if they were deprived of imports by sea, were decisive to their attitude. Germany's allies, however, were disposed to take this as ground for regarding Greece also as an enemy, and it was not without difficulty that the German point of view prevailed and Greece was treated as a friend.

After the Entente troops, as already mentioned, had been defeated by the Bulgarians in the hills to the south of Strumitza, they abandoned their advance in this direction, and marched instead up the Vardar valley. In the middle of November, the heads of their forces were on the left bank of the Cerna, facing formations from the Second Bulgarian Army, which had been diverted to meet them. The movements of the enemy were very slow. The inactivity of the troops in general led to the conclusion that they were very unwilling to obey orders given merely for political reasons, to risk their lives for Serbian interests.

In this matter our High Staff acted consistently with its general attitude to the Serbian undertaking. It regarded it as emphatically a subsidiary operation. The object of the campaign would be completely achieved with the now impending complete defeat of the Serbians, which would remove the threat to the Austro-Hungarian flank, and open the way to the Near East. The idea, however, of seeking the decision of the war in the Balkans was wholly unsound. The German troops necessary for this could not be spared from the main theatres of war.

Holding the views above stated, the Chief of the High Staff found himself to some extent in disagreement with the army chiefs of our allies. They both attached importance

to the presence of German troops in the Balkans in as great strength and for as long a time as possible. In addition to the purely military advantages which they stood to gain by this, they hoped also for a furthering of their political aims. It was obviously useful for them to be able, as a result of the presence of strong German forces, to have portions of their own troops available for particular aims of their own. This motive was especially noticeable in the case of the Austrian-Hungarian G. H. Q.

This divergence of views on fundamental questions relating to the conduct of the war possessed elements of danger that were not to be underestimated, and which were increased by the coolness that had existed from the first in the relations between Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria. The position was not improved when the two armies were brought into closer contact, and the points of difference brought about actual friction. The Bulgarian leaders were greatly hurt by the tendency, apparently firmly rooted among the Austrians, to regard, and at times even to treat, their allies in the Balkans less as allies than as auxiliaries of inferior standing. Austro-Hungarian G. H. Q. complained bitterly of the Bulgarians' thirst for territory and of their arrogance. I make no attempt here to decide which party was in the right. In any case, the unhappy relations between the two allies did not assist the conduct of operations, and frequently called for the mediation of the third party in the alliance. So far this had always been successful, but it was doubtful whether it would always be available at the right moment when the attention of the Chief of the High Staff was more fully taken up with other theatres of war.

Having regard to this situation, the Chief went into the question whether it would not be advisable to give an officially recognized and, therefore, more binding form to the command of the campaign, which in fact lay in German hands, but was exercised formally on the basis of complete equality. But to emphasize publicly Germany's prominence in the alliance would have an unfavorable effect on the respect commanded by the Austro-Hungarian Govern-

ment in the interior of the Dual Monarchy. The position would have been different if such a régime had prevailed from the outbreak of war. At the present time its introduction would have been taken by ill-disposed persons, of whom there were many in Austria-Hungary, as an expression of distrust. Finally, we thought we were justified in expecting that the experience gained up to date in the campaign would enable us to avoid serious friction in the future. Accordingly, although both Bulgaria and Turkey favored the proposal, the Chief of the High Staff let it drop.

The advance of the Third Austro-Hungarian and our Eleventh Army to the decisive point in the neighborhood of Pristina did not, unfortunately, keep to its program. In the end, the advance could only be maintained by the withdrawal of half of each of the armies in the neighborhood of the railways, and the handing over of their supply columns to the troops that remained on the march, in order to enable the latter to continue. The distant coöperation of these troops, however, had its effect on a despairing attack delivered by the Serbians on the 22nd of November at Ferizovic, depriving it of all hope of success once it had failed to break immediately through the brave Bulgarians. The Serbian Army moved quickly to its fate. In the last days of November and on the 1st of December it was repeatedly defeated by the Bulgarian troops pursuing it towards Prizrend, being in part taken prisoner and in part scattered. Weaker Serbian groups, with which the heads of the Third Austro-Hungarian and Eleventh Armies came into contact, met with the same fate. Only a few miserable remnants escaped into the Albanian mountains, losing the whole of their artillery and everything else that they could not carry. There was no longer a Serbian Army.

The Bulgarians continued the pursuit with small bodies across the Djakova-Dibra line, occupied Ochrida, and dispatched a column to Monastir. A few small German infantry and cavalry formations were attached to this column, both for purposes of deception and to secure the presence of capable and acceptable negotiators in the event of any

encounter with Greek troops. To the north of the Bulgarians, portions of the Third Austro-Hungarian Army, repelling without difficulty some Montenegrin batallions that had moved across the frontier, advanced on Ipek, Rozaz and Bjelopolje.

The English and French troops dispatched from Salonika had not succeeded in altering the closing act of the Serbian drama. As soon as they realized this, they withdrew, in the latter half of November, the portions of their armies that had advanced over the Cerna back behind the sector, and now held against the main body of the Second Bulgarian Army a line running from the Cerna, behind the Vardar to Mirovca, and thence to Lake Doiran. Their condition led to the conclusion that, in spite of the shortness of their rear communications, they had not succeeded in satisfactorily solving the question of supply.

BY GENERAL VON CRAMON

Toward the end of September the Imperial Austrian Army, composed of Austrian and German troops, stood to the northwest and north of Belgrade, the German Eleventh Army in the region of Versetsch. Tersztyansky had originally been chosen as the commander of the Austrians. Shortly, however, before the operations began he had a quarrel in his headquarters with one of the officials of Tisza and this assumed such proportions that the all-powerful Hungarian president of the ministry brought the question before the Emperor, Franz Josef. The latter, as could not otherwise be expected, in view of the powerful position occupied by Tisza, dropped the general. In Teschen, at least among the younger men, the departure of Tersztyansky was not particularly regretted. Instead of him, General von Kövess now had the honor of winning Belgrade. The Bulgarians drew up on the western frontier of their country. Czar Ferdinand had stipulated that he was not to move forward until several days after our own advance. He wanted absolute security. Nevertheless, the turn in the policy of Bulgaria could not remain unknown to the Entente. Russia sent an ultimatum on Octo-

ber 3rd to which Bulgaria replied "in unsatisfactory form" three days later; whereupon the quadruple alliance severed its relations with the government at Sofia.

On October 6th the German and Austrian troops of Mackensen crossed the Danube. While the Austrian battalions fastened themselves upon the northern edge of Belgrade, the 22nd Reserve Corps of the Germans forced its way through west of the city and compelled the enemy to evacuate the place. The Serbians offered an obstinate resistance, but could not arrest our advance. A week of great successes passed and now the moment had come also for a decision on the part of the Bulgarians. One day the report arrived at Sofia that the Serbians had passed across the western border of Bulgaria at several points. On the following day the Bulgarian armies invaded old Serbia and Macedonia. Toward the end of October another Imperial division joined in the encircling movement by penetrating into the Sandjak. By the end of November, Serbia and Macedonia were in the hands of the armies of the Central Powers. Only the shattered remnants of the enemy forces were able to effect their escape across the snow-covered mountains.

To the Entente the turn of affairs on the Balkan Peninsula was a great blow. When Bulgaria glided from its grasp, it endeavored to equalize this by an increased pressure on Greece, where, in the astute Venizelos it possessed a sure ally. But King Constantine was for the time the stronger. Venizelos had to yield. The German Emperor gave a personal guarantee that no Bulgarian would cross the Macedonian-Greek border. The fears of the Greeks because of the Bulgarians were thus to some extent allayed.

The Entente did not content itself with the just mentioned unsuccessful attempt in Athens. In the middle of October French and English troops were landed at Salonika. Greece could only make a protest against this breach of neutrality, which mild procedure greatly displeased General Conrad von Hoetzendorff, chief of the General Staff of the Austrian army. General Falkenhayn tranquilized him with the assurance that he, for his part, considered the attitude

of Greece as "perfectly wonderful and particularly propitious." He assured the Austrian chief of staff that Germany would do all in its power to support the friendly disposed King of Greece. These efforts on the part of Germany, as we know, met with success.

During the preparations for the campaign in Serbia no great enthusiasm for it was manifested at Austrian headquarters. The primal moving factor had really been Falkenhayn. General von Hoetzendorff was not in accord with all points of the plan of operations. He was of the opinion that more powerful forces would have to be put in action from the direction of the Upper Drina, in order to make the success in Serbia complete. Mackensen, however, drew to the barrier on the Save a division already congregated on the Bosnian front. The catastrophe in Northern Serbia would surely have been greater had a timely attack been made on the enemy's rear at Uzice.

A similar difference of opinion arose during the course of the further operations when the Serbians in Macedonia were hard pressed from north and east, and it was a question of throwing them back into the Albanian mountains. General von Hoetzendorff earnestly tried to persuade General Falkenhayn to use all available forces to strengthen the Bulgarian troops which were exerting pressure from the east. He was, as ever, a master in recognizing the direction in which strategy could most effectively be exercised. Falkenhayn, however, could rightly object on the ground that it would be impossible to add several divisions to the Bulgarian army under Bojadjeff because of the difficulties attending the transportation of supplies.

It is not necessary to enter into details. In a little over six weeks' time old Serbia and Macedonia were conquered. The remnants of the Serbian army wandered about in the desert mountains of Albania or after losing all accoutrements and supplies found touch with the Orient army of the Entente.

EXECUTION OF EDITH CAVELL

THE WORLD'S PROTEST AGAINST GERMAN "LAW"

OCTOBER 12TH

G. DeLEVAL BRAND WHITLOCK HUGH GIBSON
H. STIRLING GAHAN DR. ALFRED ZIMMERMANN

Not since Napoleon had the Duke D'Enghien shot has any military execution aroused such widespread comment as that of Miss Cavell. She was an English head-nurse in Brussels who aided in managing a system by which British and Belgian soldiers were enabled to escape secretly from Belgium. Such a course was in obvious disobedience to the laws the Germans had announced; but the sheer impossibility that any person, not utterly a brute, should obey these laws, is conveyed as in a lightning flash by one of the few phrases that have been disclosed from Miss Cavell's defense. "I helped them for fear they would be shot if I didn't." The perfected arrogance of the "superhuman!" While shooting his victims at will without even the pretense of law, he insists it is unlawful for their own countrymen to save them from his blind wrath. So Edith Cavell died a martyr. Whether in shooting her the Germans exceeded their own one-sided law is wholly unimportant. Most lawyers have declared that they did not. But the evil things the Germans did in Belgium lose no jot of their evil because the Germans made laws to cover some of them.

The height of execration roused by the Cavell case depended, however, on something far other than its legal status. It arose from the victim's sex and high character. No truly "cultured" race could slay a woman for a deed of kindliness, for following the mother instinct to save and to protect. If a man-made law condemns her, real men ignore that law. Nothing showed more sharply the gulf between Germany and the rest of the world than the fact that German officials with one voice insisted on enforcing their law against Miss Cavell Worse yet, they tried to escape the protests which they knew would come from disinterested neutrals, and to which they were determined not to yield. To escape those protests, they dissembled, and they lied; they rushed the execution through suddenly at night, giving the condemned woman no chance to communicate with friends. They knew well how public sentiment would execrate their deed; but being Prussians they thought the "frightfulness" of this example would aid them more than its shamefulness would harm them. Thank God, they underestimated the courage of the human race!

C. F. H.

BY MAITRE G. DE LEVAL

Report to Mr. Whitlock, from the Belgian Councilor to the U. S. Legation

October 12, 1915.

Sir,

AS soon as the Legation received an intimation that Miss Cavell was arrested, your letter of August 31st was sent to Baron von der Lancken. The German authorities were by that letter requested, *inter alia,* to allow me to see Miss Cavell, so as to have all necessary steps taken for her defense. No reply being received, the Legation, on September 10th, reminded the German authorities of your letter.

The German reply, sent on September 12th, was that I would not be allowed to see Miss Cavell, but that Mr. Braun, lawyer at the Brussels Court, was defending her and was already seeing the German authorities about the case.

I immediately asked Mr. Braun to come to see me at the Legation, which he did a few days later. He informed me that personal friends of Miss Cavell had asked him to defend her before the German Court, that he agreed to do so, but that owing to some unforeseen circumstances he was prevented from pleading before that Court, adding that he had asked Mr. Kirschen, a member of the Brussels Bar and his friend, to take up the case and plead for Miss Cavell, and that Mr. Kirschen had agreed to do so.

I, therefore, at once put myself in communication with Mr. Kirschen, who told me that Miss Cavell was prosecuted for having helped soldiers to cross the frontier. I asked him whether he had seen Miss Cavell and whether she had made any statement to him, and to my surprise found that the lawyers defending prisoners before the German Military Court were not allowed to see their clients before the trial, and were not shown any document of the prosecution. This, Mr. Kirschen said, was in accordance with the German military rules. He added that the hearing of the trial of such cases was carried out very carefully, and that in his opinion, although it was not possible to see the client before the trial, in fact the trial itself developed so carefully and so slowly, that it was generally possible to have a fair knowledge of

all the facts and to present a good defense for the prisoner. This would specially be the case for Miss Cavell, because the trial would be rather long as she was prosecuted with thirty-four other prisoners.

I informed Mr. Kirschen of my intention to be present at the trial so as to watch the case. He immediately dissuaded me from taking such attitude, which he said would cause a great prejudice to the prisoner, because the German judges would resent it and feel it almost as an affront if I was appearing to exercise a kind of supervision on the trial. He thought that if the Germans would admit my presence, which was very doubtful, it would in any case cause prejudice to Miss Cavell.

Mr. Kirschen assured me over and over again that the Military Court of Brussels was always perfectly fair and that there was not the slightest danger of any miscarriage of justice. He promised that he would keep me posted on all the developments which the case would take and would report to me the exact charges that were brought against Miss Cavell and the facts concerning her that would be disclosed at the trial, so as to allow me to judge by myself about the merits of the case. He insisted that, of course, he would do all that was humanly possible to defend Miss Cavell to the best of his ability.

Three days before the trial took place, Mr. Kirschen wrote me a few lines saying that the trial would be on the next Thursday, October 7th. The Legation at once sent him, on October 5th, a letter confirming in writing in the name of the Legation the arrangement that had been made between him and me. This letter was delivered to Mr. Kirschen by a messenger of the Legation.

The trial took two days, ending Friday, the 8th.

On Saturday I was informed by an outsider that the trial had taken place, but that no judgment would be reached till a few days later.

Receiving no report from Mr. Kirschen, I tried to find him, but failed. I then sent him a note on Sunday, asking him to send his report to the Legation or call there on Monday morning at 8.30. At the same time I obtained from

some other person present at the trial some information about what had occurred, and the following facts were disclosed to me:

Miss Cavell was prosecuted for having helped English and French soldiers, as well as Belgian young men, to cross the frontier and to go over to England. She had admitted by signing a statement before the day of the trial, and by public acknowledgment in Court, in the presence of all the other prisoners and the lawyers, that she was guilty of the charges brought against her, and she had acknowledged not only that she had helped these soldiers to cross the frontier, but also that some of them had thanked her in writing when arriving in England. This last admission made her case so much the more serious, because if it only had been proved against her that she had helped the soldiers to traverse the Dutch frontier, and no proof was produced that these soldiers had reached a country at war with Germany, she could only have been sentenced for an attempt to commit the "crime" and not for the "crime" being duly accomplished. As the case stood, the sentence fixed by the German military law was a sentence of death.

Paragraph 58 of the German Military Code says:

"Will be sentenced to death for treason any person who, with the intention of helping the hostile Power, or of causing harm to the German or allied troops, is guilty of one of the crimes of paragraph 90 of the German Penal Code."

The case referred to in above said paragraph 90 consists in: "Conducting soldiers to the enemy."

The penalties above set forth apply, according to paragraph 160 of the German Code, in case of war, to foreigners as well as to Germans.

In her oral statement before the Court Miss Cavell disclosed almost all the facts of the whole prosecution. She was questioned in German, an interpreter translating all the questions in French, with which language Miss Cavell was well acquainted. She spoke without trembling and showed a clear mind. Often she added some greater precision to her previous depositions.

When she was asked why she helped these soldiers to go

to England, she replied that she thought that if she had not done so they would have been shot by the Germans, and that therefore she thought she only did her duty to her country in saving their lives.

The Military Public Prosecutor said that argument might be good for English soldiers, but did not apply to Belgian young men whom she induced to cross the frontier and who would have been perfectly free to remain in the country without danger to their lives.

Mr. Kirschen made a very good plea for Miss Cavell, using all arguments that could be brought in her favor before the Court.

The Military Public Prosecutor, however, asked the Court to pass a death sentence on Miss Cavell and eight other prisoners amongst the thirty-five. The Court did not seem to agree, and the judgment was postponed. The person informing me said he thought that the Court would not go to the extreme limit.

Anyhow, after I had found out these facts (viz., Sunday evening), I called at the Political Division of the German Government in Belgium and asked whether, now that the trial had taken place, permission would be granted to me to see Miss Cavell in jail, as surely there was no longer any object in refusing that permission. The German official, Mr. Conrad, said he would make the necessary inquiry at the Court and let me know later on.

I also asked him that permission be granted to Mr. Gahan, the English clergyman, to see Miss Cavell.

At the same time we prepared at the Legation, to be ready for every eventuality, a petition for pardon, addressed to the Governor-General in Belgium and a transmitting note addressed to Baron von der Lancken.

Monday morning at 11 I called up Mr. Conrad on the telephone from the Legation (as I already had done previously on several occasions when making inquiries about the case), asking what the Military Court had decided about Mr. Gahan and myself seeing Miss Cavell. He replied that Mr. Gahan could not see her, but that she could see any of the three Protestant clergymen attached to the prison; and

that I could not see her till the judgment was pronounced and signed, but that this would probably only take place in a day or two. I asked the German official to inform the Legation immediately after the passing of said judgment, so that I might see Miss Cavell at once, thinking, of course, that the Legation might, according to your intentions, take immediate steps for Miss Cavell's pardon if the judgment really was a sentence of death.

Very surprised to receive still no news from Mr. Kirschen, I then called at his house at 12.30 and was informed that he would not be there till about the end of the afternoon. I then called, at 12.40, at the house of another lawyer interested in the case of a fellow-prisoner, and found that he also was out. In the afternoon, however, the latter lawyer called at my house, saying that in the morning he had heard from the German Kommandantur that judgment would be passed only the next morning, viz., Tuesday morning. He said that he feared that the Court would be very severe for all the prisoners.

Shortly after, this lawyer left me, and while I was preparing a note about the case, at 8 p. m. I was privately and reliably informed that the judgment had been delivered at 5 o'clock in the afternoon, that Miss Cavell had been sentenced to death, and that she would be shot at 2 o'clock the next morning. I told my informer that I was extremely surprised at this, because the Legation had received no information yet, neither from the German authorities nor from Mr. Kirschen, but that the matter was too serious to run the smallest chance, and that therefore I would proceed immediately to the Legation to confer with your Excellency and take all possible steps to save Miss Cavell's life.

According to your Excellency's decision, Mr. Gibson and myself went, with the Spanish Minister, to see Baron von der Lancken, and the report of our interview and of our efforts to save Miss Cavell is given to you by Mr. Gibson.

This morning, Mr. Gahan, the English clergyman, called to see me and told me that he had seen Miss Cavell in her cell yesterday night at 10 o'clock, that he had given her the Holy Communion and had found her admirably strong and

calm. I asked Mr. Gahan whether she had made any remarks about anything concerning the legal side of her case, and whether the confession which she made before the trial and in Court was, in his opinion, perfectly free and sincere. Mr. Gahan says that she told him she perfectly well knew what she had done; that according to the law, of course, she was guilty and had admitted her guilt, but that she was happy to die for her country.

BY BRAND WHITLOCK

Official Letter sent Baron von der Lancken, also to Governor von Bissing

Your Excellency, October 11, 1915.

I have just heard that Miss Cavell, a British subject, and consequently under the protection of my Legation, was this morning condemned to death by court-martial.

If my information is correct, the sentence in the present case is more severe than all the others that have been passed in similar cases which have been tried by the same court, and, without going into the reasons for such a drastic sentence, I feel that I have the right to appeal to his Excellency the Governor-General's feelings of humanity and generosity in Miss Cavell's favor, and to ask that the death penalty passed on Miss Cavell may be commuted, and that this unfortunate woman shall not be executed.

Miss Cavell is the head of the Brussels Surgical Institute. She has spent her life in alleviating the sufferings of others, and her school has turned out many nurses who have watched at the bedside of the sick all the world over, in Germany as in Belgium. At the beginning of the war Miss Cavell bestowed her care as freely on the German soldiers as on others. Even in default of all other reasons, her career as a servant of humanity is such as to inspire the greatest sympathy and to call for pardon. If the information in my possession is correct, Miss Cavell, far from shielding herself, has, with commendable straightforwardness, admitted the truth of all the charges against her, and it is the very information which she herself has furnished, and which she alone was in a position to furnish, that has aggravated the severity of the sentence passed on her.

It is then with confidence, and in the hope of its favorable reception, that I beg your Excellency to submit to the Governor-General my request for pardon on Miss Cavell's behalf.

BY HUGH GIBSON

Report to Mr. Whitlock by the Secretary of the U. S. Legation

Sir, AMERICAN LEGATION, BRUSSELS, October 12, 1915.

Upon learning early yesterday morning through unofficial sources that the trial of Miss Edith Cavell had been finished on Saturday afternoon, and that the prosecuting attorney (*"Kriegsgerichtsrat"*) had asked for a sentence of death against her, telephonic inquiry was immediately made at the Politische Abteilung as to the facts. It was stated that no sentence had as yet been pronounced and that there would probably be delay of a day or two before a decision was reached. Mr. Conrad gave positive assurances that the Legation would be fully informed as to developments in this case. Despite these assurances, we made repeated inquiries in the course of the day, the last one being at 6.20 p. m. Belgian time. Mr. Conrad then stated that sentence had not yet been pronounced, and specifically renewed his previous assurances that he would not fail to inform us as soon as there was any news.

At 8.30 it was learned from an outside source that sentence had been passed in the course of the afternoon (before the last conversation with Mr. Conrad), and that the execution would take place during the night. In conformity with your instructions, I went (accompanied by Mr. de Leval) to look for the Spanish Minister and found him dining at the home of Baron Lambert. I explained the circumstances to his Excellency and asked that (as you were ill and unable to go yourself) he go with us to see Baron von der Lancken and support as strongly as possible the plea, which I was to make in your name, that execution of the death penalty should be deferred until the Governor could consider your appeal for clemency.

We took with us a note addressed to Baron von der Lancken, and a plea for clemency (*"requête en grâce"*) ad-

dressed to the Governor-General. The Spanish Minister willingly agreed to accompany us, and we went together to the Politische Abteilung.

Baron von der Lancken and all the members of his staff were absent for the evening. We sent a messenger to ask that he return at once to see us in regard to a matter of utmost urgency. A little after 10 o'clock he arrived, followed shortly after by Count Harrach and Herr von Falkenhausen, members of his staff. The circumstances of the case were explained to him and your note presented, and he read it aloud in our presence. He expressed disbelief in the report that sentence had actually been passed, and manifested some surprise that we should give credence to any report not emanating from official sources. He was quite insistent on knowing the exact source of our information, but this I did not feel at liberty to communicate to him. Baron von der Lancken stated that it was quite improbable that sentence had been pronounced, that even if so, it would not be executed within so short a time, and that in any event it would be quite impossible to take any action before morning. It was, of course, pointed out to him that if the facts were as we believed them to be, action would be useless unless taken at once. We urged him to ascertain the facts immediately, and this, after some hesitancy, he agreed to do. He telephoned to the presiding judge of the court-martial and returned in a short time to say that the facts were as we had represented them, and that it was intended to carry out the sentence before morning. We then presented, as earnestly as possible, your plea for delay. So far as I am able to judge, we neglected to present no phase of the matter which might have had any effect, emphasizing the horror of executing a woman, no matter what her offense, pointing out that the death sentence had heretofore been imposed only for actual cases of espionage, and that Miss Cavell was not even accused by the German authorities of anything so serious. I further called attention to the failure to comply with Mr. Conrad's promise to inform the Legation of the sentence. I urged that inasmuch as the offenses charged against Miss Cavell were long since accomplished, and that as she

had been for some weeks in prison, a delay in carrying out the sentence could entail no danger to the German cause. I even went so far as to point out the fearful effect of a summary execution of this sort upon public opinion, both here and abroad, and, although I had no authority for doing so, called attention to the possibility that it might bring about reprisals.

The Spanish Minister forcibly supported all our representations and made an earnest plea for clemency.

Baron von der Lancken stated that the Military Governor was the supreme authority (*"Gerichtsherr"*) in matters of this sort; that appeal from his decision could be carried only to the Emperor, the Governor-General having no authority to intervene in such cases. He added that under the provisions of German martial law the Military Governor had discretionary power to accept or to refuse acceptance of an appeal for clemency. After some discussion he agreed to call the Military Governor on to the telephone and learn whether he had already ratified the sentence, and whether there was any chance for clemency. He returned in about half an hour, and stated that he had been to confer personally with the Military Governor, who said that he had acted in the case of Miss Cavell only after mature deliberation; that the circumstances in her case were of such a character that he considered the infliction of the death penalty imperative; and that in view of the circumstances of this case he must decline to accept your plea for clemency, or any representation in regard to the matter.

BY H. STIRLING GAHAN

Statement by Rev. Mr. Gahan, a British Chaplain in Brussels

On Monday evening, October 11th, I was admitted by special passport from the German authorities to the prison of St. Gilles, where Miss Edith Cavell had been confined for ten weeks. The final sentence had been given early that afternoon.

To my astonishment and relief I found my friend perfectly calm and resigned. But this could not lessen the ten-

derness and intensity of feeling on either part during that last interview of almost an hour.

Her first words to me were upon a matter concerning herself personally, but the solemn asseveration which accompanied them was made expressedly in the light of God and eternity. She then added that she wished all her friends to know that she willingly gave her life for her country, and said: "I have no fear nor shrinking; I have seen death so often that it is not strange or fearful to me." She further said: "I thank God for this ten weeks' quiet before the end." "Life has always been hurried and full of difficulty." "This time of rest has been a great mercy." "They have all been very kind to me here. But this I would say, standing as I do in view of God and eternity, I realize that patriotism is not enough. I must have no hatred or bitterness towards any one."

We partook of the Holy Communion together, and she received the Gospel message of consolation with all her heart. At the close of the little service I began to repeat the words, "Abide with me," and she joined softly in the end.

We sat quietly talking until it was time for me to go. She gave me parting messages for relations and friends. She spoke of her soul's needs at the moment and she received the assurance of God's Word as only the Christian can do.

Then I said "Good-by," and she smiled and said, "We shall meet again."

The German military chaplain was with her at the end and afterwards gave her Christian burial.

He told me: "She was brave and bright to the last. She professed her Christian faith and that she was glad to die for her country." "She died like a heroine."

BY DR. ALFRED ZIMMERMANN

An Open Interview Given to the Foreign Press by the German Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs

It was a pity that Miss Cavell had to be executed, but it was necessary. She was judged justly. We hope it will not be necessary to have any more executions.

I see from the English and American press that the shooting of an Englishwoman and the condemnation of several other women in Brussels for treason has caused a sensation, and capital against us is being made out of the fact. It is undoubtedly a terrible thing that the woman has been executed; but consider what would happen to a State, particularly in war, if it left crimes aimed at the safety of its armies to go unpunished because committed by women. No criminal code in the world—least of all the laws of war—makes such a distinction; and the feminine sex has but one preference, according to legal usages, namely, that women in a delicate condition may not be executed. Otherwise man and woman are equal before the law, and only the degree of guilt makes a difference in the sentence for the crime and its consequences.

I have before me the court's verdict in the Cavell case, and can assure you that it was gone into with the utmost thoroughness, and was investigated and cleared up to the smallest details. The result was so convincing, and the circumstances were so clear, that no war court in the world could have given any other verdict, for it was not concerned with a single emotional deed of one person, but a well-thought-out plot, with many far-reaching ramifications, which for nine months succeeded in doing valuable service to our enemies to the great detriment of our armies. Countless Belgian, French, and English soldiers are again fighting in the ranks of the Allies who owe their escape to the activities of the band now found guilty, whose head was the Cavell woman. Only the utmost sternness could do away with such activities under the very nose of our authorities, and a Government which in such case does not resort to the sternest measures sins against its most elementary duties toward the safety of its own army.

All those convicted were thoroughly aware of the nature of their acts. The court particularly weighed this point with care, letting off several of the accused because they were in doubt as to whether they knew that their actions were punishable. Those condemned knew what they were doing, for numerous public proclamations had pointed out

the fact that aiding enemies' armies was punishable with death.

I know that the motives of the condemned were not base; that they acted from patriotism; but in war one must be prepared to seal one's patriotism with blood whether one faces the enemy in battle or otherwise in the interest of one's cause does deeds which justly bring after them the death penalty. Among our Russian prisoners are several young girls who fought against us in soldiers' uniforms. Had one of these girls fallen no one would have accused us of barbarity against women. Why, now, when another woman has met the death to which she knowingly exposed herself, as did her comrades in battle?

There are moments in the life of nations where consideration for the existence of the individual is a crime against all. Such a moment was here. It was necessary once for all to put an end to the activity of our enemies, regardless of their motives; therefore the death penalty was executed so as to frighten off all those who, counting on preferential treatment for their sex, take part in undertakings punishable by death. Were special consideration shown to women we should open the door wide to such activities on the part of women, who are often more clever in such matters than the cleverest male spy. The man who is in a position of responsibility must do that, but, unconcerned about the world's judgment, he must often follow the difficult path of duty.

If, despite these considerations, it is now being discussed whether mercy shall be shown the rest of those convicted, and if the life which they have forfeited under recognized law is given back to them, you can deduce from that how earnestly we are striving to bring our feelings of humanity in accord with the commandments of stern duty. If the others are pardoned it will be at the expense of the security of our armies, for it is to be feared that new attempts will be made to harm us when it is believed that offenders will go unpunished or suffer only a mild penalty. Only pity for the guilty can lead to such pardons; they will not be an admission that the suspended sentence was too stern.

THE EMPIRE OF MID-EUROPE ESTABLISHED

A GERMAN RAILROAD RUNS FROM BERLIN TO CONSTANTINOPLE

NOVEMBER 5TH

HARRY PRATT JUDSON R. W. SETON-WATSON
MANIFESTO OF THE GERMAN "INTELLECTUALS"
DR. LUDWIG STEIN

Even the most extravagant of Germany's dreams seemed for the moment to have come true with the Bulgarian alliance and the consequent crushing of Serbia. Austro-Hungary had been humbled into complete obedience. Turkey, under Enver Pasha, was a German tool. The Bulgarian rulers, despised and hated by the rest of the world for their sudden, treacherous, and utterly unprovoked attack on Serbia, had no chance of continued power except under German protection. Thus the long dreamed-of Empire of Middle Europe became suddenly, triumphantly, blindingly, an accomplished fact.

Dr. Judson, President of the University of Chicago, here points out the American realization of this fact. Dr. Seton-Watson of the University of London discusses its meaning for Europe. And then we present the remarkable "Manifesto" which is the highest authority for establishing the German outlook of 1915. This "Manifesto of the Intellectuals" was a statement so widely signed by German leaders of thought and action as to represent the practically universal public opinion of the Empire at the time. It is an astonishing revelation of what Germans meant to make the Allies pay for peace, of how completely the Germany of 1915 believed that she had won the War, and that she "held the world in thrall." Among other points, it is worth noting that the Intellectuals had no slightest intention of keeping their country's pledge to restore Belgium's freedom.

Of the coming of this new empire, Germans had a metaphor and a symbol. They wanted and spoke of a wholly German railroad to run without frontier barriers or change of cars "From Berlin to Bagdad." The first great step of this was now, immediately that the Serbian victories permitted, on November 5th, put into practice. A through German train was run from Berlin to Constantinople. Dr. Stein, a passenger on that historic train, describes for us its triumphant progress.

The full realization of the German dream, the further passage of that German train across Asiatic Turkey from Constantinople to Bagdad was never realized. In theory it might have been accomplished; official Turkey had no chance of opposition; but practically the chaotic condition of western Asia, the utter breakdown of all organization throughout the Turkish Empire made the journey impos-

sible. The Prussianized empire of Middle Europe could not yet spare officials to Prussianize middle Asia.

In Europe, however, the German enthusiasts extended their dreams. One writer immediately proposed that the through train should run from Antwerp to Constantinople, that is, that Belgium should be treated as a permanent part of the empire. Another writer at once outmatched this with a further cry, which was widely taken up, "From Lille to Constantinople." Lille was the chief French city held by the Germans, so that the new demand was for northern France as well as Belgium.

C. F. H.

BY HARRY PRATT JUDSON[1]

THE aims of the Pan-German policy are based on the control of a great Central-European dominion by Germany itself. This Central-European dominion comprises in the first place the Germanization of Austria-Hungary, first by a customs union and then by such close bonds as in the case of the North-German Zollverein, forming an intermediate step to actual Prussian political domination.

The Austro-Hungarian monarchy is a curious aggregation of territories and races united under the Hapsburg emperor. The history of this empire in the main consists of the gradual accession of the House of Hapsburg to the sovereignty over one after the other of the various elements, as duke, count, king, or what not. The union, therefore, is essentially personal in the emperor. The title of the emperor of Austria as such dates only from 1806, when the medieval Roman Empire was dissolved, and the head of the House of Hapsburg assumed the new title of "Emperor of Austria." Since 1867 the monarchy has been dual in character, and the head of the House of Hapsburg reigns as emperor of Austria and king of Hungary. Each of these two portions of the joint monarchy has its own parliament and its own ministry, and there is a common ministry for war, finance, and foreign affairs. The democratic basis of the two parliaments is not substantial, and the emperor and king is able to rule without parliament or in spite of parliament whenever it seems best.

The race elements in the Dual Monarchy are numerous.

[1] Published in 1917, and reprinted by permission from the University of Chicago Press.

In Austria there is a total population of approximately 28 millions; 10 millions of these are Germans, the remaining 18 millions being Slavs and Italians. In Hungary the population is approximately 20 millions. Perhaps 10 millions are Magyars, 2 millions Germans, and 8 millions Slavs and Latins. And further, in the Dual Monarchy the imperial provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina have a population of almost 2 millions, nearly all Serbian-Slavs.

Thus it will be seen that both in Austria and in Hungary the ruling class is a minority which imposes its will on the majority by force and by legal subtleties.[2] Of the total population in the Dual Monarchy of about 50 millions there are approximately 12 millions of Germans and 10 millions of Magyars, or 22 millions of the ruling classes. The remaining 28 millions include Slavs and Latins. The Slavs comprise the Czecho-Slovaks in Bohemia, Moravia, and eastern Silesia, the Poles in central and western Galicia, and the South-Slavs, including Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes. The Latins include Italians in the South Tyrol and in Trieste and vicinity and Rumanians in Transylvania and Bukowina. The Czechs, or Bohemians, are a highly cultivated people, with a history rich in literature, the arts, and free government. The freedom of the Bohemian kingdom historically is as old as that of Hungary, and the desire of the Czechs has long been that the emperor of Austria should be crowned as "King of Bohemia," the ancient kingdom thus forming a third element in the monarchy, on a par with Austria and Hungary The Galician Poles are a fragment of the ancient Polish kingdom, and represent a part of the plunder of that kingdom taken by the House of Hapsburg late in the eighteenth century. The Rumanians and the South-Slavs are a remnant forced across the Austrian line from the old independent Serbian and Rumanian kingdoms,

[2] The Austrian parliament is cunningly juggled in the membership of its lower house. At the sitting in May, 1917—the first meeting since the war broke out—a rabid Pan-German was elected to the presidency by a vote of 215 to 195—215 Germans to 195 non-Germans in a nation in which Germans are in a minority by a ratio of 10 to 18. The election law puts about an average of 42,889 Germans in a parliamentary district, while it takes about 65,479 Slavs to elect one deputy.

which were destroyed by the Turks in the late Middle Ages.

The next element in this Central-European dominion to be controlled by Germany lies in the Balkan Peninsula. It is quite essential that through Austria-Hungary Germany should be dominant from Austria to the Ægean Sea. This involves control of Serbia and such alliances with the other Balkan states as might easily be effected through the German princelings on their thrones, or by German intermarriage, as in the case of Greece.

The next step involves the Germanization of Turkey. In the guise of an alliance there would be a real political and economic control of that empire, which might then be exploited by German capital. Thus Germany, if this plan for a Central-European state should be carried out, would be dominant from the Baltic Sea to the Persian Gulf.

Central Europe as thus organized is the essential basis of the Pan-German plan for the domination of the rest of Europe. It was believed by the Pan-Germanists that it would be easy for Germany to crush Russia, annex Poland and the Baltic provinces, and very likely the large wheat section of the southeast, thus greatly extending German economic influence and putting an end for all time to the power of Russia in Europe. Again, in the west, if there should be objection to the German domination in Central Europe, Germany could easily crush France, annex the valuable mining and industrial region of the north, annex the Channel ports, seize Belgium, and ultimately intimidate Holland into absorption in the German Empire. This would secure for Germany the valuable ports of the North Sea, which could be made the base of her future naval supremacy, and at the same time would annex to the German Empire the large colonies of Holland and of Belgium, great areas in Africa and Asia and the Asiatic islands which Germany has long coveted. It is obvious that if this plan is carried out the next step will be the destruction of the British Empire. A base of operations in the Channel ports would make it not very difficult a few years later to throw a great army into the Island, and either seize it outright or reduce it to impotence by the exaction of an enormous indemnity.

Meanwhile, subsequent plans for the overthrow of the British Empire in India and for dominance on the China coast are all carefully worked out and on record. The seizure of Egypt would readily follow the control of Turkey, and thus in the long run Africa would become German almost as a whole. The maps found by the Boer conquerors of German Southwest Africa indicated Africa as German from the northern boundaries of the Belgian Congo colonies clear to the Cape, leaving only the little Boer republic as a German suzerainty.

The plans for Pan-German domination in the Americas are just as well known and just as obvious in their intent. The German colony in southern Brazil was expected to be a base, if need be, of military operations, and through naval and military force and through alliances it was believed that by the middle of the twentieth century at the latest Germany would control practically all the valuable parts of South America. The result as to the Panama Canal and Central America needs no comment, and the Zimmermann note makes very plain the intent of Germany, hoping to combine with Mexico and Japan to dismember the United States, and to extort from it so enormous an indemnity as to make it simply a vassal state of the world-wide German Empire.

These are not the dreams of visionaries. They are actual plans, worked out in great detail, on record, and proved beyond the possibility of doubt as the ultimate aims of the controlling forces in Germany.

BY R. W. SETON WATSON

The victorious Balkan campaign conducted by the Central Powers, aided by treacherous Bulgaria, revealed, as by a flash of lightning, the vast designs which underlie Germany's military operations. Serbia is the gate of the East, and its warders had to be dispossessed, if Germany was to assure her command of Constantinople and the decaying Turkish heritage. There are three stages in the Pan-German plan—first, the creation of "Mitteleuropa," a great central European state-organism of 130-150,000,000 inhabitants, as an economic and military unit; second, the realiza-

tion of the dream of "Berlin-Bagdad," by the inclusion within the political and economic sphere of influence of the new Zollverein of all the territory lying between the Hungarian frontier and the Persian Gulf; and third, the achievement of naval supremacy and world-power. There can be no half measures in such a struggle: the answer must be "Yes" or "No." It ought to be obvious that there is an essential unity of outlook among our four chief adversaries. Prussia, Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria—each stands for racial domination in varying degrees of crudeness. The policy of Germanization in Posen, and Magyarization among the unhappy Slovaks and Rumanians, the Young Turkish policy of repression and extermination in Armenia, and the dream of Bulgarian hegemony in the Balkans on the most approved Prussian lines—all are based upon the same principle of brute force as the determining factor in human progress, and all stand or fall together. Even in defeat Germany will remain a great nation, and will, it is to be hoped, once more devote herself to the pursuit of that true "culture" which her rulers have so hideously parodied in this war. But for Hungary and Turkey defeat means the end of evil ambitions which have too long plagued the civilized world. Magyars and Turks may continue to exist side by side with the races whom they have so long held in thrall, but the liberation of the latter will render Magyar and Ottoman Imperialism impossible, set free the pent-up energies of the Slavonic world and give a new direction to European progress. Such an event can only be welcome to the Western Powers, whose vital interests demand the erection of a barrier to the *Drang nach Osten,* and who can only hope to build with the material which is already to hand. This material consists of the Slav and Latin peoples of Austria-Hungary and Southeastern Europe generally, who are eager to lead their own national lives, and to free themselves from the exploitation, military, political, and economic, of their alien rulers. In one of its main aspects this war is the decisive struggle of Slav and German, and upon it depends the final settlement of the Balkan and Austrian problems. On the manner of this settlement and on its completeness depends in

turn the question whether this war is to be followed by stable peace in Europe, or by the creation of an armed camp. The essential preliminaries, then, are the expulsion of the Turks from Europe, and the disruption of the Hapsburg Monarchy into its component parts. On its ruins new and vigorous national states will rise. The great historic memories of the past will be adapted to modern economic necessities. Poland, Bohemia, and Serbia will be restored to the commonwealth of nations, and in their new form will constitute a chain of firm obstacles on the path of German aggression. Poland, freed from her long bondage, and reunited as a State of over twenty million inhabitants, on terms of close intimacy with Russia, will be able to develop still further her great natural riches, and to reconstruct her social system on the lines of Western democracy. Of Bohemia it can fairly be said that no Slav race is so thoroughly modern, so keenly national in feeling, so well educated and well organized, so ready for endurance and sacrifice. Bohemia has been in the forefront of the battle against Germanism, from the days when John Huss ejected the Germans from Prague University and the Hussites held all Europe at bay, till the modern epoch when the great Czech scientists and poets laid the foundations of intellectual Pan-Slavism, and when the lower and middle classes contested inch by inch every village, every house, every school, every child, against the Germans with their infinitely superior resources and backing. Bohemia is one of the most valuable assets in the struggle against Pan-Germanism, and cannot be ignored by any one who has the cause of the Allies at heart. Finally, the small and land-locked Serbia of the past will be transformed into a strong and united Southern Slav State upon the eastern shore of the Adriatic. The depth of the movement for national unity among all the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes of the Dual Monarchy, and the intensity of their opposition to Magyar misrule in Croatia, had even before the war made it abundantly clear that a radical solution of the Southern Slav problem is a *sine qua non* for the peace of Southeastern Europe. The geographical situation of the new state assigns to it a rôle of peculiar importance in the struggle against

the Pan-German program, the more so as it supplies the possibility of establishing a new and much shorter non-German land route to the East, via North Italy, Laibach, Agram, Belgrade.

As a second line behind these three Slavonic States we should aim at creating Independent Hungary, stripped of its oppressed nationalities, and reduced to its true Magyar kernel, but for that very reason emancipated from the corrupt oligarchy which has hitherto controlled its destinies, and thus at last enabled to develop as a prosperous and progressive peasant state; and Greater Rumania, consisting of the present kingdom, augmented by the Rumanian districts of Hungary, Bukowina, and Bessarabia. Behind these again would stand Greece and Bulgaria as national States, the latter purged of her evil desire to exercise hegemony over the Peninsula.

The events of the war have amply demonstrated the Dual Monarchy's dependence upon German discipline and organizing talent; and if for no other reason, this dependence will tend to increase more and more rapidly, as the result of economic exhaustion and imminent bankruptcy. Possible failure in other directions will only strengthen Germany's hold upon the Monarchy, which, according to the Pan-German plan, is regarded as a fertile field for German colonization. In other words, we are faced by the alternatives of breaking up Austria-Hungary—in which case Germany obtains an addition of eight or nine million inhabitants, but is restricted to her natural limits, and is surrounded by new and virile national states—or of permitting its survival and thus securing to Germany the final assertion of political control over its fifty-one million inhabitants, and thus indirectly the mastery of Central Europe and the control of the Adriatic, the Balkans, and Constantinople.

It cannot be too often repeated that there is no prospect of detaching from Germany any of her three allies by anything short of overwhelming military success. The idea that the Dual Monarchy, which was rescued from disintegration by its German ally's energy and powers of reorganization, and held as in a vise by the iron hand of Prussian military

discipline and financial pressure, could ever be detached as a whole from the German side, is altogether too fantastic to be discussed seriously.

Scarcely more plausible is the idea, still entertained in a dwindling circle of sentimentalists, that Hungary could be won to the side of the Allies. Those who argue thus forget that the Anglomania of the Magyar aristocracy upon which they reckon, is confined to country-house life, racing, and tailors' fashions, and that the glib phrases about liberty and constitution in which they so freely indulge are mere ornaments to conceal the grossest racial tyranny which modern Europe has witnessed. Budapest and Berlin are equally responsible for this war; and on its successful issue for the Central Powers depend the last hopes of the hateful policy of Magyarization which Hungarian statesmen have pursued so fiercely since 1867.

The twentieth century is the century of the Slav, and it is one of the main tasks of the war to emancipate the hitherto despised, unknown, or forgotten Slavonic democracies of central and southern Europe If the Poles, the Czecho-Slovaks, and the Jugo-Slavs succeed in reasserting their right to independent national development, and to that close and cordial intercourse with the West to which they have always aspired, they will become so many links between the West and their Russian kinsmen, and will restore to Europe that idealism which Prussian materialist doctrine was rapidly crushing out. Establish one nation supreme over the Continent, controlling the destinies of a whole group of its neighbors, and you must surely inaugurate a new era of armaments and racial strife, accentuated tenfold by revolution, bankruptcy, and social upheaval. The theory of racial domination, whether it be Prussian, Magyar, Turk, or Bulgarian, must be replaced by a program of free and untrammeled development for every race. The supernation must follow the superman into the limbo of history.

THE MANIFESTO OF THE "INTELLECTUALS"

[The following is the full text of the Petition agreed on by 352 leading German professors, 330 diplomatists, and 185

superior Government officials, at a meeting held on June 20, 1915, in the *Künstlerhaus,* Berlin, for the purpose of its presentation to the German Imperial Chancellor.]

The German people and their Emperor have preserved peace for forty-four years, preserved it until its further maintenance was incompatible with national honor and security. Despite her increase in strength and population, Germany never thought of transgressing the narrow bounds of her possessions on the European Continent with a view to conquest. Upon the world's markets alone was she forced to make an entry, so as to insure her economic existence by peacefully competing with other nations.

To our enemies, however, even these narrow limits and a share of the world's trade necessary to our existence seemed too much, and they formed plans which aimed at the very annihilation of the German Empire. Then we Germans rose as one man, from the highest to the meanest, realizing that we must defend not only our physical existence but also our inner, spiritual, and moral life—in short, defend German and European civilization (*Kultur*) against barbarian hordes from the east, and lust for vengeance and domination from the west. With God's help, hand in hand with our trusty allies, we have been able to maintain ourselves victoriously against half a world of enemies.

Now, however, although another foe has arisen, in Italy, it is no longer sufficient for us merely to defend ourselves. Our foes have forced the sword into our hands and have compelled us to make enormous sacrifices of blood and treasure. Henceforth our aim is to protect ourselves with all our might against a repetition of such an attack from every side—against a whole succession of wars which we might have to wage against enemies who had again become strong. Moreover, we are determined to extend our territory and to establish ourselves so firmly and so securely upon it that our independent existence shall be guaranteed for generations to come.

As to these main objects, the nation is unanimous in its determination. The plain truth, which is supported by evidence from all sides, is this:—In all classes of the people

there is only one single fear, which is most prevalent and deep-seated in the most simple-minded sections, viz., the fear that illusory ideas of reconciliation, or even perhaps a nervous impatience, might lead to the conclusion of a premature and consequently patched-up peace which could never be lasting; and that, as happened a hundred years ago, the pen of the diplomats might ruin what the sword has victoriously won, and this perhaps in the most fateful hour of German history, when popular feeling has attained an intensity and unanimity, which were never known in the past and will not so easily recur in the future.

Let there be no mistake. We do not wish to dominate the world, but to have a standing in it fully corresponding to our great position as a civilized Power and to our economic and military strength. It may be that, owing to the numerical superiority of our enemies, we cannot obtain at a single stroke all that is required in order thus to insure our national position; but the military results of this war, obtained by such great sacrifices, must be utilized to the very utmost possible extent. This, we repeat, is the firm determination of the German people.

To give clear expression to this resolute popular determination, so that it may be at the service of the Government and may afford it strong support in its difficult task of enforcing Germany's necessary claims against a few faint-hearted individuals at home as well as against stubborn enemies abroad, is the duty and right of those whose education and position raise them to the level of intellectual leaders and protagonists of public opinion. We appeal to them to fulfill this duty.

Being well aware that a distinction must be drawn between the objects of the war and the final conditions of peace, that everything of necessity depends on the final success of our arms, and that it cannot be our business to discuss Austria-Hungary's and Turkey's military objects, we have drawn up the following brief statement of what, according to our conviction, constitutes for Germany the guarantee of a lasting peace and the goal to which the blood-stained roads of this war must lead:

1. FRANCE.—After being threatened by France for centuries, and after hearing the cry of *revanche* from 1815 till 1870, and from 1871 till 1915, we wish to have done with the French menace once for all. All classes of our people are imbued with this desire. There must be no misplaced attempts at reconciliation, which have always been opposed by France with the utmost fanaticism; and as regards this, we would utter a most urgent warning to Germans not to deceive themselves. Even after the terrible lesson of this unsuccessful war of vengeance, France will still thirst for *revanche*, in so far as her strength permits. For the sake of our own existence we must ruthlessly weaken her both politically and economically, and must improve our military and strategic position with regard to her. For this purpose, in our opinion, it is necessary to effect a thorough rectification of our whole Western frontier from Belfort to the coast. Part of the North French Channel-coast we must acquire, if possible, in order to be strategically safer as regards England and to secure better access to the ocean.

Special measures must be taken, in order that the German Empire may not suffer any internal injury owing to this enlargement of its frontiers and addition to its territory. In order not to have conditions such as those in Alsace-Lorraine, the most important business undertakings and estates must be transferred from anti-German ownership to German hands, France taking over and compensating the former owners. Such portion of the population as is taken over by us must be allowed absolutely no influence in the Empire.

Furthermore, we must have no mercy upon France, however terrible the financial losses her own folly and British self-seeking have already brought upon her. We must impose upon her a heavy war indemnity (of which more hereafter), and indeed upon France before our other enemies.

We must also not forget that she has disproportionately large colonial possessions, and that, should circumstances arise, England could indemnify herself out of these, if we do not help ourselves to them.

2. BELGIUM.—On Belgium, in the acquisition of which so much of the best German blood has been shed, we must

keep a firm hold, political, military, and economic, despite any arguments which may be urged to the contrary. On no point is public opinion so unanimous. The German people consider it an absolutely unquestionable matter of honor to keep a firm hold of Belgium.

From the political and military standpoints it is obvious that, were this not done, Belgium would be neither more nor less than a basis from which England could attack and most dangerously menace Germany—in short, a shield behind which our foes would again assemble against us. Economically Belgium means a prodigious increase of power to us.

Belgium may also bring us a considerable addition to our population, if in course of time the Flemish element, which is so closely allied to us, becomes emancipated from the artificial grip of French culture and remembers its Teutonic affinities.

As to the problems which we shall have to solve, once we possess Belgium, we would here confine ourselves to emphasizing the following principles:—(1) The inhabitants must be precluded from exercising any political influence whatever in the Empire; and (2) the most important business undertakings and estates (as in the districts to be ceded by France) must be transferred from anti-German ownership to German hands.

3. Russia.—On our Eastern frontier the population of the Russian Empire is increasing on an enormous scale—about 2½ to 3 millions yearly. Within a generation a population of 250 millions will be attained. Against this overwhelming pressure of numbers on our eastern flank, undoubtedly the greatest danger to the German and European future, Germany can hold her ground only—(*a*) if a strong boundary-wall be erected both against the advancing tide of Russification, which encroaches imperceptibly in times of peace, and also against the menace of an aggressive war; and (*b*) if we adopt all possible measures to maintain the past healthy increase of our population. But the realization of both these conditions demands land, which Russia must cede to us. It must be agricultural land for colonization—

land which will yield us healthy peasants, the rejuvenating source of all national and political energy; land which can take up part of the increase of our population, and offer to the returning German emigrants, who wish to turn their backs on hostile foreign countries, a new home in their own country; land which will increase Germany's economic independence of foreign countries, by developing her own possibilities of food-production, which will constitute the necessary counterpoise to the advancing industrialization of our people and the increase of town-dwellers, thus conserving that equilibrium of our economic resources whose inestimable value has been proved during the war, and saving us from the dangerous one-sidedness of the English economic system; land which will arrest the decline of the birth-rate, check emigration, and alleviate the dearth of dwelling-houses; land whose re-settlement and Germanization will provide new possibilities of livelihood for the professional classes also. Such land for our physical, moral, and intellectual health is to be found above all in the East.

The measure in which our Eastern frontier is to be advanced will depend on the military situation, and in particular also it should be determined by strategic considerations. As far as the rectification of the eastern frontier of Posen and Silesia and the southern frontier of East Prussia is concerned, a frontier zone, accessible to German colonization and as far as possible free of private ownership, must be created. This German frontier zone will protect the Prussian Poles against the direct and excessive influence of Russian Poland, which will perhaps attain its independence. Moreover, in this connection, we have no hesitation whatever in drawing special attention to that ancient territory in the Russian Baltic Provinces which has been cultivated by Germans for the last 700 years. It is sparsely populated, its soil is fruitful, and it therefore promises to have a great future as a field for colonization, whilst its Lithuanian, Lettish, and Esthonian population is derived from a stock alien to the Russians, which may prove a reliable source of that supply of journeyman-labor which we so urgently need.

We based our demand for land for colonization from

Russia on two grounds—the need for erecting a "boundary-wall" and the need for maintaining the increase of our population. But, in the third place, land is the form in which Russia's war-indemnity ought to be paid to us. To obtain an indemnity from Russia in cash or in securities will probably be just as impossible after this war as it proved after the Russo-Japanese war. On the other hand, Russia can easily pay an indemnity in kind. Russia is excessively rich in territory, and we demand that the territory which Russia is to surrender to us in lieu of a war-indemnity shall be delivered to us for the most part free of private ownership. This is by no means an outrageous demand, if we bear in mind Russian administrative methods. The Russian population is not so firmly rooted in the soil as that of Western and Central Europe. Again and again, right up to the early days of the present war, Russia has transplanted parts of her population on an enormous scale and settled them in far distant provinces. The possibilities of the scheme here proposed must not be judged in accordance with the modest standards of German civilization (*Kultur*). If the acquisition of political control over territory is to bring with it that increase of power which we so urgently need for our future, we must also obtain economic control and have in the main free disposition over it. To conclude peace with Russia without insuring the diminution of Russian preponderance, and without acquiring those territorial acquisitions which Germany needs, would be to lose a great opportunity for promoting Germany's political, economic, and social regeneration, and to impose upon future generations the burden of the final settlement with Russia—in other words, Germany and European civilization would be confronted with the certainty of a renewal of their life-and-death struggle.

4. England, the East, Colonies, and Oversea Trade.—The war between us and Russia has been waged with extraordinary violence, and has led to a glorious success for our arms; and we must never forget the menace to our future presented by the enormous Russian mass encamped on our Eastern frontier, if we should fail to disintegrate it. Nevertheless, we must never for one moment lose

sight of the fact that this war is, in its ultimate origin, England's war upon the foreign trade, the naval power, and the world-prestige of Germany.

Since this is the motive of England's hostility and war against us, our war-aims against England are clear. We must wrest a free field for our foreign trade, we must enforce the recognition of our naval power and our world-prestige in spite of England.

We admit that England has taught us one lesson by her blockade, which has compelled Germany to reorganize herself for the duration of this war as a self-contained industrial state; for we have learned that, before and above all, we must win and secure a wider territorial basis in Europe (as is explained in detail above), in order that we may stand before the world in the utmost possible political, military and economic independence. And we must also create on the Continent the widest possible sphere of economic interest, directly contiguous with our country's frontiers (*i.e.*, avoiding sea-routes), so as to free ourselves as far as possible from dependence upon the good pleasure of England and of the other world-empires, whose self-sufficiency and exclusiveness are constantly increasing. In this respect our political friendship with Austria-Hungary and Turkey, which is bound to throw open the Balkans and Western Asia to us, is of the first importance. It is therefore necessary that Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, Turkey, and Western Asia, down to the Persian Gulf, should be permanently secured against the covetousness of Russia and England. Commercial relations with our political friends must be furthered by all available means.

But, in the second place, it must be our aim to reënter the world's oversea markets, in spite of England, and even though we have already safeguarded our foundations on the Continent. Undoubtedly it will be necessary to change the direction of a considerable part of our oversea trade; but we shall also have to conquer anew our old trade and shipping connections. Herein we shall in future stand upon our own feet, and shall, *e.g.*, eliminate the hitherto customary mediation of English bankers and brokers, English arbitrage

and exchange business, and the preponderance of English marine insurance companies. England has wantonly destroyed in us the trust and confidence which all such transactions require, and must pay the penalty by losing the profits which she has hitherto derived from them at the expense of German trade. In Africa our aim must be to rebuild our Colonial Empire, making it more self-contained and stronger than before. Central Africa alone would, it is true, give us a great extent of territory, but the value of the colonial products which it contains does not correspond to its size. We must therefore look to other quarters of the globe also, if we are to secure adequate acquisitions. From this point of view the importance of a permanent connection with the world of Islam and the vital necessity of a safe ocean highway are once more plainly evident. Those, therefore, who insist upon colonies at the sacrifice of our security against England's naval tyranny over the Channel—those who insist upon colonies in return for, and subject to, our surrender of Belgium—not only fail to realize that the acquisition of an extended European basis for our Fatherland is far more important than all colonial possessions; they are also guilty of the grave political blunder of aspiring to colonial possessions without securing their maritime communications, *i.e.*, colonial possessions which will once more be dependent on England's arbitrary will.

We must have the freedom of the seas. For this—which is to benefit all peoples alike—we are wrestling with England. And if we are to enforce it, the first requisite is to establish ourselves firmly upon the Channel, facing England. As we have already explained above, we must retain a firm hold upon Belgium, and we must, if possible, conquer part of the Channel-coast of Northern France in addition. Further, we must break the chain of England's naval bases, which encircles the globe, or weaken it by a corresponding acquisition of German bases. But Egypt, which connects English possessions in Africa with those in Asia and converts the Indian Ocean into an English sea with Australia for its distant opposite shore; Egypt, which forms the connecting link between the mother country and all her Eastern

colonies:—Egypt is, as Bismarck said, the neck of the British Empire, the vise in which England holds East and West in subjection. *There* a blow may be dealt at England's vital nerve. If it is successful, the international trade route of the Suez Canal must be freed from the domination of a single Power, and the ancient rights of Turkey be protected as far as possible.

But England's power is also essentially based upon the overwhelming influence which she exercises on the Governments and the Press of the whole world. In order to remedy this state of affairs and to secure counter-influence for Germany, it is vitally necessary to destroy England's monopoly of the cable-service and press-agencies. Our best ally in our fight against England's influence over the world's public opinion is freedom—freedom which we shall bring to all nations by fighting for our own liberation from the yoke imposed by England upon the world. We must not strive to dominate and exploit the world, like the English: our aim should be to safeguard our own special needs, and then to act as pathmakers and leaders of Europe, respecting and securing the free self-development of the peoples.

5. Indemnity for the War.—Finally, as regards indemnity for the war, we naturally desire such an indemnity as will, so far as possible, cover the public cost of the war, make restoration possible in East Prussia and Alsace, guarantee the establishment of a pension fund for cripples, widows, and orphans, indemnify private individuals for losses inflicted on them contrary to international law, and provide for the renewal and further development of our armaments.

But we are aware that these matters depend not only upon the extent of our military successes but also upon the financial capacity of our enemies. If we found ourselves in a position to impose a war-indemnity upon England—England, which has always been so niggardly in sacrificing the lives of its own citizens—no sum in money could be great enough. England has set the whole world against us, and chiefly by her money. The purse is the sensitive spot in this nation of shopkeepers. If we have the power, we must

strike at her purse above all else and without any consideration whatever. In all probability, however, we shall have to look to France (primarily, if not exclusively) for our financial indemnification. And we ought not, from a mistaken idea of generosity, to hesitate to impose upon France the heaviest indemnity. Let France turn to her ally across the Channel for the alleviation of this enforced burden. If England refuses to fulfill her financial obligations towards her ally, we shall have secured an incidental political advantage with which we may be well contented.

But we are primarily concerned to insist that, important as it is to adopt retrospective measures for the mitigation of the injuries we have already suffered, it is still more vitally important to secure such terms of peace as will throw open to our people new paths for a vigorous future development; and in proportion as a financial indemnity is unobtainable, increased political and moral justification attaches to all the demands set forth above for the acquisition of territory, for an additional supply of productive labor for our manufactures, and for colonies. If we win in this titanic struggle, we must not emerge from it with losses. Otherwise, despite all our victories, posterity will view us as the conquered party.

We refrain from expressing any decided opinion on the weighty question of the mode of payment, but we would draw attention to the following point. It would be greatly to our interest if a considerable part of the indemnity were paid in the form of foreign securities of such a kind that their possession would strengthen our economic position in the countries of our political friends, whilst freeing the latter from the preponderant influence of England and France.

6. A Policy of Civilization (Kulturpolitik) can only be based on a Policy of Power.—If the signatories of this Petition—particularly the men of science, the artists, and ecclesiastics—are reproached, on the ground that the demands which they put forward are solely to promote Germany's political and economic power, and perhaps also to satisfy some of her social requirements, whilst the purely

spiritual tasks of Germany's future have been forgotten, our answer is as follows:

Care for the development of the German Mind and Genius (*die Sorge um den deutschen Geist*) cannot be made a war-aim or a condition of peace.

If, nevertheless, we are to say a few words on this subject, our position is briefly this. The German Mind is, in our opinion, beyond all doubt our one supremely valuable asset. It is the one priceless possession amongst all our possessions. It alone justifies our people's existence and their impulse to maintain and assert themselves in the world; and to it they owe their superiority over all other peoples. But, in the first place, we must emphatically insist that, if Germany is to be free to pursue her spiritual vocation, she must first of all secure her political and economic independence. And, secondly, to those who advocate the so-called Policy of Civilization (*Kulturpolitik*) alone, to those whose watchword is "The German Mind without the Policy of Power," we reply: "We have no use for a 'German Mind' which is in danger of becoming, as it were, an uprooted national spirit, in danger of being itself disintegrated and the cause of disintegration in others. We have no use for a Mind which, having no healthy national body of its own, is driven to seek vainly in every country for a home and to become 'all things to all men'—a Mind which is forced to be untrue to its own character and a spurious imitation of the character of the nation that is its host. If the demands which we have formulated are satisfied, we shall create the necessary healthy body for the German Mind. The expansion of the national body which we have demanded will do the German Mind no injury, provided the precautions upon which we have also insisted are observed. On the contrary, subject to those precautions, such an expansion will strengthen the German Mind by providing it with wider opportunities."

We are well aware that the aims which we have proposed are great, and that their attainment is impossible without a spirit of resolute self-sacrifice and the most energetic skill in negotiation. But we appeal to a sentence of Bismarck's: "It is palpably true in Politics, if it is true anywhere, that

'faith removes mountains,' that Courage and Victory are not cause and effect, but identical with one another."

BY DR. LUDWIG STEIN

The First Trip of the All-German Express from Berlin to Constantinople

Between Budapest and Semlin we easily made up the little time we had lost, so the train was able to draw up at the platform in Belgrade with true Prussian punctuality. This was at 6.45 in the morning, and with the brilliant sun and the clear sky we could see the former capital of Serbia from the station at Semlin. The ruins of the great railway bridge lay on both banks of the Save—it had been blown up the day after the declaration of war. The famous pontoon bridge which the German engineers had erected in its place is a wonderful monument of the rapid strategic technic of our army. Belgrade was just waking up as we approached, and when we arrived at the station I could hardly believe my eyes. I had expected to see every sign of ravage and ruin, but I found instead a completely new station which had never felt the effects of a shell. Here again our military sense of order had rebuilt in a few weeks the buildings which the guns had destroyed, so that one was forced to say that the inevitable victory must surely fall to those who have proved their abilities both in destruction and in restoration.

In Semlin and in Belgrade, as well, we saw large numbers of Russian prisoners who looked at the new train as if it had been some fabulous animal—doubtless not knowing that this latest journey meant a stab at the heart of territory which Russia had been longing for ever since the time of Peter the Great. Thanks to the bravery of our gallant soldiers, we could now travel through a single geographical stretch of territory from Hamburg to Constantinople. A cruel awakening, symbolized by this very "Balkan train" we are traveling in, follows Russia's century-old dream. The dream has been fulfilled, but negatively. The dream has become a reality, not for the Russians, but for us.

The ravages of war are more in evidence when we leave the station at Belgrade. Of the dwelling houses in the

neighborhood, only heaps of stones remain. The suburbs, too, have suffered, and I noticed whole streets in which every house had suffered from shell-fire. But in comparison with the suburbs, one of the railway officials at the station assured me the town of Belgrade itself was not much injured. The people had returned to their occupations for the most part, and more or less normal life was now in evidence.

Outside Belgrade the country presented a desolate appearance, much of it being under water. Soon after we had passed the Avala Hill, which cost us hecatombs of men, we came to the plains, and here there was a distinct improvement. The fields were cultivated, and the villages seemed to be as peaceful as if nothing whatever had happened to the Serbian dynasty. The houses had not suffered much; but there were few men to be seen—mostly women and children and Russian prisoners working under supervision. Our troops leave the local inhabitants to themselves, and order has been restored.

The Morava Valley was not gained without hard-fought battles, but there are no signs of strife now. All traces of the war have been removed, and normal life has been resumed. Here again, however, men are scarce, and the work is being done by the women. We are now at Jagodina, where the wild strawberries ripen early in May; the mild climate of the place made it a favorite resort of wealthy Belgrade merchants. So mild, indeed, was the climate in the middle of December last, as a German General told me, that the troops were able to bathe in the Morava River.

The restaurant car was put on at Nish, and thence the journey to Sofia was rapid. The nearer we approached the Bulgarian capital the fewer sights of war did we see. The roads were better, the villages more active, the aspect of the inhabitants more contented. A warm welcome awaited us at Sofia, and now we are off to Constantinople.

THE SERBIAN EXODUS

THE AWFUL WINTER FLIGHT ACROSS THE MOUNTAINS AND THE AGONIES OF THOSE LEFT BEHIND

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER

HENRI BARBY FORTIER JONES DR. NIERMEIJER
DR. ANTHANASIADOS KOSTA NOVAKOVITCH
BULGARIAN PEACE COMMISSION

"The Exodus of a Nation," that is what the awful march of the Serbs across the Albanian mountains has well been called. Crushed by the overwhelming masses of their foes, the Serbians on November 16th abandoned their temporary capital of Mitrovitza. The whole nation knew then that their cause was hopeless. They had some forewarning, too, of the hideous treatment the survivors would receive at Teuton, Hungarian, and especially at Bulgarian hands.

So, boys as well as men, and frequently women and children also, fled southward and westward with the retreating armies. By the end of November the fugitives were all crowded up against the Albanian mountains in the region around Ipek. They must either surrender or scale the huge, winter-locked mountain wall. All of the soldiers and many of the civilians chose the desperate and deadly journey. On foot and with but the scantiest remnants of food they attempted a feat few of our western folk could have accomplished with the best of appliances and provisions. The women and boys perished; only the hardiest men survived.

Pictures from that exodus are here sketched by foreigners who saw some part of it. Barby, a French war-correspondent, witnessed its earlier stages at Mitrovitza. Jones, the daring American correspondent, saw the departure from Ipek and some of the most awful horrors of the flight. Savic, the Serbian historian, claims that even in its flight, the army by refusing to surrender, saved the Allied cause from further disaster. He says: "The enemy was able to conquer Serbia thanks only to its all-powerful artillery. In Albania it was of no use, therefore he slackened his pursuit and dared not attack. That gave the Allies time to reënforce the Salonika front, and by fortifying it to make their position impregnable. This fact surely played a decisive part in creating a new situation in the Balkans favorable to the Allies. Had the Serbs, instead of retreating over Albania, taken the direction of Salonika, the situation for the Allies would have been far worse. The Austro-Germans, reënforced by the Bulgars, would have quickly followed them with a force half a million strong, would have swept them from Greek territory. Salonika most probably would have passed into the Austro-German-Bulgarians' hands, and the Balkan situation would have been irretrievably lost for the Allies.

"The royal family, also in this wholesale suffering, shared unreservedly the lot of the Serbian army and nation. Old King Peter, broken down by age and sickness, delayed his retreat to the last moment, and shared his bread and shelter with the common soldiers. The Prince Regent Alexander, exhausted by fatigue and mental effort, never parted from his troops."

There remains an even grimmer story to be told—the treatment of those who were unable to flee across the mountains, their torture by the mad devotees of lordship over other folk. So unbelievable are the true details of this long continued atrocity that they are first presented here in the official statement of a neutral committee from Holland, men whose sympathies and whose training would prevent exaggeration. Dr. Niermeijer was president of this committee. Then we let some Serbians speak for their martyred countrymen. Dr. Anthanasiados was a Serbian government physician. M. Novakovitch was a Serbian editor in Belgrade who escaped to France, and was there made Secretary of the Serbian Trade Unions. A yet more horrifying statement is made by the report of the investigating committee appointed by the Peace Conference, but this goes into details too hideous for repetition here. Against this official report the Bulgarian delegation to the Peace Conference attempted the defense, the main part of which is here presented. Unhappily the "defense" consists almost wholly of iterating that other people had committed murders also.

C. F. H.

BY HENRI BARBY

THE destitution of the Serb soldiers and people was complete. Most of them were in rags and went barefoot, and they lived on raw cabbage and maize.

But all the miseries, all the sufferings which I had till then witnessed were as nothing beside the frightful things I saw on quitting Mitrovitza. We had hardly proceeded three miles when we found the road blocked by some thirty motor cars and lorries imbedded in the mud. Soldiers and gangs of prisoners were endeavoring to extricate them from the quagmire. Only people on foot or on horseback could get by—and Lipliane was still thirty miles off. Finally, after waiting four hours I set off on foot in the night, and after two hours' march through a pelting rain I reached Vuchitru. On the next day, November 17th, the rain, which had not ceased, fell in torrents, the cold became sharper, and soon a driving snowstorm covered the town, the immense plain of Kossovo, and the surrounding mountains. The road alone was darkened by the crowd of fugitives who spent the night amid the storm, stumbling on with drooping heads, dazed

with fatigue, suffering, and despair. To my last day I shall remember that fearful march across the plain of Kossovo from Vuchitru to Prishtina. Around me all the unhappy fugitives were exhausted. Overcome by the cold, by the sudden snowstorm, numbers of them fell on the road among sunken lorries, overturned and broken vehicles, dead oxen and horses.

None of the pictures recalling the retreat from Moscow gives any idea of the terrifying spectacle spread out as far as the eye could reach in all its tragic reality. I saw a woman stretched out on the step of a lorry which had sunk in the mud. She was straining to her breast a baby already stark and stiff. She, too, was dying of cold and hunger. A little girl—eight years at most—shivering under a tattered shawl, was vainly trying to raise her; then, scared all at once by her mother's frightful silence, she burst into sobs and fell on her knees.

Further on, again, a little boy was cowering by the ditch. Tears were streaming down his wan cheeks and his teeth were chattering. I questioned him. He had lost his parents and had eaten nothing for two days. He could go no further. What could I do? I gave him what was left of my maize bread and went on with sinking heart unable to restrain my own tears. . . .

The first time I witnessed the frightful death agony it seemed to me that the poor wretch who was dying before my eyes was intoxicated. After a supreme effort to rise, he rolled his head from this side to that and moved his legs. Then his movements grew feebler till they ceased entirely and all was over.

Right through that awful day I witnessed the agony of the Serb people in that same valley of Kossovo where five centuries earlier the first great Serb Empire had gone under.

And the snow kept on falling, covering the dead and the dying and lashing the faces of those who still held out.

BY FORTIER JONES

It seems impossible for one who saw it to speak or write coldly about this period of the retreat. It was the death mo-

ment. After it the flight over the mountains seemed merely the instinctive departure of men who for the most part did not care whether they lived or died. All three armies were crowding toward Ipek, except several thousand who already had gone into Albania from Prizrend. The road having been cut, part of the second army was coming across country, without any roads at all, over frozen plains and snow-covered hills, fording icy streams every few miles, dragging their cannon and ammunition with them. The three field commanders would soon hold their council in Ipek. King Peter, the Crown Prince, General Putnik, and the General Staff were already on their way to Scutari. The Allies had failed her; Serbia was lost.

Throughout the long night carts struggled up to the monastery, and men bearing stretchers filed in. They carried Serbian officers, many wounded, some dead from cold and the cruel exhaustion of the carts. I do not love Ipek, but I shall be dust and ashes before I forget it.

Of course we did not have so many refugees to make life terrible, but here it was the army that took the star rôle in our masque of horror. There were just enough civilians to make the town really congested. Around it on the ice and snow the army camped, or, rather, lay down in the frosty open, nursed its wounded, and took stock of its dead. When I saw the Serbian soldiers at Ipek I said to myself that I had seen the hardiest men on earth reduced to the furthest limit of their endurance. Again, like the quick-trip journalists, I was very ignorant and foolish. Had a pressing contract to write up the court etiquette of Timbuctoo in 1776 called me hurriedly away at the moment, in all good faith I would have cabled any newspaper that had been unfortunate enough to retain me that the Serbian army had reached the end of its rope, was merely scratching around in the snows of Ipek for a place in which to die, and would never get ten miles over the mountains toward Scutari. I might have padded this information with more or less veracious details of hungry soldiers eating live oxen on the half-shell, and fastidious officers living on consommé made from expensive Russian

boots, and in all probability I would have established myself as an authority on Serbia.

As a matter of fact, two war correspondents, one English and one American, did find time and inspiration to make part of the retreat. They took the route through Albania to Scutari and thence to Rome. They were the first two; I happened to be the third curiosity to arrive in the Eternal City from the great retreat. As such, Ambassador Page questioned me extensively, with his habitual Southern courtesy. Among other things, he asked how many Serbian soldiers came through. When I replied, not less than one hundred thousand, he laughed politely, but very heartily. It was impossible; it could not be; besides, the two eminent correspondents differed radically from me. One said about thirty, and the other about forty thousand, had escaped. Mr. Page was inclined to split the difference at thirty-five thousand. Later His Highness Alexander, Prince Regent, announced that one hundred and fifty thousand Serbs were now completely reorganized, reëquipped, and sufficiently rested to fight again on any battlefield. Sixteen thousand of these came out by way of Salonika, the rest through Albania and Montenegro.

The army that huddled around the cheerless town of Ipek really did not seem to have enough reserve strength to make any further exertion. I knew, as I looked at the drab, bedraggled groups clustering about fires that their transport-wagons fed, that these men were doomed to death or capture at Ipek. Three weeks later, watching the same men crawl into Scutari, I knew that I had been mistaken previously, but that, unless Scutari was safe for months and ample food and clothing came, they would die or surrender there. Further mountain retreating for that mechanical mass, scarcely instinct with life, was impossible. Again I would have cabled lies to my paper. I was ignorant again. They did not get rest at Scutari nor at San Giovanni di Medua, but they made the indescribable march to Durazzo on rations that were criminally short, hundreds and hundreds perishing by the roadside, and then they fell into boats, and only on the islands of the Adriatic and in southern Italy

did they find food and rest. Now, after scarcely two months, comes the amazing announcement that they are ready and eager for the battle again! Such were the men I saw evacuating the hospitals, such were the men I saw crowding the long refugee trains in the indescribable discomfort; such were the men I saw, wounded and bleeding, tramping the muddy roads through the wilderness; such were they whom I saw freezing and starving around Ipek, who died by the hundreds there and by the thousands in the mountains; such were they who, when they could have surrendered with betterment to themselves, and dishonor for their country, did not, but made a retreat as brave and as glorious as any victory of this or any other war—a retreat that dims the flight from Moscow in suffering. Such is the Serbian army, the army that cannot die.

The economic life of Ipek was interesting. Splendid oxen could be bought here for ten or fifteen dollars a pair, their former price being about one hundred and twenty-five dollars. The food situation was acute, but not so bad as at Prizrend. However, the supply, such as it was, was purely temporary, and before I left had been completely exhausted. The price of boots was a phenomenon. Since the first day of the retreat footgear had sold at constantly increasing prices, until the amount paid for a pair of boots was fabulous, amounting to sixty or seventy dollars. In the streets of Ipek there were quantities of excellent Russian boots for sale at four or five dollars, the normal price of these in Serbia being about twenty dollars. Government magazines had been thrown open to the soldiers, and many of those who happened to be more or less decently shod preferred to sell. So the bottom dropped out of the boot market. Bread, however, was at the same famine prices that had prevailed before. I saw a pound loaf sell for eight dollars.

The council between the three generals was on. All communication with the General Staff was cut off. It devolved upon the field-commanders to decide upon the final abandonment of Serbia. Their conference lasted two days, and, according to all reports, was stormy. General Mishich was for an offensive even at that date. With those emaciated

regiments out there in the frozen fields, killing their transport-beasts for food, burning their transport-wagons for fuel, and having enough of neither, with most of his ammunition gone, together with a great part of the very insufficient artillery which the army had possessed, he still felt that there was a chance, and that is all that is necessary for the Serbian soldier. They are not fools, they do not die needlessly, as the Montenegrins are popularly reported to do, but if there is a chance life counts nothing to them. During the months that I lived with them, slept with them on the ground, ate their bread, saw their battle-lines, I learned this beyond all else. Soldier for soldier, I believe them to be the best fighters in the world. Most soldiers are brave men; the Serb is also a marvelous stoic, a rare optimist, and built of steel. But the odds there were too great. The other two generals favored the course which was carried out with a very remarkable degree of success—a general retreat through the mountains with as many of the smaller guns and as much ammunition as possible. So the evacuation of Ipek was announced.

[The writer secured horses, crossed the mountains by a circuitous route and joined the survivors on the Albanian coast.]

On leaving Androvitze we had come each day more in contact with the army, for the route they had taken joined ours there. Many thousands were about Podgoritze when we arrived, and many more thousands had already reached Scutari. Looking at these filthy, ragged, starved, ill men, one wondered if it were still permissible to call them an army. How could any feeling of nationality or cohesion now be alive in this dull, horror-stricken horde? Could this frayed remnant, these hollow-eyed, harassed officers, these soldiers, as mechanical and listless as automata, be really considered a military force? Had not that rugged, surpassingly brave thing, the almost mystical *esprit de corps* which had endured a continuous and hopeless retreat for ten weeks, died when the peaks above Ipek shut off the distant Serbian plains? Had not the story of Serbia ended in death and destruction at the evacuation of Ipek?

It is true that the retreat through Albania and Montenegro was only a *tour de force* in the business of getting away. At the moment the need for armies had ceased; there was no country to defend. It was a flight without military maneuvering, merely *sauve qui peut*. A few thousand were able to find food and equipment sufficient to aid the Montenegrins, and in Albania about twenty thousand were actively engaged. The sole object of all the others was to reach Scutari, where it would be "up to" the Allies to reclothe, rearm, and provision them. From one thousand to fifteen hundred were lost in Albania by savage native attacks. Many hundreds at least must have died on both lines of march from cold, exposure, and starvation. A good part of the smaller artillery was saved. The soldiers, weakened as they were, went through incredible hardships to effect this. In many places on the Montenegrin route it had been necessary to take the guns to pieces, and the men had had to carry the heavy barrels on their shoulders. The paths were slippery with ice, the ascents long and very steep, the precipices at times dizzying, the cold severe, and there was little or no shelter.

But we did not see a disorganized, soulless mass about Podgoritze. We saw the cream of Serbia's fighting men, the nearly superhuman residue which remained after shot and shell, disease, exhaustion, cold, and starvation had done their cruel censoring; after the savage teeth of frozen peaks had combed out all but the strongest. And the near-annihilation of their bodies only allowed to be seen more clearly the unfaltering flame of their determination and their devotion to the glorious quest, the temporary loss of which hurt them more deeply than all they had to bear. Dauntless and alone, they had fought the unequal battle, and defeat was more bitter than death.

To realize at all what the loss of Serbia means to the Serb, one must consider not only the separation from home and family; one must understand a little the strength and depth of the Southern Slav's desire for a free Slav nation. One must know the extent to which this idea has permeated all his thoughts, all his literature, all his folk-songs for five

hundred years. One must have learned that it is his religion.

It is a patriotism that is astounding in its capacity for sacrifice. It is firmly and irrevocably resolved on the liberation or the extermination of its people. Whether one agrees with its desires or not, its presence is undeniably there, fiercely blazing in the desolate, disease-swept camps of that exiled army. Its sorrow is not of physical discomfort or even of personal loss. Centuries of dogged fighting have taught the Serbs to accept such things as part of the day's work. Their grief is deeper than that. It is the crushing sense of a supreme idol broken.

BY DR. NIERMEIJER

Report from the Holland Section of the "League of Neutral Countries," 1917

Deportations from Serbia began with the driving forth of 5,000 men, women, and children by the Austrians at the time of the occupation of Belgrade. Because of bad housing and insufficient food one-half of these unfortunates succumbed to typhoid fever in less than a year.

The Bulgarians made their first use of deportations in the countries that had been given to Serbia by the peace of Bucharest in 1913, notably in Southern Serbia and a part of Macedonia. Thus they deported into Bulgaria almost all the Serbian families of Prizren and Prishtina; from Prilep, 170; from Krushevo, 70. At the end of 1915 an order was given to assemble and conduct away all the male population between the ages of 15 and 70 years from the districts of Veles, Poretch, and Prilep, where already torrents of blood had been shed.

The Bulgarian Bishop of Kitchevo, who had just been appointed, protested. He wrote to King Ferdinand that such a measure would demonstrate to the whole world that Macedonia sympathized with Serbia and not with the Bulgarians. This argument may have had some effect; at any rate, the King ordered that the deportations should cease, although the men might already be on the road. However, 500 notables and their families were selected and interned in

the environs of Sofia. Their property was immediately confiscated by the Bulgarian Government and most of their houses were rented to Mohammedans.

When the Rumanians declared war the deportations were continued in still greater numbers, both by the Austrians and by the Bulgars, reaching their maximum after the capture of Monastir. The victims always included men, women, and children, but especially men of 17 to 70 years. A special method was applied to boys. In May, 1916, the reopening of the schools was announced, and the enrollment lists were accessible. The Austro-Hungarian authorities had the lists copied, and the deportations were based on these.

Not less than nine internment camps for Serbs were established in Austria-Hungary, three of the principal ones being situated in the Danube marshes, where the health conditions are extremely bad; the most distant are the camps of Heinrichsgrüs in Bohemia and Braunau in Upper Austria, near the German frontier. In that at Braunau there are not less than 35,000 Serbians; it is quite correct, therefore, to speak of deportations en masse. Among these interned prisoners one finds high officials of the Serbian Government, members of the Council of State, Deputies, besides physicians, lawyers, merchants, etc. The sanitary conditions are very bad in these places, where the Serbs are obliged to live in great wooden barracks that are penetrated by wind and rain; they are ill-fed, and are compelled to sleep upon straw on the ground, where the children especially are dying in great numbers. At Braunau there was an epidemic of typhus.

Like the Austrians and Hungarians, the Bulgars have been making deportations since July, 1916, from all the Serbian territory they occupy. The northern part of the country is subject to Bulgarian rule. The families deported by the Bulgarians alone in the last six months of 1916 are estimated at 10,000.

The Bulgarians are inhumane in their treatment of prisoners. They do not permit these unfortunates to prepare themselves, or to take away from their homes even the most

indispensable articles, as the Germans do in Belgium. At Nish prominent persons were made prisoner in the streets without permitting them to say good-by to their families.

The largest Serbian internment camp in Bulgaria is situated in a swampy plain near Sofia, where the families are housed in miserable sheds, and where they are dying of cold, hunger, and wretched sanitary conditions. Thus without any military necessity a part of the Serbian population has been systematically killed. What is the object of such actions? The answer will be found in what follows.

It has long been known that the Museum of Belgrade was pillaged immediately after the Austrian occupation. The same thing has happened to the Ethnographical Museum, which contained objects of high value. Not a single souvenir of the history or the life of the nation has been left there. The Bulgars have gone still further; they have deported into Bulgaria all the priests of the Serbian Church. The Bulgarian Synod has sent priests from Bulgaria and subjected all the occupied country to the Bulgarian Exarchate, which was obtained by force from the Sultan in 1871, but which the other Orthodox Greek Churches regard as schismatic. All the Serbian churches and convents have been pillaged. All the inscriptions recording the foundation of these institutions by Serbian Princes have been broken with axes. The famous convents of Ravanitza and Manassia have suffered most, though they date from the thirteenth century and had been respected even by the Turks.

Furthermore, whatever the Bulgars have found written in the Serbian language they have destroyed absolutely. With this object they have made house-to-house search, and have confiscated all the books and manuscripts, even those of the churches, courts, and archives. All these were burned —until the Minister of Commerce at Sofia ordered all papers to be sent to the national printing office, stating that they would make good material for manufacturing paper.

Immediately after occupation the Bulgarian authorities compelled the Serbs, whose family names usually end in "itch," to change that termination to "off," like those of Bulgarian families.

Naturally, it was also at Belgrade that the Serbian teachers were interned; they were replaced by Bulgarians and the Bulgarian language was made compulsory. The children were compelled to learn the popular Bulgarian songs and heard the war explained from the Bulgar viewpoint; they were given to understand that henceforth they were Bulgarians. A great number of reading rooms were opened, whose names recall Bulgarian patriots, and through these centers the authorities are spreading every sort of writing in favor of Bulgarian chauvinism. Thus they are trying to kill the spirit of the Serbian people.

As long ago as October, 1916, Prime Minister Pashitch formulated a protest in the name of the Serbian Government against the recruiting of Serbs by the Bulgars. Since then the Serbian Government has received many Bulgarian newspapers that speak openly of such recruiting. These publications refer to Macedonia, but from other sources it is learned that compulsory recruiting has also been introduced into Old Serbia, so that thousands of Serbs have been forced to fight in the Bulgarian army against their own country. We do not know whether Bulgaria has denied this accusation, which is extremely grave.

In Macedonia the Bulgars began immediately after their arrival to put to death the authorities of cities and towns. These murders reached extreme proportions in the three districts of Macedonia which we have mentioned in connection with deportations. The deported victims were generally the objects of the greatest cruelty. Some were obliged to make the journey on foot, poorly clad, without shoes, in the terrible cold; they were given only half a loaf of bread a week. The Bulgarian soldiers drove them onward with blows from rifle stocks, like cattle; many died on the way.

The Austrian soldiers acted with the same brutality, driving children with the bayonet, so that many had to be taken to the hospital at Szegedin; women about to become mothers were forced to march with the rest. Many priests were killed by the Bulgarian troops. By a refinement of cruelty the Serbs who fled are prevented from corresponding with their families who remained behind.

We have believed in these circumstances that it was our duty to cite the facts more in detail than ordinarily. Before the Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian Governments can clear themselves of the odium imposed by this simple enumeration of facts, they will have to try to draw up a denial of its truth. We believe that such a denial will be very difficult to formulate.

The mass of documents placed at our disposal has left a profound impression of an attempt to achieve the complete ruin of a free nation by means the most brutal and cruel. Among all the horrors of war practiced en masse against an entire nation, the worst certainly is the wholesale murder of the Armenians by the Turks under the indifferent or approving eye of the Germans. The systematic destruction of the Serbian Nation is a pendant to the enslavement of Belgium. The latter, perhaps, has suffered more in certain regards, because it is nearer to one of the fronts, but in other respects there is something still more grave in the treatment inflicted upon the Serbians; and the civilized world has known less about it.

Le Temps of Paris has expressed a desire to see the neutral Governments realize that they also have signed the international conventions which have been violated, adding that now is the moment to protest, since they have neglected thus far to do so. We also have formerly expressed the same hope, but our disillusionment has been too great; we will not return to that prayer again. Happily the neutrals that have the power to do so are going to oppose themselves to these crimes, abandoning their neutrality. The only thing we can do is to take care that, later, no one can say that from Holland no voice was raised against such barbarities.

Permanent Committee of the League of Neutral Countries:

NIERMEIJER, President.
DE LA FAILLE, Home Secretary.
DIEPENBROCK, Foreign Secretary.

BY DR. ANTONY ANTHANASIADOS

When the Serbian army retreated in the autumn of 1915 I was at my headquarters at Prishmina and decided to

stay there. Bulgarian cavalry entered the town November 11th, followed by German and Austrian infantry. The first day the troops behaved well. On the morrow, seeing that the shops remained closed, the troops plundered them bare. The Germans led in the pillage.

The violence was not confined to the shops, but private dwellings, too, were looted. The houses then were torn down and the wood was used for fuel. Several forcible contributions were levied upon the town, provisions being seized whenever they were not forthcoming on demand. The Germans took all the beds from the Serbian hospitals, turning adrift the occupants, even those suffering from severe wounds. These beds they sent to Austria.

Soon the invaders began to intern townsfolk, principally school teachers and priests, of whom not one was left at liberty. The Turkish residents had been rejoicing before the arrival of the allies of Turkey, but they soon had cause to regret their attitude. One Turkish notable told me his people were exasperated beyond endurance by the dishonoring of their women at the hands of the Bulgars and Austro-Germans. German officers were among the criminals. Often the Turkish citizens were compelled to be the spectators of such scenes.

Finally I was able to leave and arrived at Belgrade, where I found conditions similar. The houses had been pillaged and many trainloads of loot sent to Austria. I was forced to proceed to Nish, where I became acquainted with several Bulgarians whom I attended in my professional capacity. One of them, Dr. Tendas, related that he caused twenty-four Serbian professors to be brought to a certain orchard, where, with his own hands, he brained them all. I overheard another Bulgarian telling quite calmly how he had killed two priests and two school teachers. All this was done with the object of eradicating the Serbian population.

BY KOSTA NOVAKOVITCH

As to Serbia itself, the state of things is more hopeless than ever. The official statistics are published in several Austro-Hungarian journals and fully in the Official Jour-

nal at Belgrade, the *Belgradske Novine*. There it was stated that the Serbian population in the territories occupied by Austria-Hungary a year ago was only 2,218,027. The population normally would have been 3,170,000. There is, therefore, a reduction of 951,973, or 28.2 per cent. The male population has been reduced by 38.3 per cent. In some towns this percentage is much greater. At Belgrade it is 65.6 per cent.; at Shabatz 47.6 per cent. There are now in Serbia 144 women to 100 men. At Belgrade even the female population has gone down by 21.6 per cent.

In the *Segedi Naplo* of August 2, 1917, the Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce at Segedine states that the difference between the official Serbian statistics of 1910 and the returns now made by the Bulgarians in the territories they occupy is 300,000. The same authority states that all the males from 18 to 60 are away from their homes. In 1910 the population of Serbia was 4,300,000. It is now reduced by 1,352,000. Then there are the massacres committed by the Bulgarian military authorities after a revolt of the Serbian people against enforced recruiting. The revolt was crushed in blood. Those left were deported. This fact is admitted by the Bulgarian War Minister in the document sent to the Bulgarian Headquarters.

Dr. Otokar Ribar, the Austrian Reichsrat Deputy, declared in the Vienna Parliament on June 26th last: "Serbia will be saved, but there will no longer be Serbs." He said these words when protesting against the greatest crime committed in this war, the deportation of 30,000 Serbian women, children, and men from the departments of Vranje, Nish, and Pirot, and their internment in Asia Minor. Fugitives relate that, among those 30,000, there were 8,000 women and young girls delivered over to the Turks. Of these a great number courted death by throwing themselves out of the trains conveying them to Asia Minor. War prisoners and those interned are suffering actual martyrdom. They are ravaged by hunger and disease. Their number decreases daily.

Imagine, then, the state of mind of those surviving in France and near Salonika who receive every day letters from

their families remaining in Serbia appealing for bread, and money to buy bread; requests, too, from prisoners and those interned, who cry: "Send us bread, or you will not see us again alive."

BY THE BULGARIAN PEACE DELEGATION

Our Serbian and Greek neighbors had no sooner returned to the territories formerly occupied by the Bulgarian armies than they opened against them a campaign of denunciations, charging them with massacres and destruction, and appealing to the civilized world to brand "the criminal conduct of the Bulgarians." By this means they succeeded in bringing on two inquiries in Serbia and Eastern Macedonia which, carried out in a perfunctory fashion and without sufficient precautions being taken against possible errors, have, as might have been anticipated, resulted in a series of grave accusations against Bulgaria and the Bulgarian nation.

These accusations, of which only a faint echo reached us in our isolation after hostilities had ceased, making all defence well-nigh impossible, did not come to our full knowledge until after the arrival of the Bulgarian Delegation in Paris.

Without denying that reprehensible acts have been committed in the territories under Bulgarian occupation, the Bulgarian Delegation ventures to remind the Peace Conference that similar methods of accusation, employed by the Serbians and the Greeks in 1913, were soon after unmasked by the impartial and neutral Carnegie inquiry.

The report of the Allies' commission is divided into a series of paragraphs which we shall examine in their order.

I

Massacres of the Civilian Population.—There is no doubt that certain offenses against the Law of Nations were committed in the Morava region during the war. But it is no less certain that the individuals guilty of violations of the laws of war have not escaped the sternness of Bulgarian justice; some of them were punished by the military courts during the occupation itself, while over the others legal proceedings are now pending.

Whoever desires to ascertain the real sentiments of the Bulgarian people toward the inhabitants of the occupied country has but to turn to the testimony of MM. Katslerovitch and Popovitch, well-known leaders of the Serbian Socialist party. Speaking in their memorandum to the International Socialist Conference at Stockholm of the conduct of the Bulgarian soldiers in the Morava region, they say the following: "One of the two signers of this memorandum had during the first months of the war the opportunity of gaining a personal knowledge of the two administrations, that of the Bulgars and that of the Austro-Hungarians. He was able to observe them at close range, and to compare them. The Bulgarian soldier, that is to say, the Bulgarian serving under the colors, made a good impression upon the entire Serbian population wherever he came in contact with it. During the first days of the invasion, when every soldier had, so to say, the right of life and death over the subjugated population, when his discretionary power was unlimited and his responsibility was almost null, when there was no legal order in existence, the situation in the territory conquered by the Bulgarian army was easily better. There was more order and liberty then than later, when the occupation authorities had come and introduced official "order." During that first period, assassinations, cases of rape and pillage were unknown, and no one amused himself by maltreating the population. The situation in the East of Serbia, occupied by the Bulgars, was at that time better, less intolerable, than that of the West, occupied by the Germans and Austrians.

The Bulgarian government has never shielded those who have been guilty of crime in the Morava region. When such cases came to its knowledge, it insisted on the exemplary punishment of their authors, irrespective of the position which they occupied. In perfect accord with the aroused conscience of the nation, the Bulgarian government appointed on 18th of December, 1918[1] a Commission at the Ministry of War to investigate all offences com-

[1] This date is unhappily, subsequent to Bulgaria's defeat and surrender.

mitted in the occupied territories during the war and to arraign the culprits. The principal offenders, such as Major Ilkoff, Colonel Kalkandjieff, who are mentioned by the Commission of Enquiry, Colonel Airanoff, Colonel Popoff and others responsible for the crimes perpetrated, are already in the hands of justice which will soon pronounce on the misdeeds which are imputed to them. Major Kultchin, town commandant at Kyupriya during the war, whose prosecution was begun early in 1918, has been sentenced to death and executed in Sofia. Bulgarian justice was proceeding with rigor against offenders long before the conclusion of the armistice.[1]

During the Morava insurrectionary movement in February, 1917, which, as we shall see farther on, was instigated and directed from the Serbian Headquarters and seriously threatened the sole line of communication between the rear and the front of the Bulgarian army, the Bulgarian authorities prosecuted and punished none but rebels and *comitadjis*, some of whom even crossed over into Bulgaria and gave themselves to murdering and looting the population.

The Bulgarian army was indeed magnanimous towards the rebels. As evidence of this we may mention the following example. The revolutionary band of the Plavtchitch Brothers who on 27th of January, 1918, had waylaid and assassinated seven Bulgarian soldiers, including a corporal, and seriously wounded two others, were merely interned in Bulgaria, upon consenting to surrender voluntarily to the Bulgarian authorities. Today all those *comitadjis* are

[1] "The court martial of the Morava region pronounced from November 1915 to September 1918 some 238 condemnatory verdicts against administrative officials accused of committing crimes on the local population. The same court martial sentenced for similar reasons eight officers, of whom one to capital punishment, five to hard labor from two and a half years to six years, and one to seclusion." This footnote was part of the Bulgarian report. It is in itself an astounding confession. The Bulgarian courts established 246 cases in which their officials had committed "crimes"; 238 of these criminals were allowed to continue their work. Only 8 were punished, and only one "condemned" to death. The report does not say that even this worst beast was actually executed.

back in their homes and one of them, Ivan Plavtchitch, is mayor of the village of Borovtsi, district of Lebane.

The Bulgarian authorities did their utmost to protect the inhabitants from the activities of the revolutionary ring-leaders, and even endeavored to win over the rebels by kindness and persuasion, publishing to that effect a series of amnesties.

It is very characteristic of Serbian conduct and methods that the Serb *comitadjis* have always tried to charge the Bulgarian authorities with the crimes which they themselves committed. A *comitadji* writes the following in one of the letters: "Sinadine Yankovitch (one of the prominent *comitadjis* in the district of Lebane) assassinated Sava Dragovitch in the fields, in broad daylight, and attributed this crime to the Bulgarian authorities." It is difficult to imagine how many of these crimes are to-day ascribed to Bulgarians. Certain it is, that the figures given by the Serbs in their report also include the victims of their own *comitadjis* in the Morava region.

II

Tortures.—As much must be said of the Serbian charges in the matter of alleged tortures committed by the Bulgarian authorities upon the inhabitants of the province.

Here, in fact, is what the famous rebel chief Costa Petchanatz wrote himself in June, 1917, to his colleague Dmitry Dmitrievitch: "You and your infamous bandits have burnt children, old men and old women in order to extort money from them." Another Serb voivode, Tosho Vlakhovitch, wrote about the same time: "We at once broached the topic which was the object of our meeting. I asked Costa Petchanatz why he had permitted the *comitadjis* to pillage and carry on in this wicked manner. He explained to me that it was impossible to stop this nuisance because the men were bad characters. Later I talked to him of the pillaging in the villages of Lapotintsi and Stuble and pointed out to him the *comitadjis* who had done it. He thereupon said that it was a trifling matter in comparison with what other *comitadjis* were doing, and cited as example that three

children had been cooked on the fire because their parents had not given money." The Bulgarians are accused of having thrown living men into wells. This charge is surely of the same origin.

III

Internments.—Internments are not sanctioned either by International Law or by the Hague Conventions; nevertheless they have been practised by all the belligerents. We therefore believe that it would be unjust to hold none but the Bulgarians strictly answerable for them.

It is not true that the interned were not told the reasons for the measure taken with regard to them. Order No. 48 of 10th July, 1917, issued by the General Officer in command of the Morava Military Inspection Area, is categorical in this respect. He directs that the person whom it is proposed to intern should be acquainted with the motives of his internment, and that his objections and the opinion of the local notables should be considered, before carrying out the measure.

The remaining Serbian charges on this count are no better founded:

1. It is false to pretend that the Bulgarian authorities left the interned no time to prepare for the journey. The orders of the Military Inspection tended all the other way and were always carried out. To enable the interned to set their private affairs in order and to get what they required after their internment, leaves from 15-20 days were granted from time to time. More than that, with the object of hastening the arrival of the clothing which the families of the interned forwarded, a special courier visited the villages of the interned to receive the parcels and bring them to the internment camps. As for the complaint that the interned were conveyed in cattle trucks, it should be remembered that the Bulgarian soldiers and even the officers fared no better in that respect. . . .

The Attitude of the Bulgarian Authorities in Macedonia.—We now come to the most astounding of all the accusations: that concerning the conduct of the Bulgarian authorities in Macedonia.

The Serbians have the audacity to speak of "general massacres" perpetrated upon "compact Serbian populations" constituting the "centre of the opposition to the Bulgarian propaganda" in Macedonia and to assert that the Bulgarians, in their wish "to annihilate all the more compact Serbian populations," interned the male population in such large numbers "that the traffic on the roads leading to Bulgaria was congested and the Germans, unable to proceed freely with the dislocation of their troops, had to ask on military grounds for a temporary suspension of the internments." The least one can say of such accusations on the part of the Serbs is that they are out of place. There certainly was a time when the roads in Macedonia were encumbered, but that was during the mournful days of the exodus of Macedonians who, in 1913 and 1914, fled in thousands to Bulgaria to escape from the "favors" with which their "deliverers" the Serbians wished to overwhelm them. There have also been murders and revolting massacres; but that was during the sad period of the Serbian occupation, when entire populations were moved away because they would remain Bulgarian, and when all those who dared show their affection for Bulgaria, the mother country which had just sacrificed the best of its children for their liberation, were persecuted and pitilessly exterminated.

We have no wish to dwell on these facts; the honorable Conference will find a full account of them in the "Enquiry in the Balkans" of the Carnegie Commission, as well as in the memorandum entitled "The Bulgarian Question and the Balkan States." Our only purpose here is to show the absurdity of an accusation which might with better cause be addressed to those who have formulated it.

THE AGONY OF POLAND

SLAVERY AND DISEASE SLAY HALF A MILLION

F. C. WALCOTT M. TROMPCZYNSKI
STATEMENT OF GENERAL VON KRIES

Words can not picture the mortal "Agony of Poland." Harrowed and plundered in both the German attacks of 1914, her lands were again fought over in 1915 until, with the fall of Warsaw in August, control of her destinies passed for over three years into German hands.

The German leaders intended that Poland should become a permanent part of her Mid-Europe Empire, and a loyal part inhabited by Germans not by obstinate poles who somehow persisted in refusing to accept their manifest destiny and become slaves of the Germans. Read the officially published statement of Mr. Walcott, an American member, first of the Belgian Relief Commission, and then of the commission to Poland. Read the statement which he quotes from General von Kries, the German commander in Poland. Read the speech of the Polish legislator, M. Trompczynski, going as far as he might venture before a Prussian legislature. And then read the terrible picture drawn by the Poles themselves, and you will know that it is not exaggerated.

Germany undertook the task of completely subjugating the Poles with a scientific thoroughness that put to shame the crude method of individual murder employed against Serbia by the Bulgarians. In Belgium the German rulers were restrained by the constant presence and protest of many neutrals. In Poland there were no lookers on, and the super-beast could work his will.

BY FREDERICK C. WALCOTT

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THIS I have seen. I could not believe it unless I had seen it through and through. For several weeks I lived with it; I went all about it and back of it; inside and out of it was shown to me—until finally I came to realize that the incredible was true. It is monstrous, it is unthinkable, but it exists. It is the Prussian system.

A year ago I went to Poland to learn its facts concerning the remnant of a people that had been decimated by war.

The country had been twice devastated. First the Russian army swept through it and then the Germans. Along the roadside from Warsaw to Pinsk, the present firing line, 230 miles, near half a million people had died of hunger and cold. The way was strewn with their bones picked clean by the crows. With their usual thrift, the Germans were collecting the larger bones to be milled into fertilizer, but finger and toe bones lay on the ground with the mud-covered and rain-soaked clothing.

Wicker baskets were scattered along the way—the basket in which the baby swings from the rafter in every peasant home. Every mile there were scores of them, each one telling a death. I started to count, but after a little I had to give it up, there were so many.

That is the desolation one saw along the great road from Warsaw to Pinsk, mile after mile, more than two hundred miles. They told me a million people were made homeless in six weeks of the German drive in August and September, 1915. They told me four hundred thousand died on the way. The rest, scarcely half alive, got through with the Russian army. Many of these have been sent to Siberia; it is these people whom the Paderewski committee is trying to relieve.

In the refugee camps, 300,000 survivors of the flight were gathered by the Germans, members of broken families. They were lodged in jerry-built barracks, scarcely waterproof, unlighted, unwarmed in the dead of winter. Their clothes, where the buttons were lost, were sewed on. There were no conveniences, they had not even been able to wash for weeks. Filth and infection from vermin were spreading. They were famished, their daily ration a cup of soup and a piece of bread as big as my fist.

In Warsaw, which had not been destroyed, a city of one million inhabitants, one of the most prosperous cities of Europe before the war, the streets were lined with people in the pangs of starvation. Famished and rain-soaked, they squatted there, with their elbows on their knees or leaning against the buildings, too feeble to lift a hand for a bit of money or a morsel of bread if one offered it, perishing of hunger and cold. Charity did what it could. The rich gave

all that they had, the poor shared their last crust. Hundreds of thousands were perishing. Day and night the picture is before my eyes—a people starving, a nation dying.

In that situation, the German commander issued a proclamation. Every able-bodied Pole was bidden to Germany to work. If any refused, let no other Pole give him to eat, not so much as a mouthful, under penalty of German military law.

This is the choice the German Government gives to the conquered Pole, to the husband and father of a starving family: Leave your family to die or survive as the case may be. Leave your country which is destroyed, to work in Germany for its further destruction. If you are obstinate, we shall see that you surely starve.

Staying with his folk, he is doomed and they are not saved; the father and husband can do nothing for them, he only adds to their risk and suffering. Leaving them, he will be cut off from his family, they may never hear from him again nor he from them. Germany will set him to work that a German workman may be released to fight against his own land and people. He shall be lodged in barracks, behind barbed wire entanglements, under armed guard. He shall sleep on the bare ground with a single thin blanket. He shall be scantily fed and his earnings shall be taken from him to pay for his food.

That is the choice which the German Government offers to a proud, sensitive, high strung people. Death or slavery.

When a Pole gave me that proclamation, I was boiling. But I had to restrain myself. I was practically the only foreign civilian in the country and I wanted to get food to the people. That was what I was there for and I must not for any cause jeopardize the undertaking. I asked Governor General von Beseler "Can this be true?"

"Really, I cannot say," he replied, "I have signed so many proclamations; ask General von Kries."

Statement of General von Kries

So I asked General von Kries. "General, this is a civilized people. Can this be true?"

"Yes," he said, "it is true"—with an air of, "Why not?"

I dared not trust myself to speak; I turned to go. "Wait," he said. And he explained to me how Germany, official Germany, regards the state of subject peoples.

Even now I find it hard to describe in comprehensible terms the mind of official Germany, which dominates and shapes all German thought and action. Yet it is as hard, as clear-cut, as real as any material thing. I saw it in Poland, I saw the same thing in Belgium, I hear of it in Serbia and Rumania. For weeks it was always before me, always the same. Officers talked freely, frankly, directly. All the staff officers have the same view.

Let me try to tell it, as General von Kries told me, in Poland, in the midst of a dying nation. Germany is destined to rule the world, or at least a great part of it. The German people are so much human material for building the German state, other people do not count. All is for the glory and might of the German state. The lives of human beings are to be conserved only if it makes for the state's advancement, their lives are to be sacrificed if it is to the state's advantage. The state is all, the people are nothing.

Conquered people signify little in the German account. Life, liberty, happiness, human sentiment, family ties, grace and generous impulse, these have no place beside the one concern, the greatness of the German state.

Starvation must excite no pity; sympathy must not be allowed, if it hampers the main design of promoting Germany's ends.

"Starvation is here," said General von Kries. "Candidly, we would like to see it relieved; we fear our soldiers may be unfavorably affected by the things that they see. But since it is here, starvation must serve our purpose. So we set it to work for Germany. By starvation we can accomplish in two or three years in East Poland more than we have in West Poland, which is East Prussia, in the last hundred years. With that in view, we propose to turn this force to our advantage."

"This country is meant for Germany," continued the keeper of starving Poland. "It is a rich alluvial country which Germany has needed for some generations. We pro-

pose to remove the able-bodied working Poles from this country. It leaves it open for the inflow of German working people as fast as we can spare them. They will occupy it and work it."

Then with a cunning smile, "Can't you see how it works out? By and by we shall give back freedom to Poland. When that happens Poland will appear automatically as a German province."

In Belgium, General von Bissing told me exactly the same thing. "If the relief of Belgium breaks down we can force the industrial population into Germany through starvation and colonize other Belgians in Mesopotamia, where we have planned large irrigation works; Germans will then overrun Belgium. Then when the war is over and freedom is given back to Belgium, it will be a German Belgium that is restored. Belgium will be a German province and we have Antwerp—which is what we are after."

In Poland, the able-bodied men are being removed to relieve the German workman and make the land vacant for Germany. In Belgium, the men are deported that the country may be a German colony. In Serbia, where three-fourths of a million people out of three millions have perished miserably in the last three years, Germany hardens its heart, shuts its eyes to the suffering, thinks only of Germany's gain. In Armenia, six hundred thousand people were slain in cold blood by Kurds and Turks under the domination and leadership of German officers—Germany looking on, indifferent to the horror and woe, intent only on seizing the opportunity thus given. War, famine, pestilence—these bring to the German mind no appeal for humane effort, only the resolution to profit from them to the utmost that the German state may be powerful and great.

That is not all. Removing the men, that the land may be vacant for German occupation, that German stock may replace Belgians, Poles, Serbians, Armenians, and now Rumanians, Germany does more. Women left captive are enslaved. Germany makes all manner of lust its instrumentality.

The other day a friend of mine told me of a man just

returned from Northern France. "I cannot tell you the details," he said, "man to man, I don't want to repeat what I heard." Some of the things he did tell—shocking mutilation and moral murder. He told of women, by the score, in occupied territory of Northern France, prisoned in underground dungeons, tethered for the use of their bodies by officers and men.

If this is not a piece of the Prussian system, it is the logical product of disregard of the rights of others.

Such is the German mind as it was disclosed to me in several weeks' contact with officers of the staff. Treaties are scraps of paper, if they hinder German aims. Treachery is condoned and praised, if it falls in with German interest. Men, lands, countries are German prizes. Populations are to be destroyed or enslaved so Germany may gain. Women are Germany's prey, children are spoils of war. God gave Germany the Hohenzollern and together they are destined to rule Europe and, eventually, the world—thus reasons the Kaiser.

Coolly, deliberately, officers of the German staff, permeated by this monstrous philosophy, discuss the denationalization of peoples, the destruction of nations, the undoing of other civilizations, for Germany's account.

In all the world such a thing has never been. The human mind has never conceived the like. Even among barbarians, the thing would be incredible. The mind can scarcely grasp the fact that these things are proposed and done by a modern government professedly a Christian government in the family of civilized nations.

This system has got to be rooted out. If it takes everything in the world, if it takes every one of us, this abomination must be overthrown. It must be ended or the world is not worth living in. No matter how long it takes, no matter how much it costs, we must endure to the end with agonized France, with imperiled Britain, with shattered Belgium, with shaken Russia.

We must hope that Germany will have a new birth as Russia is being reborn. We must pray, as we fight against the evil that is in Germany, that the good which is in Ger-

many may somehow prevail. We must trust that in the end a Germany really great with the strength of a wonderful race may find its place as one of the brotherhood of nations in the new world that is to be.

BY M. TROMPCZYNSKI

Speech by a Polish Member of the Prussian Legislature in 1917

In the first place, I wish to call attention to the sad fate of the Polish workmen from the Kingdom of Poland (Russian Poland). I know very well that different abuses, of which these workmen are victims, are not the fault of the Minister, or of his Department, because he has to share his power with the military authorities. If, however, the Minister cannot help I appeal to public opinion to force a change in the conditions.

At the outbreak of the war, 250,000 Polish workmen happened to be in Germany. In accordance with military orders, they were forbidden to leave the territory of the German Empire. This order was completely illegal and contrary to the principles of international law, which admit only such aliens to be interned who might be summoned to the enemy army. You can easily imagine the condition of these people who now for two and a half years have been separated from their families. They have simply become victims of exploitation on the part of their employers, who now that the workman cannot leave his place of employment pay only as much as they choose. For instance, in a certain village of West Prussia a certain farmer pays the season-workman literally 30 pfennigs (3½ d.) daily, and has kept him for the last two years!

As the need for workmen was greater than the number of those interned, attempts have been made to get a bigger number of workmen from the Kingdom of Poland. Gradually the number of workmen from the Kingdom has reached the figure of half a million. The present Minister of the Interior has handed over the monopoly of finding new workmen to the Central German Labor Office. I am compelled to accuse that institution of choosing for its agents—and there are some 600 of them—people who grossly mislead the

workmen concerning their future pay and mode of employment. One of their special ways of attracting people is to promise in a written agreement very considerable supplies in kind, for instance, 30 pounds of potatoes a week, a liter of milk a day, etc., and they do not call attention to the postscriptum which states that instead of the supplies in kind, money will be given. The German newspapers have raised an outcry that those workmen get so much food, whereas in reality they get very little food, and instead of a pound of potatoes they get 3½ pfennigs, and for a liter of milk 4 or 5 pfennigs. It is clear that for that money they cannot buy even sufficient food.

The next way in which the workman is being exploited is the time of service to which he agrees. In the printed agreements it is usually stated that the agreement is for six months or the duration of the war. The agents rely on it that no one reads the printed contract and persuade the workman that he is agreeing only to six months' work. I know it from hundreds of workmen that they have been cheated in that manner. But the military authorities have twisted the matter still more to the detriment of the workmen by declaring that all workmen from the Kingdom of Poland without regard to the nature of their agreement are considered unfree, *i.e.,* prisoners who are not allowed to go home. I appeal to public opinion to consider in what an unworthy way these people have been attracted by lies to Germany. And thus there are many thousands of them who imagined that they agreed to a contract for six months and who have by now been kept here for more than a year and a half.

Also in this respect the employers obviously exploit the situation by dictating arbitrary conditions for the extension of the contract, because they know that the workman is unable to defend himself. It has, moreover, to be considered that even a contract extending the original conditions is now detrimental to the workmen, because it is impossible to live at the present day on the pay which was sufficient a year and a half ago.

I pillory before public opinion the orders of the Commanding General of Münster of October 16, 1915, and Feb-

ruary 16, 1916, in which he recommends to the employers to compel unwilling workmen to accept an extension of the contract by depriving them of their bedding, of light and food. I hope that the Minister will use his influence in order to prevent the new military authorities from continuing such a policy.

Nor can I remain silent on the point that recently the Central Labor Office has instituted with the help of the local authorities in the Kingdom of Poland a regular hunt for people. Thus, for instance, towards the end of November, 1916, *i.e.*, after the Manifesto of November 5th (the Proclamation of Polish "Independence"), a free entertainment was announced in the theater. The lights were put up in the theater, but when the public had assembled the theater was surrounded by soldiers, men fit for work were caught and handed over to the Central Labor Office.

Further, the Minister of the Interior has issued an order that subjects of the Kingdom of Poland can be employed only in big or middling undertakings and not in small ones. The result of this order is that the police remove hairdressers, bakers, tailors, etc., from their workshops and send them to the farmers. These orders are supposed to help the farmers who suffer from a lack of labor, whilst in reality they burden the farms with workmen, some of whom are weak and others incapable of doing the work, and who, anyhow, are unwilling to do it.

We have no objection to our countrymen from the Kingdom of Poland seeking work in this country, but we consider it a most scandalous injustice that an order has been issued which, without any reason or sensible purpose, has changed these workmen into slaves.

From Various Polish Newspapers

The German authorities are doing everything in their power to induce workmen to leave for Germany. They almost force them to go. The workmen, however, are not willing to leave the country, and the majority of them go to work on the land. People who go to Prussia for work must have a certificate. A man may only leave his (Prus-

sian) employer when he has obtained another post. If he tries to return home, the Prussian authorities throw all sorts of difficulties in his way.

"Warsaw," writes the *Nowa Reforma* on November 7, 1915, "is getting depopulated on account of the incredibly high prices and the economic stagnation." Yet the migration to the countryside must have accounted for most of this depopulation, for the migration from Warsaw to Germany has been extraordinarily small. At the end of November, 1915, no more than 2,639 Warsaw workmen had answered the German call; 8,000 more had been beaten up from Piotrkov, Pabianitse and Lask; 21,000 working men and 1,702 working women have gone to Germany from Lodz, and 2,427 persons of the educated class—less than 25,000 people in all from a district where the cessation of industry has cut off the subsistence of 500,000 souls. If we add 20,000 emigrants from the coal district, we have enumerated them all; and it will be obvious at once that the German bid for Polish labor has been a miserable fiasco.

The Germans hoped high things from their "organization" of Poland. They hoped to organize Polish food into German warehouses and to organize Polish industry out of existence, and that much they have achieved. But their greatest dream was this exploitation of Polish man-power, this drafting of skilled and docile helots into German workshops and mines, so that every able-bodied German might be free to take his rifle and enter the fighting ranks, with a vast impetus to German military power. It was an audacious conception, but it has failed—failed, as so often happens with German schemes, through a radical mistake in psychology. It might have been possible in an ant-hill—ants exploit in such fashion more tame and sluggish insects—but it is not possible in this "barbaric" or "decadent" Europe, which Germany aspires to organize on to a higher plane.

The spirit of the Polish people has not been broken, and Germany has been foiled of her expectation. But Poland is still in her power, and there is nothing to restrain Ger-

many from her revenge. The suffering of Poland grows more terrible month by month.

From the Journal de Génève, December 1, 1915

According to the special correspondent of the *Journal de Génève*, the condition of Lodz goes from bad to worse. The two chief evils, as was to be expected, are lack of employment and exorbitantly high prices. As for the former, the factories are now working only three days in the week, the raw material having been mostly requisitioned by Germany. At first the invaders did everything they could to persuade the artisans to emigrate to Germany, which is at present short of labor. But, when it was found that only a few thousand yielded to persuasion, the President of Police issued a proclamation (end of September) in which, after announcing that the factories would soon be altogether closed and that no relief would be distributed during the winter from any source, he offered navvy work on the repair of the roads and bridges, work which it was known would employ only a limited number, and that only for a short time, as the sole alternative to emigration. That is the dilemma which the artisans have now to face.

This leads to the question of prices. The German authorities have commandeered all provisions. Wheat may now be sold only by the *Goods Importation Company,* which buys it up cheap from the peasants and sells the resultant flour (war-flour) at exorbitant prices to the townspeople, who find their bread "simply uneatable," as well as 10 per cent. above the price to which they were accustomed. The same company has the monopoly of sugar and alcohol. "Huge quantities" of pulse and oatmeal have been exported to Germany, and their price at Lodz has gone up fourfold. The present scheme for exporting to Germany 12-15 million quintals of potatoes will cause a similar rise in what is now "almost the only resource left to the poor." Almost all the cattle have already been exported, and the price of meat, which for some months has been quite beyond the reach of the artisans, has gone up 400-500 per cent. Even the handfuls of bread, meat, and flour, which the artisans who have

taken work in the fields bring back with them, are confiscated at the city gates, on the plea of contraband.

It was oppressive measures of the same kind which brought about the "riots of Lodz." In the course of September, the municipality cut off the relief which had hitherto been paid to the wives of Russian reservists. The women, to the number of nearly 15,000, rioted, and the authorities were compelled to renew the grants, setting aside 3 million marks for the purpose.

As for landed property, the German authorities have piled such heavy taxes upon it that even the German landlords, of whom there are a good many, have risen in revolt and are joining the Poles in deputations to Warsaw and Berlin.

Under these circumstances, can it be wondered that "indignation against the proceedings of the German authorities is growing from day to day and that, especially among the working classes, it is now passing into open hostility."

From the Nowa Reforma of November 20, 1915

A communication from Lodz, dated November 18th, describes the unfathomable distress of the city. Prices are higher than the highest known anywhere else. According to the *Nowy Kuryer Lodzki:* "At a sitting of the Town Council of Lodz Mr. Winnicki, a town councilor of Polish nationality, raised the question why the German 'Import Company,' which has been invested by the German Government with the monopoly of buying grain for Russian Poland, pays 7½ roubles for 1 cwt. of rye when it buys it in the districts of Russian Poland under German occupation, but charges at Lodz 23 roubles for a bag of 'war flour' which contains hardly 40 per cent. of the 1 cwt. of rye. In answer to Mr. Winnicki's question, the senior burgomaster, Herr Schoppen,[1] answered that an injustice is certainly done to the inhabitants of Lodz, but that he could do nothing to lower prices, since the prices at which the 'Import Company, Limited,' bought grain in Russian Poland, as well as the prices it charged for grain at Lodz and elsewhere, had been

[1] A German official appointed by the German Government.

fixed by Field-Marshal von Hindenburg, Supreme Commander in the East, and could not, therefore, be modified by the town administration. In order, however, to ease the situation to some degree, Herr Schoppen promised in his own name, and in that of the German police, to lower the octroi for the importation of food into Lodz, considerable supplies being available at some distance from the city.

"The delegation from Lodz which went recently to Berlin to raise a loan for the town, complained about the excessive price of bread. It asked that the town might be allowed to provision itself without the intervention of the 'Import Company, Ltd.,' as is done in neighboring towns, where bread is consequently cheaper by about 30 per cent.

"The scarcity of fuel in Lodz is equally the fault of the 'Import Company.' The town requires about 150 railway trucks of coal a day, and it has to import it by way of Germany instead of getting it straight from Polish coal-fields. This city of half a million inhabitants has no stores of fuel, and if the railway communication is interrupted it may be left destitute of fuel altogether, especially as the forests round Lodz have been cut down during the war."

That is a faithful picture of Lodz as it was three months ago. The nightmare of starvation had haunted the folk the whole summer through, and now it was accompanied by a more frightful prospect still. Winter was at hand—the merciless winter of Northeastern Europe—and they were to be abandoned without fuel to the intolerable cold. Here is the plight that stared them in the face, as it is outlined in the *Lodzianin,* the Social Democratic newspaper in the town:

"There are about 60,000 householders in Lodz. Every one of them is entitled to a coal card, and as only 150 of these are issued a day (which makes 4,500 a month), the rest are likely to remain without fuel for the winter. The cold favors the development of tuberculosis. Last year we had 40 per cent. mortality from tuberculosis, although conditions then were much better than can be hoped for this winter.

"The manufacturers have been told to give support only to those workmen who have been employed by them for no

less than 15 years; *that practically means the old people who are not fit to go to work in Prussia.* The German administration is assisted in promoting emigration by the municipal authorities, though it is said that there are Poles, too, on the town council. The town committee for poor relief helps only those who bring certificates from the German Labor Exchange to the effect that they are not fit for work in Germany.

"We raise a solemn protest, in the name of the Polish laboring classes, to all the more enlightened elements of the German nation and to German Socialists in particular. The present condition of things is reducing the Polish proletariat to mental and physical exhaustion."

That was the last cry of despair, before the winter descended upon Lodz like a shroud.

Here are a few sentences from a statement drawn up, in authoritative Polish quarters, in January, 1916:

"On May 22, 1915, all textile mills in Lodz were shut and all stocks of raw materials, as well as part of the machinery, were confiscated. The same thing happened a little later in Warsaw and Sosnovitse.

"The working people are starving. Hundreds of people are dying from a new illness caused by lack of food. The majority of infants have died, and the death-rate is now much higher than the birth-rate."

That is a bare summary of what has occurred; but the agony of Lodz is revealed in detail in the narrative of a visitor to the city, which was published in the *Nowa Reforma:*

"Wishing to acquaint myself with the misery in the factory towns and to consider means of relief, I went to Lodz. What I found surpassed my most awful fears. The population is slowly dying, after exhausting its forces in a hopeless struggle. I went under the guidance of the relief caretaker of the district and I visited only one street, Ciemna, in the suburb of Bluty. We went to the house of a boy who is now in our Home for Children at Kutno. We were to take his love to his parents. 'Our parents are gone,' answered his eldest sister of about 15. 'Father died a week ago

of exhaustion, and the day after father's funeral mother died of typhus. It is the same next door. Both the father and the mother have died during the war, leaving four small children in the care of a brother of 18.'

"When we entered this other tenement we found the youngest child of two dead and the girl of four dying. There were others who had no strength left to fetch wood from the forests round the town, and were burning everything they had—tables, beds, and even picture-frames.

"In one of these tenements we found only a group of crying children. The mother had died and the father had gone out into the country to beg for potatoes. They had sold everything, even the bedding, the most precious possession of the poor.

"All the factories at Lodz are closed, but some of the rich manufacturers are nobly supporting their employees. They give them a rouble (50 cents) a week. The poor creatures, who have been subsisting many months now on that pittance alone, are growing anemic and consumptive; but they are rich in comparison with the families to which the Town Committee allows 40 kopecks (20 cents) for each adult and 12 cents for every child. There are about 60,000 of these families in the care of the Committee, for every one is economizing on account of the general high prices, and many artisans, tailors and servants have lost employment. Those who own any property do not receive any support from the Committee, and consequently the owners of the houses in the suburbs where nobody pays any rent, are sometimes worse off than the workmen. I shall never forget a mother with five small children. As she held in her arms the youngest, who was only two years old and who already resembled a corpse, she said to me with desperate resignation: 'I do not ask for any medicine for him at the hospital, for the doctor told me to give him nourishing food, and I can give him nothing but water.'

"In a radius of a few miles round the town there is a regular procession of starving paupers fetching wood or potatoes. I have met a number of people who are devoting their services to the relief of this misery. They have in-

stituted cheap kitchens, homes for children and orphans, free dinners for school children, tailoring establishments for poor girls; but all those institutions have to contend continually against lack of funds. Some of them have even had to be closed because local philanthropy is unequal to their maintenance. The cheap kitchens provide for 3 kopecks a portion of soup so poor that the people who try to live on it die of exhaustion; but even such soup cannot be provided for all, as 3 kopecks is far below cost price on account of the incredibly high prices of food."

That is what Germany has done to Lodz, and the fate of Lodz is being shared by every town and village in the territory subject to German "organization." Nothing could be more terrible than the situation at Warsaw itself. The following paragraph from the *Kuryer Warszawski* gives a sufficient glimpse of the ghastly life-in-death there:

"Nowadays there is a dearth of everything in Warsaw, even of wood shavings to light and warm the room. In the Dzika Street opposite Stawki, near the cemeteries, there is a big timber yard. On the pavement in front of it a group of women and children, poorly clad, watch eagerly for the removal of timber from the yard, because then some shavings sometimes drop from the basket or cart on to the muddy pavement; that is the signal for a struggle, the prize of which is that little scrap of wood. Outside the yard stands a watchman with a whip. On Sunday, at noon, we had been watching how a boy, a scholar of one of the private secondary schools of Warsaw, had collected a basketful of shavings which had been lying about in the yard. With joy radiant in his face and eyes, he was carrying the basket out of the yard gate, when he was spied by the watchman. There was a short, brutal struggle, and the watchman had snatched away the pitiful booty, while a group of ragged women and children were fighting to secure the shavings which fell out of the basket into the mud."

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